1. 05 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  2. 04 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  3. 27 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • A
      RDS: Check cmsg_len before dereferencing CMSG_DATA · 14e138a8
      Avinash Repaka 提交于
      RDS currently doesn't check if the length of the control message is
      large enough to hold the required data, before dereferencing the control
      message data. This results in following crash:
      
      BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rds_rdma_bytes net/rds/send.c:1013
      [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rds_sendmsg+0x1f02/0x1f90
      net/rds/send.c:1066
      Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801c928fb70 by task syzkaller455006/3157
      
      CPU: 0 PID: 3157 Comm: syzkaller455006 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #161
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
      Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
       dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
       print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
       kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
       kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
       __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
       rds_rdma_bytes net/rds/send.c:1013 [inline]
       rds_sendmsg+0x1f02/0x1f90 net/rds/send.c:1066
       sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:628 [inline]
       sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:638
       ___sys_sendmsg+0x320/0x8b0 net/socket.c:2018
       __sys_sendmmsg+0x1ee/0x620 net/socket.c:2108
       SYSC_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2139 [inline]
       SyS_sendmmsg+0x35/0x60 net/socket.c:2134
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
      RIP: 0033:0x43fe49
      RSP: 002b:00007fffbe244ad8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fe49
      RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000002020c000 RDI: 0000000000000003
      RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 00000000004017b0
      R13: 0000000000401840 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
      
      To fix this, we verify that the cmsg_len is large enough to hold the
      data to be read, before proceeding further.
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAvinash Repaka <avinash.repaka@oracle.com>
      Acked-by: NSantosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NYuval Shaia <yuval.shaia@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      14e138a8
  4. 07 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • H
      rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map · f3069c6d
      Håkon Bugge 提交于
      This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
      attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.
      
      Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
      (2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.
      
      Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:
      
      BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
      IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
      PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
      Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
      dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
      coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
      ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
      iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
      shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
      auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
      mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
      sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
      crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
      dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
      CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
      Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
      task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
      RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
      RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
      RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
      RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
      R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
      R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
      FS:  00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
      Call Trace:
       rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
       rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
       ? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
       ? __fdget+0x13/0x20
       SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
       do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
       entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
      RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
      RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
      RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
      RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
      R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
      R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021
      
      Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
      89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
      83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08
      
      The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
      __rds_rdma_map().
      Signed-off-by: NHåkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Acked-by: NSantosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f3069c6d
  5. 16 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  6. 10 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • H
      rds: ib: Fix NULL pointer dereference in debug code · 1cb483a5
      Håkon Bugge 提交于
      rds_ib_recv_refill() is a function that refills an IB receive
      queue. It can be called from both the CQE handler (tasklet) and a
      worker thread.
      
      Just after the call to ib_post_recv(), a debug message is printed with
      rdsdebug():
      
                  ret = ib_post_recv(ic->i_cm_id->qp, &recv->r_wr, &failed_wr);
                  rdsdebug("recv %p ibinc %p page %p addr %lu ret %d\n", recv,
                           recv->r_ibinc, sg_page(&recv->r_frag->f_sg),
                           (long) ib_sg_dma_address(
                                  ic->i_cm_id->device,
                                  &recv->r_frag->f_sg),
                          ret);
      
      Now consider an invocation of rds_ib_recv_refill() from the worker
      thread, which is preemptible. Further, assume that the worker thread
      is preempted between the ib_post_recv() and rdsdebug() statements.
      
      Then, if the preemption is due to a receive CQE event, the
      rds_ib_recv_cqe_handler() will be invoked. This function processes
      receive completions, including freeing up data structures, such as the
      recv->r_frag.
      
      In this scenario, rds_ib_recv_cqe_handler() will process the receive
      WR posted above. That implies, that the recv->r_frag has been freed
      before the above rdsdebug() statement has been executed. When it is
      later executed, we will have a NULL pointer dereference:
      
