commit ea422312a462696093b5db59d294439796cba4ad upstream.

The driver was setting the device remote-wakeup feature during probe in
violation of the USB specification (which says it should only be set
just prior to suspending the device). This could potentially waste
power during suspend as well as lead to spurious wakeups.

Note that USB core would clear the remote-wakeup feature at first
resume.

Fixes: 0f64478c ("USB: add USB serial mos7720 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>     # 2.6.19
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e696d00e65e81d46e911f24b12e441037bf11b38 upstream.

Add USB ID for MOXA UPort 2210. This device contains mos7820 but
it passes GPIO0 check implemented by driver and it's detected as
mos7840. Hence product id check is added to force mos7820 mode.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Löbl <pavel@loebl.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
[ johan: rename id defines and add vendor-id check ]
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 91feb01596e5efc0cc922cc73f5583114dccf4d2 upstream.

The work item can operate on

1. stale memory left over from the last transfer
the actual length of the data transfered needs to be checked
2. memory already freed
the error handling in appledisplay_probe() needs
to cancel the work in that case

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+495dab1f175edc9c2f13@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NOliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191106124902.7765-1-oneukum@suse.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 92aa5986f4f7b5a8bf282ca0f50967f4326559f5 upstream.

In case of a timeout or if a signal aborts a read
communication with the device needs to be ended
lest we overwrite an active URB the next time we
do IO to the device, as the URB may still be active.
Signed-off-by: NOliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191107142856.16774-1-oneukum@suse.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 347bc8cb26388791c5881a3775cb14a3f765a674 upstream.

Add support for the Mark-10 digital force gauge device to the cp201x
driver.

Based on a report and a larger patch from Joel Jennings
Reported-by: NJoel Jennings <joel.jennings@makeitlabs.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJohan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191118092119.GA153852@kroah.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 2a9125317b247f2cf35c196f968906dcf062ae2d upstream.

Smatch reported that nents is not initialized and used in
stub_recv_cmd_submit(). nents is currently initialized by sgl_alloc()
and used to allocate multiple URBs when host controller doesn't
support scatter-gather DMA. The use of uninitialized nents means that
buf_len is zero and use_sg is true. But buffer length should not be
zero when an URB uses scatter-gather DMA.

To prevent this situation, add the conditional that checks buf_len
and use_sg. And move the use of nents right after the sgl_alloc() to
avoid the use of uninitialized nents.

If the error occurs, it adds SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_MALLOC and stub_priv
will be released by stub event handler and connection will be shut
down.

Fixes: ea44d190764b ("usbip: Implement SG support to vhci-hcd and stub driver")
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NSuwan Kim <suwan.kim027@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NShuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191111141035.27788-1-suwan.kim027@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 26a4d4c00f85cb844dd11dd35e848b079c2f5e8f upstream.

We should close the fd before the return of read_attr_usbip_status.

Fixes: 3391ba0e ("usbip: tools: Extract generic code to be shared with vudc backend")
Signed-off-by: NHewenliang <hewenliang4@huawei.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191025043515.20053-1-hewenliang4@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1ec13abac58b6f24e32f0d3081ef4e7456e62ed8 upstream.

USBIP uses lib/scatterlist.h
Hence it needs to set CONFIG_SGL_ALLOC
Signed-off-by: NOliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: NShuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112154939.21217-1-oneukum@suse.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit f7728002c1c7bfa787b276a31c3ef458739b8e7c ]

Commit 780bc790 ("virtio_ring: Support DMA APIs")  makes
virtqueue_add() return -EIO when we fail to map our I/O buffers. This is
a very realistic scenario for guests with encrypted memory, as swiotlb
may run out of space, depending on it's size and the I/O load.

The virtio-blk driver interprets -EIO form virtqueue_add() as an IO
error, despite the fact that swiotlb full is in absence of bugs a
recoverable condition.

Let us change the return code to -ENOMEM, and make the block layer
recover form these failures when virtio-blk encounters the condition
described above.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 780bc790 ("virtio_ring: Support DMA APIs")
Signed-off-by: NHalil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: NMichael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit f3f5ba42c58d56d50f539854d8cc188944e96087 upstream.

