- 25 10月, 2013 32 次提交
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
...which just returns -EBUSY if a directory alias would be created. This is to be used by fuse mkdir to make sure that a buggy or malicious userspace filesystem doesn't do anything nasty. Previously fuse used a private mutex for this purpose, which can now go away. Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Instead of passing the direction as argument (and checking it on every step through the hash chain), just have separate __lookup_mnt() and __lookup_mnt_last(). And use the standard iterators... Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
aka br_write_{lock,unlock} of vfsmount_lock. Inlines in fs/mount.h, vfsmount_lock extern moved over there as well. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
wake_up_interruptible/poll_wait provide sufficient barriers; just use ACCESS_ONCE() to fetch ns->event and that's it. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
should've been done 6 years ago... Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
->mnt_expire is protected by namespace_sem Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
MNT_WRITER_UNDERFLOW_LIMIT has been missed 4 years ago when it became unused. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... and don't bother with dropping and regaining vfsmount_lock Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
mnt_list is protected by namespace_sem, not vfsmount_lock Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... rather than open-coding it Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
duplicated to hell and back... Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... on anything found via ->d_fsdata Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
If the underlying dentry doesn't have ->d_revalidate(), there's no need to force dropping out of RCU mode. All we need for that is to make freeing ecryptfs_dentry_info RCU-delayed. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 05 10月, 2013 8 次提交
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
When btrfs creates a bioset, we must also allocate the integrity data pool. Otherwise btrfs will crash when it tries to submit a bio to a checksumming disk: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 IP: [<ffffffff8111e28a>] mempool_alloc+0x4a/0x150 PGD 2305e4067 PUD 23063d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: btrfs scsi_debug xfs ext4 jbd2 ext3 jbd mbcache sch_fq_codel eeprom lpc_ich mfd_core nfsd exportfs auth_rpcgss af_packet raid6_pq xor zlib_deflate libcrc32c [last unloaded: scsi_debug] CPU: 1 PID: 4486 Comm: mount Not tainted 3.12.0-rc1-mcsum #2 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff8802451c9720 ti: ffff880230698000 task.ti: ffff880230698000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8111e28a>] [<ffffffff8111e28a>] mempool_alloc+0x4a/0x150 RSP: 0018:ffff880230699688 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000005f8445 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000010 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8802306996f8 R08: 0000000000011200 R09: 0000000000000008 R10: 0000000000000020 R11: ffff88009d6e8000 R12: 0000000000011210 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: ffff8802306996b8 R15: ffff8802451c9720 FS: 00007f25b8a16800(0000) GS:ffff88024fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000230576000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 Stack: ffff8802451c9720 0000000000000002 ffffffff81a97100 0000000000281250 ffffffff81a96480 ffff88024fc99150 ffff880228d18200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000040 ffff880230e8c2e8 ffff8802459dc900 Call Trace: [<ffffffff811b2208>] bio_integrity_alloc+0x48/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811b26fc>] bio_integrity_prep+0xac/0x360 [<ffffffff8111e298>] ? mempool_alloc+0x58/0x150 [<ffffffffa03e8041>] ? alloc_extent_state+0x31/0x110 [btrfs] [<ffffffff81241579>] blk_queue_bio+0x1c9/0x460 [<ffffffff8123e58a>] generic_make_request+0xca/0x100 [<ffffffff8123e639>] submit_bio+0x79/0x160 [<ffffffffa03f865e>] btrfs_map_bio+0x48e/0x5b0 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa03c821a>] btree_submit_bio_hook+0xda/0x110 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa03e7eba>] submit_one_bio+0x6a/0xa0 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa03ef450>] read_extent_buffer_pages+0x250/0x310 [btrfs] [<ffffffff8125eef6>] ? __radix_tree_preload+0x66/0xf0 [<ffffffff8125f1c5>] ? radix_tree_insert+0x95/0x260 [<ffffffffa03c66f6>] btree_read_extent_buffer_pages.constprop.128+0xb6/0x120 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa03c8c1a>] read_tree_block+0x3a/0x60 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa03caefd>] open_ctree+0x139d/0x2030 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa03a282a>] btrfs_mount+0x53a/0x7d0 [btrfs] [<ffffffff8113ab0b>] ? pcpu_alloc+0x8eb/0x9f0 [<ffffffff81167305>] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x35/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81176ba0>] mount_fs+0x20/0xd0 [<ffffffff81191096>] vfs_kern_mount+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81193320>] do_mount+0x200/0xa40 [<ffffffff81135cdb>] ? strndup_user+0x5b/0x80 [<ffffffff81193bf0>] SyS_mount+0x90/0xe0 [<ffffffff8156d31d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f Code: 4c 8d 75 a8 4c 89 6d e8 45 89 e0 4c 8d 6f 30 48 89 5d d8 41 83 e0 af 48 89 fb 49 83 c6 18 4c 89 7d f8 65 4c 8b 3c 25 c0 b8 00 00 <48> 8b 73 18 44 89 c7 44 89 45 98 ff 53 20 48 85 c0 48 89 c2 74 RIP [<ffffffff8111e28a>] mempool_alloc+0x4a/0x150 RSP <ffff880230699688> CR2: 0000000000000018 ---[ end trace 7a96042017ed21e2 ]--- Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
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由 Ilya Dryomov 提交于
free_device rcu callback, scheduled from btrfs_rm_dev_replace_srcdev, can be processed before btrfs_scratch_superblock is called, which would result in a use-after-free on btrfs_device contents. Fix this by zeroing the superblock before the rcu callback is registered. Cc: Stefan Behrens <sbehrens@giantdisaster.de> Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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由 Ilya Dryomov 提交于