      [ 4088.068008] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
      [ 4088.076754] IP: rds_ib_recv_refill+0x87/0x620 [rds_rdma]
      [ 4088.082686] PGD 0 P4D 0
      [ 4088.085515] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [ 4088.089015] Modules linked in: rds_rdma(OE) rds(OE) rpcsec_gss_krb5(E) nfsv4(E) dns_resolver(E) nfs(E) fscache(E) mlx4_ib(E) ib_ipoib(E) rdma_ucm(E) ib_ucm(E) ib_uverbs(E) ib_umad(E) rdma_cm(E) ib_cm(E) iw_cm(E) ib_core(E) binfmt_misc(E) sb_edac(E) intel_powerclamp(E) coretemp(E) kvm_intel(E) kvm(E) irqbypass(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) crc32_pclmul(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) pcbc(E) aesni_intel(E) crypto_simd(E) iTCO_wdt(E) glue_helper(E) iTCO_vendor_support(E) sg(E) cryptd(E) pcspkr(E) ipmi_si(E) ipmi_devintf(E) ipmi_msghandler(E) shpchp(E) ioatdma(E) i2c_i801(E) wmi(E) lpc_ich(E) mei_me(E) mei(E) mfd_core(E) nfsd(E) auth_rpcgss(E) nfs_acl(E) lockd(E) grace(E) sunrpc(E) ip_tables(E) ext4(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) fscrypto(E) mgag200(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) drm_kms_helper(E) syscopyarea(E) sysfillrect(E) sysimgblt(E)
      [ 4088.168486]  fb_sys_fops(E) ahci(E) ixgbe(E) libahci(E) ttm(E) mdio(E) ptp(E) pps_core(E) drm(E) sd_mod(E) libata(E) crc32c_intel(E) mlx4_core(E) i2c_core(E) dca(E) megaraid_sas(E) dm_mirror(E) dm_region_hash(E) dm_log(E) dm_mod(E) [last unloaded: rds]
      [ 4088.193442] CPU: 20 PID: 1244 Comm: kworker/20:2 Tainted: G           OE   4.14.0-rc7.master.20171105.ol7.x86_64 #1
      [ 4088.205097] Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
      [ 4088.216074] Workqueue: ib_cm cm_work_handler [ib_cm]
      [ 4088.221614] task: ffff885fa11d0000 task.stack: ffffc9000e598000
      [ 4088.228224] RIP: 0010:rds_ib_recv_refill+0x87/0x620 [rds_rdma]
      [ 4088.234736] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e59bb68 EFLAGS: 00010286
      [ 4088.240568] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9002115d050 RCX: ffffc9002115d050
      [ 4088.248535] RDX: ffffffffa0521380 RSI: ffffffffa0522158 RDI: ffffffffa0525580
      [ 4088.256498] RBP: ffffc9000e59bbf8 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
      [ 4088.264465] R10: 0000000000000339 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
      [ 4088.272433] R13: ffff885f8c9d8000 R14: ffffffff81a0a060 R15: ffff884676268000
      [ 4088.280397] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff885fbec80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      [ 4088.289434] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [ 4088.295846] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000001e09005 CR4: 00000000001606e0
      [ 4088.303816] Call Trace:
      [ 4088.306557]  rds_ib_cm_connect_complete+0xe0/0x220 [rds_rdma]
      [ 4088.312982]  ? __dynamic_pr_debug+0x8c/0xb0
      [ 4088.317664]  ? __queue_work+0x142/0x3c0
      [ 4088.321944]  rds_rdma_cm_event_handler+0x19e/0x250 [rds_rdma]
      [ 4088.328370]  cma_ib_handler+0xcd/0x280 [rdma_cm]
      [ 4088.333522]  cm_process_work+0x25/0x120 [ib_cm]
      [ 4088.338580]  cm_work_handler+0xd6b/0x17aa [ib_cm]
      [ 4088.343832]  process_one_work+0x149/0x360
      [ 4088.348307]  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
      [ 4088.352397]  kthread+0x109/0x140
      [ 4088.355996]  ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
      [ 4088.360467]  ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
      [ 4088.364563]  ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
      [ 4088.368548] Code: 48 89 45 90 48 89 45 98 eb 4d 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 43 08 48 89 d9 48 c7 c2 80 13 52 a0 48 c7 c6 58 21 52 a0 48 c7 c7 80 55 52 a0 <4c> 8b 48 20 44 89 64 24 08 48 8b 40 30 49 83 e1 fc 48 89 04 24
      [ 4088.389612] RIP: rds_ib_recv_refill+0x87/0x620 [rds_rdma] RSP: ffffc9000e59bb68
      [ 4088.397772] CR2: 0000000000000020
      [ 4088.401505] ---[ end trace fe922e6ccf004431 ]---
      
      This bug was provoked by compiling rds out-of-tree with
      EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DRDS_DEBUG -DDEBUG" and inserting an artificial delay
      between the rdsdebug() and ib_ib_port_recv() statements:
      