The touch timer is set up in intf1. If the second interface does not exist,
the timer and touch input device are not setup and we get the following
error, when touch events are reported via intf0.

kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:956!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:956 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:949 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mod_timer+0x5a2/0xb50 kernel/time/timer.c:1100
Code: 45 10 c7 44 24 14 ff ff ff ff 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 45 20 48 c7 44 24 18 00 00 00 00 48 89 04 24 e9 5a fc ff ff e8 ae ce 0e 00 <0f> 0b e8 a7 ce 0e 00 4c 89 74 24 20 e9 37 fe ff ff e8 98 ce 0e 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881db209930 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffffffff86c2b200 RBX: 00000000ffffa688 RCX: ffffffff83efc583
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff812f4d82 RDI: ffff8881d2356200
RBP: ffff8881d23561e8 R08: ffffffff86c2b200 R09: ffffed103a46abeb
R10: ffffed103a46abea R11: ffff8881d2355f53 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 1ffff1103b64132d R14: ffff8881d2355f50 R15: 0000000000000006
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881db200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f75e2799000 CR3: 00000001d3b07000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 imon_touch_event drivers/media/rc/imon.c:1348 [inline]
 imon_incoming_packet.isra.0+0x2546/0x2f10 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:1603
 usb_rx_callback_intf0+0x151/0x1e0 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:1734
 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x1f2/0x470 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1654
 usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x368/0x420 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1719
 dummy_timer+0x120f/0x2fa2 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1965
 call_timer_fn+0x179/0x650 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
 run_timer_softirq+0x5e3/0x1490 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
 __do_softirq+0x221/0x912 kernel/softirq.c:292
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
 irq_exit+0x178/0x1a0 kernel/softirq.c:413
 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12f/0x500 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:830
 </IRQ>
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x28/0x2e0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:581
Code: 90 90 41 56 41 55 65 44 8b 2d 44 3a 8f 7a 41 54 55 53 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 36 ee d0 fb e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d fa dd 4f 00 fb f4 <65> 44 8b 2d 20 3a 8f 7a 0f 1f 44 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3
RSP: 0018:ffffffff86c07da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffffffff86c2b200 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffffff86c2ba4c
RBP: fffffbfff0d85640 R08: ffffffff86c2b200 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
 do_idle+0x3b6/0x500 kernel/sched/idle.c:263
 cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:355
 start_kernel+0x82a/0x864 init/main.c:784
 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241
Modules linked in:

Reported-by: syzbot+f49d12d34f2321cf4df2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NSean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit ca8f245f284eeffa56f3b7a5eb6fc503159ee028 upstream.

Don't use uninitialized ircode[] in cxusb_rc_query() when
cxusb_ctrl_msg() fails to populate its contents.

syzbot reported:

dvb-usb: bulk message failed: -22 (1/-30591)
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ir_lookup_by_scancode drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:494 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rc_g_keycode_from_table drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:582 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rc_keydown+0x1a6/0x6f0 drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:816
CPU: 1 PID: 11436 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events dvb_usb_read_remote_control
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x13a/0x2b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:108
 __msan_warning+0x73/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:250
 bsearch+0x1dd/0x250 lib/bsearch.c:41
 ir_lookup_by_scancode drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:494 [inline]
 rc_g_keycode_from_table drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:582 [inline]
 rc_keydown+0x1a6/0x6f0 drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:816
 cxusb_rc_query+0x2e1/0x360 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:548
 dvb_usb_read_remote_control+0xf9/0x290 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-remote.c:261
 process_one_work+0x1572/0x1ef0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0x111b/0x2460 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x4b5/0x4f0 kernel/kthread.c:256
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:355

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:150 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0xd2/0x170 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314
 __msan_chain_origin+0x6b/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:184
 rc_g_keycode_from_table drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:583 [inline]
 rc_keydown+0x2c4/0x6f0 drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:816
 cxusb_rc_query+0x2e1/0x360 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:548
 dvb_usb_read_remote_control+0xf9/0x290 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-remote.c:261
 process_one_work+0x1572/0x1ef0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0x111b/0x2460 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x4b5/0x4f0 kernel/kthread.c:256
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:355

Local variable description: ----ircode@cxusb_rc_query
Variable was created at:
 cxusb_rc_query+0x4d/0x360 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:543
 dvb_usb_read_remote_control+0xf9/0x290 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-remote.c:261
Signed-off-by: NVito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1b976fc6d684e3282914cdbe7a8d68fdce19095c upstream.

