Patch series "Replacing PID bitmap implementation with IDR API", v4.

This series replaces kernel bitmap implementation of PID allocation with
IDR API.  These patches are written to simplify the kernel by replacing
custom code with calls to generic code.

The following are the stats for pid and pid_namespace object files
before and after the replacement.  There is a noteworthy change between
the IDR and bitmap implementation.

Before
   text       data        bss        dec        hex    filename
   8447       3894         64      12405       3075    kernel/pid.o
After
   text       data        bss        dec        hex    filename
   3397        304          0       3701        e75    kernel/pid.o

Before
   text       data        bss        dec        hex    filename
   5692       1842        192       7726       1e2e    kernel/pid_namespace.o
After
   text       data        bss        dec        hex    filename
   2854        216         16       3086        c0e    kernel/pid_namespace.o

The following are the stats for ps, pstree and calling readdir on /proc
for 10,000 processes.

ps:
        With IDR API    With bitmap
real    0m1.479s        0m2.319s
user    0m0.070s        0m0.060s
sys     0m0.289s        0m0.516s

pstree:
        With IDR API    With bitmap
real    0m1.024s        0m1.794s
user    0m0.348s        0m0.612s
sys     0m0.184s        0m0.264s

proc:
        With IDR API    With bitmap
real    0m0.059s        0m0.074s
user    0m0.000s        0m0.004s
sys     0m0.016s        0m0.016s

This patch (of 2):

Replace the current bitmap implementation for Process ID allocation.
Functions that are no longer required, for example, free_pidmap(),
alloc_pidmap(), etc.  are removed.  The rest of the functions are
modified to use the IDR API.  The change was made to make the PID
allocation less complex by replacing custom code with calls to generic
API.

[gs051095@gmail.com: v6]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507760379-21662-2-git-send-email-gs051095@gmail.com
[avagin@openvz.org: restore the old behaviour of the ns_last_pid sysctl]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171106183144.16368-1-avagin@openvz.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507583624-22146-2-git-send-email-gs051095@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NGargi Sharma <gs051095@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The variable slots is being assigned a value of zero that is never read,
slots is being updated again a few lines later.  Remove this redundant
assignment.

Cleans clang warning: Value stored to 'slots' is never read

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171017140258.22536-1-colin.king@canonical.comSigned-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NOGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Delete variables 'tree' and 'sb', which are set but never used.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507977146-15875-1-git-send-email-chris.gekas@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NChristos Gkekas <chris.gekas@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

It's never used in nilfs2.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510064486-1728-2-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jpSigned-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Replace S_IRWXUGO with 0777 because symbolic permissions are considered
harmful:

 https://lwn.net/Articles/696229/

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509367935-3086-5-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jpSigned-off-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix the following checkpatch warning:

 WARNING: Block comments should align the * on each line
 #633: FILE: sufile.c:633:
 +/**
 +  * nilfs_sufile_truncate_range - truncate range of segment array

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509367935-3086-4-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jpSigned-off-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters
with the following properties:

 - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set()
 - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero
 - once counter reaches zero, its further
   increments aren't allowed
 - counter schema uses basic atomic operations
   (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.)

Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided refcount_t
type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and underflows.
This is important since overflows and underflows can lead to
use-after-free situation and be exploitable.

The variable nilfs_root.count is used as pure reference counter.
Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509367935-3086-3-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jpSigned-off-by: NElena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Suggested-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NHans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

There is a race condition between nilfs_dirty_inode() and
nilfs_set_file_dirty().

When a file is opened, nilfs_dirty_inode() is called to update the
access timestamp in the inode.  It calls __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() in a
separate transaction.  __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() caches the ifile
buffer_head in the i_bh field of the inode info structure and marks it
as dirty.

After some data was written to the file in another transaction, the
function nilfs_set_file_dirty() is called, which adds the inode to the
ns_dirty_files list.

Then the segment construction calls nilfs_segctor_collect_dirty_files(),
which goes through the ns_dirty_files list and checks the i_bh field.
If there is a cached buffer_head in i_bh it is not marked as dirty
again.

