- 20 7月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
It is pointless and confusing to allow a pid namespace hierarchy and the user namespace hierarchy to get out of sync. The owner of a child pid namespace should be the owner of the parent pid namespace or a descendant of the owner of the parent pid namespace. Otherwise it is possible to construct scenarios where a process has a capability over a parent pid namespace but does not have the capability over a child pid namespace. Which confusingly makes permission checks non-transitive. It requires use of setns into a pid namespace (but not into a user namespace) to create such a scenario. Add the function in_userns to help in making this determination. v2: Optimized in_userns by using level as suggested by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Ref: 49f4d8b9 ("pidns: Capture the user namespace and filter ns_last_pid") Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 07 3月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Always increment/decrement ucount->count under the ucounts_lock. The increments are there already and moving the decrements there means the locking logic of the code is simpler. This simplification in the locking logic fixes a race between put_ucounts and get_ucounts that could result in a use-after-free because the count could go zero then be found by get_ucounts and then be freed by put_ucounts. A bug presumably this one was found by a combination of syzkaller and KASAN. JongWhan Kim reported the syzkaller failure and Dmitry Vyukov spotted the race in the code. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f6b2db1a ("userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user") Reported-by: NJongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com> Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 03 3月, 2017 2 次提交
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
So we want to simplify <linux/sched.h>'s header dependencies, but one roadblock of that is <linux/timer.h>'s inclusion of sysctl.h, which brings in other, problematic headers. Note that timer.h's inclusion of sysctl.h can be avoided if we pre-declare ctl_table - so do that. Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
This is a stray header that is not needed by anything in sched.h, so remove it. Update files that relied on the stray inclusion. This reduces the size of the header dependency graph. Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 02 3月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
We are going to remove the following header inclusions from <linux/sched.h>: #include <asm/param.h> #include <linux/threads.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/timex.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/rbtree.h> #include <linux/thread_info.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/nodemask.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/topology.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/time.h> #include <linux/timer.h> #include <linux/llist.h> #include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <asm/processor.h> Fix up a single .h file that got hold of <linux/sysctl.h> via one of these headers. Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 24 1月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Nikolay Borisov 提交于
This patchset converts inotify to using the newly introduced per-userns sysctl infrastructure. Currently the inotify instances/watches are being accounted in the user_struct structure. This means that in setups where multiple users in unprivileged containers map to the same underlying real user (i.e. pointing to the same user_struct) the inotify limits are going to be shared as well, allowing one user(or application) to exhaust all others limits. Fix this by switching the inotify sysctls to using the per-namespace/per-user limits. This will allow the server admin to set sensible global limits, which can further be tuned inside every individual user namespace. Additionally, in order to preserve the sysctl ABI make the existing inotify instances/watches sysctls modify the values of the initial user namespace. Signed-off-by: NNikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com> Acked-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 23 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Andrey Vagin 提交于
Return -EPERM if an owning user namespace is outside of a process current user namespace. v2: In a first version ns_get_owner returned ENOENT for init_user_ns. This special cases was removed from this version. There is nothing outside of init_user_ns, so we can return EPERM. v3: rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it grabs a reference. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 31 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
v2: Fixed the very obvious lack of setting ucounts on struct mnt_ns reported by Andrei Vagin, and the kbuild test report. Reported-by: NAndrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 09 8月, 2016 9 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
The same kind of recursive sane default limit and policy countrol that has been implemented for the user namespace is desirable for the other namespaces, so generalize the user namespace refernce count into a ucount. Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Add a structure that is per user and per user ns and use it to hold the count of user namespaces. This makes prevents one user from creating denying service to another user by creating the maximum number of user namespaces. Rename the sysctl export of the maximum count from /proc/sys/userns/max_user_namespaces to /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces to reflect that the count is now per user. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> -
由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Export the export the maximum number of user namespaces as /proc/sys/userns/max_user_namespaces. Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Limit per userns sysctls to only be opened for write by a holder of CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. Add all of the necessary boilerplate for having per user namespace sysctls. Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 08 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Add the necessary boiler plate to move freeing of user namespaces into work queue and thus into process context where things can sleep. This is a necessary precursor to per user namespace sysctls. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 24 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Seth Forshee 提交于
Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged. Add a new helper function, current_in_user_ns(), to test whether a user namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace. Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set should be applied to the caps constructed during exec. --EWB Replaced in_userns with the simpler current_in_userns. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 12 12月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the future in this user namespace. A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled. - Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from their parents. - A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do not allow checking the permissions at open time. - Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map for the user namespace is set. This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace level will never remove the ability to call setgroups from a process that already has that ability. A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled. Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 10 12月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called, in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups. The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call that function in the setgroups permission check. This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups without privilege using user namespaces. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 05 12月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
for now - just move corresponding ->proc_inum instances over there Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 09 8月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Fabian Frederick 提交于
