- 07 6月, 2017 2 次提交
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由 Antony Antony 提交于
Add XFRMA_ENCAP, UDP encapsulation port, to km_migrate announcement to userland. Only add if XFRMA_ENCAP was in user migrate request. Signed-off-by: NAntony Antony <antony@phenome.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@tricolour.ca> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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由 Antony Antony 提交于
Add UDP encapsulation port to XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE using an optional netlink attribute XFRMA_ENCAP. The devices that support IKE MOBIKE extension (RFC-4555 Section 3.8) could go to sleep for a few minutes and wake up. When it wake up the NAT mapping could have expired, the device send a MOBIKE UPDATE_SA message to migrate the IPsec SA. The change could be a change UDP encapsulation port, IP address, or both. Reported-by: NPaul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAntony Antony <antony@phenome.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@tricolour.ca> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 02 5月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Ilan Tayari 提交于
Current code silently ignores driver errors when configuring IPSec offload xfrm_state, and falls back to host-based crypto. Fail the xfrm_state creation if the driver has an error, because the NIC offloading was explicitly requested by the user program. This will communicate back to the user that there was an error. Fixes: d77e38e6 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API") Signed-off-by: NIlan Tayari <ilant@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 14 4月, 2017 4 次提交
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由 Steffen Klassert 提交于
This patch adds all the bits that are needed to do IPsec hardware offload for IPsec states and ESP packets. We add xfrmdev_ops to the net_device. xfrmdev_ops has function pointers that are needed to manage the xfrm states in the hardware and to do a per packet offloading decision. Joint work with: Ilan Tayari <ilant@mellanox.com> Guy Shapiro <guysh@mellanox.com> Yossi Kuperman <yossiku@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: NGuy Shapiro <guysh@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: NIlan Tayari <ilant@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: NYossi Kuperman <yossiku@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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由 Johannes Berg 提交于
This is an add-on to the previous patch that passes the extended ACK structure where it's already available by existing genl_info or extack function arguments. This was done with this spatch (with some manual adjustment of indentation): @@ expression A, B, C, D, E; identifier fn, info; @@ fn(..., struct genl_info *info, ...) { ... -nlmsg_parse(A, B, C, D, E, NULL) +nlmsg_parse(A, B, C, D, E, info->extack) ... } @@ expression A, B, C, D, E; identifier fn, info; @@ fn(..., struct genl_info *info, ...) { <... -nla_parse_nested(A, B, C, D, NULL) +nla_parse_nested(A, B, C, D, info->extack) ...> } @@ expression A, B, C, D, E; identifier fn, extack; @@ fn(..., struct netlink_ext_ack *extack, ...) { <... -nlmsg_parse(A, B, C, D, E, NULL) +nlmsg_parse(A, B, C, D, E, extack) ...> } @@ expression A, B, C, D, E; identifier fn, extack; @@ fn(..., struct netlink_ext_ack *extack, ...) { <... -nla_parse(A, B, C, D, E, NULL) +nla_parse(A, B, C, D, E, extack) ...> } @@ expression A, B, C, D, E; identifier fn, extack; @@ fn(..., struct netlink_ext_ack *extack, ...) { ... -nlmsg_parse(A, B, C, D, E, NULL) +nlmsg_parse(A, B, C, D, E, extack) ... } @@ expression A, B, C, D; identifier fn, extack; @@ fn(..., struct netlink_ext_ack *extack, ...) { <... -nla_parse_nested(A, B, C, D, NULL) +nla_parse_nested(A, B, C, D, extack) ...> } @@ expression A, B, C, D; identifier fn, extack; @@ fn(..., struct netlink_ext_ack *extack, ...) { <... -nlmsg_validate(A, B, C, D, NULL) +nlmsg_validate(A, B, C, D, extack) ...> } @@ expression A, B, C, D; identifier fn, extack; @@ fn(..., struct netlink_ext_ack *extack, ...) { <... -nla_validate(A, B, C, D, NULL) +nla_validate(A, B, C, D, extack) ...> } @@ expression A, B, C; identifier fn, extack; @@ fn(..., struct netlink_ext_ack *extack, ...) { <... -nla_validate_nested(A, B, C, NULL) +nla_validate_nested(A, B, C, extack) ...> } Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> -
由 Johannes Berg 提交于
Pass the new extended ACK reporting struct to all of the generic netlink parsing functions. For now, pass NULL in almost all callers (except for some in the core.) Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Johannes Berg 提交于
Add the base infrastructure and UAPI for netlink extended ACK reporting. All "manual" calls to netlink_ack() pass NULL for now and thus don't get extended ACK reporting. Big thanks goes to Pablo Neira Ayuso for not only bringing up the whole topic at netconf (again) but also coming up with the nlattr passing trick and various other ideas. Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 10 4月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Herbert Xu 提交于
This patch fixes the xfrm_user code to use the actual array size rather than the hard-coded CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME length. This is because the array size is fixed at 64 bytes while we want to increase the in-kernel CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME value. Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: NAlexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> Tested-by: NAlexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> Acked-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 29 3月, 2017 2 次提交
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由 Andy Whitcroft 提交于
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: NAndy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andy Whitcroft 提交于
When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for priviledge escalation. We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained replay_window. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: NAndy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 24 3月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 25 12月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 30 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Yi Zhao 提交于
It doesn't support to run 32bit 'ip' to set xfrm objdect on 64bit host. But the return value is unknown for user program: ip xfrm policy list RTNETLINK answers: Unknown error 524 Replace ENOTSUPP with EOPNOTSUPP: ip xfrm policy list RTNETLINK answers: Operation not supported Signed-off-by: NYi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 09 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Mathias Krause 提交于
