1. 06 9月, 2018 1 次提交
  2. 31 8月, 2018 1 次提交
  3. 30 8月, 2018 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/entry/64: Wipe KASAN stack shadow before rewind_stack_do_exit() · f12d11c5
      Jann Horn 提交于
      Reset the KASAN shadow state of the task stack before rewinding RSP.
      Without this, a kernel oops will leave parts of the stack poisoned, and
      code running under do_exit() can trip over such poisoned regions and cause
      nonsensical false-positive KASAN reports about stack-out-of-bounds bugs.
      
      This does not wipe the exception stacks; if an oops happens on an exception
      stack, it might result in random KASAN false-positives from other tasks
      afterwards. This is probably relatively uninteresting, since if the kernel
      oopses on an exception stack, there are most likely bigger things to worry
      about. It'd be more interesting if vmapped stacks and KASAN were
      compatible, since then handle_stack_overflow() would oops from exception
      stack context.
      
      Fixes: 2deb4be2 ("x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit()")
      Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828184033.93712-1-jannh@google.com
      f12d11c5
  4. 19 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  5. 26 4月, 2018 8 次提交
  6. 08 3月, 2018 1 次提交
  7. 03 2月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/dumpstack: Avoid uninitlized variable · ebfc1501
      Arnd Bergmann 提交于
      In some configurations, 'partial' does not get initialized, as shown by
      this gcc-8 warning:
      
      arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c: In function 'show_trace_log_lvl':
      arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:156:4: error: 'partial' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
          show_regs_if_on_stack(&stack_info, regs, partial);
          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      
      This initializes it to false, to get the previous behavior in this case.
      
      Fixes: a9cdbe72 ("x86/dumpstack: Fix partial register dumps")
      Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202145634.200291-1-arnd@arndb.de
      ebfc1501
  8. 03 1月, 2018 2 次提交
  9. 24 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • V
      x86/dumpstack: Indicate in Oops whether PTI is configured and enabled · 5f26d76c
      Vlastimil Babka 提交于
      CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is relatively new and intrusive feature that may
      still have some corner cases which could take some time to manifest and be
      fixed. It would be useful to have Oops messages indicate whether it was
      enabled for building the kernel, and whether it was disabled during boot.
      
      Example of fully enabled:
      
      	Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP PTI
      
      Example of enabled during build, but disabled during boot:
      
      	Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP NOPTI
      
      We can decide to remove this after the feature has been tested in the field
      long enough.
      
      [ tglx: Made it use boot_cpu_has() as requested by Borislav ]
      Signed-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NEduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: bpetkov@suse.de
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: jkosina@suse.cz
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      5f26d76c
  10. 23 12月, 2017 2 次提交
    • T
      x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap · 92a0f81d
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Put the cpu_entry_area into a separate P4D entry. The fixmap gets too big
      and 0-day already hit a case where the fixmap PTEs were cleared by
      cleanup_highmap().
      
      Aside of that the fixmap API is a pain as it's all backwards.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      92a0f81d
    • D
      x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack · 4fe2d8b1
      Dave Hansen 提交于
      If the kernel oopses while on the trampoline stack, it will print
      "<SYSENTER>" even if SYSENTER is not involved.  That is rather confusing.
      
      The "SYSENTER" stack is used for a lot more than SYSENTER now.  Give it a
      better string to display in stack dumps, and rename the kernel code to
      match.
      
      Also move the 32-bit code over to the new naming even though it still uses
      the entry stack only for SYSENTER.
      Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      4fe2d8b1
  11. 17 12月, 2017 6 次提交
    • A
      x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code · 0f9a4810
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The existing code was a mess, mainly because C arrays are nasty.  Turn
      SYSENTER_stack into a struct, add a helper to find it, and do all the
      obvious cleanups this enables.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.653244723@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      0f9a4810
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary · 7fbbd5cb
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Now that the SYSENTER stack has a guard page, there's no need for a canary
      to detect overflow after the fact.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.572577316@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7fbbd5cb
    • A
      x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area · 72f5e08d
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      This has a secondary purpose: it puts the entry stack into a region
      with a well-controlled layout.  A subsequent patch will take
      advantage of this to streamline the SYSCALL entry code to be able to
      find it more easily.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.962042855@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      72f5e08d
    • A
      x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks · 6e60e583
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      We currently special-case stack overflow on the task stack.  We're
      going to start putting special stacks in the fixmap with a custom
      layout, so they'll have guard pages, too.  Teach the unwinder to be
      able to unwind an overflow of any of the stacks.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.802057305@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6e60e583
    • A
      x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack · 33a2f1a6
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      get_stack_info() doesn't currently know about the SYSENTER stack, so
      unwinding will fail if we entered the kernel on the SYSENTER stack
      and haven't fully switched off.  Teach get_stack_info() about the
      SYSENTER stack.
      