The driver needs an isochronous endpoint to be present. It will
oops in its absence. Add checking for it.

Reported-by: syzbot+d93dff37e6a89431c158@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NOliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 8c279e9394cade640ed86ec6c6645a0e7df5e0b6 upstream.

When parsing the UVC control descriptors fails, the error path tries to
cleanup a media device that hasn't been initialised, potentially
resulting in a crash. Fix this by initialising the media device before
the error handling path can be reached.

Fixes: 5a254d75 ("[media] uvcvideo: Register a v4l2_device")
Reported-by: syzbot+c86454eb3af9e8a4da20@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e6e8df07268c1f75dd9215536e2ce4587b70f977 upstream.

Add NULL checks to show() and store() in cpufreq.c to avoid attempts
to invoke a NULL callback.

Though some interfaces of cpufreq are set as read-only, users can
still get write permission using chmod which can lead to a kernel
crash, as follows:

chmod +w /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_cur_freq
echo 1 >  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_cur_freq

This bug was found in linux 4.19.
Signed-off-by: NKai Shen <shenkai8@huawei.com>
Reported-by: NFeilong Lin <linfeilong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NFeilong Lin <linfeilong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NViresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
[ rjw: Subject & changelog ]
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9e08117c9d4efc1e1bc6fce83dab856d9fd284b6 upstream.

Visual inspection of the usbvision driver shows that it suffers from
three races between its open, close, and disconnect handlers.  In
particular, the driver is careful to update its usbvision->user and
usbvision->remove_pending flags while holding the private mutex, but:

	usbvision_v4l2_close() and usbvision_radio_close() don't hold
	the mutex while they check the value of
	usbvision->remove_pending;

	usbvision_disconnect() doesn't hold the mutex while checking
	the value of usbvision->user; and

	also, usbvision_v4l2_open() and usbvision_radio_open() don't
	check whether the device has been unplugged before allowing
	the user to open the device files.

Each of these can potentially lead to usbvision_release() being called
twice and use-after-free errors.

This patch fixes the races by reading the flags while the mutex is
still held and checking for pending removes before allowing an open to
succeed.
Signed-off-by: NAlan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 6dcd5d7a7a29c1e4b8016a06aed78cd650cd8c27 upstream.

There is the same incorrect approach to locking implemented in
vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap(), vivid_stop_generating_vid_out() and
sdr_cap_stop_streaming().

These functions are called during streaming stopping with vivid_dev.mutex
locked. And they all do the same mistake while stopping their kthreads,
which need to lock this mutex as well. See the example from
vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap():
  /* shutdown control thread */
  vivid_grab_controls(dev, false);
  mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
  kthread_stop(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
  dev->kthread_vid_cap = NULL;
  mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);

But when this mutex is unlocked, another vb2_fop_read() can lock it
instead of vivid_thread_vid_cap() and manipulate the buffer queue.
That causes a use-after-free access later.

To fix those issues let's:
  1. avoid unlocking the mutex in vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap(),
vivid_stop_generating_vid_out() and sdr_cap_stop_streaming();
  2. use mutex_trylock() with schedule_timeout_uninterruptible() in
the loops of the vivid kthread handlers.
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: NHans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: NHans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>      # for v3.18 and up
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b4add02d2236fd5f568db141cfd8eb4290972eb3 upstream.

When vbi stream is started, followed by video streaming,
the vid_cap_streaming and vid_out_streaming were not being set to true,
which would cause the video stream to stop when vbi stream is stopped.
This patch allows to set vid_cap_streaming and vid_out_streaming to true.
According to Hans Verkuil it appears that these 'if (dev->kthread_vid_cap)'
checks are a left-over from the original vivid development and should never
have been there.
Signed-off-by: NVandana BN <bnvandana@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>      # for v3.18 and up
Signed-off-by: NHans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5f9f0b11f0816b35867f2cf71e54d95f53f03902 upstream.