When we fail to attach the security context in xfrm_state_construct() we'll return 0 as error value which, in turn, will wrongly claim success to userland when, in fact, we won't be adding / updating the XFRM state. This is a regression introduced by commit fd21150a ("[XFRM] netlink: Inline attach_encap_tmpl(), attach_sec_ctx(), and attach_one_addr()"). Fix it by propagating the error returned by security_xfrm_state_alloc() in this case. Fixes: fd21150a ("[XFRM] netlink: Inline attach_encap_tmpl()...") Signed-off-by: NMathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 27 7月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Vegard Nossum 提交于
During fuzzing I regularly run into this WARN(). According to Herbert Xu, this "certainly shouldn't be a WARN, it probably shouldn't print anything either". Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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由 Vegard Nossum 提交于
AFAICT this message is just printed whenever input validation fails. This is a normal failure and we shouldn't be dumping the stack over it. Looks like it was originally a printk that was maybe incorrectly upgraded to a WARN: commit 62db5cfd Author: stephen hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Date: Wed May 12 06:37:06 2010 +0000 xfrm: add severity to printk Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 18 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Vegard Nossum 提交于
If we hit any of the error conditions inside xfrm_dump_sa(), then xfrm_state_walk_init() never gets called. However, we still call xfrm_state_walk_done() from xfrm_dump_sa_done(), which will crash because the state walk was never initialized properly. We can fix this by setting cb->args[0] only after we've processed the first element and checking this before calling xfrm_state_walk_done(). Fixes: d3623099 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump") Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Acked-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 24 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Nicolas Dichtel 提交于
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 23 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
The code wants to prevent compat code from receiving messages. Use in_compat_syscall for this. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 23 10月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Sowmini Varadhan 提交于
On sparc, deleting established SAs (e.g., by restarting ipsec) results in unaligned access messages via xfrm_del_sa -> km_state_notify -> xfrm_send_state_notify(). Even though struct xfrm_usersa_info is aligned on 8-byte boundaries, netlink attributes are fundamentally only 4 byte aligned, and this cannot be changed for nla_data() that is passed up to userspace. As a result, the put_unaligned() macro needs to be used to set up potentially unaligned fields such as the xfrm_stats in copy_to_user_state() Signed-off-by: NSowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 29 9月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Michael Rossberg 提交于
Allow to change the replay threshold (XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH) and expiry timer (XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH) of a state without having to set other attributes like replay counter and byte lifetime. Changing these other values while traffic flows will break the state. Signed-off-by: NMichael Rossberg <michael.rossberg@tu-ilmenau.de> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 11 8月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Andrzej Hajda 提交于
The patch was generated using fixed coccinelle semantic patch scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup.cocci [1]. [1]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2014320Signed-off-by: NAndrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 21 7月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Jakub Wilk 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJakub Wilk <jwilk@jwilk.net> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 28 5月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Herbert Xu 提交于
This patch adds IV generator information to xfrm_state. This is currently obtained from our own list of algorithm descriptions. Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 03 3月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Fan Du 提交于
structure like xfrm_usersa_info or xfrm_userpolicy_info has different sizeof when compiled as 32bits and 64bits due to not appending pack attribute in their definition. This will result in broken SA and SP information when user trying to configure them through netlink interface. Inform user land about this situation instead of keeping silent, the upper test scripts would behave accordingly. Signed-off-by: NFan Du <fan.du@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 18 1月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Johannes Berg 提交于
Contrary to common expectations for an "int" return, these functions return only a positive value -- if used correctly they cannot even return 0 because the message header will necessarily be in the skb. This makes the very common pattern of if (genlmsg_end(...) < 0) { ... } be a whole bunch of dead code. Many places also simply do return nlmsg_end(...); and the caller is expected to deal with it. This also commonly (at least for me) causes errors, because it is very common to write if (my_function(...)) /* error condition */ and if my_function() does "return nlmsg_end()" this is of course wrong. Additionally, there's not a single place in the kernel that actually needs the message length returned, and if anyone needs it later then it'll be very easy to just use skb->len there. Remove this, and make the functions void. This removes a bunch of dead code as described above. The patch adds lines because I did - return nlmsg_end(...); + nlmsg_end(...); + return 0; I could have preserved all the function's return values by returning skb->len, but instead I've audited all the places calling the affected functions and found that none cared. A few places actually compared the return value with <= 0 in dump functionality, but that could just be changed to < 0 with no change in behaviour, so I opted for the more efficient version. One instance of the error I've made numerous times now is also present in net/phonet/pn_netlink.c in the route_dumpit() function - it didn't check for <0 or <=0 and thus broke out of the loop every single time. I've preserved this since it will (I think) have caused the messages to userspace to be formatted differently with just a single message for every SKB returned to userspace. It's possible that this isn't needed for the tools that actually use this, but I don't even know what they are so couldn't test that changing this behaviour would be acceptable. Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 03 11月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 dingzhi 提交于