      With future patches applied that run part of the entry code on the
      SYSENTER stack and introduce an intentional BUG(), I would get:
      
        PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
        ...
        RIP: 0010:do_error_trap+0x33/0x1c0
        ...
        Call Trace:
        Code: ...
      
      With this patch, I get:
      
        PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
        ...
        Call Trace:
         <SYSENTER>
         ? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60
         ? invalid_op+0x22/0x40
         ? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60
         ? sync_regs+0x3c/0x40
         ? sync_regs+0x2e/0x40
         ? error_entry+0x6c/0xd0
         ? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60
         </SYSENTER>
        Code: ...
      
      which is a lot more informative.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.392711508@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      33a2f1a6
    • J
      x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully · b02fcf9b
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      There are at least two unwinder bugs hindering the debugging of
      stack-overflow crashes:
      
      - It doesn't deal gracefully with the case where the stack overflows and
        the stack pointer itself isn't on a valid stack but the
        to-be-dereferenced data *is*.
      
      - The ORC oops dump code doesn't know how to print partial pt_regs, for the
        case where if we get an interrupt/exception in *early* entry code
        before the full pt_regs have been saved.
      
      Fix both issues.
      
      http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171126024031.uxi4numpbjm5rlbr@trebleSigned-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.071425003@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      b02fcf9b
  12. 30 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/asm/32: Remove a bunch of '& 0xffff' from pt_regs segment reads · 99504819
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Now that pt_regs properly defines segment fields as 16-bit on 32-bit
      CPUs, there's no need to mask off the high word.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      99504819
  13. 18 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  14. 18 4月, 2017 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/unwind: Ensure stack pointer is aligned · e335bb51
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      With frame pointers disabled, on some older versions of GCC (like
      4.8.3), it's possible for the stack pointer to get aligned at a
      half-word boundary:
      
        00000000000004d0 <fib_table_lookup>:
             4d0:       41 57                   push   %r15
             4d2:       41 56                   push   %r14
             4d4:       41 55                   push   %r13
             4d6:       41 54                   push   %r12
             4d8:       55                      push   %rbp
             4d9:       53                      push   %rbx
             4da:       48 83 ec 24             sub    $0x24,%rsp
      
      In such a case, the unwinder ends up reading the entire stack at the
      wrong alignment.  Then the last read goes past the end of the stack,
      hitting the stack guard page:
      
        BUG: stack guard page was hit at ffffc900217c4000 (stack is ffffc900217c0000..ffffc900217c3fff)
        kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP
        ...
      
      Fix it by ensuring the stack pointer is properly aligned before
      unwinding.
      Reported-by: NJirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Fixes: 7c7900f8 ("x86/unwind: Add new unwind interface and implementations")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cff33847cc9b02fa548625aa23268ac574460d8d.1492436590.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      e335bb51
  15. 27 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0 · 9a93848f
      Peter Zijlstra 提交于
      By using "UD0" for WARN()s we remove the function call and its possible
      __FILE__ and __LINE__ immediate arguments from the instruction stream.
      