Since nilfs_dirty_inode() and nilfs_set_file_dirty() use separate
transactions, it is possible that a segment construction that writes out
the ifile occurs in-between the two.  If this happens the inode is not
on the ns_dirty_files list, but its ifile block is still marked as dirty
and written out.

In the next segment construction, the data for the file is written out
and nilfs_bmap_propagate() updates the b-tree.  Eventually the bmap root
is written into the i_bh block, which is not dirty, because it was
written out in another segment construction.

As a result the bmap update can be lost, which leads to file system
corruption.  Either the virtual block address points to an unallocated
DAT block, or the DAT entry will be reused for something different.

The error can remain undetected for a long time.  A typical error
message would be one of the "bad btree" errors or a warning that a DAT
entry could not be found.

This bug can be reproduced reliably by a simple benchmark that creates
and overwrites millions of 4k files.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509367935-3086-2-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jpSigned-off-by: NAndreas Rohner <andreas.rohner@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Tested-by: NAndreas Rohner <andreas.rohner@gmx.net>
Tested-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In preparation for unconditionally passing the struct timer_list pointer
to all timer callbacks, switch to using the new timer_setup() and
from_timer() to pass the timer pointer explicitly.  This requires adding
a pointer to hold the timer's target task, as the lifetime of sc_task
doesn't appear to match the timer's task.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016235900.GA102729@beastSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

pipe_max_size is assigned directly via procfs sysctl:

  static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
          ...
          {
                  .procname       = "pipe-max-size",
                  .data           = &pipe_max_size,
                  .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                  .mode           = 0644,
                  .proc_handler   = &pipe_proc_fn,
                  .extra1         = &pipe_min_size,
          },
          ...

  int pipe_proc_fn(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
                   size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
  {
          ...
          ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buf, lenp, ppos)
          ...

and then later rounded in-place a few statements later:

          ...
          pipe_max_size = round_pipe_size(pipe_max_size);
          ...

This leaves a window of time between initial assignment and rounding
that may be visible to other threads.  (For example, one thread sets a
non-rounded value to pipe_max_size while another reads its value.)

Similar reads of pipe_max_size are potentially racy:

  pipe.c :: alloc_pipe_info()
  pipe.c :: pipe_set_size()

Add a new proc_dopipe_max_size() that consolidates reading the new value
from the user buffer, verifying bounds, and calling round_pipe_size()
with a single assignment to pipe_max_size.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507658689-11669-4-git-send-email-joe.lawrence@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NJoe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

round_pipe_size() contains a right-bit-shift expression which may
overflow, which would cause undefined results in a subsequent
roundup_pow_of_two() call.

  static inline unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned int size)
  {
          unsigned long nr_pages;

          nr_pages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
          return roundup_pow_of_two(nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT;
  }

PAGE_SIZE is defined as (1UL << PAGE_SHIFT), so:
  - 4 bytes wide on 32-bit (0 to 0xffffffff)
  - 8 bytes wide on 64-bit (0 to 0xffffffffffffffff)

That means that 32-bit round_pipe_size(), nr_pages may overflow to 0:

  size=0x00000000    nr_pages=0x0
  size=0x00000001    nr_pages=0x1
  size=0xfffff000    nr_pages=0xfffff
  size=0xfffff001    nr_pages=0x0         << !
  size=0xffffffff    nr_pages=0x0         << !

This is bad because roundup_pow_of_two(n) is undefined when n == 0!

64-bit is not a problem as the unsigned int size is 4 bytes wide
(similar to 32-bit) and the larger, 8 byte wide unsigned long, is
sufficient to handle the largest value of the bit shift expression:

  size=0xffffffff    nr_pages=100000

Modify round_pipe_size() to return 0 if n == 0 and updates its callers to
handle accordingly.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507658689-11669-3-git-send-email-joe.lawrence@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NJoe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Patch series "A few round_pipe_size() and pipe-max-size fixups", v3.

While backporting Michael's "pipe: fix limit handling" patchset to a
distro-kernel, Mikulas noticed that current upstream pipe limit handling
contains a few problems:

  1 - procfs signed wrap: echo'ing a large number into
      /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size and then cat'ing it back out shows a
      negative value.

