1. 24 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE · a89f040f
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of
      user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented
      ways to exploit that.
      
      The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space
      page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime
      conditional.
      
      Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature
      bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled.
      
      Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be
      made later.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      a89f040f
  2. 23 12月, 2017 3 次提交
    • T
      x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it to a separate unit · ed1bbc40
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Separate the cpu_entry_area code out of cpu/common.c and the fixmap.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ed1bbc40
    • P
      x86/microcode: Dont abuse the TLB-flush interface · 23cb7d46
      Peter Zijlstra 提交于
      Commit:
      
        ec400dde ("x86/microcode_intel_early.c: Early update ucode on Intel's CPU")
      
      ... grubbed into tlbflush internals without coherent explanation.
      
      Since it says its a precaution and the SDM doesn't mention anything like
      this, take it out back.
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      23cb7d46
    • D
      x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack · 4fe2d8b1
      Dave Hansen 提交于
      If the kernel oopses while on the trampoline stack, it will print
      "<SYSENTER>" even if SYSENTER is not involved.  That is rather confusing.
      
      The "SYSENTER" stack is used for a lot more than SYSENTER now.  Give it a
      better string to display in stack dumps, and rename the kernel code to
      match.
      
      Also move the 32-bit code over to the new naming even though it still uses
      the entry stack only for SYSENTER.
      Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      4fe2d8b1
  3. 17 12月, 2017 12 次提交
    • T
      x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky · 6cbd2171
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That
      makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all
      upcoming CPUs.
      
      Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.992156574@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6cbd2171
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only · c482feef
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
      is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR.  Make it
      read-only on x86_64.
      
      On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
      switches, and we use a task gate for double faults.  I'd also be
      nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
      without double fault handling.
      
      [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO.  So
        	it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
        	might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
        	confirmation. ]
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      c482feef
    • A
      x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code · 0f9a4810
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The existing code was a mess, mainly because C arrays are nasty.  Turn
      SYSENTER_stack into a struct, add a helper to find it, and do all the
      obvious cleanups this enables.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.653244723@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      0f9a4810
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area · 40e7f949
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The IST stacks are needed when an IST exception occurs and are accessed
      before any kernel code at all runs.  Move them into struct cpu_entry_area.
      
      The IST stacks are unlike the rest of cpu_entry_area: they're used even for
      entries from kernel mode.  This means that they should be set up before we
      load the final IDT.  Move cpu_entry_area setup to trap_init() for the boot
      CPU and set it up for all possible CPUs at once in native_smp_prepare_cpus().
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.480598743@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      40e7f949
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline · 3386bc8a
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Handling SYSCALL is tricky: the SYSCALL handler is entered with every
      single register (except FLAGS), including RSP, live.  It somehow needs
      to set RSP to point to a valid stack, which means it needs to save the
      user RSP somewhere and find its own stack pointer.  The canonical way
      to do this is with SWAPGS, which lets us access percpu data using the
      %gs prefix.
      
      With PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION-like pagetable switching, this is
      problematic.  Without a scratch register, switching CR3 is impossible, so
      %gs-based percpu memory would need to be mapped in the user pagetables.
      Doing that without information leaks is difficult or impossible.
      
      Instead, use a different sneaky trick.  Map a copy of the first part
      of the SYSCALL asm at a different address for each CPU.  Now RIP
      varies depending on the CPU, so we can use RIP-relative memory access
      to access percpu memory.  By putting the relevant information (one
      scratch slot and the stack address) at a constant offset relative to
      RIP, we can make SYSCALL work without relying on %gs.
      
      A nice thing about this approach is that we can easily switch it on
      and off if we want pagetable switching to be configurable.
      
      The compat variant of SYSCALL doesn't have this problem in the first
      place -- there are plenty of scratch registers, since we don't care
      about preserving r8-r15.  This patch therefore doesn't touch SYSCALL32
      at all.
      
      This patch actually seems to be a small speedup.  With this patch,
      SYSCALL touches an extra cache line and an extra virtual page, but
      the pipeline no longer stalls waiting for SWAPGS.  It seems that, at
      least in a tight loop, the latter outweights the former.
      
      Thanks to David Laight for an optimization tip.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.403607157@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      3386bc8a
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries · 7f2590a1
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Historically, IDT entries from usermode have always gone directly
      to the running task's kernel stack.  Rearrange it so that we enter on
      a per-CPU trampoline stack and then manually switch to the task's stack.
      This touches a couple of extra cachelines, but it gives us a chance
      to run some code before we touch the kernel stack.
      
      The asm isn't exactly beautiful, but I think that fully refactoring
      it can wait.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.225330557@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7f2590a1
    • A
      x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area · 72f5e08d
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      This has a secondary purpose: it puts the entry stack into a region
      with a well-controlled layout.  A subsequent patch will take
      advantage of this to streamline the SYSCALL entry code to be able to
      find it more easily.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.962042855@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      72f5e08d
    • A
      x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct · 1a935bc3
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      SYSENTER_stack should have reliable overflow detection, which
      means that it needs to be at the bottom of a page, not the top.
      Move it to the beginning of struct tss_struct and page-align it.
      