If starting the transfer of a command suceeds but the transfer for the reply
fails, it is not enough to initiate killing the transfer for the
command may still be running. You need to wait for the killing to finish
before you can reuse URB and buffer.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+711468aa5c3a1eabf863@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NOliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9435f2bb66874a0c4dd25e7c978957a7ca2c93b1 upstream.

snd_usb_mixer_controls_badd() that parses UAC3 BADD profiles misses a
NULL check for the given interfaces.  When a malformed USB descriptor
is passed, this may lead to an Oops, as spotted by syzkaller.
Skip the iteration if the interface doesn't exist for avoiding the
crash.

Fixes: 17156f23 ("ALSA: usb: add UAC3 BADD profiles support")
Reported-by: syzbot+a36ab65c6653d7ccdd62@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122112840.24797-1-tiwai@suse.deSigned-off-by: NTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit ca16d5bee59807bf04deaab0a8eccecd5061528c upstream.

Robust futexes utilize the robust_list mechanism to allow the kernel to
release futexes which are held when a task exits. The exit can be voluntary
or caused by a signal or fault. This prevents that waiters block forever.

The futex operations in user space store a pointer to the futex they are
either locking or unlocking in the op_pending member of the per task robust
list.

After a lock operation has succeeded the futex is queued in the robust list
linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.

After an unlock operation has succeeded the futex is removed from the
robust list linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.

The robust list exit code checks for the pending operation and any futex
which is queued in the linked list. It carefully checks whether the futex
value is the TID of the exiting task. If so, it sets the OWNER_DIED bit and
tries to wake up a potential waiter.

This is race free for the lock operation but unlock has two race scenarios
where waiters might not be woken up. These issues can be observed with
regular robust pthread mutexes. PI aware pthread mutexes are not affected.

(1) Unlocking task is killed after unlocking the futex value in user space
    before being able to wake a waiter.

        pthread_mutex_unlock()
                |
                V
        atomic_exchange_rel (&mutex->__data.__lock, 0)
                        <------------------------killed
            lll_futex_wake ()                   |
                                                |
                                                |(__lock = 0)
                                                |(enter kernel)
                                                |
                                                V
                                            do_exit()
                                            exit_mm()
                                          mm_release()
                                        exit_robust_list()
                                        handle_futex_death()
                                                |
                                                |(__lock = 0)
                                                |(uval = 0)
                                                |
                                                V
        if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
                return 0;

    The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned by
    the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters which in consequence
    block infinitely.

(2) Waiting task is killed after a wakeup and before it can acquire the
    futex in user space.

        OWNER                         WAITER
				futex_wait()
   pthread_mutex_unlock()               |
                |                       |
                |(__lock = 0)           |
                |                       |
                V                       |
         futex_wake() ------------>  wakeup()
                                        |
                                        |(return to userspace)
                                        |(__lock = 0)
                                        |
                                        V
                        oldval = mutex->__data.__lock
                                          <-----------------killed
    atomic_compare_and_exchange_val_acq (&mutex->__data.__lock,  |
                        id | assume_other_futex_waiters, 0)      |
                                                                 |
                                                                 |
                                                   (enter kernel)|
                                                                 |
                                                                 V
                                                         do_exit()
                                                        |
                                                        |
                                                        V
                                        handle_futex_death()
                                        |
                                        |(__lock = 0)
                                        |(uval = 0)
                                        |
                                        V
        if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
                return 0;

    The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned
    by the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters, which seems to
    be correct as the exiting task does not own the futex value, but
    the consequence is that other waiters wont be woken up and block
    infinitely.

In both scenarios the following conditions are true:

   - task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
   - user space futex value == 0
   - Regular futex (not PI)

If these conditions are met then it is reasonably safe to wake up a
potential waiter in order to prevent the above problems.

As this might be a false positive it can cause spurious wakeups, but the
waiter side has to handle other types of unrelated wakeups, e.g. signals
gracefully anyway. So such a spurious wakeup will not affect the
correctness of these operations.

This workaround must not touch the user space futex value and cannot set
the OWNER_DIED bit because the lock value is 0, i.e. uncontended. Setting
OWNER_DIED in this case would result in inconsistent state and subsequently
in malfunction of the owner died handling in user space.

The rest of the user space state is still consistent as no other task can
observe the list_op_pending entry in the exiting tasks robust list.