  2 - round_pipe_size() nr_pages overflow on 32bit:  this would
      subsequently try roundup_pow_of_two(0), which is undefined.

  3 - visible non-rounded pipe-max-size value: there is no mutual
      exclusion or protection between the time pipe_max_size is assigned
      a raw value from proc_dointvec_minmax() and when it is rounded.

  4 - unsigned long -> unsigned int conversion makes for potential odd
      return errors from do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv() and
      do_proc_dopipe_max_size_conv().

This version underwent the same testing as v1:
https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=150643571406022&w=2

This patch (of 4):

pipe_max_size is defined as an unsigned int:

  unsigned int pipe_max_size = 1048576;

but its procfs/sysctl representation is an integer:

  static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
          ...
          {
                  .procname       = "pipe-max-size",
                  .data           = &pipe_max_size,
                  .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                  .mode           = 0644,
                  .proc_handler   = &pipe_proc_fn,
                  .extra1         = &pipe_min_size,
          },
          ...

that is signed:

  int pipe_proc_fn(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
                   size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
  {
          ...
          ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buf, lenp, ppos)

This leads to signed results via procfs for large values of pipe_max_size:

  % echo 2147483647 >/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
  % cat /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
  -2147483648

Use unsigned operations on this variable to avoid such negative values.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507658689-11669-2-git-send-email-joe.lawrence@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NJoe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Currently if the autofs kernel module gets an error when writing to the
pipe which links to the daemon, then it marks the whole moutpoint as
catatonic, and it will stop working.

It is possible that the error is transient.  This can happen if the
daemon is slow and more than 16 requests queue up.  If a subsequent
process tries to queue a request, and is then signalled, the write to
the pipe will return -ERESTARTSYS and autofs will take that as total
failure.

So change the code to assess -ERESTARTSYS and -ENOMEM as transient
failures which only abort the current request, not the whole mountpoint.

It isn't a crash or a data corruption, but having autofs mountpoints
suddenly stop working is rather inconvenient.

Ian said:

: And given the problems with a half dozen (or so) user space applications
: consuming large amounts of CPU under heavy mount and umount activity this
: could happen more easily than we expect.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y3norvgp.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.nameSigned-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Acked-by: NIan Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The use of ep_call_nested() in ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is the .poll
routine for an epoll fd, is used to prevent excessively deep epoll
nesting, and to prevent circular paths.

However, we are already preventing these conditions during
EPOLL_CTL_ADD.  In terms of too deep epoll chains, we do in fact allow
deep nesting of the epoll fds themselves (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS),
however we don't allow more than EP_MAX_NESTS when an epoll file
descriptor is actually connected to a wakeup source.  Thus, we do not
require the use of ep_call_nested(), since ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is
called via ep_scan_ready_list() only continues nesting if there are
events available.

Since ep_call_nested() is implemented using a global lock, applications
that make use of nested epoll can see large performance improvements
with this change.

Davidlohr said:

: Improvements are quite obscene actually, such as for the following
: epoll_wait() benchmark with 2 level nesting on a 80 core IvyBridge:
:
: ncpus  vanilla     dirty     delta
: 1      2447092     3028315   +23.75%
: 4      231265      2986954   +1191.57%
: 8      121631      2898796   +2283.27%
: 16     59749       2902056   +4757.07%
: 32     26837	     2326314   +8568.30%
: 64     12926       1341281   +10276.61%
:
: (http://linux-scalability.org/epoll/epoll-test.c)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509430214-5599-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.comSigned-off-by: NJason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Cc: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

ep_poll_safewake() is used to wakeup potentially nested epoll file
descriptors.  The function uses ep_call_nested() to prevent entering the
same wake up queue more than once, and to prevent excessively deep
wakeup paths (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS).  However, this is not necessary
since we are already preventing these conditions during EPOLL_CTL_ADD.
This saves extra function calls, and avoids taking a global lock during
the ep_call_nested() calls.

