- 02 12月, 2016 9 次提交
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
We must ensure that we don't schedule a layoutreturn if the layout stateid has been marked as invalid. Fixes: 2a59a041 ("pNFS: Fix pnfs_set_layout_stateid() to clear...") Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
If we no longer hold any layout segments, we're normally expected to consider the layout stateid to be invalid. However we cannot assume this if we're about to, or in the process of sending a layoutreturn. Fixes: 334a8f37 ("pNFS: Don't forget the layout stateid if...") Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
We must not call nfs_pageio_init_read() on a new nfs_pageio_descriptor while holding a reference to a layout segment, as that can deadlock pnfs_update_layout(). Fixes: d67ae825 ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver") Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.0+
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由 Fred Isaman 提交于
When initializing a freshly created slot for the calllback channel, the seq_nr needs to be 0, not 1. Otherwise validate_seqid and nfs4_slot_wait_on_seqid get confused and believe that the mpty slot corresponds to a previously sent reply. Signed-off-by: NFred Isaman <fred.isaman@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
The NFS_INO_REVAL_FORCED flag needs to be set if we just got a delegation, and we see that there might still be some ambiguity as to whether or not our attribute or data cache are valid. In practice, this means that a call to nfs_check_inode_attributes() will have noticed a discrepancy between cached attributes and measured ones, so let's move the setting of NFS_INO_REVAL_FORCED to there. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
If holding a delegation, we do not need to ask the server to return close-to-open cache consistency attributes as part of the CLOSE compound. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
If we're not closing the file completely, there is no need to request close-to-open attributes. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
We don't need to ask for the change attribute when returning a delegation or recovering from a server reboot, and it could actually cause us to obtain an incorrect value if we're using a pNFS flavour that requires LAYOUTCOMMIT. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
If we're reclaiming state after a reboot, or as part of returning a delegation, we don't need to check access modes again. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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- 27 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Botched calculation of number of pages. As the result, we were dropping pieces when doing splice to pipe from e.g. 9p. Reported-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Tested-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 23 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
A correct bugfix introduced a harmless warning that shows up with gcc-7: fs/nfs/callback.c: In function 'nfs_callback_up': fs/nfs/callback.c:214:14: error: array subscript is outside array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds] What happens here is that the 'minorversion == 0' check tells the compiler that we assume minorversion can be something other than 0, but when CONFIG_NFS_V4_1 is disabled that would be invalid and result in an out-of-bounds access. The added check for IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NFS_V4_1) tells gcc that this really can't happen, which makes the code slightly smaller and also avoids the warning. The bugfix that introduced the warning is marked for stable backports, we want this one backported to the same releases. Fixes: 98b0f80c ("NFSv4.x: Fix a refcount leak in nfs_callback_up_net") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7+ Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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- 22 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Benjamin Coddington 提交于
While walking the list of lock_states, keep a reference on each nfs4_lock_state to be checked, otherwise the lock state could be removed while the check performs TEST_STATEID and possible FREE_STATEID. Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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- 20 11月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
If the block size or cluster size is insane, reject the mount. This is important for security reasons (although we shouldn't be just depending on this check). Ref: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/539661 Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1332506Reported-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Reported-by: NNikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
With the new (in 4.9) option to use a virtually-mapped stack (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK), stack buffers cannot be used as input/output for the scatterlist crypto API because they may not be directly mappable to struct page. get_crypt_info() was using a stack buffer to hold the output from the encryption operation used to derive the per-file key. Fix it by using a heap buffer. This bug could most easily be observed in a CONFIG_DEBUG_SG kernel because this allowed the BUG in sg_set_buf() to be triggered. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
With the new (in 4.9) option to use a virtually-mapped stack (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK), stack buffers cannot be used as input/output for the scatterlist crypto API because they may not be directly mappable to struct page. For short filenames, fname_encrypt() was encrypting a stack buffer holding the padded filename. Fix it by encrypting the filename in-place in the output buffer, thereby making the temporary buffer unnecessary. This bug could most easily be observed in a CONFIG_DEBUG_SG kernel because this allowed the BUG in sg_set_buf() to be triggered. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 19 11月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Benjamin Coddington 提交于