      Total image size will not change much, what we win in the instruction
      stream we'll lose because of the __bug_table entries. Still, saves on
      I$ footprint and the total image size does go down a bit.
      
            text    data       filename
        10702123    4530992    defconfig-build/vmlinux.orig
        10682460    4530992    defconfig-build/vmlinux.patched
      
      (UML didn't seem to use GENERIC_BUG at all, so remove it)
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      9a93848f
  16. 02 3月, 2017 2 次提交
  17. 21 11月, 2016 1 次提交
  18. 18 11月, 2016 1 次提交
  19. 17 11月, 2016 1 次提交
  20. 26 10月, 2016 2 次提交
    • J
      x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dump · 0ee1dd9f
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      For mostly historical reasons, the x86 oops dump shows the raw stack
      values:
      
        ...
        [registers]
        Stack:
         ffff880079af7350 ffff880079905400 0000000000000000 ffffc900008f3ae0
         ffffffffa0196610 0000000000000001 00010000ffffffff 0000000087654321
         0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
        Call Trace:
        ...
      
      This seems to be an artifact from long ago, and probably isn't needed
      anymore.  It generally just adds noise to the dump, and it can be
      actively harmful because it leaks kernel addresses.
      
      Linus says:
      
        "The stack dump actually goes back to forever, and it used to be
         useful back in 1992 or so. But it used to be useful mainly because
         stacks were simpler and we didn't have very good call traces anyway. I
         definitely remember having used them - I just do not remember having
         used them in the last ten+ years.
      
         Of course, it's still true that if you can trigger an oops, you've
         likely already lost the security game, but since the stack dump is so
         useless, let's aim to just remove it and make games like the above
         harder."
      
      This also removes the related 'kstack=' cmdline option and the
      'kstack_depth_to_print' sysctl.
      Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e83bd50df52d8fe88e94d2566426ae40d813bf8f.1477405374.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      0ee1dd9f
    • J
      x86/dumpstack: Remove kernel text addresses from stack dump · bb5e5ce5
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      Printing kernel text addresses in stack dumps is of questionable value,
      especially now that address randomization is becoming common.
      
      It can be a security issue because it leaks kernel addresses.  It also
      affects the usefulness of the stack dump.  Linus says:
      
        "I actually spend time cleaning up commit messages in logs, because
        useless data that isn't actually information (random hex numbers) is
        actively detrimental.
      
        It makes commit logs less legible.
      
        It also makes it harder to parse dumps.
      
        It's not useful. That makes it actively bad.
      
        I probably look at more oops reports than most people. I have not
        found the hex numbers useful for the last five years, because they are
        just randomized crap.
      
        The stack content thing just makes code scroll off the screen etc, for
        example."
      
      The only real downside to removing these addresses is that they can be
      used to disambiguate duplicate symbol names.  However such cases are
      rare, and the context of the stack dump should be enough to be able to
      figure it out.
      
      There's now a 'faddr2line' script which can be used to convert a
      function address to a file name and line:
      
        $ ./scripts/faddr2line ~/k/vmlinux write_sysrq_trigger+0x51/0x60
        write_sysrq_trigger+0x51/0x60:
        write_sysrq_trigger at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1098
      
      Or gdb can be used:
      
        $ echo "list *write_sysrq_trigger+0x51" |gdb ~/k/vmlinux |grep "is in"
        (gdb) 0xffffffff815b5d83 is in driver_probe_device (/home/jpoimboe/git/linux/drivers/base/dd.c:378).
      
      (But note that when there are duplicate symbol names, gdb will only show
      the first symbol it finds.  faddr2line is recommended over gdb because
      it handles duplicates and it also does function size checking.)
      
      Here's an example of what a stack dump looks like after this change:
      
        BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
        IP: sysrq_handle_crash+0x45/0x80
        PGD 36bfa067 [   29.650644] PUD 7aca3067
        Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
        Modules linked in: ...
        CPU: 1 PID: 786 Comm: bash Tainted: G            E   4.9.0-rc1+ #1
        Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.1-1.fc24 04/01/2014
        task: ffff880078582a40 task.stack: ffffc90000ba8000
        RIP: 0010:sysrq_handle_crash+0x45/0x80
        RSP: 0018:ffffc90000babdc8 EFLAGS: 00010296
        RAX: ffff880078582a40 RBX: 0000000000000063 RCX: 0000000000000001
        RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000292
        RBP: ffffc90000babdc8 R08: 0000000b31866061 R09: 0000000000000000
        R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
        R13: 0000000000000007 R14: ffffffff81ee8680 R15: 0000000000000000
        FS:  00007ffb43869700(0000) GS:ffff88007d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
        CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
        CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007a3e9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
        Stack:
         ffffc90000babe00 ffffffff81572d08 ffffffff81572bd5 0000000000000002
         0000000000000000 ffff880079606600 00007ffb4386e000 ffffc90000babe20
         ffffffff81573201 ffff880036a3fd00 fffffffffffffffb ffffc90000babe40
        Call Trace:
         __handle_sysrq+0x138/0x220
         ? __handle_sysrq+0x5/0x220
         write_sysrq_trigger+0x51/0x60
         proc_reg_write+0x42/0x70
         __vfs_write+0x37/0x140
         ? preempt_count_sub+0xa1/0x100
         ? __sb_start_write+0xf5/0x210
         ? vfs_write+0x183/0x1a0
         vfs_write+0xb8/0x1a0
         SyS_write+0x58/0xc0
         entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
        RIP: 0033:0x7ffb42f55940
        RSP: 002b:00007ffd33bb6b18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
        RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000046 RCX: 00007ffb42f55940
        RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007ffb4386e000 RDI: 0000000000000001
        RBP: 0000000000000011 R08: 00007ffb4321ea40 R09: 00007ffb43869700
        R10: 00007ffb43869700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000778a10
        R13: 00007ffd33bb5c00 R14: 0000000000000007 R15: 0000000000000010
        Code: 34 e8 d0 34 bc ff 48 c7 c2 3b 2b 57 81 be 01 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 e0 dd e5 81 e8 a8 55 ba ff c7 05 0e 3f de 00 01 00 00 00 0f ae f8 <c6> 04 25 00 00 00 00 01 5d c3 e8 4c 49 bc ff 84 c0 75 c3 48 c7
        RIP: sysrq_handle_crash+0x45/0x80 RSP: ffffc90000babdc8
        CR2: 0000000000000000
      Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/69329cb29b8f324bb5fcea14d61d224807fb6488.1477405374.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      bb5e5ce5
  21. 21 10月, 2016 2 次提交
    • J
      x86/dumpstack: Print any pt_regs found on the stack · 3b3fa11b
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      Now that we can find pt_regs registers on the stack, print them.  Here's
      an example of what it looks like:
      
        Call Trace:
         <IRQ>
         [<ffffffff8144b793>] dump_stack+0x86/0xc3
         [<ffffffff81142c73>] hrtimer_interrupt+0xb3/0x1c0
         [<ffffffff8105eb86>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x36/0x60
         [<ffffffff818b27cd>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x3d/0x50
         [<ffffffff818b06ee>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x9e/0xb0
        RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff818aef43>]  [<ffffffff818aef43>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x33/0x60
        RSP: 0018:ffff880079c4f760  EFLAGS: 00000202
        RAX: ffff880078738000 RBX: ffff88007d3da0c0 RCX: 0000000000000007
        RDX: 0000000000006d78 RSI: ffff8800787388f0 RDI: ffff880078738000
        RBP: ffff880079c4f768 R08: 0000002199088f38 R09: 0000000000000000
        R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff81e0d540
        R13: ffff8800369fb700 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880078738000
         <EOI>
         [<ffffffff810e1f14>] finish_task_switch+0xb4/0x250
         [<ffffffff810e1ed6>] ? finish_task_switch+0x76/0x250
         [<ffffffff818a7b61>] __schedule+0x3e1/0xb20
         ...
         [<ffffffff810759c8>] trace_do_page_fault+0x58/0x2c0
         [<ffffffff8106f7dc>] do_async_page_fault+0x2c/0xa0
         [<ffffffff818b1dd8>] async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
        RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8145b062>]  [<ffffffff8145b062>] __clear_user+0x42/0x70
        RSP: 0018:ffff880079c4fd38  EFLAGS: 00010202
        RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000138 RCX: 0000000000000138
        RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 000000000061b640
        RBP: ffff880079c4fd48 R08: 0000002198feefd7 R09: ffffffff82a40928
        R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000061b640
        R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880079c50000 R15: ffff8800791d7400
         [<ffffffff8145b043>] ? __clear_user+0x23/0x70
         [<ffffffff8145b0fb>] clear_user+0x2b/0x40
         [<ffffffff812fbda2>] load_elf_binary+0x1472/0x1750
         [<ffffffff8129a591>] search_binary_handler+0xa1/0x200
         [<ffffffff8129b69b>] do_execveat_common.isra.36+0x6cb/0x9f0
         [<ffffffff8129b5f3>] ? do_execveat_common.isra.36+0x623/0x9f0
         [<ffffffff8129bcaa>] SyS_execve+0x3a/0x50
         [<ffffffff81003f5c>] do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x1e0
         [<ffffffff818afa3f>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
        RIP: 0033:[<00007fd2e2f2e537>]  [<00007fd2e2f2e537>] 0x7fd2e2f2e537
        RSP: 002b:00007ffc449c5fc8  EFLAGS: 00000246
        RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc449c8860 RCX: 00007fd2e2f2e537
        RDX: 000000000127cc40 RSI: 00007ffc449c8860 RDI: 00007ffc449c6029
        RBP: 00007ffc449c60b0 R08: 65726f632d667265 R09: 00007ffc449c5e20
        R10: 00000000000005a7 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000127cc40
        R13: 000000000127ce05 R14: 00007ffc449c6029 R15: 000000000127ce01
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5cc2c512ec82cfba00dd22467644d4ed751a48c0.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      3b3fa11b
    • J
      x86/dumpstack: Print stack identifier on its own line · 79439d8e
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      show_trace_log_lvl() prints the stack id (e.g. "<IRQ>") without a
      newline so that any stack address printed after it will appear on the
      same line.  That causes the first stack address to be vertically
      misaligned with the rest, making it visually cluttered and slightly
      confusing:
      
