- 16 6月, 2020 5 次提交
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
task #28557685 commit 37b0b6b8b99c0e1c1f11abbe7cf49b6d03795b3f upstream. If sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated is zero and the first allocation fails then this code will crash. The problem is that "i--" will set "i" to -1 but when we compare "i >= sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated" then the -1 is type promoted to unsigned and becomes UINT_MAX. Since UINT_MAX is more than zero, the condition is true so we call kvfree(new_groups[-1]). The loop will carry on freeing invalid memory until it crashes. Fixes: 7c990728b99e ("ext4: fix potential race between s_flex_groups online resizing and access") Reviewed-by: NSuraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200228092142.7irbc44yaz3by7nb@kili.mountainSigned-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
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由 Suraj Jitindar Singh 提交于
task #28557685 commit 7c990728b99ed6fbe9c75fc202fce1172d9916da upstream. During an online resize an array of s_flex_groups structures gets replaced so it can get enlarged. If there is a concurrent access to the array and this memory has been reused then this can lead to an invalid memory access. The s_flex_group array has been converted into an array of pointers rather than an array of structures. This is to ensure that the information contained in the structures cannot get out of sync during a resize due to an accessor updating the value in the old structure after it has been copied but before the array pointer is updated. Since the structures them- selves are no longer copied but only the pointers to them this case is mitigated. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-4-tytso@mit.eduSigned-off-by: NSuraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
task #28557685 commit 1d0c3924a92e69bfa91163bda83c12a994b4d106 upstream. During an online resize an array of pointers to buffer heads gets replaced so it can get enlarged. If there is a racing block allocation or deallocation which uses the old array, and the old array has gotten reused this can lead to a GPF or some other random kernel memory getting modified. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-2-tytso@mit.eduReported-by: NSuraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
task #28557685 commit 4f97a68192bd33b9963b400759cef0ca5963af00 upstream. A recent commit, 9803387c55f7 ("ext4: validate the debug_want_extra_isize mount option at parse time"), moved mount-time checks around. One of those changes moved the inode size check before the blocksize variable was set to the blocksize of the file system. After 9803387c55f7 was set to the minimum allowable blocksize, which in practice on most systems would be 1024 bytes. This cuased file systems with inode sizes larger than 1024 bytes to be rejected with a message: EXT4-fs (sdXX): unsupported inode size: 4096 Fixes: 9803387c55f7 ("ext4: validate the debug_want_extra_isize mount option at parse time") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200206225252.GA3673@mit.eduReported-by: NHerbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
task #28557685 commit 9803387c55f7d2ce69aa64340c5fdc6b3027dbc8 upstream. Instead of setting s_want_extra_size and then making sure that it is a valid value afterwards, validate the field before we set it. This avoids races and other problems when remounting the file system. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191215063020.GA11512@mit.edu Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+4a39a025912b265cacef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NZubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
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- 17 1月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 zhangyi (F) 提交于
commit 9ba55543fc0c6bb1cf8edd63be8802d9ab7e1202 upstream. If user specify a large enough value of "commit=" option, it may trigger signed integer overflow which may lead to sbi->s_commit_interval becomes a large or small value, zero in particular. UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ../fs/ext4/super.c:1592:31 signed integer overflow: 536870912 * 1000 cannot be represented in type 'int' [...] Call trace: [...] [<ffffff9008a2d120>] ubsan_epilogue+0x34/0x9c lib/ubsan.c:166 [<ffffff9008a2d8b8>] handle_overflow+0x228/0x280 lib/ubsan.c:197 [<ffffff9008a2d95c>] __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x4c/0x68 lib/ubsan.c:218 [<ffffff90086d070c>] handle_mount_opt fs/ext4/super.c:1592 [inline] [<ffffff90086d070c>] parse_options+0x1724/0x1a40 fs/ext4/super.c:1773 [<ffffff90086d51c4>] ext4_remount+0x2ec/0x14a0 fs/ext4/super.c:4834 [...] Although it is not a big deal, still silence the UBSAN by limit the input value. Signed-off-by: Nzhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
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- 15 1月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Joseph Qi 提交于
This is trying to do jbd2 checkpoint in a specific kernel thread, then checkpoint won't be under io throttle control. Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NJiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Nzhangliguang <zhangliguang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed by: Baoyou Xie <baoyou.xie@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NLiu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
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- 27 12月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Eric Whitney 提交于
commit 1dc0aa46e74a3366e12f426b7caaca477853e9c3 upstream. Add new pending reservation mechanism to help manage reserved cluster accounting. Its primary function is to avoid the need to read extents from the disk when invalidating pages as a result of a truncate, punch hole, or collapse range operation. Signed-off-by: NEric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NJiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
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- 05 12月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