The eventually woken up waiter will observe the uncontended lock value and
take it over.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and comment. Made the return explicit and not
  	depend on the subsequent check and added constants to hand into
  	handle_futex_death() instead of plain numbers. Fixed a few coding
	style issues. ]

Fixes: 0771dfef ("[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: core")
Signed-off-by: NYang Tao <yang.tao172@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NYi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1573010582-35297-1-git-send-email-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224555.943191378@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 04e7712f4460585e5eed5b853fd8b82a9943958f upstream.

We are going to share the compat_sys_futex() handler between 64-bit
architectures and 32-bit architectures that need to deal with both 32-bit
and 64-bit time_t, and this is easier if both entry points are in the
same file.

In fact, most other system call handlers do the same thing these days, so
let's follow the trend here and merge all of futex_compat.c into futex.c.

In the process, a few minor changes have to be done to make sure everything
still makes sense: handle_futex_death() and futex_cmpxchg_enabled() become
local symbol, and the compat version of the fetch_robust_entry() function
gets renamed to compat_fetch_robust_entry() to avoid a symbol clash.

This is intended as a purely cosmetic patch, no behavior should
change.
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 03bf73c315edca28f47451913177e14cd040a216 upstream.

In nbd_add_socket when krealloc succeeds, if nsock's allocation fail the
reallocted memory is leak. The correct behaviour should be assigning the
reallocted memory to config->socks right after success.
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NNavid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit cd5a2aa89e847bdda7b62029d94e95488d73f6b2 upstream.

Since MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related for processors that are
affected by both vulnerabilities, the followiing confusing messages can
be printed in the kernel log:

  MDS: Vulnerable
  MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers

To avoid the first incorrect message, defer the printing of MDS
mitigation after the TAA mitigation selection has been done. However,
that has the side effect of printing TAA mitigation first before MDS
mitigation.

 [ bp: Check box is affected/mitigations are disabled first before
   printing and massage. ]
Suggested-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-3-longman@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 64870ed1b12e235cfca3f6c6da75b542c973ff78 upstream.

For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.

For example, with only the "mds=off" option:

  vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
  vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable

The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.

Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.

Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.

 [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]

Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 700c1018b86d0d4b3f1f2d459708c0cdf42b521d upstream.

gawk 5.0.1 generates the following regexp warnings:

  GEN      /home/sasha/torvalds/tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/inat-tables.c
  awk: ../arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk:260: warning: regexp escape sequence `\:' is not a known regexp operator
  awk: ../arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk:350: (FILENAME=../arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt FNR=41) warning: regexp escape sequence `\&' is  not a known regexp operator

Ealier versions of gawk are not known to generate these warnings. The
gawk manual referenced below does not list characters ':' and '&' as
needing escaping, so 'unescape' them. See

  https://www.gnu.org/software/gawk/manual/html_node/Escape-Sequences.html

for more info.

Running diff on the output generated by the script before and after
applying the patch reported no differences.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

[ Caught the respective tools header discrepancy. ]
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Kapshuk <alexander.kapshuk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190924044659.3785-1-alexander.kapshuk@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5effc09c4907901f0e71e68e5f2e14211d9a203f upstream.

8-letter strings representing ARC perf events are stores in two
32-bit registers as ASCII characters like that: "IJMP", "IALL", "IJMPTAK" etc.

And the same order of bytes in the word is used regardless CPU endianness.

Which means in case of big-endian CPU core we need to swap bytes to get
the same order as if it was on little-endian CPU.

Otherwise we're seeing the following error message on boot:
------------------------->8----------------------
ARC perf        : 8 counters (32 bits), 40 conditions, [overflow IRQ support]
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/arc_pct/events/pmji'
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.2.18 #3
Stack Trace:
  arc_unwind_core+0xd4/0xfc
  dump_stack+0x64/0x80
  sysfs_warn_dup+0x46/0x58
  sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0xb2/0x168
  create_files+0x70/0x2a0
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/events/core.c:12144 perf_event_sysfs_init+0x70/0xa0
Failed to register pmu: arc_pct, reason -17
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.2.18 #3
Stack Trace:
  arc_unwind_core+0xd4/0xfc
  dump_stack+0x64/0x80
  __warn+0x9c/0xd4
  warn_slowpath_fmt+0x22/0x2c
  perf_event_sysfs_init+0x70/0xa0
---[ end trace a75fb9a9837bd1ec ]---
------------------------->8----------------------

What happens here we're trying to register more than one raw perf event
with the same name "PMJI". Why? Because ARC perf events are 4 to 8 letters
and encoded into two 32-bit words. In this particular case we deal with 2
events:
 * "IJMP____" which counts all jump & branch instructions
 * "IJMPC___" which counts only conditional jumps & branches

Those strings are split in two 32-bit words this way "IJMP" + "____" &
"IJMP" + "C___" correspondingly. Now if we read them swapped due to CPU core
being big-endian then we read "PMJI" + "____" & "PMJI" + "___C".