         	       /* XXX when can this fail? */
      	       ret = ib_post_recv(ic->i_cm_id->qp, &recv->r_wr, &failed_wr);
      +		if (can_wait)
      +			usleep_range(1000, 5000);
      	       rdsdebug("recv %p ibinc %p page %p addr %lu ret %d\n", recv,
      			recv->r_ibinc, sg_page(&recv->r_frag->f_sg),
      			(long) ib_sg_dma_address(
      
      The fix is simply to move the rdsdebug() statement up before the
      ib_post_recv() and remove the printing of ret, which is taken care of
      anyway by the non-debug code.
      Signed-off-by: NHåkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NKnut Omang <knut.omang@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NWei Lin Guay <wei.lin.guay@oracle.com>
      Acked-by: NSantosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1cb483a5
  7. 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • G
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
      makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
      
      By default all files without license information are under the default
      license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
      
      Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
      SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
      shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
      
      This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
      Philippe Ombredanne.
      
      How this work was done:
      
      Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
      the use cases:
       - file had no licensing information it it.
       - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
       - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
      
      Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
      where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
      had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
      
      The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
      a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
      output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
      tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
      base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
      
      The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
      assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
      results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
      to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
      immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
       - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
       - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
         lines of source
       - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
         lines).
      
      All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
      
      The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
      identifiers to apply.
      
       - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
         considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
         COPYING file license applied.
      
         For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0                                              11139
      
         and resulted in the first patch in this series.
      
         If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
         Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
      
         and resulted in the second patch in this series.
      
       - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
         of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
         any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
         it (per prior point).  Results summary:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
         GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
         LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
         GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
         ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
         LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
         LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
      
         and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
      
       - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
         the concluded license(s).
      
       - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
         license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
         licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
      
       - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
         resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
         which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
      
       - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
         confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
       - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
         the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
         in time.
      
      In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
      spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
      source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
      by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
      FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
      disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
      Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
      they are related.
      
      Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
      for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
      files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
      in about 15000 files.
      
      In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
      copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
      correct identifier.
      
      Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
      inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
      version early this week with:
       - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
         license ids and scores
       - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
         files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
       - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
         was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
         SPDX license was correct
      
      This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
      worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
      different types of files to be modified.
      
      These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
      parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
      format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
      based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
      distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
      comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
      generate the patches.
      Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b2441318
  8. 26 10月, 2017 2 次提交
  9. 06 10月, 2017 2 次提交
  10. 08 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 06 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  12. 29 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 09 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  14. 04 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  15. 21 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  16. 17 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • S
      rds: cancel send/recv work before queuing connection shutdown · aed20a53
      Sowmini Varadhan 提交于
      We could end up executing rds_conn_shutdown before the rds_recv_worker
      thread, then rds_conn_shutdown -> rds_tcp_conn_shutdown can do a
      sock_release and set sock->sk to null, which may interleave in bad
      ways with rds_recv_worker, e.g., it could result in:
      
      "BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078"
          [ffff881769f6fd70] release_sock at ffffffff815f337b
          [ffff881769f6fd90] rds_tcp_recv at ffffffffa043c888 [rds_tcp]
          [ffff881769f6fdb0] rds_recv_worker at ffffffffa04a4810 [rds]
          [ffff881769f6fde0] process_one_work at ffffffff810a14c1
          [ffff881769f6fe40] worker_thread at ffffffff810a1940
          [ffff881769f6fec0] kthread at ffffffff810a6b1e
      
      Also, do not enqueue any new shutdown workq items when the connection is
      shutting down (this may happen for rds-tcp in softirq mode, if a FIN
      or CLOSE is received while the modules is in the middle of an unload)
      Signed-off-by: NSowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      aed20a53
  17. 08 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  18. 05 7月, 2017 4 次提交
  19. 01 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  20. 22 6月, 2017 2 次提交
  21. 17 6月, 2017 3 次提交
  22. 22 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  23. 06 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  24. 03 4月, 2017 2 次提交
  25. 14 3月, 2017 4 次提交
  26. 10 3月, 2017 2 次提交
    • D
      net: Work around lockdep limitation in sockets that use sockets · cdfbabfb
      David Howells 提交于
      Lockdep issues a circular dependency warning when AFS issues an operation
      through AF_RXRPC from a context in which the VFS/VM holds the mmap_sem.
      
