if, when mounting //HOST/share/sub/dir/foo we can query /sub/dir/foo but
not any of the path components above:

- store the /sub/dir/foo prefix in the cifs super_block info
- in the superblock, set root dentry to the subpath dentry (instead of
  the share root)
- set a flag in the superblock to remember it
- use prefixpath when building path from a dentry

fixes bso#8950
Signed-off-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info
struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions.  However, the
server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated
and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below:

mount.cifs(8) #1				mount.cifs(8) #2

Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
// false

						Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
						// false

secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash..
secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc..
sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd;

						secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc
						// sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm
						// not yet assigned

crypto_shash_update()
 deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm

 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030
 epc   : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
 ra    : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
 Call Trace:
  crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
  setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
  build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c
  sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248
  CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178
  cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84
  cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314
  cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c
  cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440
  mount_fs+0x20/0xc0
  vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138
  do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc
  SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4
  syscall_common+0x30/0x54

Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these
hmac(md5) structures.  All the other secmech algos already have similar
locking.

Fixes: 95dc8dd1 ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires")
Signed-off-by: NRabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>
Acked-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

adfeb3e0 ("cifs: Make echo interval tunable") added a comparison of
vol->echo_interval to server->echo_interval as a criterium to
match_server(), but:

 (1) A default value is set for server->echo_interval but not for
 vol->echo_interval, meaning these can never match if the echo_interval
 option is not specified.

 (2) vol->echo_interval is in seconds but server->echo_interval is in
 jiffies, meaning these can never match even if the echo_interval option
 is specified.

This broke TCP session reuse since match_server() can never return 1.
Fix it.

Fixes: adfeb3e0 ("cifs: Make echo interval tunable")
Signed-off-by: NRabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>
Acked-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

When opening a file with O_CREAT flag, check to see if the file opened
is an existing directory.

This prevents the directory from being opened which subsequently causes
a crash when the close function for directories cifs_closedir() is called
which frees up the file->private_data memory while the file is still
listed on the open file list for the tcon.
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: NXiaoli Feng <xifeng@redhat.com>

We should be able to use the same helper functions used for SMB 2.1 and
later versions.
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs.  We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.

CVE-2016-1583
Signed-off-by: NJeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

This reverts commit 2f36db71.

It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on
the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file,
which is a bit of a heavy hammer.  The right fix is to have mmap depend
on the existence of the mmap handler instead.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

overlay needs underlying fs to support d_type. Recently I put in a
patch in to detect this condition and started failing mount if
underlying fs did not support d_type.

But this breaks existing configurations over kernel upgrade. Those who
are running docker (partially broken configuration) with xfs not
supporting d_type, are surprised that after kernel upgrade docker does
not run anymore.

https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/22937#issuecomment-229881315

So instead of erroring out, detect broken configuration and warn
about it. This should allow existing docker setups to continue
working after kernel upgrade.
Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 45aebeaf ("ovl: Ensure upper filesystem supports d_type")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.6

(Another one for the f_path debacle.)

ltp fcntl33 testcase caused an Oops in selinux_file_send_sigiotask.

The reason is that generic_add_lease() used filp->f_path.dentry->inode
while all the others use file_inode().  This makes a difference for files
opened on overlayfs since the former will point to the overlay inode the
latter to the underlying inode.

So generic_add_lease() added the lease to the overlay inode and
generic_delete_lease() removed it from the underlying inode.  When the file
was released the lease remained on the overlay inode's lock list, resulting
in use after free.
Reported-by: NEryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4bacc9c9 ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

- m_start() in fs/namespace.c expects that ns->event is incremented each
  time a mount added or removed from ns->list.
- umount_tree() removes items from the list but does not increment event
  counter, expecting that it's done before the function is called.
- There are some codepaths that call umount_tree() without updating
  "event" counter. e.g. from __detach_mounts().
- When this happens m_start may reuse a cached mount structure that no
  longer belongs to ns->list (i.e. use after free which usually leads
  to infinite loop).

