The differences between minor version 0 and minor version 1
migration will be abstracted by the addition of a set of migration
recovery ops.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Cached opens have already been handled by _nfs4_opendata_reclaim_to_nfs4_state
and can safely skip being reprocessed, but must still call update_open_stateid
to make sure that all active fmodes are recovered.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x: f494a607: NFSv4: fix NULL dereference
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x: a43ec98b: NFSv4: don't fail on missin
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Currently, if the call to nfs_refresh_inode fails, then we end up leaking
a reference count, due to the call to nfs4_get_open_state.
While we're at it, replace nfs4_get_open_state with a simple call to
atomic_inc(); there is no need to do a full lookup of the struct nfs_state
since it is passed as an argument in the struct nfs4_opendata, and
is already assigned to the variable 'state'.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x: a43ec98b: NFSv4: don't fail on missing
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

This is an unneeded check that could cause the client to fail to recover
opens.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

_nfs4_opendata_reclaim_to_nfs4_state doesn't expect to see a cached
open CLAIM_PREVIOUS, but this can happen. An example is when there are
RDWR openers and RDONLY openers on a delegation stateid. The recovery
path will first try an open CLAIM_PREVIOUS for the RDWR openers, this
marks the delegation as not needing RECLAIM anymore, so the open
CLAIM_PREVIOUS for the RDONLY openers will not actually send an rpc.

The NULL dereference is due to _nfs4_opendata_reclaim_to_nfs4_state
returning PTR_ERR(rpc_status) when !rpc_done. When the open is
cached, rpc_done == 0 and rpc_status == 0, thus
_nfs4_opendata_reclaim_to_nfs4_state returns NULL - this is unexpected
by callers of nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state().

This can be reproduced easily by opening the same file two times on an
NFSv4.0 mount with delegations enabled, once as RDWR and once as RDONLY then
sleeping for a long time.  While the files are held open, kick off state
recovery and this NULL dereference will be hit every time.

An example OOPS:

[   65.003602] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000
00000030
[   65.005312] IP: [<ffffffffa037d6ee>] __nfs4_close+0x1e/0x160 [nfsv4]
[   65.006820] PGD 7b0ea067 PUD 791ff067 PMD 0
[   65.008075] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[   65.008802] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache
snd_ens1371 gameport nfsd snd_rawmidi snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus btusb snd_seq snd
_seq_device snd_pcm ppdev bluetooth auth_rpcgss coretemp snd_page_alloc crc32_pc
lmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel microcode rfkill nfs_acl vmw_balloon serio
_raw snd_timer lockd parport_pc e1000 snd soundcore parport i2c_piix4 shpchp vmw
_vmci sunrpc ata_generic mperf pata_acpi mptspi vmwgfx ttm scsi_transport_spi dr
m mptscsih mptbase i2c_core
[   65.018684] CPU: 0 PID: 473 Comm: 192.168.10.85-m Not tainted 3.11.2-201.fc19
.x86_64 #1
[   65.020113] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop
Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/31/2013
[   65.022012] task: ffff88003707e320 ti: ffff88007b906000 task.ti: ffff88007b906000
[   65.023414] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa037d6ee>]  [<ffffffffa037d6ee>] __nfs4_close+0x1e/0x160 [nfsv4]
[   65.025079] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b907d10  EFLAGS: 00010246
[   65.026042] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   65.027321] RDX: 0000000000000050 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   65.028691] RBP: ffff88007b907d38 R08: 0000000000016f60 R09: 0000000000000000
[   65.029990] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[   65.031295] R13: 0000000000000050 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[   65.032527] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   65.033981] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   65.035177] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000007b27f000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
[   65.036568] Stack:
[   65.037011]  0000000000000000 0000000000000001 ffff88007b907d90 ffff88007a880220
[   65.038472]  ffff88007b768de8 ffff88007b907d48 ffffffffa037e4a5 ffff88007b907d80
[   65.039935]  ffffffffa036a6c8 ffff880037020e40 ffff88007a880000 ffff880037020e40
[   65.041468] Call Trace:
[   65.042050]  [<ffffffffa037e4a5>] nfs4_close_state+0x15/0x20 [nfsv4]
[   65.043209]  [<ffffffffa036a6c8>] nfs4_open_recover_helper+0x148/0x1f0 [nfsv4]
[   65.044529]  [<ffffffffa036a886>] nfs4_open_recover+0x116/0x150 [nfsv4]
[   65.045730]  [<ffffffffa036d98d>] nfs4_open_reclaim+0xad/0x150 [nfsv4]
[   65.046905]  [<ffffffffa037d979>] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x149/0x5f0 [nfsv4]
[   65.048071]  [<ffffffffa037e1dc>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x3bc/0x670 [nfsv4]
[   65.049436]  [<ffffffffa037de20>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x5f0/0x5f0 [nfsv4]
[   65.050686]  [<ffffffffa037de20>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x5f0/0x5f0 [nfsv4]
[   65.051943]  [<ffffffff81088640>] kthread+0xc0/0xd0
[   65.052831]  [<ffffffff81088580>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
[   65.054697]  [<ffffffff8165686c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[   65.056396]  [<ffffffff81088580>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
[   65.058208] Code: 5c 41 5d 5d c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 89 f7 41 56 41 89 ce 41 55 41 89 d5 41 54 53 48 89 fb <4c> 8b 67 30 f0 41 ff 44 24 44 49 8d 7c 24 40 e8 0e 0a 2d e1 44
[   65.065225] RIP  [<ffffffffa037d6ee>] __nfs4_close+0x1e/0x160 [nfsv4]
[   65.067175]  RSP <ffff88007b907d10>
[   65.068570] CR2: 0000000000000030
[   65.070098] ---[ end trace 0d1fe4f5c7dd6f8b ]---