Now that we're doing TEST_STATEID in nfs4_reclaim_open_state(), we can have a NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID returned from nfs41_open_expired() . Instead of marking state recovery as failed, mark the state for recovery again. Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
Ensure we test to see if the open stateid is actually set, before we send a CLOSE. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
If the reply to a successful CLOSE call races with an OPEN to the same file, we can end up scribbling over the stateid that represents the new open state. The race looks like: Client Server ====== ====== CLOSE stateid A on file "foo" CLOSE stateid A, return stateid C OPEN file "foo" OPEN "foo", return stateid B Receive reply to OPEN Reset open state for "foo" Associate stateid B to "foo" Receive CLOSE for A Reset open state for "foo" Replace stateid B with C The fix is to examine the argument of the CLOSE, and check for a match with the current stateid "other" field. If the two do not match, then the above race occurred, and we should just ignore the CLOSE. Reported-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
We don't want to call nfs4_free_revoked_stateid() in the case where the delegreturn was successful. Reported-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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- 17 11月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Andreas Gruenbacher 提交于
The IOP_XATTR flag is set on sockfs because sockfs supports getting the "system.sockprotoname" xattr. Since commit 6c6ef9f2, this flag is checked for setxattr support as well. This is wrong on sockfs because security xattr support there is supposed to be provided by security_inode_setsecurity. The smack security module relies on socket labels (xattrs). Fix this by adding a security xattr handler on sockfs that returns -EAGAIN, and by checking for -EAGAIN in setxattr. We cannot simply check for -EOPNOTSUPP in setxattr because there are filesystems that neither have direct security xattr support nor support via security_inode_setsecurity. A more proper fix might be to move the call to security_inode_setsecurity into sockfs, but it's not clear to me if that is safe: we would end up calling security_inode_post_setxattr after that as well. Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Mike Marshall 提交于
Without ".owner = THIS_MODULE" it is possible to crash the kernel by unloading the Orangefs module while someone is reading debugfs files. Signed-off-by: NMike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
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- 15 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
If pos is at the beginning of a page and copied is zero then page is not zeroed but is marked uptodate. Fix by skipping everything except unlock/put of page if zero bytes were copied. Reported-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: 6b12c1b3 ("fuse: Implement write_begin/write_end callbacks") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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- 12 11月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
A bugfix introduced a harmless gcc warning in nfs4_slot_seqid_in_use if we enable -Wmaybe-uninitialized again: fs/nfs/nfs4session.c:203:54: error: 'cur_seq' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] gcc is not smart enough to conclude that the IS_ERR/PTR_ERR pair results in a nonzero return value here. Using PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() instead makes this clear to the compiler. Fixes: e09c978a ("NFSv4.1: Fix Oopsable condition in server callback races") Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
It could be not possible to freeze coredumping task when it waits for 'core_state->startup' completion, because threads are frozen in get_signal() before they got a chance to complete 'core_state->startup'. Inability to freeze a task during suspend will cause suspend to fail. Also CRIU uses cgroup freezer during dump operation. So with an unfreezable task the CRIU dump will fail because it waits for a transition from 'FREEZING' to 'FROZEN' state which will never happen. Use freezer_do_not_count() to tell freezer to ignore coredumping task while it waits for core_state->startup completion. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1475225434-3753-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Junxiao Bi 提交于
The following panic was caught when run ocfs2 disconfig single test (block size 512 and cluster size 8192). ocfs2_journal_dirty() return -ENOSPC, that means credits were used up. The total credit should include 3 times of "num_dx_leaves" from ocfs2_dx_dir_rebalance(), because 2 times will be consumed in ocfs2_dx_dir_transfer_leaf() and 1 time will be consumed in ocfs2_dx_dir_new_cluster() -> __ocfs2_dx_dir_new_cluster() -> ocfs2_dx_dir_format_cluster(). But only two times is included in ocfs2_dx_dir_rebalance_credits(), fix it. This can cause read-only fs(v4.1+) or panic for mainline linux depending on mount option. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/journal.c:775! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ocfs2 nfsd lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrpc autofs4 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sd_mod sg ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ppdev xen_kbdfront xen_netfront fb_sys_fops sysimgblt sysfillrect syscopyarea parport_pc parport acpi_cpufreq i2c_piix4 i2c_core pcspkr ext4 jbd2 mbcache xen_blkfront floppy pata_acpi ata_generic ata_piix dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod CPU: 2 PID: 10601 Comm: dd Not tainted 4.1.12-71.el6uek.bug24939243.x86_64 #2 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.4.4OVM 02/11/2016 task: ffff8800b6de6200 ti: ffff8800a7d48000 task.ti: ffff8800a7d48000 RIP: ocfs2_journal_dirty+0xa7/0xb0 [ocfs2] RSP: 0018:ffff8800a7d4b6d8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 00000000ffffffe4 RBX: 00000000814d0a9c RCX: 00000000000004f9 RDX: ffffffffa008e990 RSI: ffffffffa008f1ee RDI: ffff8800622b6460 RBP: ffff8800a7d4b6f8 R08: ffffffffa008f288 R09: ffff8800622b6460 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000002c8421e R13: ffff88006d0cad00 R14: ffff880092beef60 R15: 0000000000000070 FS: 00007f9b83e92700(0000) GS:ffff8800be880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb2c0d1a000 CR3: 