This change fixes the above problem by incrementing global event counter
before invoking umount_tree().

Change-Id: I622c8e84dcb9fb63542372c5dbf0178ee86bb589
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ulanov <andreyu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

v9fs may be used as lower layer of overlayfs and accessing f_path.dentry
can lead to a crash.  In this case it's a NULL pointer dereference in
p9_fid_create().

Fix by replacing direct access of file->f_path.dentry with the
file_dentry() accessor, which will always return a native object.
Reported-by: NAlessio Igor Bogani <alessioigorbogani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NAlessio Igor Bogani <alessioigorbogani@gmail.com>
Fixes: 4bacc9c9 ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

If the lockd service fails to start up then we need to be sure that the
notifier blocks are not registered, otherwise a subsequent start of the
service could cause the same notifier to be registered twice, leading to
soft lockups.
Signed-off-by: NScott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0751ddf7 "lockd: Register callbacks on the inetaddr_chain..."
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Asynchronous wb switching of inodes takes an additional ref count on an
inode to make sure inode remains valid until switchover is completed.

However, anyone calling ihold() must already have a ref count on inode,
but in this case inode->i_count may already be zero:

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 917 at fs/inode.c:397 ihold+0x2b/0x30
CPU: 1 PID: 917 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc2+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:16)
 0000000000000000 ffff88007ca0fb58 ffffffff805990af 0000000000000000
 0000000000000000 ffff88007ca0fb98 ffffffff80268702 0000018d000004e2
 ffff88007cef40e8 ffff88007c9b89a8 ffff880079e3a740 0000000000000003
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff805990af>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x6e
 [<ffffffff80268702>] __warn+0xc2/0xe0
 [<ffffffff802687d8>] warn_slowpath_null+0x18/0x20
 [<ffffffff8035b4ab>] ihold+0x2b/0x30
 [<ffffffff80367ecc>] inode_switch_wbs+0x11c/0x180
 [<ffffffff80369110>] wbc_detach_inode+0x170/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff80369abc>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x21c/0x530
 [<ffffffff80369f7e>] wb_writeback+0xee/0x1e0
 [<ffffffff8036a147>] wb_workfn+0xd7/0x280
 [<ffffffff80287531>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x1b1/0x2b0
 [<ffffffff8027bb09>] process_one_work+0x129/0x300
 [<ffffffff8027be06>] worker_thread+0x126/0x480
 [<ffffffff8098cde7>] ? __schedule+0x1c7/0x561
 [<ffffffff8027bce0>] ? process_one_work+0x300/0x300
 [<ffffffff80280ff4>] kthread+0xc4/0xe0
 [<ffffffff80335578>] ? kfree+0xc8/0x100
 [<ffffffff809903cf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
 [<ffffffff80280f30>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x70/0x70
---[ end trace aaefd2fd9f306bc4 ]---
Signed-off-by: NTahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com>
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>

Negotiate with userspace filesystems whether they support parallel readdir
and lookup.  Disable parallelism by default for fear of breaking fuse
filesystems.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 9902af79 ("parallel lookups: actual switch to rwsem")
Fixes: d9b3dbdc ("fuse: switch to ->iterate_shared()")

The simple_write_to_buffer() already increments the @ppos on success,
see fs/libfs.c simple_write_to_buffer() comment:

"
On success, the number of bytes written is returned and the offset @ppos
advanced by this number, or negative value is returned on error.
"

If the configfs_write_bin_file() is invoked with @count smaller than the
total length of the written binary file, it will be invoked multiple times.
Since configfs_write_bin_file() increments @ppos on success, after calling
simple_write_to_buffer(), the @ppos is incremented twice.

Subsequent invocation of configfs_write_bin_file() will result in the next
piece of data being written to the offset twice as long as the length of
the previous write, thus creating buffer with "holes" in it.

