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  1. 16 7月, 2017 4 次提交
  3. 13 7月, 2017 6 次提交
  5. 02 3月, 2017 2 次提交
  7. 15 12月, 2016 1 次提交
    • J
      ipc: msg, make msgrcv work with LONG_MIN · 99989835
      由 Jiri Slaby 提交于 
      When LONG_MIN is passed to msgrcv, one would expect to recieve any
message.  But convert_mode does *msgtyp = -*msgtyp and -LONG_MIN is
undefined.  In particular, with my gcc -LONG_MIN produces -LONG_MIN
again.

So handle this case properly by assigning LONG_MAX to *msgtyp if
LONG_MIN was specified as msgtyp to msgrcv.

This code:
  long msg[] = { 100, 200 };
  int m = msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT | 0644);
  msgsnd(m, &msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
  msgrcv(m, &msg, sizeof(msg), LONG_MIN, 0);

produces currently nothing:

  msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT|0644)     = 65538
  msgsnd(65538, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, 0) = 0
  msgrcv(65538, ...

Except a UBSAN warning:

  UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ipc/msg.c:745:13
  negation of -9223372036854775808 cannot be represented in type 'long int':

With the patch, I see what I expect:

  msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT|0644)     = 0
  msgsnd(0, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, 0) = 0
  msgrcv(0, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, -9223372036854775808, 0) = 16

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161024082633.10148-1-jslaby@suse.czSigned-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      99989835
  9. 21 11月, 2016 1 次提交
  11. 12 10月, 2016 4 次提交
  13. 03 8月, 2016 1 次提交
    • F
      sysv, ipc: fix security-layer leaking · 9b24fef9
      由 Fabian Frederick 提交于 
      Commit 53dad6d3 ("ipc: fix race with LSMs") updated ipc_rcu_putref()
to receive rcu freeing function but used generic ipc_rcu_free() instead
of msg_rcu_free() which does security cleaning.

Running LTP msgsnd06 with kmemleak gives the following:

  cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak

  unreferenced object 0xffff88003c0a11f8 (size 8):
    comm "msgsnd06", pid 1645, jiffies 4294672526 (age 6.549s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      1b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00                          ........
    backtrace:
      kmemleak_alloc+0x23/0x40
      kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe1/0x180
      selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security+0x3f/0xd0
      security_msg_queue_alloc+0x2e/0x40
      newque+0x4e/0x150
      ipcget+0x159/0x1b0
      SyS_msgget+0x39/0x40
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f

Manfred Spraul suggested to fix sem.c as well and Davidlohr Bueso to
only use ipc_rcu_free in case of security allocation failure in newary()

Fixes: 53dad6d3 ("ipc: fix race with LSMs")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470083552-22966-1-git-send-email-fabf@skynet.beSigned-off-by: NFabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[3.12+]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9b24fef9
  15. 01 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • L
      Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid() · b9a53227
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state.  Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.

We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b9a53227
  17. 01 7月, 2015 2 次提交
  19. 16 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 14 12月, 2014 1 次提交
    • M
      ipc/msg: increase MSGMNI, remove scaling · 0050ee05
      由 Manfred Spraul 提交于 
      SysV can be abused to allocate locked kernel memory.  For most systems, a
small limit doesn't make sense, see the discussion with regards to SHMMAX.

Therefore: increase MSGMNI to the maximum supported.

And: If we ignore the risk of locking too much memory, then an automatic
scaling of MSGMNI doesn't make sense.  Therefore the logic can be removed.

The code preserves auto_msgmni to avoid breaking any user space applications
that expect that the value exists.

Notes:
1) If an administrator must limit the memory allocations, then he can set
MSGMNI as necessary.

Or he can disable sysv entirely (as e.g. done by Android).

2) MSGMAX and MSGMNB are intentionally not increased, as these values are used
to control latency vs. throughput:
If MSGMNB is large, then msgsnd() just returns and more messages can be queued
before a task switch to a task that calls msgrcv() is forced.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0050ee05
  23. 07 6月, 2014 6 次提交
  25. 17 3月, 2014 1 次提交
    • M
      ipc: Fix 2 bugs in msgrcv() MSG_COPY implementation · 4f87dac3
      由 Michael Kerrisk 提交于 
      While testing and documenting the msgrcv() MSG_COPY flag that Stanislav
Kinsbursky added in commit 4a674f34 ("ipc: introduce message queue
copy feature" => kernel 3.8), I discovered a couple of bugs in the
implementation.  The two bugs concern MSG_COPY interactions with other
msgrcv() flags, namely:

 (A) MSG_COPY + MSG_EXCEPT
 (B) MSG_COPY + !IPC_NOWAIT

The bugs are distinct (and the fix for the first one is obvious),
however my fix for both is a single-line patch, which is why I'm
combining them in a single mail, rather than writing two mails+patches.

 ===== (A) MSG_COPY + MSG_EXCEPT =====

With the addition of the MSG_COPY flag, there are now two msgrcv()
flags--MSG_COPY and MSG_EXCEPT--that modify the meaning of the 'msgtyp'
argument in unrelated ways.  Specifying both in the same call is a
logical error that is currently permitted, with the effect that MSG_COPY
has priority and MSG_EXCEPT is ignored.  The call should give an error
if both flags are specified.  The patch below implements that behavior.

 ===== (B) (B) MSG_COPY + !IPC_NOWAIT =====

The test code that was submitted in commit 3a665531 ("selftests: IPC
message queue copy feature test") shows MSG_COPY being used in
conjunction with IPC_NOWAIT.  In other words, if there is no message at
the position 'msgtyp'.  return immediately with the error in ENOMSG.

