1. 16 11月, 2016 2 次提交
  2. 21 10月, 2016 5 次提交
  3. 19 10月, 2016 4 次提交
  4. 18 10月, 2016 3 次提交
  5. 15 10月, 2016 2 次提交
  6. 12 10月, 2016 16 次提交
  7. 11 10月, 2016 5 次提交
    • J
      MIPS: VDSO: Drop duplicated -I*/-E* aflags · 9445622c
      James Hogan 提交于
      The aflags-vdso is based on ccflags-vdso, which already contains the -I*
      and -EL/-EB flags from KBUILD_CFLAGS, but those flags are needlessly
      added again to aflags-vdso.
      
      Drop the duplication.
      Signed-off-by: NJames Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Reported-by: NMaciej W. Rozycki <macro@imgtec.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMaciej W. Rozycki <macro@imgtec.com>
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/14369/Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      9445622c
    • J
      MIPS: Fix -mabi=64 build of vdso.lds · 034827c7
      James Hogan 提交于
      The native ABI vDSO linker script vdso.lds is built by preprocessing
      vdso.lds.S, with the native -mabi flag passed in to get the correct ABI
      definitions. Unfortunately however certain toolchains choke on -mabi=64
      without a corresponding compatible -march flag, for example:
      
      cc1: error: ‘-march=mips32r2’ is not compatible with the selected ABI
      scripts/Makefile.build:338: recipe for target 'arch/mips/vdso/vdso.lds' failed
      
      Fix this by including ccflags-vdso in the KBUILD_CPPFLAGS for vdso.lds,
      which includes the appropriate -march flag.
      
      Fixes: ebb5e78c ("MIPS: Initial implementation of a VDSO")
      Signed-off-by: NJames Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMaciej W. Rozycki <macro@imgtec.com>
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x-
      Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/14368/Signed-off-by: NRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      034827c7
    • N
      powerpc/64s: Fix power4_fixup_nap placement · 7c8cb4b5
      Nicholas Piggin 提交于
      power4_fixup_nap is called from the "common" handlers, not the virt/real
      handlers, therefore it should itself be a common handler. Placing it
      down in the trampoline space caused it to go out of reach of its
      callers, requiring a trampoline inserted at the start of the text
      section, which breaks the fixed section address calculations.
      
      Fixes: da2bc464 ("powerpc/64s: Add new exception vector macros")
      Reported-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
      Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      7c8cb4b5
    • L
      powerpc/pseries: Fix stack corruption in htpe code · 05af40e8
      Laurent Dufour 提交于
      This commit fixes a stack corruption in the pseries specific code dealing
      with the huge pages.
      
      In __pSeries_lpar_hugepage_invalidate() the buffer used to pass arguments
      to the hypervisor is not large enough. This leads to a stack corruption
      where a previously saved register could be corrupted leading to unexpected
      result in the caller, like the following panic:
      
        Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
        SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
        Modules linked in: virtio_balloon ip_tables x_tables autofs4
        virtio_blk 8139too virtio_pci virtio_ring 8139cp virtio
        CPU: 11 PID: 1916 Comm: mmstress Not tainted 4.8.0 #76
        task: c000000005394880 task.stack: c000000005570000
        NIP: c00000000027bf6c LR: c00000000027bf64 CTR: 0000000000000000
        REGS: c000000005573820 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (4.8.0)
        MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 84822884  XER: 20000000
        CFAR: c00000000010a924 DAR: 420000000014e5e0 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 1
        GPR00: c00000000027bf64 c000000005573aa0 c000000000e02800 c000000004447964
        GPR04: c00000000404de18 c000000004d38810 00000000042100f5 00000000f5002104
        GPR08: e0000000f5002104 0000000000000001 042100f5000000e0 00000000042100f5
        GPR12: 0000000000002200 c00000000fe02c00 c00000000404de18 0000000000000000
        GPR16: c1ffffffffffe7ff 00003fff62000000 420000000014e5e0 00003fff63000000
        GPR20: 0008000000000000 c0000000f7014800 0405e600000000e0 0000000000010000
        GPR24: c000000004d38810 c000000004447c10 c00000000404de18 c000000004447964
        GPR28: c000000005573b10 c000000004d38810 00003fff62000000 420000000014e5e0
        NIP [c00000000027bf6c] zap_huge_pmd+0x4c/0x470
        LR [c00000000027bf64] zap_huge_pmd+0x44/0x470
        Call Trace:
        [c000000005573aa0] [c00000000027bf64] zap_huge_pmd+0x44/0x470 (unreliable)
        [c000000005573af0] [c00000000022bbd8] unmap_page_range+0xcf8/0xed0
        [c000000005573c30] [c00000000022c2d4] unmap_vmas+0x84/0x120
        [c000000005573c80] [c000000000235448] unmap_region+0xd8/0x1b0
        [c000000005573d80] [c0000000002378f0] do_munmap+0x2d0/0x4c0
        [c000000005573df0] [c000000000237be4] SyS_munmap+0x64/0xb0
        [c000000005573e30] [c000000000009560] system_call+0x38/0x108
        Instruction dump:
        fbe1fff8 fb81ffe0 7c7f1b78 7ca32b78 7cbd2b78 f8010010 7c9a2378 f821ffb1
        7cde3378 4bfffea9 7c7b1b79 41820298 <e87f0000> 48000130 7fa5eb78 7fc4f378
      
      Most of the time, the bug is surfacing in a caller up in the stack from
      __pSeries_lpar_hugepage_invalidate() which is quite confusing.
      
      This bug is pending since v3.11 but was hidden if a caller of the
      caller of __pSeries_lpar_hugepage_invalidate() has pushed the corruped
      register (r18 in this case) in the stack and is not using it until
      restoring it. GCC 6.2.0 seems to raise it more frequently.
      
      This commit also change the definition of the parameter buffer in
      pSeries_lpar_flush_hash_range() to rely on the global define
      PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE (no functional change here).
      
      Fixes: 1a527286 ("powerpc: Optimize hugepage invalidate")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
      Signed-off-by: NLaurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Reviewed-by: NAneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Acked-by: NBalbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      05af40e8
    • E
      gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin · 38addce8
      Emese Revfy 提交于
      This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
      extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
      possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
      (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
      thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
      
      At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
      how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
      
      The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
      system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
      of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
      entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
      a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
      in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
      is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
      if/then/else branching, etc).
      
      To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
      marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
      variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
      random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
      compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
      value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).
      
      Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
      the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
      is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
      though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
      of the global are just used to mix the pool.
      
      Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
      random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
      hardware will not have the same starting values.
      Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
      [kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      38addce8
  8. 10 10月, 2016 1 次提交
  9. 09 10月, 2016 2 次提交