      Also add an assertion to make sure that the fixed hardware TSS
      doesn't cross a page boundary.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.881827433@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      1a935bc3
    • A
      x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss · 7fb983b4
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      A future patch will move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of cpu_tss
      to help detect overflow.  Before this can happen, fix several code
      paths that hardcode assumptions about the old layout.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Reviewed-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.722425540@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7fb983b4
    • A
      x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area · ef8813ab
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Currently, the GDT is an ad-hoc array of pages, one per CPU, in the
      fixmap.  Generalize it to be an array of a new 'struct cpu_entry_area'
      so that we can cleanly add new things to it.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.563271721@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ef8813ab
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack · 1a79797b
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      This will simplify future changes that want scratch variables early in
      the SYSENTER handler -- they'll be able to spill registers to the
      stack.  It also lets us get rid of a SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK user.
      
      This does not depend on CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=y because we'll want the
      stack space even without IA32 emulation.
      
      As far as I can tell, the reason that this wasn't done from day 1 is
      that we use IST for #DB and #BP, which is IMO rather nasty and causes
      a lot more problems than it solves.  But, since #DB uses IST, we don't
      actually need a real stack for SYSENTER (because SYSENTER with TF set
      will invoke #DB on the IST stack rather than the SYSENTER stack).
      
      I want to remove IST usage from these vectors some day, and this patch
      is a prerequisite for that as well.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.312726423@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      1a79797b
    • R
      x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD · f2dbad36
      Rudolf Marek 提交于
      [ Note, this is a Git cherry-pick of the following commit:
      
          2b67799bdf25 ("x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD")
      
        ... for easier x86 PTI code testing and back-porting. ]
      
      The latest AMD AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual
      adds a CPUID feature XSaveErPtr (CPUID_Fn80000008_EBX[2]).
      
      If this feature is set, the FXSAVE, XSAVE, FXSAVEOPT, XSAVEC, XSAVES
      / FXRSTOR, XRSTOR, XRSTORS always save/restore error pointers,
      thus making the X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK workaround obsolete on such CPUs.
      Signed-Off-By: NRudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bdcebe90-62c5-1f05-083c-eba7f08b2540@assembler.czSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f2dbad36
  4. 11 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  5. 10 11月, 2017 2 次提交
  6. 03 11月, 2017 2 次提交
    • R
      x86: CPU: Fix up "cpu MHz" in /proc/cpuinfo · 941f5f0f
      Rafael J. Wysocki 提交于
      Commit 890da9cf (Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get() for
      /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"") is not sufficient to restore the previous
      behavior of "cpu MHz" in /proc/cpuinfo on x86 due to some changes
      made after the commit it has reverted.
      
      To address this, make the code in question use arch_freq_get_on_cpu()
      which also is used by cpufreq for reporting the current frequency of
      CPUs and since that function doesn't really depend on cpufreq in any
      way, drop the CONFIG_CPU_FREQ dependency for the object file
      containing it.
      
      Also refactor arch_freq_get_on_cpu() somewhat to avoid IPIs and
      return cached values right away if it is called very often over a
      short time (to prevent user space from triggering IPI storms through
      it).
      
      Fixes: 890da9cf (Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get() for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"")
      Cc: stable@kernel.org   # 4.13 - together with 890da9cfSigned-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      941f5f0f
    • L
      Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get() for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"" · 890da9cf
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      This reverts commit 51204e06.
      
      There wasn't really any good reason for it, and people are complaining
      (rightly) that it broke existing practice.
      
      Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      890da9cf
  7. 02 11月, 2017 5 次提交
    • T
      x86/cpuid: Replace set/clear_bit32() · 06dd688d
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Peter pointed out that the set/clear_bit32() variants are broken in various
      aspects.
      
      Replace them with open coded set/clear_bit() and type cast
      cpu_info::x86_capability as it's done in all other places throughout x86.
      
      Fixes: 0b00de85 ("x86/cpuid: Add generic table for CPUID dependencies")
      Reported-by: NPeter Ziljstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      06dd688d
    • G
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
      makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
      
      By default all files without license information are under the default
      license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
      
      Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
      SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
      shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
      
      This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
      Philippe Ombredanne.
      
      How this work was done:
      
      Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
      the use cases:
       - file had no licensing information it it.
       - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
       - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
      
      Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
      where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
      had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
      
      The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
      a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
      output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
      tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
      base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
      
      The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
      assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
      results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
      to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
      immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
       - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
       - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
         lines of source
       - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
         lines).
      
      All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
      
      The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
      identifiers to apply.
      
       - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
         considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
         COPYING file license applied.
      