What was not (fully) tested is the behavior if MSG_COPY is specified
*without* IPC_NOWAIT, and there is an odd behavior.  If the queue
contains less than 'msgtyp' messages, then the call blocks until the
next message is written to the queue.  At that point, the msgrcv() call
returns a copy of the newly added message, regardless of whether that
message is at the ordinal position 'msgtyp'.  This is clearly bogus, and
problematic for applications that might want to make use of the MSG_COPY
flag.

I considered the following possible solutions to this problem:

 (1) Force the call to block until a message *does* appear at the
     position 'msgtyp'.

 (2) If the MSG_COPY flag is specified, the kernel should implicitly add
     IPC_NOWAIT, so that the call fails with ENOMSG for this case.

 (3) If the MSG_COPY flag is specified, but IPC_NOWAIT is not, generate
     an error (probably, EINVAL is the right one).

I do not know if any application would really want to have the
functionality of solution (1), especially since an application can
determine in advance the number of messages in the queue using msgctl()
IPC_STAT.  Obviously, this solution would be the most work to implement.

Solution (2) would have the effect of silently fixing any applications
that tried to employ broken behavior.  However, it would mean that if we
later decided to implement solution (1), then user-space could not
easily detect what the kernel supports (but, since I'm somewhat doubtful
that solution (1) is needed, I'm not sure that this is much of a
problem).

Solution (3) would have the effect of informing broken applications that
they are doing something broken.  The downside is that this would cause
a ABI breakage for any applications that are currently employing the
broken behavior.  However:

a) Those applications are almost certainly not getting the results they
   expect.
b) Possibly, those applications don't even exist, because MSG_COPY is
   currently hidden behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

The upside of solution (3) is that if we later decided to implement
solution (1), user-space could determine what the kernel supports, via
the error return.

In my view, solution (3) is mildly preferable to solution (2), and
solution (1) could still be done later if anyone really cares.  The
patch below implements solution (3).

PS.  For anyone out there still listening, it's the usual story:
documenting an API (and the thinking about, and the testing of the API,
that documentation entails) is the one of the single best ways of
finding bugs in the API, as I've learned from a lot of experience.  Best
to do that documentation before releasing the API.
Signed-off-by: NMichael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NStanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4f87dac3
  27. 28 1月, 2014 3 次提交
  29. 01 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  31. 25 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      ipc: fix race with LSMs · 53dad6d3
      由 Davidlohr Bueso 提交于 
      Currently, IPC mechanisms do security and auditing related checks under
RCU.  However, since security modules can free the security structure,
for example, through selinux_[sem,msg_queue,shm]_free_security(), we can
race if the structure is freed before other tasks are done with it,
creating a use-after-free condition.  Manfred illustrates this nicely,
for instance with shared mem and selinux:

 -> do_shmat calls rcu_read_lock()
 -> do_shmat calls shm_object_check().
     Checks that the object is still valid - but doesn't acquire any locks.
     Then it returns.
 -> do_shmat calls security_shm_shmat (e.g. selinux_shm_shmat)
 -> selinux_shm_shmat calls ipc_has_perm()
 -> ipc_has_perm accesses ipc_perms->security

shm_close()
 -> shm_close acquires rw_mutex & shm_lock
 -> shm_close calls shm_destroy
 -> shm_destroy calls security_shm_free (e.g. selinux_shm_free_security)
 -> selinux_shm_free_security calls ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm)
 -> ipc_free_security calls kfree(ipc_perms->security)

This patch delays the freeing of the security structures after all RCU
readers are done.  Furthermore it aligns the security life cycle with
that of the rest of IPC - freeing them based on the reference counter.
For situations where we need not free security, the current behavior is
kept.  Linus states:

 "... the old behavior was suspect for another reason too: having the
  security blob go away from under a user sounds like it could cause
  various other problems anyway, so I think the old code was at least
  _prone_ to bugs even if it didn't have catastrophic behavior."

I have tested this patch with IPC testcases from LTP on both my
quad-core laptop and on a 64 core NUMA server.  In both cases selinux is
enabled, and tests pass for both voluntary and forced preemption models.
While the mentioned races are theoretical (at least no one as reported
them), I wanted to make sure that this new logic doesn't break anything
we weren't aware of.
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Acked-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      53dad6d3
  33. 12 9月, 2013 2 次提交
  35. 04 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • M
      ipc/msg.c: Fix lost wakeup in msgsnd(). · bebcb928
      由 Manfred Spraul 提交于 
      The check if the queue is full and adding current to the wait queue of
pending msgsnd() operations (ss_add()) must be atomic.

Otherwise:
 - the thread that performs msgsnd() finds a full queue and decides to
   sleep.
 - the thread that performs msgrcv() first reads all messages from the
   queue and then sleeps, because the queue is empty.
 - the msgrcv() calls do not perform any wakeups, because the msgsnd()
   task has not yet called ss_add().
 - then the msgsnd()-thread first calls ss_add() and then sleeps.

Net result: msgsnd() and msgrcv() both sleep forever.

Observed with msgctl08 from ltp with a preemptible kernel.

Fix: Call ipc_lock_object() before performing the check.

The patch also moves security_msg_queue_msgsnd() under ipc_lock_object:
 - msgctl(IPC_SET) explicitely mentions that it tries to expunge any
   pending operations that are not allowed anymore with the new
   permissions.  If security_msg_queue_msgsnd() is called without locks,
   then there might be races.
 - it makes the patch much simpler.
Reported-and-tested-by: NVineet Gupta <Vineet.Gupta1@synopsys.com>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org  # for 3.11
Signed-off-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      bebcb928
  37. 29 8月, 2013 1 次提交