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.7+
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The current caching model calls for the security label to be set on
first lookup and/or on any subsequent label changes. There is no
need to do it as part of an open reclaim.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

In nfs4_proc_getlk(), when some error causes a retry of the call to
_nfs4_proc_getlk(), we can end up with Oopses of the form

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000134
 IP: [<ffffffff8165270e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x30
<snip>
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff812f287d>] _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x4d/0x70
  [<ffffffffa053c4f2>] nfs4_put_lock_state+0x32/0xb0 [nfsv4]
  [<ffffffffa053c585>] nfs4_fl_release_lock+0x15/0x20 [nfsv4]
  [<ffffffffa0522c06>] _nfs4_proc_getlk.isra.40+0x146/0x170 [nfsv4]
  [<ffffffffa052ad99>] nfs4_proc_lock+0x399/0x5a0 [nfsv4]

The problem is that we don't clear the request->fl_ops after the first
try and so when we retry, nfs4_set_lock_state() exits early without
setting the lock stateid.
Regression introduced by commit 70cc6487
(locks: make ->lock release private data before returning in GETLK case)
Reported-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Reported-by: NJorge Mora <mora@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #2.6.22+

The previous patch introduces a compile warning by not assigning an initial
value to the "flavor" variable.  This could only be a problem if the server
returns a supported secflavor list of length zero, but it's better to
fix this before it's ever hit.
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Acked-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Call nfs4_lookup_root_sec for each flavor returned by SECINFO_NO_NAME until
one works.

One example of a situation this fixes:

 - server configured for krb5
 - server principal somehow gets deleted from KDC
 - server still thinking krb is good, sends krb5 as first entry in
    SECINFO_NO_NAME response
 - client tries krb5, but this fails without even sending an RPC because
    gssd's requests to the KDC can't find the server's principal
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Determine if we've created a new file by examining the directory change
attribute and/or the O_EXCL flag.

This fixes a regression when doing a non-exclusive create of a new file.
If the FILE_CREATED flag is not set, the atomic_open() command will
perform full file access permissions checks instead of just checking
for MAY_OPEN.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Recent SP4_MACH_CRED changes allows rpc_message.rpc_cred to change,
so keep a separate pointer to the machine cred for put_rpccred.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Request SP4_MACH_CRED WRITE and COMMIT support in spo_must_allow list --
they're already supported by the client.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Commit 97431204 introduced a regression
that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if:

 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default)
 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials

This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use
krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted
for not having run kinit.

The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity
protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME.

Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity
protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall
back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case.

We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers -
they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the
mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for
SECINFO*.  Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on
SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the
filesystem's auth flavor.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Ensure that nfs4_proc_lookup_common respects the NFS_MOUNT_SECFLAVOUR
flag.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

NFSv4 security auto-negotiation has been broken since
commit 4580a92d (NFS:
Use server-recommended security flavor by default (NFSv3))
because nfs4_try_mount() will automatically select AUTH_SYS
if it sees no auth flavours.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

WRITE and COMMIT can use the machine credential.

If WRITE is supported and COMMIT is not, make all (mach cred) writes FILE_SYNC4.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

TEST_STATEID and FREE_STATEID can use the machine credential.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

SECINFO and SECINFO_NONAME can use the machine credential.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

CLOSE and LOCKU can use the machine credential.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

This is a minimal client side implementation of SP4_MACH_CRED.  It will
attempt to negotiate SP4_MACH_CRED iff the EXCHANGE_ID is using
krb5i or krb5p auth.  SP4_MACH_CRED will be used if the server supports the
minimal operations:

 BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION
 EXCHANGE_ID
 CREATE_SESSION
 DESTROY_SESSION
 DESTROY_CLIENTID

This patch only includes the EXCHANGE_ID negotiation code because
the client will already use the machine cred for these operations.