         For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0                                              11139
      
         and resulted in the first patch in this series.
      
         If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
         Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
      
         and resulted in the second patch in this series.
      
       - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
         of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
         any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
         it (per prior point).  Results summary:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
         GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
         LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
         GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
         ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
         LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
         LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
      
         and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
      
       - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
         the concluded license(s).
      
       - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
         license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
         licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
      
       - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
         resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
         which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
      
       - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
         confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
       - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
         the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
         in time.
      
      In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
      spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
      source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
      by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
      FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
      disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
      Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
      they are related.
      
      Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
      for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
      files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
      in about 15000 files.
      
      In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
      copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
      correct identifier.
      
      Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
      inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
      version early this week with:
       - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
         license ids and scores
       - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
         files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
       - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
         was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
         SPDX license was correct
      
      This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
      worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
      different types of files to be modified.
      
      These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
      parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
      format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
      based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
      distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
      comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
      generate the patches.
      Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b2441318
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Stop initializing TSS.sp0 at boot · 20bb8344
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      In my quest to get rid of thread_struct::sp0, I want to clean up or
      remove all of its readers.  Two of them are in cpu_init() (32-bit and
      64-bit), and they aren't needed.  This is because we never enter
      userspace at all on the threads that CPUs are initialized in.
      
      Poison the initial TSS.sp0 and stop initializing it on CPU init.
      
      The comment text mostly comes from Dave Hansen.  Thanks!
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ee4a00540ad28c6cff475fbcc7769a4460acc861.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      20bb8344
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Pass SP0 directly to load_sp0() · da51da18
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      load_sp0() had an odd signature:
      
        void load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss, struct thread_struct *thread);
      
      Simplify it to:
      
        void load_sp0(unsigned long sp0);
      
      Also simplify a few get_cpu()/put_cpu() sequences to
      preempt_disable()/preempt_enable().
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2655d8b42ed940aa384fe18ee1129bbbcf730a08.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      da51da18
    • B
      x86/mcelog: Get rid of RCU remnants · 7298f08e
      Borislav Petkov 提交于
      Jeremy reported a suspicious RCU usage warning in mcelog.
      
      /dev/mcelog is called in process context now as part of the notifier
      chain and doesn't need any of the fancy RCU and lockless accesses which
      it did in atomic context.
      
      Axe it all in favor of a simple mutex synchronization which cures the
      problem reported.
      
      Fixes: 5de97c9f ("x86/mce: Factor out and deprecate the /dev/mcelog driver")
      Reported-by: NJeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-and-tested-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171101164754.xzzmskl4ngrqc5br@pd.tnic
      Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1498969
      7298f08e
  8. 31 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  9. 19 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  10. 18 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 17 10月, 2017 2 次提交
  12. 16 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 14 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  14. 05 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  15. 18 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  16. 15 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  17. 13 9月, 2017 2 次提交
    • K
      x86/hyper-V: Allocate the IDT entry early in boot · 213ff44a
      K. Y. Srinivasan 提交于
      Allocate the hypervisor callback IDT entry early in the boot sequence.
      
      The previous code would allocate the entry as part of registering the handler
      when the vmbus driver loaded, and this caused a problem for the IDT cleanup
      that Thomas is working on for v4.15.
      Signed-off-by: NK. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: apw@canonical.com
      Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org
      Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
      Cc: jasowang@redhat.com
      Cc: olaf@aepfle.de
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170908231557.2419-1-kys@exchange.microsoft.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      213ff44a
    • A
      x86/mm/64: Initialize CR4.PCIDE early · c7ad5ad2
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      cpu_init() is weird: it's called rather late (after early
      identification and after most MMU state is initialized) on the boot
      CPU but is called extremely early (before identification) on secondary
      CPUs.  It's called just late enough on the boot CPU that its CR4 value
      isn't propagated to mmu_cr4_features.
      
      Even if we put CR4.PCIDE into mmu_cr4_features, we'd hit two
      problems.  First, we'd crash in the trampoline code.  That's
      fixable, and I tried that.  It turns out that mmu_cr4_features is
      totally ignored by secondary_start_64(), though, so even with the
      trampoline code fixed, it wouldn't help.
      
      This means that we don't currently have CR4.PCIDE reliably initialized
      before we start playing with cpu_tlbstate.  This is very fragile and
      tends to cause boot failures if I make even small changes to the TLB
      handling code.
      
      Make it more robust: initialize CR4.PCIDE earlier on the boot CPU
      and propagate it to secondary CPUs in start_secondary().
      
      ( Yes, this is ugly.  I think we should have improved mmu_cr4_features
        to actually control CR4 during secondary bootup, but that would be
        fairly intrusive at this stage. )
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Reported-by: NSai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
      Tested-by: NSai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Fixes: 660da7c9 ("x86/mm: Enable CR4.PCIDE on supported systems")
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      c7ad5ad2
  18. 07 9月, 2017 2 次提交