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  1. 04 10月, 2016 2 次提交
  3. 26 9月, 2016 1 次提交
    • D
      xfs: remote attribute blocks aren't really userdata · 292378ed
      由 Dave Chinner 提交于 
      When adding a new remote attribute, we write the attribute to the
new extent before the allocation transaction is committed. This
means we cannot reuse busy extents as that violates crash
consistency semantics. Hence we currently treat remote attribute
extent allocation like userdata because it has the same overwrite
ordering constraints as userdata.

Unfortunately, this also allows the allocator to incorrectly apply
extent size hints to the remote attribute extent allocation. This
results in interesting failures, such as transaction block
reservation overruns and in-memory inode attribute fork corruption.

To fix this, we need to separate the busy extent reuse configuration
from the userdata configuration. This changes the definition of
XFS_BMAPI_METADATA slightly - it now means that allocation is
metadata and reuse of busy extents is acceptible due to the metadata
ordering semantics of the journal. If this flag is not set, it
means the allocation is that has unordered data writeback, and hence
busy extent reuse is not allowed. It no longer implies the
allocation is for user data, just that the data write will not be
strictly ordered. This matches the semantics for both user data
and remote attribute block allocation.

As such, This patch changes the "userdata" field to a "datatype"
field, and adds a "no busy reuse" flag to the field.
When we detect an unordered data extent allocation, we immediately set
the no reuse flag. We then set the "user data" flags based on the
inode fork we are allocating the extent to. Hence we only set
userdata flags on data fork allocations now and consider attribute
fork remote extents to be an unordered metadata extent.

The result is that remote attribute extents now have the expected
allocation semantics, and the data fork allocation behaviour is
completely unchanged.

It should be noted that there may be other ways to fix this (e.g.
use ordered metadata buffers for the remote attribute extent data
write) but they are more invasive and difficult to validate both
from a design and implementation POV. Hence this patch takes the
simple, obvious route to fixing the problem...
Reported-and-tested-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      292378ed
  5. 19 9月, 2016 1 次提交
    • D
      xfs: set up per-AG free space reservations · 3fd129b6
      由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于 
      One unfortunate quirk of the reference count and reverse mapping
btrees -- they can expand in size when blocks are written to *other*
allocation groups if, say, one large extent becomes a lot of tiny
extents.  Since we don't want to start throwing errors in the middle
of CoWing, we need to reserve some blocks to handle future expansion.
The transaction block reservation counters aren't sufficient here
because we have to have a reserve of blocks in every AG, not just
somewhere in the filesystem.

Therefore, create two per-AG block reservation pools.  One feeds the
AGFL so that rmapbt expansion always succeeds, and the other feeds all
other metadata so that refcountbt expansion never fails.

Use the count of how many reserved blocks we need to have on hand to
create a virtual reservation in the AG.  Through selective clamping of
the maximum length of allocation requests and of the length of the
longest free extent, we can make it look like there's less free space
in the AG unless the reservation owner is asking for blocks.

In other words, play some accounting tricks in-core to make sure that
we always have blocks available.  On the plus side, there's nothing to
clean up if we crash, which is contrast to the strategy that the rough
draft used (actually removing extents from the freespace btrees).
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      3fd129b6
  7. 26 8月, 2016 1 次提交
  9. 17 8月, 2016 2 次提交
  11. 03 8月, 2016 9 次提交
  13. 21 6月, 2016 2 次提交
  15. 01 6月, 2016 1 次提交
  17. 04 1月, 2016 2 次提交
  19. 03 11月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      xfs: introduce BMAPI_ZERO for allocating zeroed extents · 3fbbbea3
      由 Dave Chinner 提交于 
      To enable DAX to do atomic allocation of zeroed extents, we need to
drive the block zeroing deep into the allocator. Because
xfs_bmapi_write() can return merged extents on allocation that were
only partially allocated (i.e. requested range spans allocated and
hole regions, allocation into the hole was contiguous), we cannot
zero the extent returned from xfs_bmapi_write() as that can
overwrite existing data with zeros.

Hence we have to drive the extent zeroing into the allocation code,
prior to where we merge the extents into the BMBT and return the
resultant map. This means we need to propagate this need down to
the xfs_alloc_vextent() and issue the block zeroing at this point.

