Setting up ahash has some overhead.  Only use ahash to calculate the
hash of a buffer, if the buffer is larger than ima_ahash_minsize.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>

This patch provides convenient buffer hash calculation function.

Changelog v3:
- fix while hash calculation - Dmitry
v1:
- rewrite to support loff_t sized buffers - Mimi
  (based on Fenguang Wu's testing)
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Cleanup the function arguments by using "ima_hooks" enumerator as needed.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>

Define and call a function to display the "ima_hooks" rules.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>

Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to
read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the
functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read
the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

ima_check_policy() has no parameters, so use the normal void
parameter convention to make it match the prototype in the header file
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

There is no need to hold the ima_write_mutex for so long.  We only need it
around ima_parse_add_rule().

Changelog:
- The return path now takes into account failed kmalloc() call.
Reported-by: NAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Commit "IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times" assumed that the
policy would be updated at least once.

If there are zero updates, the temporary list head object will get added
to the policy list, and later dereferenced as an IMA policy object, which
means that invalid memory will be accessed.

Changelog:
- Move list_empty() test to ima_release_policy(), before audit msg - Mimi
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:

ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"

...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.

Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the
driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only.

Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is
updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the
existing policy.  This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag.  Only when
the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>

Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace
from removing keys from the keyring.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy.  It is
even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.
Signed-off-by: NZbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings.  IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy.  To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.

IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys.  It is consulted
before any other keyring.  If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
Signed-off-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue.
The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error
get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations.  On
success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced.

IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to
writes, the match code is RCU protected.  The updater side also does
list splice in RCU manner.
Signed-off-by: NPetko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

The newly added EVM_LOAD_X509 code can be configured even if
CONFIG_EVM is disabled, but that causes a link error:

security/built-in.o: In function `integrity_load_keys':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.init.text+0x400): undefined reference to `evm_load_x509'

This adds a Kconfig dependency to ensure it is only enabled when
CONFIG_EVM is set as well.
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 2ce523eb ("evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel")
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

The EVM verification status is cached in iint->evm_status and if it
was successful, never re-verified again when IMA passes the 'iint' to
evm_verifyxattr().

When file attributes or extended attributes change, we may wish to
re-verify EVM integrity as well.  For example, after setting a digital
signature we may need to re-verify the signature and update the
iint->flags that there is an EVM signature.

This patch enables that by resetting evm_status to INTEGRITY_UKNOWN
state.

Changes in v2:
* Flag setting moved to EVM layer
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

A crypto HW kernel module can possibly initialize the EVM key from the
kernel __init code to enable EVM before calling the 'init' process.
This patch provides a function evm_set_key() to set the EVM key
directly without using the KEY subsystem.

Changes in v4:
* kernel-doc style for evm_set_key

Changes in v3:
* error reporting moved to evm_set_key
* EVM_INIT_HMAC moved to evm_set_key
* added bitop to prevent key setting race

Changes in v2:
* use size_t for key size instead of signed int
* provide EVM_MAX_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
* provide EVM_MIN_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

In order to enable EVM before starting the 'init' process,
evm_initialized needs to be non-zero.  Previously non-zero indicated
that the HMAC key was loaded.  When EVM loads the X509 before calling
'init', with this patch it is now possible to enable EVM to start
signature based verification.

This patch defines bits to enable EVM if a key of any type is loaded.

Changes in v3:
* print error message if key is not set

Changes in v2:
* EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC
* EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook
to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

Changes in v4:
* Patch description updated

Changes in v3:
* Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used
  directly.

Changes in v2:
* default key patch changed to /etc/keys
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.

This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().