The current implementation of worker threads in Btrfs has races in worker stopping code, which cause all kinds of panics and lockups when running btrfs/011 xfstest in a loop. The problem is that btrfs_stop_workers is unsynchronized with respect to check_idle_worker, check_busy_worker and __btrfs_start_workers. E.g., check_idle_worker race flow: btrfs_stop_workers(): check_idle_worker(aworker): - grabs the lock - splices the idle list into the working list - removes the first worker from the working list - releases the lock to wait for its kthread's completion - grabs the lock - if aworker is on the working list, moves aworker from the working list to the idle list - releases the lock - grabs the lock - puts the worker - removes the second worker from the working list ...... btrfs_stop_workers returns, aworker is on the idle list FS is umounted, memory is freed ...... aworker is waken up, fireworks ensue With this applied, I wasn't able to trigger the problem in 48 hours, whereas previously I could reliably reproduce at least one of these races within an hour. Reported-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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由 Liu Bo 提交于
The crash[1] is found by xfstests/generic/208 with "-o compress", it's not reproduced everytime, but it does panic. The bug is quite interesting, it's actually introduced by a recent commit (573aecaf, Btrfs: actually limit the size of delalloc range). Btrfs implements delay allocation, so during writeback, we (1) get a page A and lock it (2) search the state tree for delalloc bytes and lock all pages within the range (3) process the delalloc range, including find disk space and create ordered extent and so on. (4) submit the page A. It runs well in normal cases, but if we're in a racy case, eg. buffered compressed writes and aio-dio writes, sometimes we may fail to lock all pages in the 'delalloc' range, in which case, we need to fall back to search the state tree again with a smaller range limit(max_bytes = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset). The mentioned commit has a side effect, that is, in the fallback case, we can find delalloc bytes before the index of the page we already have locked, so we're in the case of (delalloc_end <= *start) and return with (found > 0). This ends with not locking delalloc pages but making ->writepage still process them, and the crash happens. This fixes it by just thinking that we find nothing and returning to caller as the caller knows how to deal with it properly. [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2170! [...] CPU: 2 PID: 11755 Comm: btrfs-delalloc- Tainted: G O 3.11.0+ #8 [...] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810f5093>] [<ffffffff810f5093>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1e/0x83 [...] [ 4934.248731] Stack: [ 4934.248731] ffff8801477e5dc8 ffffea00049b9f00 ffff8801869f9ce8 ffffffffa02b841a [ 4934.248731] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000fff 0000000000000620 [ 4934.248731] ffff88018db59c78 ffffea0005da8d40 ffffffffa02ff860 00000001810016c0 [ 4934.248731] Call Trace: [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02b841a>] extent_range_clear_dirty_for_io+0xcf/0xf5 [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02a8889>] compress_file_range+0x1dc/0x4cb [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff8104f7af>] ? detach_if_pending+0x22/0x4b [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02a8bad>] async_cow_start+0x35/0x53 [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02c694b>] worker_loop+0x14b/0x48c [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02c6800>] ? btrfs_queue_worker+0x25c/0x25c [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff810608f5>] kthread+0x8d/0x95 [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff81060868>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x43/0x43 [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff814fe09c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff81060868>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x43/0x43 [ 4934.248731] Code: ff 85 c0 0f 94 c0 0f b6 c0 59 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 48 89 fb e8 2c de 00 00 49 89 c4 48 8b 03 a8 01 75 02 <0f> 0b 4d 85 e4 74 52 49 8b 84 24 80 00 00 00 f6 40 20 01 75 44 [ 4934.248731] RIP [<ffffffff810f5093>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1e/0x83 [ 4934.248731] RSP <ffff8801869f9c48> [ 4934.280307] ---[ end trace 36f06d3f8750236a ]--- Signed-off-by: NLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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由 Josef Bacik 提交于
If we crash with a log, remount and recover that log, and then crash before we can commit another transaction we will get transid verify errors on the next mount. This is because we were not zero'ing out the log when we committed the transaction after recovery. This is ok as long as we commit another transaction at some point in the future, but if you abort or something else goes wrong you can end up in this weird state because the recovery stuff says that the tree log should have a generation+1 of the super generation, which won't be the case of the transaction that was started for recovery. Fix this by removing the check and _always_ zero out the log portion of the super when we commit a transaction. This fixes the transid verify issues I was seeing with my force errors tests. Thanks, Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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由 Thierry Reding 提交于
This fixes a build failure caused by calling the free() function which does not exist in the Linux kernel. Signed-off-by: NThierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit aaaae980)
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由 tinguely@sgi.com 提交于
Free the memory in error path of xlog_recover_add_to_trans(). Normally this memory is freed in recovery pass2, but is leaked in the error path. Signed-off-by: NMark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com> Reviewed-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit 519ccb81)
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
The determination of whether a directory entry contains a dtype field originally was dependent on the filesystem having CRCs enabled. This meant that the format for dtype beign enabled could be determined by checking the directory block magic number rather than doing a feature bit check. This was useful in that it meant that we didn't need to pass a struct xfs_mount around to functions that were already supplied with a directory block header. Unfortunately, the introduction of dtype fields into the v4 structure via a feature bit meant this "use the directory block magic number" method of discriminating the dirent entry sizes is broken. Hence we need to convert the places that use magic number checks to use feature bit checks so that they work correctly and not by chance. The current code works on v4 filesystems only because the dirent size roundup covers the extra byte needed by the dtype field in the places where this problem occurs. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit 367993e7)
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