While this functionality is being introduced for DAX, there is no
reason why it is specific to DAX - we can per-zero blocks during the
allocation transaction on any type of device. It's just slow (and
usually slower than unwritten allocation and conversion) on
traditional block devices so doesn't tend to get used. We can,
however, hook hardware zeroing optimisations via sb_issue_zeroout()
to this operation, so it may be useful in future and hence the
"allocate zeroed blocks" API needs to be implementation neutral.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      3fbbbea3
  21. 12 10月, 2015 2 次提交
    • B
      xfs: per-filesystem stats counter implementation · ff6d6af2
      由 Bill O'Donnell 提交于 
      This patch modifies the stats counting macros and the callers
to those macros to properly increment, decrement, and add-to
the xfs stats counts. The counts for global and per-fs stats
are correctly advanced, and cleared by writing a "1" to the
corresponding clear file.

global counts: /sys/fs/xfs/stats/stats
per-fs counts: /sys/fs/xfs/sda*/stats/stats

global clear:  /sys/fs/xfs/stats/stats_clear
per-fs clear:  /sys/fs/xfs/sda*/stats/stats_clear

[dchinner: cleaned up macro variables, removed CONFIG_FS_PROC around
 stats structures and macros. ]
Signed-off-by: NBill O'Donnell <billodo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      ff6d6af2
    • B
      xfs: validate metadata LSNs against log on v5 superblocks · a45086e2
      由 Brian Foster 提交于 
      Since the onset of v5 superblocks, the LSN of the last modification has
been included in a variety of on-disk data structures. This LSN is used
to provide log recovery ordering guarantees (e.g., to ensure an older
log recovery item is not replayed over a newer target data structure).

While this works correctly from the point a filesystem is formatted and
mounted, userspace tools have some problematic behaviors that defeat
this mechanism. For example, xfs_repair historically zeroes out the log
unconditionally (regardless of whether corruption is detected). If this
occurs, the LSN of the filesystem is reset and the log is now in a
problematic state with respect to on-disk metadata structures that might
have a larger LSN. Until either the log catches up to the highest
previously used metadata LSN or each affected data structure is modified
and written out without incident (which resets the metadata LSN), log
recovery is susceptible to filesystem corruption.

This problem is ultimately addressed and repaired in the associated
userspace tools. The kernel is still responsible to detect the problem
and notify the user that something is wrong. Check the superblock LSN at
mount time and fail the mount if it is invalid. From that point on,
trigger verifier failure on any metadata I/O where an invalid LSN is
detected. This results in a filesystem shutdown and guarantees that we
do not log metadata changes with invalid LSNs on disk. Since this is a
known issue with a known recovery path, present a warning to instruct
the user how to recover.
Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      a45086e2
  23. 25 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  25. 29 7月, 2015 1 次提交
    • E
      xfs: create new metadata UUID field and incompat flag · ce748eaa
      由 Eric Sandeen 提交于 
      This adds a new superblock field, sb_meta_uuid.  If set, along with
a new incompat flag, the code will use that field on a V5 filesystem
to compare to metadata UUIDs, which allows us to change the user-
visible UUID at will.  Userspace handles the setting and clearing
of the incompat flag as appropriate, as the UUID gets changed; i.e.
setting the user-visible UUID back to the original UUID (as stored in
the new field) will remove the incompatible feature flag.

If the incompat flag is not set, this copies the user-visible UUID into
into the meta_uuid slot in memory when the superblock is read from disk;
the meta_uuid field is not written back to disk in this case.

The remainder of this patch simply switches verifiers, initializers,
etc to use the new sb_meta_uuid field.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      ce748eaa
  27. 22 6月, 2015 4 次提交
  29. 29 5月, 2015 1 次提交
    • B
      xfs: support min/max agbno args in block allocator · bfe46d4e
      由 Brian Foster 提交于 
      The block allocator supports various arguments to tweak block allocation
behavior and set allocation requirements. The sparse inode chunk feature
introduces a new requirement not supported by the current arguments.
Sparse inode allocations must convert or merge into an inode record that
describes a fixed length chunk (64 inodes x inodesize). Full inode chunk
allocations by definition always result in valid inode records. Sparse
chunk allocations are smaller and the associated records can refer to
blocks not owned by the inode chunk. This model can result in invalid
inode records in certain cases.

For example, if a sparse allocation occurs near the start of an AG, the
aligned inode record for that chunk might refer to agbno 0. If an
allocation occurs towards the end of the AG and the AG size is not
aligned, the inode record could refer to blocks beyond the end of the
AG. While neither of these scenarios directly result in corruption, they
both insert invalid inode records and at minimum cause repair to
complain, are unlikely to merge into full chunks over time and set land
mines for other areas of code.