proc_uid_seq_operations, proc_gid_seq_operations and proc_projid_seq_operations are only called in proc_id_map_open with seq_open as const struct seq_operations so we can constify the 3 structures and update proc_id_map_open prototype. text data bss dec hex filename 6817 404 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-before 6913 308 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-after Signed-off-by: NFabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 24 9月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos caches held within the kernel. This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's processes so that the user's cron jobs can work. The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 big_key - A ccache blob \___ tkt12345 big_key - Another ccache blob Or possibly: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 keyring - A ccache \___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key \___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key \___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace. Kernel support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want. The user asks for their Kerberos cache by: krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring); The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to mess with the cache. The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read, search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to. Active LSMs get a chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link. Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring goes away after a while. The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to three days. Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the register. The cache keyrings are added to it. This means that standard key search and garbage collection facilities are available. The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left in it is then automatically gc'd. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: NSimo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 27 8月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace. Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant way. I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly for other filesystems to mount on top of. Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs. This makes this test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves. Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 09 8月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
Ensure that user_namespace->parent chain can't grow too much. Currently we use the hardroded 32 as limit. Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 27 3月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already mounted when the user namespace is created. proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that is shared between every instance. Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time the user namespace was created. In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all (some form of mount namespace jail). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 27 1月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
When freeing a deeply nested user namespace free_user_ns calls put_user_ns on it's parent which may in turn call free_user_ns again. When -fno-optimize-sibling-calls is passed to gcc one stack frame per user namespace is left on the stack, potentially overflowing the kernel stack. CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER forces -fno-optimize-sibling-calls so we can't count on gcc to optimize this code. Remove struct kref and use a plain atomic_t. Making the code more flexible and easier to comprehend. Make the loop in free_user_ns explict to guarantee that the stack does not overflow with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER enabled. I have tested this fix with a simple program that uses unshare to create a deeply nested user namespace structure and then calls exit. With 1000 nesteuser namespaces before this change running my test program causes the kernel to die a horrible death. With 10,000,000 nested user namespaces after this change my test program runs to completion and causes no harm. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Pointed-out-by: NVasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 20 11月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc inode for every namespace in proc. A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test to see if two processes are in the same namespace. This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks impossible. We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors) but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important. I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so their structures can be statically initialized. Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> -
由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
- Add CLONE_THREAD to the unshare flags if CLONE_NEWUSER is selected As changing user namespaces is only valid if all there is only a single thread. - Restore the code to add CLONE_VM if CLONE_THREAD is selected and the code to addCLONE_SIGHAND if CLONE_VM is selected. Making the constraints in the code clear. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 18 9月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Implement kprojid_t a cousin of the kuid_t and kgid_t. The per user namespace mapping of project id values can be set with /proc/<pid>/projid_map. A full compliment of helpers is provided: make_kprojid, from_kprojid, from_kprojid_munged, kporjid_has_mapping, projid_valid, projid_eq, projid_eq, projid_lt. Project identifiers are part of the generic disk quota interface, although it appears only xfs implements project identifiers currently. The xfs code allows anyone who has permission to set the project identifier on a file to use any project identifier so when setting up the user namespace project identifier mappings I do not require a capability. Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 03 5月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
These function are no longer needed replace them with their more useful equivalents. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile and behave correctly. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 26 4月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
- Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> -
由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
- Transform userns->creator from a user_struct reference to a simple kuid_t, kgid_t pair. In cap_capable this allows the check to see if we are the creator of a namespace to become the classic suser style euid permission check. This allows us to remove the need for a struct cred in the mapping functions and still be able to dispaly the user namespace creators uid and gid as 0. - Remove the now unnecessary delayed_work in free_user_ns. All that is left for free_user_ns to do is to call kmem_cache_free and put_user_ns. Those functions can be called in any context so call them directly from free_user_ns removing the need for delayed work. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 08 4月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Modify alloc_uid to take a kuid and make the user hash table global. Stop holding a reference to the user namespace in struct user_struct. This simplifies the code and makes the per user accounting not care about which user namespace a uid happens to appear in. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
I am about to remove the struct user_namespace reference from struct user_struct. So keep an explicit track of the parent user namespace. Take advantage of this new reference and replace instances of user_ns->creator->user_ns with user_ns->parent. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 14 1月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Pavel Emelyanov 提交于
Currently on 64-bit arch the user_namespace is 2096 and when being kmalloc-ed it resides on a 4k slab wasting 2003 bytes. If we allocate a separate cache for it and reduce the hash size from 128 to 64 chains the packaging becomes *much* better - the struct is 1072 bytes and the hole between is 98 bytes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/__initcall/module_init/] Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 17 6月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Define what happens when a we view a uid from one user_namespace in another user_namepece. - If the user namespaces are the same no mapping is necessary. - For most cases of difference use overflowuid and overflowgid, the uid and gid currently used for 16bit apis when we have a 32bit uid that does fit in 16bits. Effectively the situation is the same, we want to return a uid or gid that is not assigned to any user. - For the case when we happen to be mapping the uid or gid of the creator of the target user namespace use uid 0 and gid as confusing that user with root is not a problem. Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 28 2月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
free_uid() and free_user_ns() are corecursive when CONFIG_USER_SCHED=n, but free_user_ns() is called from free_uid() by way of uid_hash_remove(), which requires uidhash_lock to be held. free_user_ns() then calls free_uid() to complete the destruction. Fix this by deferring the destruction of the user_namespace. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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