If the server doesn't support SP4_MACH_CRED or doesn't support the minimal
operations, the exchange id will be resent with SP4_NONE.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Rename the new 'recover_locks' kernel parameter to 'recover_lost_locks'
and change the default to 'false'. Document why in
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

Move the 'recover_lost_locks' kernel parameter to fs/nfs/super.c to
make it easy to backport to kernels prior to 3.6.x, which don't have
a separate NFSv4 module.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

When an NFSv4 client loses contact with the server it can lose any
locks that it holds.

Currently when it reconnects to the server it simply tries to reclaim
those locks.  This might succeed even though some other client has
held and released a lock in the mean time.  So the first client might
think the file is unchanged, but it isn't.  This isn't good.

If, when recovery happens, the locks cannot be claimed because some
other client still holds the lock, then we get a message in the kernel
logs, but the client can still write.  So two clients can both think
they have a lock and can both write at the same time.  This is equally
not good.

There was a patch a while ago
  http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.nfs/41917

which tried to address some of this, but it didn't seem to go
anywhere.  That patch would also send a signal to the process.  That
might be useful but for now this patch just causes writes to fail.

For NFSv4 (unlike v2/v3) there is a strong link between the lock and
the write request so we can fairly easily fail any IO of the lock is
gone.  While some applications might not expect this, it is still
safer than allowing the write to succeed.

Because this is a fairly big change in behaviour a module parameter,
"recover_locks", is introduced which defaults to true (the current
behaviour) but can be set to "false" to tell the client not to try to
recover things that were lost.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Ensure OPEN_CONFIRM is not emitted while the transport is plugged.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Ensure RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is not emitted while the transport is
plugged.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

When CONFIG_NFS_V4_1 is disabled, the calls to nfs4_setup_sequence()
and nfs4_sequence_done() are compiled out for the DELEGRETURN
operation.  To allow NFSv4.0 transport blocking to work for
DELEGRETURN, these call sites have to be present all the time.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Plumb in a mechanism for plugging an NFSv4.0 mount, using the
same infrastructure as NFSv4.1 sessions.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Anchor an nfs4_slot_table in the nfs_client for use with NFSv4.0
transport blocking.  It is initialized only for NFSv4.0 nfs_client's.

Introduce appropriate minor version ops to handle nfs_client
initialization and shutdown requirements that differ for each minor
version.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Refactor nfs4_call_sync_sequence() so it is used for NFSv4.0 now.
The RPC callouts will house transport blocking logic similar to
NFSv4.1 sessions.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

NFSv4.0 will have need for this functionality when I add the ability
to block NFSv4.0 traffic before migration recovery.

I'm not really clear on why nfs4_set_sequence_privileged() gets a
generic name, but nfs41_init_sequence() gets a minor
version-specific name.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up: Both the NFSv4.0 and NFSv4.1 version of
nfs4_setup_sequence() are used only in fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c.  No need
to keep global header declarations for either version.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up: rename nfs41_call_sync_data for use as a data structure
common to all NFSv4 minor versions.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Clean up, since slot and sequence numbers are all unsigned anyway.

Among other things, squelch compiler warnings:

linux/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c: In function ‘nfs4_setup_sequence’:
linux/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c:703:2: warning: signed and unsigned type in
	conditional expression [-Wsign-compare]

and

linux/fs/nfs/nfs4session.c: In function ‘nfs4_alloc_slot’:
linux/fs/nfs/nfs4session.c:151:31: warning: signed and unsigned type in
	conditional expression [-Wsign-compare]
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Commit 5ec16a85 introduced a regression
that causes SECINFO to fail without actualy sending an RPC if:

 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client was using KRB5i/p (now tried by default)
 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials

This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use
krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted
for not having run kinit.

The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity
protected auth flavor for SECINFO.

Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity
protected auth flavor for SECINFO in every circumstance, so we fall back
to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case.

We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers -
they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the
mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for
SECINFO*.  Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on SECINFO
by falling back to using the user cred and the filesystem's auth flavor.
Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The clnt->cl_principal is being used exclusively to store the service
target name for RPCSEC_GSS/krb5 callbacks. Replace it with something that
is stored only in the RPCSEC_GSS-specific code.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Add tracepoints to detect issues with the TEST_STATEID operation.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Add tracepoints to nfs41_setup_sequence and nfs41_sequence_done
to track session and slot table state changes.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Set up tracepoints to track read, write and commit, as well as
pNFS reads and writes and commits to the data server.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>