The simple testcase using DTO follows:
  $ mkdir /sys/kernel/config/device-tree/overlays/1
  $ dd bs=1 if=foo.dtbo of=/sys/kernel/config/device-tree/overlays/1/dtbo
Without this patch, the testcase will result in twice as big buffer in the
kernel, which is then passed to the cfs_overlay_item_dtbo_write() .
Signed-off-by: NMarek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Pantelis Antoniou <pantelis.antoniou@konsulko.com>

When truncating a file we should check write access on the underlying
inode.  And we should do so on the lower file as well (before copy-up) for
consistency.

Original patch and test case by Aihua Zhang.

 - - >o >o - - test.c - - >o >o - -
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	int ret;

	ret = truncate(argv[0], 4096);
	if (ret != -1) {
		fprintf(stderr, "truncate(argv[0]) should have failed\n");
		return 1;
	}
	if (errno != ETXTBSY) {
		perror("truncate(argv[0])");
		return 1;
	}

	return 0;
}
 - - >o >o - - >o >o - - >o >o - -
Reported-by: NAihua Zhang <zhangaihua1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>

When using the 'default_permissions' mount option, ovl_permission() on
non-directories was missing a dput(alias), resulting in "BUG Dentry still
in use".
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 8d3095f4 ("ovl: default permissions")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.5+

Olga Kornievskaia reports that the following test fails to trigger
an OPEN_DOWNGRADE on the wire, and only triggers the final CLOSE.

	fd0 = open(foo, RDRW)   -- should be open on the wire for "both"
	fd1 = open(foo, RDONLY)  -- should be open on the wire for "read"
	close(fd0) -- should trigger an open_downgrade
	read(fd1)
	close(fd1)

The issue is that we're missing a check for whether or not the current
state transitioned from an O_RDWR state as opposed to having transitioned
from a combination of O_RDONLY and O_WRONLY.
Reported-by: NOlga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Fixes: cd9288ff ("NFSv4: Fix another bug in the close/open_downgrade code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

This isn't functionally apparent for some reason, but
when we test io at extreme offsets at the end of the loff_t
rang, such as in fstests xfs/071, the calculation of
"max" in dax_io() can be wrong due to pos + size overflowing.

For example,

# xfs_io -c "pwrite 9223372036854771712 512" /mnt/test/file

enters dax_io with:

start 0x7ffffffffffff000
end   0x7ffffffffffff200

and the rounded up "size" variable is 0x1000.  This yields:

pos + size 0x8000000000000000 (overflows loff_t)
       end 0x7ffffffffffff200

Due to the overflow, the min() function picks the wrong
value for the "max" variable, and when we send (max - pos)
into i.e. copy_from_iter_pmem() it is also the wrong value.

This somehow(tm) gets magically absorbed without incident,
probably because iter->count is correct.  But it seems best
to fix it up properly by comparing the two values as
unsigned.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

In "NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-specific atomic open code"
unconditional d_drop() after the ->open_context() had been removed.  It had
been correct for success cases (there ->open_context() itself had been doing
dcache manipulations), but not for error ones.  Only one of those (ENOENT)
got a compensatory d_drop() added in that commit, but in fact it should've
been done for all errors.  As it is, the case of O_CREAT non-exclusive open
on a hashed negative dentry racing with e.g. symlink creation from another
client ended up with ->open_context() getting an error and proceeding to
call nfs_lookup().  On a hashed dentry, which would've instantly triggered
BUG_ON() in d_materialise_unique() (or, these days, its equivalent in
d_splice_alias()).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+
Tested-by: NOleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Commit fe742fd4 ("Revert "btrfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()"")
backed out the conversion to ->iterate_shared() for Btrfs because the
delayed inode handling in btrfs_real_readdir() is racy. However, we can
still do readdir in parallel if there are no delayed nodes.

This is a temporary fix which upgrades the shared inode lock to an
exclusive lock only when we have delayed items until we come up with a
more complete solution. While we're here, rename the
btrfs_{get,put}_delayed_items functions to make it very clear that
they're just for readdir.