commit 4ea99936a1630f51fc3a2d61a58ec4a1c4b7d55a upstream. It's possible to specify a non-zero s_want_extra_isize via debugging option, and this can cause bad things(tm) to happen when using a file system with an inode size of 128 bytes. Add better checking when the file system is mounted, as well as when we are actually doing the trying to do the inode expansion. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191110121510.GH23325@mit.edu Reported-by: syzbot+f8d6f8386ceacdbfff57@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+33d7ea72e47de3bdf4e1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+44b6763edfc17144296f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 22 5月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Andreas Dilger 提交于
commit c9e716eb9b3455a83ed7c5f5a81256a3da779a95 upstream. Don't update the superblock s_rev_level during mount if it isn't actually necessary, only if superblock features are being set by the kernel. This was originally added for ext3 since it always set the INCOMPAT_RECOVER and HAS_JOURNAL features during mount, but this is not needed since no journal mode was added to ext4. That will allow Geert to mount his 20-year-old ext2 rev 0.0 m68k filesystem, as a testament of the backward compatibility of ext4. Fixes: 0390131b ("ext4: Allow ext4 to run without a journal") Signed-off-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
commit 2c1d0e3631e5732dba98ef49ac0bec1388776793 upstream. Handling of aborted journal is a special code path different from standard ext4_error() one and it can call panic() as well. Commit 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot") forgot to update this path so fix that omission. Fixes: 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot") Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 5.1 Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Debabrata Banerjee 提交于
commit 50b29d8f033a7c88c5bc011abc2068b1691ab755 upstream. Instead of removing EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM from s_def_mount_opt as I assume was intended, all other options were blown away leading to _ext4_show_options() output being incorrect. Fixes: 1e381f60 ("ext4: do not allow journal_opts for fs w/o journal") Signed-off-by: NDebabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Barret Rhoden 提交于
commit 7bc04c5c2cc467c5b40f2b03ba08da174a0d5fa7 upstream. When remounting with debug_want_extra_isize, we were not performing the same checks that we do during a normal mount. That allowed us to set a value for s_want_extra_isize that reached outside the s_inode_size. Fixes: e2b911c5 ("ext4: clean up feature test macros with predicate functions") Reported-by: syzbot+f584efa0ac7213c226b7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NBarret Rhoden <brho@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 20 4月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
[ Upstream commit 1dc1097ff60e4105216da7cd0aa99032b039a994 ] When admin calls "reboot -f" - i.e., does a hard system reboot by directly calling reboot(2) - ext4 filesystem mounted with errors=panic can panic the system. This happens because the underlying device gets disabled without unmounting the filesystem and thus some syscall running in parallel to reboot(2) can result in the filesystem getting IO errors. This is somewhat surprising to the users so try improve the behavior by switching to errors=remount-ro behavior when the system is running reboot(2). Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 17 1月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
commit e86807862e6880809f191c4cea7f88a489f0ed34 upstream. The xfstests generic/475 test switches the underlying device with dm-error while running a stress test. This results in a large number of file system errors, and since we can't lock the buffer head when marking the superblock dirty in the ext4_grp_locked_error() case, it's possible the superblock to be !buffer_uptodate() without buffer_write_io_error() being true. We need to set buffer_uptodate() before we call mark_buffer_dirty() or this will trigger a WARN_ON. It's safe to do this since the superblock must have been properly read into memory or the mount would have been successful. So if buffer_uptodate() is not set, we can safely assume that this happened due to a failed attempt to write the superblock. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 10 1月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
commit fde872682e175743e0c3ef939c89e3c6008a1529 upstream. Some time back, nfsd switched from calling vfs_fsync() to using a new commit_metadata() hook in export_operations(). If the file system did not provide a commit_metadata() hook, it fell back to using sync_inode_metadata(). Unfortunately doesn't work on all file systems. In particular, it doesn't work on ext4 due to how the inode gets journalled --- the VFS writeback code will not always call ext4_write_inode(). So we need to provide our own ext4_nfs_commit_metdata() method which calls ext4_write_inode() directly. Google-Bug-Id: 121195940 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
commit 8a363970d1dc38c4ec4ad575c862f776f468d057 upstream. If we receive a file handle, either from NFS or open_by_handle_at(2), and it points at an inode which has not been initialized, and the file system has metadata checksums enabled, we shouldn't try to get the inode, discover the checksum is invalid, and then declare the file system as being inconsistent. This can be reproduced by creating a test file system via "mke2fs -t ext4 -O metadata_csum /tmp/foo.img 8M", mounting it, cd'ing into that directory, and then running the following program. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <fcntl.h> struct handle { struct file_handle fh; unsigned char fid[MAX_HANDLE_SZ]; }; int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct handle h = {{8, 1 }, { 12, }}; open_by_handle_at(AT_FDCWD, &h.fh, O_RDONLY); return 0; } Google-Bug-Id: 120690101 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Pan Bian 提交于
commit 61157b24e60fb3cd1f85f2c76a7b1d628f970144 upstream. The function frees qf_inode via iput but then pass qf_inode to lockdep_set_quota_inode on the failure path. This may result in a use-after-free bug. The patch frees df_inode only when it is never used. Fixes: daf647d2 ("ext4: add lockdep annotations for i_data_sem") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.6 Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NPan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
