1. 14 7月, 2016 1 次提交
  2. 23 5月, 2016 1 次提交
    • T
      sunrpc: fix stripping of padded MIC tokens · c0cb8bf3
      Tomáš Trnka 提交于
      The length of the GSS MIC token need not be a multiple of four bytes.
      It is then padded by XDR to a multiple of 4 B, but unwrap_integ_data()
      would previously only trim mic.len + 4 B. The remaining up to three
      bytes would then trigger a check in nfs4svc_decode_compoundargs(),
      leading to a "garbage args" error and mount failure:
      
      nfs4svc_decode_compoundargs: compound not properly padded!
      nfsd: failed to decode arguments!
      
      This would prevent older clients using the pre-RFC 4121 MIC format
      (37-byte MIC including a 9-byte OID) from mounting exports from v3.9+
      servers using krb5i.
      
      The trimming was introduced by commit 4c190e2f ("sunrpc: trim off
      trailing checksum before returning decrypted or integrity authenticated
      buffer").
      
      Fixes: 4c190e2f "unrpc: trim off trailing checksum..."
      Signed-off-by: NTomáš Trnka <ttrnka@mail.muni.cz>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
      Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
      c0cb8bf3
  3. 04 5月, 2016 1 次提交
  4. 27 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 10 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  6. 25 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  7. 23 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  8. 31 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  9. 08 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  10. 07 1月, 2014 3 次提交
  11. 09 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  12. 01 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  13. 02 7月, 2013 2 次提交
  14. 29 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  15. 29 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  16. 13 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  17. 01 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  18. 30 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  19. 26 4月, 2013 2 次提交
  20. 30 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • C
      SUNRPC: Consider qop when looking up pseudoflavors · 83523d08
      Chuck Lever 提交于
      The NFSv4 SECINFO operation returns a list of security flavors that
      the server supports for a particular share.  An NFSv4 client is
      supposed to pick a pseudoflavor it supports that corresponds to one
      of the flavors returned by the server.
      
      GSS flavors in this list have a GSS tuple that identify a specific
      GSS pseudoflavor.
      
      Currently our client ignores the GSS tuple's "qop" value.  A
      matching pseudoflavor is chosen based only on the OID and service
      value.
      
      So far this omission has not had much effect on Linux.  The NFSv4
      protocol currently supports only one qop value: GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
      also known as zero.
      
      However, if an NFSv4 server happens to return something other than
      zero in the qop field, our client won't notice.  This could cause
      the client to behave in incorrect ways that could have security
      implications.
      Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
      83523d08
  21. 06 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      nfsd: fix krb5 handling of anonymous principals · 3c34ae11
      J. Bruce Fields 提交于
      krb5 mounts started failing as of
      683428fa "sunrpc: Update svcgss xdr
      handle to rpsec_contect cache".
      
      The problem is that mounts are usually done with some host principal
      which isn't normally mapped to any user, in which case svcgssd passes
      down uid -1, which the kernel is then expected to map to the
      export-specific anonymous uid or gid.
      
      The new uid_valid/gid_valid checks were therefore causing that downcall
      to fail.
      
      (Note the regression may not have been seen with older userspace that
      tended to map unknown principals to an anonymous id on their own rather
      than leaving it to the kernel.)
      Reviewed-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
      3c34ae11
  22. 15 2月, 2013 2 次提交
  23. 13 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  24. 09 2月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      sunrpc: trim off trailing checksum before returning decrypted or integrity authenticated buffer · 4c190e2f
      Jeff Layton 提交于
      When GSSAPI integrity signatures are in use, or when we're using GSSAPI
      privacy with the v2 token format, there is a trailing checksum on the
      xdr_buf that is returned.
      
      It's checked during the authentication stage, and afterward nothing
      cares about it. Ordinarily, it's not a problem since the XDR code
      generally ignores it, but it will be when we try to compute a checksum
      over the buffer to help prevent XID collisions in the duplicate reply
      cache.
      
      Fix the code to trim off the checksums after verifying them. Note that
      in unwrap_integ_data, we must avoid trying to reverify the checksum if
      the request was deferred since it will no longer be present when it's
      revisited.
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
      4c190e2f
  25. 01 6月, 2012 2 次提交
  26. 03 5月, 2012 1 次提交
  27. 26 4月, 2012 1 次提交
  28. 01 2月, 2012 1 次提交
  29. 31 3月, 2011 1 次提交
  30. 18 12月, 2010 1 次提交
  31. 22 9月, 2010 2 次提交
  32. 15 5月, 2010 2 次提交