Tested with xfstests and by doing a parallel kernel build:

	while make tinyconfig && make -j4 && git clean dqfx; do
		:
	done

along with a bunch of parallel finds in another shell:

	while true; do
		for ((i=0; i<4; i++)); do
			find . >/dev/null &
		done
		wait
	done
Signed-off-by: NOmar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>

on failure d_obtain_alias() will have done iput()
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

__vfs_write() returns a negative value in a error case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160616083108.6278.65815.stgit@pluto.themaw.netSigned-off-by: NAndrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NIan Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The value `bytes' comes from the filesystem which is about to be
mounted.  We cannot trust that the value is always in the range we
expect it to be.

Check its value before using it to calculate the length for the crc32_le
call.  It value must be larger (or equal) sumoff + 4.

This fixes a kernel bug when accidentially mounting an image file which
had the nilfs2 magic value 0x3434 at the right offset 0x406 by chance.
The bytes 0x01 0x00 were stored at 0x408 and were interpreted as a
s_bytes value of 1.  This caused an underflow when substracting sumoff +
4 (20) in the call to crc32_le.

  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88021e600000
  IP:  crc32_le+0x36/0x100
  ...
  Call Trace:
    nilfs_valid_sb.part.5+0x52/0x60 [nilfs2]
    nilfs_load_super_block+0x142/0x300 [nilfs2]
    init_nilfs+0x60/0x390 [nilfs2]
    nilfs_mount+0x302/0x520 [nilfs2]
    mount_fs+0x38/0x160
    vfs_kern_mount+0x67/0x110
    do_mount+0x269/0xe00
    SyS_mount+0x9f/0x100
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x71

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466778587-5184-2-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jpSigned-off-by: NTorsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Tested-by: NTorsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

According to some high-load testing, these two BUG assertions were
encountered, this led system panic.  Actually, there were some
discussions about removing these two BUG() assertions, it would not
bring any side effect.

Then, I did the the following changes,

1) use the existing macro CATCH_BH_JBD_RACES to wrap BUG() in the
   ocfs2_read_blocks_sync function like before.

2) disable the macro CATCH_BH_JBD_RACES in Makefile by default.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466574294-26863-1-git-send-email-ghe@suse.comSigned-off-by: NGang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

jbd2_alloc is explicit about its allocation preferences wrt.  the
allocation size.  Sub page allocations go to the slab allocator and
larger are using either the page allocator or vmalloc.  This is all good
but the logic is unnecessarily complex.

1) as per Ted, the vmalloc fallback is a left-over:

 : jbd2_alloc is only passed in the bh->b_size, which can't be PAGE_SIZE, so
 : the code path that calls vmalloc() should never get called.  When we
 : conveted jbd2_alloc() to suppor sub-page size allocations in commit
 : d2eecb03, there was an assumption that it could be called with a size
 : greater than PAGE_SIZE, but that's certaily not true today.

Moreover vmalloc allocation might even lead to a deadlock because the
callers expect GFP_NOFS context while vmalloc is GFP_KERNEL.

2) __GFP_REPEAT for requests <= PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER is ignored
   since the flag was introduced.

Let's simplify the code flow and use the slab allocator for sub-page
requests and the page allocator for others.  Even though order > 0 is
not currently used as per above leave that option open.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464599699-30131-18-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

POSIX allows files with trailing spaces or a trailing period but
SMB3 does not, so convert these using the normal Services For Mac
mapping as we do for other reserved characters such as
	: < > | ? *
This is similar to what Macs do for the same problem over SMB3.

CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>

Azure server blocks clients that open a socket and don't do anything on it.
In our reconnect scenarios, we can reconnect the tcp session and
detect the socket is available but we defer the negprot and SMB3 session
setup and tree connect reconnection until the next i/o is requested, but
this looks suspicous to some servers who expect SMB3 negprog and session
setup soon after a socket is created.

In the echo thread, reconnect SMB3 sessions and tree connections
that are disconnected.  A later patch will replay persistent (and
resilient) handle opens.

CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>

Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly.  Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.

Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)

This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.

The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: NDavid Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Factor out part of posix_acl_xattr_set into a common function that takes
a posix_acl, which nfsd can also call.

The prototype already exists in include/linux/posix_acl.h.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

If we don't set the mode correctly in nfs_init_locked(), then there is
potential for a race with a second call to nfs_fhget that will cause
inode aliasing.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

According to RFC5661, section 12.5.3. the layout stateid is no longer
valid once the client no longer holds any layout segments. Ensure that
we mark it invalid.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Since commit 0bcbf039, nfs_readpage_release() has been used to
unlock the page in the read code.

Fixes: 0bcbf039 ("nfs: handle request add failure properly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

pnfs_generic_commit_cancel_empty_pagelist calls nfs_commitdata_release,
but that is wrong: nfs_commitdata_release puts the open context, something
that isn't valid until nfs_init_commit is called, which is never the case
when pnfs_generic_commit_cancel_empty_pagelist is called.

This was introduced in "nfs: avoid race that crashes nfs_init_commit".
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Commit e8d975e7 ("fixing infinite OPEN loop in 4.0 stateid recovery")
introduced access to state after it was just potentially freed by
nfs4_put_open_state leading to a random data corruption somewhere.

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88004941ee40
IP: [<ffffffff813baf01>] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x461/0x740
PGD 3501067 PUD 3504067 PMD 6ff37067 PTE 800000004941e060
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: loop rpcsec_gss_krb5 acpi_cpufreq tpm_tis joydev i2c_piix4 pcspkr tpm virtio_console nfsd ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops floppy serio_raw virtio_blk drm
CPU: 6 PID: 2161 Comm: 192.168.10.253- Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-vm-nfs+ #112
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800463dcd00 ti: ffff88003ff48000 task.ti: ffff88003ff48000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff813baf01>]  [<ffffffff813baf01>] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x461/0x740
RSP: 0018:ffff88003ff4bd68  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff81a49900 RCX: 00000000000000e8
RDX: 00000000000000e8 RSI: ffff8800418b9930 RDI: ffff880040c96c88
RBP: ffff88003ff4bdf8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880040c96c98
R13: ffff88004941ee20 R14: ffff88004941ee40 R15: ffff88004941ee00
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff88004941ee40 CR3: 0000000060b0b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
 ffffffff813baad5 ffff8800463dcd00 ffff880000000001 ffffffff810e6b68
 ffff880043ddbc88 ffff8800418b9800 ffff8800418b98c8 ffff88004941ee48
 ffff880040c96c90 ffff880040c96c00 ffff880040c96c20 ffff880040c96c40
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff813baad5>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x35/0x740
 [<ffffffff810e6b68>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x128/0x1b0
 [<ffffffff813bb7cd>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x5ed/0xa40
 [<ffffffff813bb1e0>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x740/0x740
 [<ffffffff813bb1e0>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x740/0x740
 [<ffffffff810af0d1>] kthread+0x101/0x120
 [<ffffffff810e6b68>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x128/0x1b0
 [<ffffffff818843af>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
 [<ffffffff810aefd0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x250/0x250
Code: 65 80 4c 8b b5 78 ff ff ff e8 fc 88 4c 00 48 8b 7d 88 e8 13 67 d2 ff 49 8b 47 40 a8 02 0f 84 d3 01 00 00 4c 89 ff e8 7f f9 ff ff <f0> 41 80 26 7f 48 8b 7d c8 e8 b1 84 4c 00 e9 39 fd ff ff 3d e6
RIP  [<ffffffff813baf01>] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x461/0x740
 RSP <ffff88003ff4bd68>
CR2: ffff88004941ee40
Signed-off-by: NOleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

if we read or wrote something, we must report it
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

We must call nfs4_handle_exception() on BAD_STATEID errors. The only
exception is if the stateid argument turns out to be a layout stateid
that is declared invalid.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>