commit fb265c9cb49e2074ddcdd4de99728aefdd3b3592 upstream. Today, when sb_bread() returns NULL, this can either be because of an I/O error or because the system failed to allocate the buffer. Since it's an old interface, changing would require changing many call sites. So instead we create our own ext4_sb_bread(), which also allows us to set the REQ_META flag. Also fixed a problem in the xattr code where a NULL return in a function could also mean that the xattr was not found, which could lead to the wrong error getting returned to userspace. Fixes: ac27a0ec ("ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 2.6.19 Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 21 11月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Vasily Averin 提交于
commit af18e35b upstream. Fixes: c8585c6f ("ext4: fix races between changing inode journal ...") Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.7 Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
commit 9e463084 upstream. Fixes: bfe0a5f4 ("ext4: add more mount time checks of the superblock") Reported-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.18 Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 14 11月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
commit 33458eaba4dfe778a426df6a19b7aad2ff9f7eec upstream. It's possible for ext4_show_quota_options() to try reading s_qf_names[i] while it is being modified by ext4_remount() --- most notably, in ext4_remount's error path when the original values of the quota file name gets restored. Reported-by: syzbot+a2872d6feea6918008a9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.2+ Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 16 9月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
When in effect, add "test_dummy_encryption" to _ext4_show_options() so that it is shown in /proc/mounts and other relevant procfs files. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 02 9月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
When mounting the superblock, ext4_fill_super() calculates the free blocks and free inodes and stores them in the superblock. It's not strictly necessary, since we don't use them any more, but it's nice to keep them roughly aligned to reality. Since it's not critical for file system correctness, the code doesn't call ext4_commit_super(). The problem is that it's in ext4_commit_super() that we recalculate the superblock checksum. So if we're not going to call ext4_commit_super(), we need to call ext4_superblock_csum_set() to make sure the superblock checksum is consistent. Most of the time, this doesn't matter, since we end up calling ext4_commit_super() very soon thereafter, and definitely by the time the file system is unmounted. However, it doesn't work in this sequence: mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 /dev/vdc 128M mount /dev/vdc /vdc cp xfstests/git-versions /vdc godown /vdc umount /vdc mount /dev/vdc tune2fs -l /dev/vdc With this commit, the "tune2fs -l" no longer fails. Reported-by: NChengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 30 7月, 2018 5 次提交
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由 Wang Shilong 提交于
Whenever we hit block or inode bitmap corruptions we set bit and then reduce this block group free inode/clusters counter to expose right available space. However some of ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted() is called inside group spinlock, some are not, this could make it happen that we double reduce one block group free counters from system. Always hold group spinlock for it could fix it, but it looks a little heavy, we could use test_and_set_bit() to fix race problems here. Signed-off-by: NWang Shilong <wshilong@ddn.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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由 Chengguang Xu 提交于
There is no check for allocation failure when duplicating "data" in ext4_remount(). Check for failure and return error -ENOMEM in this case. Signed-off-by: NChengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
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由 Junichi Uekawa 提交于
Output the warning message before we clobber type and be -1 all the time. The error message would now be [ 1.519791] EXT4-fs warning (device vdb): ext4_enable_quotas:5402: Failed to enable quota tracking (type=0, err=-3). Please run e2fsck to fix. Signed-off-by: NJunichi Uekawa <uekawa@google.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
The inode timestamps use 34 bits in ext4, but the various timestamps in the superblock are limited to 32 bits. If every user accesses these as 'unsigned', then this is good until year 2106, but it seems better to extend this a bit further in the process of removing the deprecated get_seconds() function. This adds another byte for each timestamp in the superblock, making them long enough to store timestamps beyond what is in the inodes, which seems good enough here (in ocfs2, they are already 64-bit wide, which is appropriate for a new layout). I did not modify e2fsprogs, which obviously needs the same change to actually interpret future timestamps correctly. Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Commit 8844618d: "ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid" will complain if block group zero does not have the EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED flag set. Unfortunately, this is not correct, since a freshly created file system has this flag cleared. It gets almost immediately after the file system is mounted read-write --- but the following somewhat unlikely sequence will end up triggering a false positive report of a corrupted file system: mkfs.ext4 /dev/vdc mount -o ro /dev/vdc /vdc mount -o remount,rw /dev/vdc Instead, when initializing the inode table for block group zero, test to make sure that itable_unused count is not too large, since that is the case that will result in some or all of the reserved inodes getting cleared. This fixes the failures reported by Eric Whiteney when running generic/230 and generic/231 in the the nojournal test case. Fixes: 8844618d ("ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid") Reported-by: NEric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- 18 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Michael Callahan 提交于