        Call Trace:
         <IRQ> [<ffffffff814431c3>] dump_stack+0x86/0xc3
         [<ffffffff8100828b>] perf_callchain_kernel+0x14b/0x160
         [<ffffffff811e915f>] get_perf_callchain+0x15f/0x2b0
         ...
         <EOI> [<ffffffff8189c6c3>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x33/0x60
         [<ffffffff810e1c84>] finish_task_switch+0xb4/0x250
         [<ffffffff8106f7dc>] do_async_page_fault+0x2c/0xa0
      
      It will look worse once we start printing pt_regs registers found in the
      middle of the stack:
      
        <IRQ> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8189c6c3>]  [<ffffffff8189c6c3>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x33/0x60
        RSP: 0018:ffff88007876f720  EFLAGS: 00000206
        RAX: ffff8800786caa40 RBX: ffff88007d5da140 RCX: 0000000000000007
        ...
      
      Improve readability by adding a newline to the stack name:
      
        Call Trace:
         <IRQ>
         [<ffffffff814431c3>] dump_stack+0x86/0xc3
         [<ffffffff8100828b>] perf_callchain_kernel+0x14b/0x160
         [<ffffffff811e915f>] get_perf_callchain+0x15f/0x2b0
         ...
         <EOI>
         [<ffffffff8189c6c3>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x33/0x60
         [<ffffffff810e1c84>] finish_task_switch+0xb4/0x250
         [<ffffffff8106f7dc>] do_async_page_fault+0x2c/0xa0
      
      Now that "continued" lines are no longer needed, we can also remove the
      hack of using the empty string (aka KERN_CONT) and replace it with
      KERN_DEFAULT.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9bdd6dee2c74555d45500939fcc155997dc7889e.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      79439d8e
  22. 21 9月, 2016 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/dumpstack: Fix show_stack() task pointer regression · 71f5443e
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      With the following commit:
      
        e18bcccd ("x86/dumpstack: Convert show_trace_log_lvl() to use the new unwinder")
      
      The task pointer argument to show_stack_log_lvl() in show_stack() was
      inadvertently changed to 'current'.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: byungchul.park@lge.com
      Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com
      Cc: keescook@chromium.org
      Cc: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: luto@amacapital.net
      Cc: nilayvaish@gmail.com
      Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
      Cc: tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf <tipbot@zytor.com>
      Fixes: e18bcccd ("x86/dumpstack: Convert show_trace_log_lvl() to use the new unwinder")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160920155340.yhewlx7vmgmov5fb@trebleSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      71f5443e
  23. 20 9月, 2016 1 次提交