I have, however, left ep_call_nested() for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case, since ep_call_nested() keeps track of the nesting level, and this
is required by the call to spin_lock_irqsave_nested().  It would be nice
to remove the ep_call_nested() calls for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case as well, however its not clear how to simply pass the nesting level
through multiple wake_up() levels without more surgery.  In any case, I
don't think CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is generally used for production.
This patch, also apparently fixes a workload at Google that Salman Qazi
reported by completely removing the poll_safewake_ncalls->lock from
wakeup paths.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507920533-8812-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.comSigned-off-by: NJason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Acked-by: NDavidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

A userspace application can directly trigger the allocations from
eventpoll_epi and eventpoll_pwq slabs.  A buggy or malicious application
can consume a significant amount of system memory by triggering such
allocations.  Indeed we have seen in production where a buggy
application was leaking the epoll references and causing a burst of
eventpoll_epi and eventpoll_pwq slab allocations.  This patch opt-in the
charging of eventpoll_epi and eventpoll_pwq slabs.

There is a per-user limit (~4% of total memory if no highmem) on these
caches.  I think it is too generous particularly in the scenario where
jobs of multiple users are running on the system and the administrator
is reducing cost by overcomitting the memory.  This is unaccounted
kernel memory and will not be considered by the oom-killer.  I think by
accounting it to kmemcg, for systems with kmem accounting enabled, we
can provide better isolation between jobs of different users.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171003021519.23907-1-shakeelb@google.comSigned-off-by: NShakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Gcc doesn't know that "len" is guaranteed to be >=1 by dcache and
generates standard while-loop prologue duplicating loop condition.

	add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/1 up/down: 0/-27 (-27)
	function                                     old     new   delta
	name_to_int                                  104      77     -27

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912195213.GB17730@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Save ~360 bytes.

	add/remove: 1/0 grow/shrink: 0/4 up/down: 104/-463 (-359)
	function                                     old     new   delta
	name_to_int                                    -     104    +104
	proc_pid_lookup                              217     126     -91
	proc_lookupfd_common                         212     121     -91
	proc_task_lookup                             289     194     -95
	__proc_create                                588     402    -186

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194850.GA17730@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Right now there is no convenient way to check if a process is being
coredumped at the moment.

It might be necessary to recognize such state to prevent killing the
process and getting a broken coredump.  Writing a large core might take
significant time, and the process is unresponsive during it, so it might
be killed by timeout, if another process is monitoring and
killing/restarting hanging tasks.

We're getting a significant number of corrupted coredump files on
machines in our fleet, just because processes are being killed by
timeout in the middle of the core writing process.

We do have a process health check, and some agent is responsible for
restarting processes which are not responding for health check requests.
Writing a large coredump to the disk can easily exceed the reasonable
timeout (especially on an overloaded machine).

This flag will allow the agent to distinguish processes which are being
coredumped, extend the timeout for them, and let them produce a full
coredump file.

To provide an ability to detect if a process is in the state of being
coredumped, we can expose a boolean CoreDumping flag in
/proc/pid/status.

Example:
$ cat core.sh
  #!/bin/sh

  echo "|/usr/bin/sleep 10" > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
  sleep 1000 &
  PID=$!

  cat /proc/$PID/status | grep CoreDumping
  kill -ABRT $PID
  sleep 1
  cat /proc/$PID/status | grep CoreDumping

$ ./core.sh
  CoreDumping:	0
  CoreDumping:	1

[guro@fb.com: document CoreDumping flag in /proc/<pid>/status]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928135357.GA8470@castle.DHCP.thefacebook.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170920230634.31572-1-guro@fb.comSigned-off-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit e1293727 "NFS: Move the flock open mode check into nfs_flock()"
changed NFSv3 behavior for flock() such that the open mode must match the
lock type, however that requirement shouldn't be enforced for flock().
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

The option was incorrectly masking off all other options.
Signed-off-by: NJoshua Watt <JPEWhacker@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #3.7
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Before traversing a referral and performing a mount, the mounted-on
directory looks strange:

dr-xr-xr-x. 2 4294967294 4294967294 0 Dec 31  1969 dir.0

nfs4_get_referral is wiping out any cached attributes with what was
returned via GETATTR(fs_locations), but the bit mask for that
operation does not request any file attributes.

Retrieve owner and timestamp information so that the memcpy in
nfs4_get_referral fills in more attributes.