0000000008f80000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 Call Trace: ocfs2_dx_dir_transfer_leaf+0x159/0x1a0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_dx_dir_rebalance+0xd9b/0xea0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_find_dir_space_dx+0xd3/0x300 [ocfs2] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert+0x219/0x450 [ocfs2] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x1d6/0x580 [ocfs2] ocfs2_mknod+0x5a2/0x1400 [ocfs2] ocfs2_create+0x73/0x180 [ocfs2] vfs_create+0xd8/0x100 lookup_open+0x185/0x1c0 do_last+0x36d/0x780 path_openat+0x92/0x470 do_filp_open+0x4a/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x11a/0x230 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Code: 1d 3f 29 09 00 48 85 db 74 1f 48 8b 03 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 4c 89 e6 ff d0 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 eb eb 90 <0f> 0b eb fe 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 RIP ocfs2_journal_dirty+0xa7/0xb0 [ocfs2] ---[ end trace 91ac5312a6ee1288 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: disabled Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478248135-31963-1-git-send-email-junxiao.bi@oracle.comSigned-off-by: NJunxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 11 11月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
i_size check is a leftover from the horrors that used to play with the page cache in that function. With the switch to ->read_iter(), it's neither needed nor correct - for gfs2 it ends up being buggy, since i_size is not guaranteed to be correct until later (inside ->read_iter()). Spotted-by: NAbhi Das <adas@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Yan, Zheng 提交于
Splice read/write implementation changed recently. When using generic_file_splice_read(), iov_iter with type == ITER_PIPE is passed to filesystem's read_iter callback. But ceph_sync_read() can't serve ITER_PIPE iov_iter correctly (ITER_PIPE iov_iter expects pages from page cache). Fixing ceph_sync_read() requires a big patch. So use default splice read callback for now. Signed-off-by: NYan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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- 08 11月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Shuah Khan 提交于
Fix the following warn: fs/nfs/nfs4session.c: In function ‘nfs4_slot_seqid_in_use’: fs/nfs/nfs4session.c:203:54: warning: ‘cur_seq’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] if (nfs4_slot_get_seqid(tbl, slotid, &cur_seq) == 0 && ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~ cur_seq == seq_nr && test_bit(slotid, tbl->used_slots)) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: NShuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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由 Anna Schumaker 提交于
We used to check for a valid layout type id before verifying pNFS flags as an indicator for if we are using pNFS. This changed in 3132e49e with the introduction of multiple layout types, since now we are passing an array of ids instead of just one. Since then, users have been seeing a KERN_ERR printk show up whenever mounting NFS v4 without pNFS. This patch restores the original behavior of exiting set_pnfs_layoutdriver() early if we aren't using pNFS. Fixes 3132e49e ("pnfs: track multiple layout types in fsinfo structure") Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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由 Petr Vandrovec 提交于
cl_rpcclient starts as ERR_PTR(-EINVAL), and connections like that are floating freely through the system. Most places check whether pointer is valid before dereferencing it, but newly added code in nfs_match_client does not. Which causes crashes when more than one NFS mount point is present. Signed-off-by: NPetr Vandrovec <petr@vandrovec.name> Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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- 07 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Mike Marshall 提交于
We recently refactored the Orangefs debugfs code. The refactor seemed to trigger dan.carpenter@oracle.com's static tester to find a possible double-free in the code. While designing the fix we saw a condition under which the buffer being freed could also be overflowed. We also realized how to rebuild the related debugfs file's "contents" (a string) without deleting and re-creating the file. This fix should eliminate the possible double-free, the potential overflow and improve code readability. Signed-off-by: NMike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> Signed-off-by: NMartin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
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- 02 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Chuck Lever 提交于
When I push NFSv4.1 / RDMA hard, (xfstests generic/089, for example), I get this crash on the server: Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Modules linked in: cts rpcsec_gss_krb5 iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support sb_edac edac_core x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm btrfs irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd xor pcspkr raid6_pq i2c_i801 i2c_smbus lpc_ich mfd_core sg mei_me mei ioatdma shpchp wmi ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler rpcrdma ib_ipoib rdma_ucm acpi_power_meter acpi_pad ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c mlx4_ib mlx4_en ib_core sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ast drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm crc32c_intel igb ahci libahci ptp mlx4_core pps_core dca libata i2c_algo_bit i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: CPU: 7 PID: 1558 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 4.9.0-rc2-00005-g82cd754 #8 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 1.0c 09/09/2015 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: task: ffff880835c3a100 task.stack: ffff8808420d8000 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05a759f>] [<ffffffffa05a759f>] release_lock_stateid+0x1f/0x60 [nfsd] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff8808420dbce0 EFLAGS: 00010246 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RAX: ffff88084e6660f0 RBX: ffff88084e667020 RCX: 0000000000000000 