And since we interpret read array of ASCII letters as a null-terminated string
on big-endian CPU we end up with 2 events of the same name "PMJI".
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NVineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1d31999cf04c21709f72ceb17e65b54a401330da upstream.

adjust_lowmem_bounds() checks every memblocks in order to find the boundary
between lowmem and highmem. However some memblocks could be marked as NOMAP
so they are not used by kernel, which should be skipped while calculating
the boundary.
Signed-off-by: NChester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a634644751c46238df58bbfe992e30c1668388db upstream.

Remove ocfs2_is_o2cb_active().  We have similar functions to identify
which cluster stack is being used via osb->osb_cluster_stack.

Secondly, the current implementation of ocfs2_is_o2cb_active() is not
totally safe.  Based on the design of stackglue, we need to get
ocfs2_stack_lock before using ocfs2_stack related data structures, and
that active_stack pointer can be NULL in the case of mount failure.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495441079-11708-1-git-send-email-ghe@suse.comSigned-off-by: NGang He <ghe@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Ren <zren@suse.com>
Acked-by: NChangwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1a97a477e666cbdededab93bd3754e508f0c09d7 upstream.

After reset SGMII Autoneg timer is set to 2us (bits 6 and 5 are 01).
That is not enough to finalize autonegatiation on some devices.
Increase this timer duration to maximum supported 16ms.
Signed-off-by: NMax Uvarov <muvarov@gmail.com>
Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NFlorian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ adapted for kernels without phy_modify_mmd ]
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 333061b924539c0de081339643f45514f5f1c1e6 upstream.

For supporting 10Mps speed in SGMII mode DP83867_10M_SGMII_RATE_ADAPT bit
of DP83867_10M_SGMII_CFG register has to be cleared by software.
That does not affect speeds 100 and 1000 so can be done on init.
Signed-off-by: NMax Uvarov <muvarov@gmail.com>
Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NFlorian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ adapted for kernels without phy_modify_mmd ]
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7ce700bf11b5e2cb84e4352bbdf2123a7a239c84 upstream.

Let's limit shrinking to !ZONE_DEVICE so we can fix the current code.
We should never try to touch the memmap of offline sections where we
could have uninitialized memmaps and could trigger BUGs when calling
page_to_nid() on poisoned pages.

There is no reliable way to distinguish an uninitialized memmap from an
initialized memmap that belongs to ZONE_DEVICE, as we don't have
anything like SECTION_IS_ONLINE we can use similar to
pfn_to_online_section() for !ZONE_DEVICE memory.

E.g., set_zone_contiguous() similarly relies on pfn_to_online_section()
and will therefore never set a ZONE_DEVICE zone consecutive.  Stopping
to shrink the ZONE_DEVICE therefore results in no observable changes,
besides /proc/zoneinfo indicating different boundaries - something we
can totally live with.

Before commit d0dc12e8 ("mm/memory_hotplug: optimize memory
hotplug"), the memmap was initialized with 0 and the node with the right
value.  So the zone might be wrong but not garbage.  After that commit,
both the zone and the node will be garbage when touching uninitialized
memmaps.

Toshiki reported a BUG (race between delayed initialization of
ZONE_DEVICE memmaps without holding the memory hotplug lock and
concurrent zone shrinking).