Changes since v1:
- Don't request attributes that the client unconditionally replaces
- Request only MOUNTED_ON_FILEID or FILEID attribute, not both
- encode_fs_locations() doesn't use the third bitmask word

Fixes: 6b97fd3d ("NFSv4: Follow a referral")
Suggested-by: NPradeep Thomas <pradeepthomas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 703509
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 703510
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 703511
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 703512
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 703513
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Publishing of net pointer is not safe,
use net->ns.inum instead
Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Be sure that nfs_client_list and nfs_volume_list lists initialized
in net_init hook were return to initial state in net_exit hook.
Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Add a jump target so that a bit of exception handling can be better reused
at the end of this function.

This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: NMarkus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

When decoding a CLOSE, replace the stateid returned by the server
with the "invalid special stateid" described in RFC5661, Section 8.2.3.

In nfs_set_open_stateid_locked, ignore stateids from closed state.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

In nfs_set_open_stateid_locked, we must ignore stateids from closed state.
Reported-by: NAndrew W Elble <aweits@rit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

If our layoutreturn returns an NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID, then try to
update the stateid and retry.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

If our layoutreturn on close operation returns an NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID,
then try to update the stateid and retry. We know that there should
be no further LAYOUTGET requests being launched.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

If the stateid is no longer recognised on the server, either due to a
restart, or due to a competing CLOSE call, then we do not have to
retry. Any open contexts that triggered a reopen of the file, will
also act as triggers for any CLOSE for the updated stateids.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

If we're racing with an OPEN, then retry the operation instead of
declaring it a success.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
[Andrew W Elble: Fix a typo in nfs4_refresh_open_stateid]
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

On successful rename, the "old_dentry" is retained and is attached to
the "new_dir", so we need to call nfs_set_verifier() accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

If the server that does not implement NFSv4.1 persistent session
semantics reboots while we are performing an exclusive create,
then the return value of NFS4ERR_DELAY when we replay the open
during the grace period causes us to lose the verifier.
When the grace period expires, and we present a new verifier,
the server will then correctly reply NFS4ERR_EXIST.

This commit ensures that we always present the same verifier when
replaying the OPEN.
Reported-by: NTigran Mkrtchyan <tigran.mkrtchyan@desy.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Ben Coddington has noted the following race between OPEN and CLOSE
on a single client.

Process 1		Process 2		Server
=========		=========		======

1)  OPEN file
2)			OPEN file
3)						Process OPEN (1) seqid=1
4)						Process OPEN (2) seqid=2
5)						Reply OPEN (2)
6)			Receive reply (2)
7)			new stateid, seqid=2

8)			CLOSE file, using
			stateid w/ seqid=2
9)						Reply OPEN (1)
10(						Process CLOSE (8)
11)						Reply CLOSE (8)
12)						Forget stateid
						file closed

13)			Receive reply (7)
14)			Forget stateid
			file closed.

15) Receive reply (1).
16) New stateid seqid=1
    is really the same
    stateid that was
    closed.

IOW: the reply to the first OPEN is delayed. Since "Process 2" does
not wait before closing the file, and it does not cache the closed
stateid, then when the delayed reply is finally received, it is treated
as setting up a new stateid by the client.

The fix is to ensure that the client processes the OPEN and CLOSE calls
in the same order in which the server processed them.

This commit ensures that we examine the seqid of the stateid
returned by OPEN. If it is a new stateid, we assume the seqid
must be equal to the value 1, and that each state transition
increments the seqid value by 1 (See RFC7530, Section 9.1.4.2,
and RFC5661, Section 8.2.2).

If the tracker sees that an OPEN returns with a seqid that is greater
than the cached seqid + 1, then it bumps a flag to ensure that the
caller waits for the RPCs carrying the missing seqids to complete.

Note that there can still be pathologies where the server crashes before
it can even send us the missing seqids. Since the OPEN call is still
holding a slot when it waits here, that could cause the recovery to
stall forever. To avoid that, we time out after a 5 second wait.
Reported-by: NBenjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Bool initializations should use true and false. Bool tests don't need
comparisons.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>