To guarantee sparse inode chunk allocation creates valid inode records,
support the ability to specify an agbno range limit for
XFS_ALLOCTYPE_NEAR_BNO block allocations. The min/max agbno's are
specified in the allocation arguments and limit the block allocation
algorithms to that range. The starting 'agbno' hint is clamped to the
range if the specified agbno is out of range. If no sufficient extent is
available within the range, the allocation fails. For backwards
compatibility, the min/max fields can be initialized to 0 to disable
range limiting (e.g., equivalent to min=0,max=agsize).
Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      bfe46d4e
  31. 24 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      xfs: xfs_alloc_fix_minleft can underflow near ENOSPC · 3790a8cd
      由 Dave Chinner 提交于 
      Test generic/224 is failing with a corruption being detected on one
of Michael's test boxes.  Debug that Michael added is indicating
that the minleft trimming is resulting in an underflow:

.....
 before fixup:              rlen          1  args->len          0
 after xfs_alloc_fix_len  : rlen          1  args->len          1
 before goto out_nominleft: rlen          1  args->len          0
 before fixup:              rlen          1  args->len          0
 after xfs_alloc_fix_len  : rlen          1  args->len          1
 after fixup:               rlen          1  args->len          1
 before fixup:              rlen          1  args->len          0
 after xfs_alloc_fix_len  : rlen          1  args->len          1
 after fixup:               rlen 4294967295  args->len 4294967295
 XFS: Assertion failed: fs_is_ok, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c, line: 1424

The "goto out_nominleft:" indicates that we are getting close to
ENOSPC in the AG, and a couple of allocations later we underflow
and the corruption check fires in xfs_alloc_ag_vextent_size().

The issue is that the extent length fixups comaprisons are done
with variables of xfs_extlen_t types. These are unsigned so an
underflow looks like a really big value and hence is not detected
as being smaller than the minimum length allowed for the extent.
Hence the corruption check fires as it is noticing that the returned
length is longer than the original extent length passed in.

This can be easily fixed by ensuring we do the underflow test on
signed values, the same way xfs_alloc_fix_len() prevents underflow.
So we realise in future that these casts prevent underflows from
going undetected, add comments to the code indicating this.
Reported-by: NMichael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NMichael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      3790a8cd
  33. 23 2月, 2015 2 次提交
  35. 28 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  37. 09 9月, 2014 1 次提交
    • E
      xfs: add a few more verifier tests · e1b05723
      由 Eric Sandeen 提交于 
      These were exposed by fsfuzzer runs; without them we fail
in various exciting and sometimes convoluted ways when we
encounter disk corruption.

Without the MAXLEVELS tests we tend to walk off the end of
an array in a loop like this:

        for (i = 0; i < cur->bc_nlevels; i++) {
                if (cur->bc_bufs[i])

Without the dirblklog test we try to allocate more memory
than we could possibly hope for and loop forever:

xfs_dabuf_map()
	nfsb = mp->m_dir_geo->fsbcount;
	irecs = kmem_zalloc(sizeof(irec) * nfsb, KM_SLEEP...

As for the logbsize check, that's the convoluted one.

If logbsize is specified at mount time, it's sanitized
in xfs_parseargs; in particular it makes sure that it's
not > XLOG_MAX_RECORD_BSIZE.

If not specified at mount time, it comes from the superblock
via sb_logsunit; this is limited to 256k at mkfs time as well;
it's copied into m_logbsize in xfs_finish_flags().

However, if for some reason the on-disk value is corrupt and
too large, nothing catches it.  It's a circuitous path, but
that size eventually finds its way to places that make the kernel
very unhappy, leading to oopses in xlog_pack_data() because we
use the size as an index into iclog->ic_data, but the array
is not necessarily that big.

Anyway - bounds checking when we read from disk is a good thing!
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      e1b05723
  39. 25 6月, 2014 2 次提交
  41. 06 6月, 2014 2 次提交
    • J
      xfs: Fix rounding in xfs_alloc_fix_len() · 30265117
      由 Jan Kara 提交于 
      Rounding in xfs_alloc_fix_len() is wrong. As the comment states, the
result should be a number of a form (k*prod+mod) however due to sign
mistake the result is different. As a result allocations on raid arrays
could be misaligned in some cases.

This also seems to fix occasional assertion failure:
	XFS_WANT_CORRUPTED_GOTO(rlen <= flen, error0)
in xfs_alloc_ag_vextent_size().

Also add an assertion that the result of xfs_alloc_fix_len() is of
expected form.
Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      30265117
    • D
      xfs: kill xfs_buf_geterror() · 36de9556
      由 Dave Chinner 提交于 
      Most of the callers are just calling ASSERT(!xfs_buf_geterror())
which means they are checking for bp->b_error == 0. If bp is null in
this case, we will assert fail, and hence it's no different in
result to oopsing because of a null bp. In some cases, errors have
already been checked for or the function returning the buffer can't
return a buffer with an error, so it's just a redundant assert.
Either way, the assert can either be removed.

The other two non-assert callers can just test for a buffer and
error properly.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      36de9556