Changes in v3:
* Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
  keyring instead of using  __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
* Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING

Changes in v2:
* Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
  CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
* Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
  file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and
could not sleep.  Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic
context and callers that are not willing to sleep.  The latter should
clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake.  As clearing
__GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the
wrong flags.  This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly
indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing
them prevents it.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net

If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, either directly or indirectly via
IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, certificates are loaded onto the IMA
trusted keyring by the kernel via key_create_or_update(). When
the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag is provided, certificates are loaded
without first verifying the certificate is properly signed by a
trusted key on the system keyring.  This patch removes the
KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc:  <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

This patch defines a builtin measurement policy "tcb", similar to the
existing "ima_tcb", but with additional rules to also measure files
based on the effective uid and to measure files opened with the "read"
mode bit set (eg. read, read-write).

Changing the builtin "ima_tcb" policy could potentially break existing
users.  Instead of defining a new separate boot command line option each
time the builtin measurement policy is modified, this patch defines a
single generic boot command line option "ima_policy=" to specify the
builtin policy and deprecates the use of the builtin ima_tcb policy.

[The "ima_policy=" boot command line option is based on Roberto Sassu's
"ima: added new policy type exec" patch.]
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee7 ima: define new template
ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng".

Changelog:
- change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion)
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13

Most code already uses consts for the struct kernel_param_ops,
sweep the kernel for the last offending stragglers. Other than
include/linux/moduleparam.h and kernel/params.c all other changes
were generated with the following Coccinelle SmPL patch. Merge
conflicts between trees can be handled with Coccinelle.

In the future git could get Coccinelle merge support to deal with
patch --> fail --> grammar --> Coccinelle --> new patch conflicts
automatically for us on patches where the grammar is available and
the patch is of high confidence. Consider this a feature request.

Test compiled on x86_64 against:

	* allnoconfig
	* allmodconfig
	* allyesconfig

@ const_found @
identifier ops;
@@

const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};

@ const_not_found depends on !const_found @
identifier ops;
@@

-struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
+const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};

Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

This patch adds the iint associated to the current inode as a new
parameter of ima_add_violation(). The passed iint is always not NULL
if a violation is detected. This modification will be used to determine
the inode for which there is a violation.

Since the 'd' and 'd-ng' template field init() functions were detecting
a violation from the value of the iint pointer, they now check the new
field 'violation', added to the 'ima_event_data' structure.

Changelog:
 - v1:
   - modified an old comment (Roberto Sassu)
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

All event related data has been wrapped into the new 'ima_event_data'
structure. The main benefit of this patch is that a new information
can be made available to template fields initialization functions
by simply adding a new field to the new structure instead of modifying
the definition of those functions.

Changelog:
 - v2:
   - f_dentry replaced with f_path.dentry (Roberto Sassu)
   - removed declaration of temporary variables in template field functions
     when possible (suggested by Dmitry Kasatkin)
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

This patch adds validity checks for 'path' parameter and
makes it const.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

EVM needs to be atomically updated when removing xattrs.
Otherwise concurrent EVM verification may fail in between.
This patch fixes by moving i_mutex unlocking after calling
EVM hook. fsnotify_xattr() is also now called while locked
the same way as it is done in __vfs_setxattr_noperm.

Changelog:
- remove unused 'inode' variable.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

To prevent offline stripping of existing file xattrs and relabeling of
them at runtime, EVM allows only newly created files to be labeled.  As
pseudo filesystems are not persistent, stripping of xattrs is not a
concern.

Some LSMs defer file labeling on pseudo filesystems.  This patch
permits the labeling of existing files on pseudo files systems.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH is always defined.  This patch removes the
IMA_X509_PATH definition and uses CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

File hashes are automatically set and updated and should not be
manually set. This patch limits file hash setting to fix and log
modes.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Include don't appraise or measure rules for the NSFS filesystem
in the builtin ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb policies.

Changelog:
- Update documentation
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19

This patch adds a rule in the default measurement policy to skip inodes
in the cgroupfs filesystem. Measurements for this filesystem can be
avoided, as all the digests collected have the same value of the digest of
an empty file.

Furthermore, this patch updates the documentation of IMA policies in
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy to make it consistent with
the policies set in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

It's a bit easier to read this if we split it up into two for loops.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>