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/11/14/1040

"Iteration of create and destroy namespace causes the panic as below:

      kernel BUG at mm/page_alloc.c:535!
      CPU: 7 PID: 2766 Comm: ndctl Not tainted 5.4.0-rc4 #6
      Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
      RIP: 0010:set_pfnblock_flags_mask+0x95/0xf0
      Call Trace:
       memmap_init_zone_device+0x165/0x17c
       memremap_pages+0x4c1/0x540
       devm_memremap_pages+0x1d/0x60
       pmem_attach_disk+0x16b/0x600 [nd_pmem]
       nvdimm_bus_probe+0x69/0x1c0
       really_probe+0x1c2/0x3e0
       driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x100
       device_driver_attach+0x4f/0x60
       bind_store+0xc9/0x110
       kernfs_fop_write+0x116/0x190
       vfs_write+0xa5/0x1a0
       ksys_write+0x59/0xd0
       do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  While creating a namespace and initializing memmap, if you destroy the
  namespace and shrink the zone, it will initialize the memmap outside
  the zone and trigger VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!zone_spans_pfn(page_zone(page),
  pfn), page) in set_pfnblock_flags_mask()."

This BUG is also mitigated by this commit, where we for now stop to
shrink the ZONE_DEVICE zone until we can do it in a safe and clean way.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191006085646.5768-5-david@redhat.com
Fixes: f1dd2cd1 ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online")	[visible after d0dc12e8]
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NAneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: NToshiki Fukasawa <t-fukasawa@vx.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Damian Tometzki <damian.tometzki@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jun Yao <yaojun8558363@gmail.com>
Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pavel.tatashin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.13+]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 45422b704db392a6d79d07ee3e3670b11048bd53 upstream.

Due to unneeded multiplication in the out_free_pages portion of
r10buf_pool_alloc(), when using a 3-copy raid10 layout, it is
possible to access a resync_pages offset that has not been
initialized.  This access translates into a crash of the system
within resync_free_pages() while passing a bad pointer to
put_page().  Remove the multiplication, preventing access to the
uninitialized area.

Fixes: f0250618 ("md: raid10: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: NJohn Pittman <jpittman@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: NDavid Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NLaurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSong Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 80e84f36412e0c5172447b6947068dca0d04ee82 upstream.

Currently, data variable in ar9003_hw_thermo_cal_apply() could be
uninitialized if ar9300_otp_read_word() will fail to read the value.
Initialize data variable with 0 to prevent an undefined behavior. This
will be enough to handle error case when ar9300_otp_read_word() fails.

Fixes: 80fe43f2 ("ath9k_hw: Read and configure thermocal for AR9462")
Cc: Rajkumar Manoharan <rmanohar@qca.qualcomm.com>
Cc: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: NKalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit bfd6e6e6c5d2ee43a3d9902b36e01fc7527ebb27 upstream.

The `ar_usb` field of `ath10k_usb_pipe_usb_pipe` objects
are initialized to point to the containing `ath10k_usb` object
according to endpoint descriptors read from the device side, as shown
below in `ath10k_usb_setup_pipe_resources`:

for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
        endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;

        // get the address from endpoint descriptor
        pipe_num = ath10k_usb_get_logical_pipe_num(ar_usb,
                                                endpoint->bEndpointAddress,
                                                &urbcount);
        ......
        // select the pipe object
        pipe = &ar_usb->pipes[pipe_num];

        // initialize the ar_usb field
        pipe->ar_usb = ar_usb;
}

The driver assumes that the addresses reported in endpoint
descriptors from device side  to be complete. If a device is
malicious and does not report complete addresses, it may trigger
NULL-ptr-deref `ath10k_usb_alloc_urb_from_pipe` and
`ath10k_usb_free_urb_to_pipe`.

This patch fixes the bug by preventing potential NULL-ptr-deref.
Signed-off-by: NHui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: NHui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: NMathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[groeck: Add driver tag to subject, fix build warning]
Signed-off-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NKalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a78986aae9b2988f8493f9f65a587ee433e83bc3 upstream.

Explicitly exempt ZONE_DEVICE pages from kvm_is_reserved_pfn() and
instead manually handle ZONE_DEVICE on a case-by-case basis.  For things
like page refcounts, KVM needs to treat ZONE_DEVICE pages like normal
pages, e.g. put pages grabbed via gup().  But for flows such as setting
A/D bits or shifting refcounts for transparent huge pages, KVM needs to
to avoid processing ZONE_DEVICE pages as the flows in question lack the
underlying machinery for proper handling of ZONE_DEVICE pages.