      The theory lockdep comes up with is as follows:
      
       (1) If the pagefault handler decides it needs to read pages from AFS, it
           calls AFS with mmap_sem held and AFS begins an AF_RXRPC call, but
           creating a call requires the socket lock:
      
      	mmap_sem must be taken before sk_lock-AF_RXRPC
      
       (2) afs_open_socket() opens an AF_RXRPC socket and binds it.  rxrpc_bind()
           binds the underlying UDP socket whilst holding its socket lock.
           inet_bind() takes its own socket lock:
      
      	sk_lock-AF_RXRPC must be taken before sk_lock-AF_INET
      
       (3) Reading from a TCP socket into a userspace buffer might cause a fault
           and thus cause the kernel to take the mmap_sem, but the TCP socket is
           locked whilst doing this:
      
      	sk_lock-AF_INET must be taken before mmap_sem
      
      However, lockdep's theory is wrong in this instance because it deals only
      with lock classes and not individual locks.  The AF_INET lock in (2) isn't
      really equivalent to the AF_INET lock in (3) as the former deals with a
      socket entirely internal to the kernel that never sees userspace.  This is
      a limitation in the design of lockdep.
      
      Fix the general case by:
      
       (1) Double up all the locking keys used in sockets so that one set are
           used if the socket is created by userspace and the other set is used
           if the socket is created by the kernel.
      
       (2) Store the kern parameter passed to sk_alloc() in a variable in the
           sock struct (sk_kern_sock).  This informs sock_lock_init(),
           sock_init_data() and sk_clone_lock() as to the lock keys to be used.
      
           Note that the child created by sk_clone_lock() inherits the parent's
           kern setting.
      
       (3) Add a 'kern' parameter to ->accept() that is analogous to the one
           passed in to ->create() that distinguishes whether kernel_accept() or
           sys_accept4() was the caller and can be passed to sk_alloc().
      
           Note that a lot of accept functions merely dequeue an already
           allocated socket.  I haven't touched these as the new socket already
           exists before we get the parameter.
      
           Note also that there are a couple of places where I've made the accepted
           socket unconditionally kernel-based:
      
      	irda_accept()
      	rds_rcp_accept_one()
      	tcp_accept_from_sock()
      
           because they follow a sock_create_kern() and accept off of that.
      
      Whilst creating this, I noticed that lustre and ocfs don't create sockets
      through sock_create_kern() and thus they aren't marked as for-kernel,
      though they appear to be internal.  I wonder if these should do that so
      that they use the new set of lock keys.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cdfbabfb
    • Z
      rds: ib: add error handle · 3b12f73a
      Zhu Yanjun 提交于
      In the function rds_ib_setup_qp, the error handle is missing. When some
      error occurs, it is possible that memory leak occurs. As such, error
      handle is added.
      
      Cc: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJunxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NGuanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NZhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
      Acked-by: NSantosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3b12f73a
  27. 08 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • S
      rds: tcp: Sequence teardown of listen and acceptor sockets to avoid races · b21dd450
      Sowmini Varadhan 提交于
      Commit a93d01f5 ("RDS: TCP: avoid bad page reference in
      rds_tcp_listen_data_ready") added the function
      rds_tcp_listen_sock_def_readable()  to handle the case when a
      partially set-up acceptor socket drops into rds_tcp_listen_data_ready().
      However, if the listen socket (rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock) is itself going
      through a tear-down via rds_tcp_listen_stop(), the (*ready)() will be
      null and we would hit a panic  of the form
        BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at   (null)
        IP:           (null)
         :
        ? rds_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x59/0xb0 [rds_tcp]
        tcp_data_queue+0x39d/0x5b0
        tcp_rcv_established+0x2e5/0x660
        tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x122/0x220
        tcp_v4_rcv+0x8b7/0x980
          :
      In the above case, it is not fatal to encounter a NULL value for
      ready- we should just drop the packet and let the flush of the
      acceptor thread finish gracefully.
      
      In general, the tear-down sequence for listen() and accept() socket
      that is ensured by this commit is:
           rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock = NULL; /* prevent any new accepts */
           In rds_tcp_listen_stop():
               serialize with, and prevent, further callbacks using lock_sock()
               flush rds_wq
               flush acceptor workq
               sock_release(listen socket)
      Signed-off-by: NSowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b21dd450