After this commit, the attribute XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL is added when no ESN replay value is defined. Thus sequence number values are always notified to userspace. Signed-off-by: Ndingzhi <zhi.ding@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: NAdrien Mazarguil <adrien.mazarguil@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 18 9月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Herbert Xu 提交于
While tracking down the MAX_AH_AUTH_LEN crash in an old kernel I thought that this limit was rather arbitrary and we should just get rid of it. In fact it seems that we've already done all the work needed to remove it apart from actually removing it. This limit was there in order to limit stack usage. Since we've already switched over to allocating scratch space using kmalloc, there is no longer any need to limit the authentication length. This patch kills all references to it, including the BUG_ONs that led me here. Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 02 9月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Christophe Gouault 提交于
Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: NChristophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 30 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Tobias Brunner 提交于
The SPI check introduced in ea9884b3 was intended for IPComp SAs but actually prevented AH SAs from getting installed (depending on the SPI). Fixes: ea9884b3 ("xfrm: check user specified spi for IPComp") Cc: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: NTobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 04 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Michal Kubecek 提交于
The xfrm_user module registers its pernet init/exit after xfrm itself so that its net exit function xfrm_user_net_exit() is executed before xfrm_net_exit() which calls xfrm_state_fini() to cleanup the SA's (xfrm states). This opens a window between zeroing net->xfrm.nlsk pointer and deleting all xfrm_state instances which may access it (via the timer). If an xfrm state expires in this window, xfrm_exp_state_notify() will pass null pointer as socket to nlmsg_multicast(). As the notifications are called inside rcu_read_lock() block, it is sufficient to retrieve the nlsk socket with rcu_dereference() and check the it for null. Signed-off-by: NMichal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 25 4月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 23 4月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Commit f1370cc4 "xfrm: Remove useless secid field from xfrm_audit." changed "struct xfrm_audit" to have either { audit_get_loginuid(current) / audit_get_sessionid(current) } or { INVALID_UID / -1 } pair. This means that we can represent "struct xfrm_audit" as "bool". This patch replaces "struct xfrm_audit" argument with "bool". Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 22 4月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
It seems to me that commit ab5f5e8b "[XFRM]: xfrm audit calls" is doing something strange at xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(). If secid != 0 && security_secid_to_secctx(secid) != 0, the caller calls audit_log_task_context() which basically does secid != 0 && security_secid_to_secctx(secid) == 0 case except that secid is obtained from current thread's context. Oh, what happens if secid passed to xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() was obtained from other thread's context? It might audit current thread's context rather than other thread's context if security_secid_to_secctx() in xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() failed for some reason. Then, are all the caller of xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() passing either secid obtained from current thread's context or secid == 0? It seems to me that they are. If I didn't miss something, we don't need to pass secid to xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() because audit_log_task_context() will obtain secid from current thread's context. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 10 3月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Nikolay Aleksandrov 提交于
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 07 3月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Nicolas Dichtel 提交于
iproute2 already defines a structure with that name, let's use another one to avoid any conflict. CC: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 20 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Steffen Klassert 提交于
We loose a lot of information of the original state if we clone it with xfrm_state_clone(). In particular, there is no crypto algorithm attached if the original state uses an aead algorithm. This patch add the missing information to the clone state. Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 17 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Nicolas Dichtel 提交于
The goal of this patch is to allow userland to dump only a part of SA by specifying a filter during the dump. The kernel is in charge to filter SA, this avoids to generate useless netlink traffic (it save also some cpu cycles). This is particularly useful when there is a big number of SA set on the system. Note that I removed the union in struct xfrm_state_walk to fix a problem on arm. struct netlink_callback->args is defined as a array of 6 long and the first long is used in xfrm code to flag the cb as initialized. Hence, we must have: sizeof(struct xfrm_state_walk) <= sizeof(long) * 5. With the union, it was false on arm (sizeof(struct xfrm_state_walk) was sizeof(long) * 7), due to the padding. In fact, whatever the arch is, this union seems useless, there will be always padding after it. Removing it will not increase the size of this struct (and reduce it on arm). Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 13 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Horia Geanta 提交于
In the case when KMs have no listeners, km_query() will fail and temporary SAs are garbage collected immediately after their allocation. This causes strain on memory allocation, leading even to OOM since temporary SA alloc/free cycle is performed for every packet and garbage collection does not keep up the pace. The sane thing to do is to make sure we have audience before temporary SA allocation. Signed-off-by: NHoria Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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- 12 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Fan Du 提交于
Clear checking when user try to use ESN through netlink keymgr for AH. As only ESP and AH support ESN feature according to RFC. Signed-off-by: NFan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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