This fixes a hang reported by Adam Borowski[*] in dev_pagemap_cleanup()
when running a KVM guest backed with /dev/dax memory, as KVM straight up
doesn't put any references to ZONE_DEVICE pages acquired by gup().

Note, Dan Williams proposed an alternative solution of doing put_page()
on ZONE_DEVICE pages immediately after gup() in order to simplify the
auditing needed to ensure is_zone_device_page() is called if and only if
the backing device is pinned (via gup()).  But that approach would break
kvm_vcpu_{un}map() as KVM requires the page to be pinned from map() 'til
unmap() when accessing guest memory, unlike KVM's secondary MMU, which
coordinates with mmu_notifier invalidations to avoid creating stale
page references, i.e. doesn't rely on pages being pinned.

[*] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190919115547.GA17963@angband.plReported-by: NAdam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
Analyzed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3565fce3 ("mm, x86: get_user_pages() for dax mappings")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sean: backport to 4.x; resolve conflict in mmu.c]
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit cf94da6f502d8caecabd56b194541c873c8a7a3c upstream.

Syzbot reported an invalid-free that I introduced fixing a memleak.

bcsp_recv() also frees bcsp->rx_skb but never nullifies its value.
Nullify bcsp->rx_skb every time it is freed.
Signed-off-by: NTomas Bortoli <tomasbortoli@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+a0d209a4676664613e76@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 5df373e95689b9519b8557da7c5bd0db0856d776 ]

The following race is observed due to which a processes faulting on a
swap entry, finds the page neither in swapcache nor swap.  This causes
zram to give a zero filled page that gets mapped to the process,
resulting in a user space crash later.

Consider parent and child processes Pa and Pb sharing the same swap slot
with swap_count 2.  Swap is on zram with SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO set.
Virtual address 'VA' of Pa and Pb points to the shared swap entry.

Pa                                       Pb

fault on VA                              fault on VA
do_swap_page                             do_swap_page
lookup_swap_cache fails                  lookup_swap_cache fails
                                         Pb scheduled out
swapin_readahead (deletes zram entry)
swap_free (makes swap_count 1)
                                         Pb scheduled in
                                         swap_readpage (swap_count == 1)
                                         Takes SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
                                         zram enrty absent
                                         zram gives a zero filled page

Fix this by making sure that swap slot is freed only when swap count
drops down to one.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1571743294-14285-1-git-send-email-vinmenon@codeaurora.org
Fixes: aa8d22a1 ("mm: swap: SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO: skip swapcache only if swapped page has no other reference")
Signed-off-by: NVinayak Menon <vinmenon@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: NMinchan Kim <minchan@google.com>
Acked-by: NMinchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit e005bd7ddea06784c1eb91ac5bb6b171a94f3b05 ]

Since we now prevent regulatory restore during STA disconnect
if concurrent AP interfaces are active, we need to reschedule
this check when the AP state changes. This fixes never doing
a restore when an AP is the last interface to stop. Or to put
it another way: we need to re-check after anything we check
here changes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 113f3aaa81bd ("cfg80211: Prevent regulatory restore during STA disconnect in concurrent interfaces")
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c2027d1e17582903e368abf5d4838b22a98f2b7b ]

A recent commit allows sockets bound to a VRF to receive ipv6 link local
packets. However, it only works for UDP and worse TCP connection attempts
to the LLA with the only listener bound to the VRF just hang where as
before the client gets a reset and connection refused. Fix by adjusting
ir_iif for LL addresses and packets received through a device enslaved
to a VRF.

Fixes: 6f12fa775530 ("vrf: mark skb for multicast or link-local as enslaved to VRF")
Reported-by: NDonald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
Cc: Mike Manning <mmanning@vyatta.att-mail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit d2ab99403ee00d8014e651728a4702ea1ae5e52c ]

When adding the memory by probing memory block in sysfs interface, there is an
obvious issue that we will unlock the device_hotplug_lock when fails to takes it.

That issue was introduced in Commit 8df1d0e4a265
("mm/memory_hotplug: make add_memory() take the device_hotplug_lock")

We should drop out in time when fails to take the device_hotplug_lock.

Fixes: 8df1d0e4a265 ("mm/memory_hotplug: make add_memory() take the device_hotplug_lock")
Reported-by: NYang yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Nzhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NOscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>