Add defines for STAT_READ and STAT_WRITE for indexing the partition stat entries. This clarifies some fs/ code which has hardcoded 1 for STAT_WRITE and will make it easier to extend the stats with additional fields. tj: Refreshed on top of v4.17. Signed-off-by: NMichael Callahan <michaelcallahan@fb.com> Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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- 09 7月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Previously, when an MMP-protected file system is remounted read-only, the kmmpd thread would exit the next time it woke up (a few seconds later), without resetting the MMP sequence number back to EXT4_MMP_SEQ_CLEAN. Fix this by explicitly killing the MMP thread when the file system is remounted read-only. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
Ext4_check_descriptors() was getting called before s_gdb_count was initialized. So for file systems w/o the meta_bg feature, allocation bitmaps could overlap the block group descriptors and ext4 wouldn't notice. For file systems with the meta_bg feature enabled, there was a fencepost error which would cause the ext4_check_descriptors() to incorrectly believe that the block allocation bitmap overlaps with the block group descriptor blocks, and it would reject the mount. Fix both of these problems. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 03 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Jon Derrick 提交于
This patch attempts to close a hole leading to a BUG seen with hot removals during writes [1]. A block device (NVME namespace in this test case) is formatted to EXT4 without partitions. It's mounted and write I/O is run to a file, then the device is hot removed from the slot. The superblock attempts to be written to the drive which is no longer present. The typical chain of events leading to the BUG: ext4_commit_super() __sync_dirty_buffer() submit_bh() submit_bh_wbc() BUG_ON(!buffer_mapped(bh)); This fix checks for the superblock's buffer head being mapped prior to syncing. [1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-ext4/msg56527.htmlSigned-off-by: NJon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 18 6月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
The kernel's ext4 mount-time checks were more permissive than e2fsprogs's libext2fs checks when opening a file system. The superblock is considered too insane for debugfs or e2fsck to operate on it, the kernel has no business trying to mount it. This will make file system fuzzing tools work harder, but the failure cases that they find will be more useful and be easier to evaluate. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 17 6月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
If there is a directory entry pointing to a system inode (such as a journal inode), complain and declare the file system to be corrupted. Also, if the superblock's first inode number field is too small, refuse to mount the file system. This addresses CVE-2018-10882. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200069Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 14 6月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
The bg_flags field in the block group descripts is only valid if the uninit_bg or metadata_csum feature is enabled. We were not consistently looking at this field; fix this. Also block group #0 must never have uninitialized allocation bitmaps, or need to be zeroed, since that's where the root inode, and other special inodes are set up. Check for these conditions and mark the file system as corrupted if they are detected. This addresses CVE-2018-10876. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199403Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
It's really bad when the allocation bitmaps and the inode table overlap with the block group descriptors, since it causes random corruption of the bg descriptors. So we really want to head those off at the pass. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199865Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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- 13 6月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于
This is very handy when debugging bugs handling maliciously corrupted file systems. Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
The kvmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kvmalloc_array(). This patch replaces cases of: kvmalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kvmalloc_array(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kvmalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kvmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kvmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kvmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kvmalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kvmalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kvmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kvmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kvmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kvmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kvmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kvmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kvmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kvmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kvmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kvmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kvmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kvmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kvmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kvmalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kvmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kvmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kvmalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kvmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kvmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kvmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kvmalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kvmalloc + kvmalloc_array ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 31 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dave Jiang 提交于
The function return values are confusing with the way the function is named. We expect a true or false return value but it actually returns 0/-errno. This makes the code very confusing. Changing the return values to return a bool where if DAX is supported then return true and no DAX support returns false. Signed-off-by: NDave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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