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88084e667020 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RBP: ffff8808420dbcf8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: R10: ffff880835c3a100 R11: ffff880835c3aca8 R12: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: R13: ffff88084e6670d8 R14: ffff880835f546f0 R15: ffff880835f1c548 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88087bdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: CR2: 00007ff020389000 CR3: 0000000001c06000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Stack: Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: ffff88084e667020 0000000000000000 ffff88084e6670d8 ffff8808420dbd20 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: ffffffffa05ac80d ffff880835f54548 ffff88084e640008 ffff880835f545b0 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: ffff8808420dbd70 ffffffffa059803d ffff880835f1c768 0000000000000870 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Call Trace: Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa05ac80d>] nfsd4_free_stateid+0xfd/0x1b0 [nfsd] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa059803d>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x40d/0x690 [nfsd] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa0583114>] nfsd_dispatch+0xd4/0x1d0 [nfsd] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa047bbf9>] svc_process_common+0x3d9/0x700 [sunrpc] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa047ca64>] svc_process+0xf4/0x330 [sunrpc] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa05827ca>] nfsd+0xfa/0x160 [nfsd] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa05826d0>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x170/0x170 [nfsd] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffff810b367b>] kthread+0x10b/0x120 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffff810b3570>] ? kthread_stop+0x280/0x280 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffff8174e8ba>] ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Code: c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 48 8b 87 b0 00 00 00 48 89 fb 4c 8b a0 98 00 00 00 <49> 8b 44 24 20 48 8d b8 80 03 00 00 e8 10 66 1a e1 48 89 df e8 Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RIP [<ffffffffa05a759f>] release_lock_stateid+0x1f/0x60 [nfsd] Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RSP <ffff8808420dbce0> Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: ---[ end trace cf5d0b371973e167 ]--- Jeff Layton says: > Hm...now that I look though, this is a little suspicious: > > struct nfs4_openowner *oo = openowner(stp->st_openstp->st_stateowner); > > I wonder if it's possible for the openstateid to have already been > destroyed at this point. > > We might be better off doing something like this to get the client pointer: > > stp->st_stid.sc_client; > > ...which should be more direct and less dependent on other stateids > staying valid. With the suggested change, I am no longer able to reproduce the above oops. v2: Fix unhash_lock_stateid() as well Fix-suggested-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Fixes: 42691398 ('nfsd: Fix race between FREE_STATEID and LOCK') Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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- 31 10月, 2016 7 次提交
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
Make sure the copied up file hits the disk before renaming to the final destination. If this is not done then the copy-up may corrupt the data in the file in case of a crash. Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
tmpfs doesn't have ->get_acl() because it only uses cached acls. This fixes the acl tests in pjdfstest when tmpfs is used as the upper layer of the overlay. Reported-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Fixes: 39a25b2b ("ovl: define ->get_acl() for overlay inodes") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
This change fixes xfstest generic/375, which failed to clear the setgid bit in the following test case on overlayfs: touch $testfile chown 100:100 $testfile chmod 2755 $testfile _runas -u 100 -g 101 -- setfacl -m u::rwx,g::rwx,o::rwx $testfile Reported-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Tested-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Fixes: d837a49b ("ovl: fix POSIX ACL setting") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
Currently we dropped freeze protection of aio writes just after IO was submitted. Thus aio write could be in flight while the filesystem was frozen and that could result in unexpected situation like aio completion wanting to convert extent type on frozen filesystem. Testcase from Dmitry triggering this is like: for ((i=0;i<60;i++));do fsfreeze -f /mnt ;sleep 1;fsfreeze -u /mnt;done & fio --bs=4k --ioengine=libaio --iodepth=128 --size=1g --direct=1 \ --runtime=60 --filename=/mnt/file --name=rand-write --rw=randwrite Fix the problem by dropping freeze protection only once IO is completed in aio_complete(). Reported-by: NDmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> [hch: forward ported on top of various VFS and aio changes] Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Pass the ABI iocb structure to aio_setup_rw and let it handle the non-vectored I/O case as well. With that and a new helper for the AIO return value handling we can now define new aio_read and aio_write helpers that implement reads and writes in a self-contained way without duplicating too much code. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Otherwise we might dereference an already freed file and/or inode when aio_complete is called before we return from the read_iter or write_iter method. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 28 10月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Richard Weinberger 提交于
Commit c83ed4c9 ("ubifs: Abort readdir upon error") broke overlayfs support because the fix exposed an internal error code to VFS. Reported-by: NPeter Rosin <peda@axentia.se> Tested-by: NPeter Rosin <peda@axentia.se> Reported-by: NRalph Sennhauser <ralph.sennhauser@gmail.com> Tested-by: NRalph Sennhauser <ralph.sennhauser@gmail.com> Fixes: c83ed4c9 ("ubifs: Abort readdir upon error") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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