- 18 12月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Shirish S 提交于
[ Upstream commit 30aa3d26edb0f3d7992757287eec0ca588a5c259 ] The MC4_MISC thresholding quirk needs to be applied during S5 -> S0 and S3 -> S0 state transitions, which follow different code paths. Carve it out into a separate function and call it mce_amd_feature_init() where the two code paths of the state transitions converge. [ bp: massage commit message and the carved out function. ] Signed-off-by: NShirish S <shirish.s@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547651417-23583-3-git-send-email-shirish.s@amd.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Shirish S 提交于
[ Upstream commit c95b323dcd3598dd7ef5005d6723c1ba3b801093 ] MC4_MISC thresholding is not supported on all family 0x15 processors, hence skip the x86_model check when applying the quirk. [ bp: massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: NShirish S <shirish.s@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547106849-3476-2-git-send-email-shirish.s@amd.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 13 12月, 2019 6 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
commit 433f4ba1904100da65a311033f17a9bf586b287e upstream. The bounds check was present in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID but not KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID. Reported-by: syzbot+e3f4897236c4eeb8af4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 84cffe49 ("kvm: Emulate MOVBE", 2013-10-29) Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
commit ad5996d9a0e8019c3ae5151e687939369acfe044 upstream. Acquire kvm->srcu for the duration of ->set_nested_state() to fix a bug where nVMX derefences ->memslots without holding ->srcu or ->slots_lock. The other half of nested migration, ->get_nested_state(), does not need to acquire ->srcu as it is a purely a dump of internal KVM (and CPU) state to userspace. Detected as an RCU lockdep splat that is 100% reproducible by running KVM's state_test selftest with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y. Note that the failing function, kvm_is_visible_gfn(), is only checking the validity of a gfn, it's not actually accessing guest memory (which is more or less unsupported during vmx_set_nested_state() due to incorrect MMU state), i.e. vmx_set_nested_state() itself isn't fundamentally broken. In any case, setting nested state isn't a fast path so there's no reason to go out of our way to avoid taking ->srcu. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.4.0-rc7+ #94 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h:626 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by evmcs_test/10939: #0: ffff88826ffcb800 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x85/0x630 [kvm] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 10939 Comm: evmcs_test Not tainted 5.4.0-rc7+ #94 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x68/0x9b kvm_is_visible_gfn+0x179/0x180 [kvm] mmu_check_root+0x11/0x30 [kvm] fast_cr3_switch+0x40/0x120 [kvm] kvm_mmu_new_cr3+0x34/0x60 [kvm] nested_vmx_load_cr3+0xbd/0x1f0 [kvm_intel] nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode+0xab8/0x1d60 [kvm_intel] vmx_set_nested_state+0x256/0x340 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x491/0x11a0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xde/0x630 [kvm] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6c0 ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x200 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7f59a2b95f47 Fixes: 8fcc4b59 ("kvm: nVMX: Introduce KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
commit cbbaa2727aa3ae9e0a844803da7cef7fd3b94f2b upstream. KVM does not implement MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, so it must not be presented to the guests. It is also confusing to have !ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR && !RTM && ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO: lack of MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL suggests TSX was not hidden (it actually was), yet the value says that TSX is not vulnerable to microarchitectural data sampling. Fix both. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
commit de1fca5d6e0105c9d33924e1247e2f386efc3ece upstream. "Shared MSRs" are guest MSRs that are written to the host MSRs but keep their value until the next return to userspace. They support a mask, so that some bits keep the host value, but this mask is only used to skip an unnecessary MSR write and the value written to the MSR is always the guest MSR. Fix this and, while at it, do not update smsr->values[slot].curr if for whatever reason the wrmsr fails. This should only happen due to reserved bits, so the value written to smsr->values[slot].curr will not match when the user-return notifier and the host value will always be restored. However, it is untidy and in rare cases this can actually avoid spurious WRMSRs on return to userspace. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Tested-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Kai-Heng Feng 提交于
commit 7e8ce0e2b036dbc6617184317983aea4f2c52099 upstream. The AMD FCH USB XHCI Controller advertises support for generating PME# while in D0. When in D0, it does signal PME# for USB 3.0 connect events, but not for USB 2.0 or USB 1.1 connect events, which means the controller doesn't wake correctly for those events. 00:10.0 USB controller [0c03]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] FCH USB XHCI Controller [1022:7914] (rev 20) (prog-if 30 [XHCI]) Subsystem: Dell FCH USB XHCI Controller [1028:087e] Capabilities: [50] Power Management version 3 Flags: PMEClk- DSI- D1- D2- AuxCurrent=0mA PME(D0+,D1-,D2-,D3hot+,D3cold+) Clear PCI_PM_CAP_PME_D0 in dev->pme_support to indicate the device will not assert PME# from D0 so we don't rely on it. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203673 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190902145252.32111-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.comSigned-off-by: NKai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Joerg Roedel 提交于
commit 9a62d20027da3164a22244d9f022c0c987261687 upstream. The job of vmalloc_sync_all() is to help the lazy freeing of vmalloc() ranges: before such vmap ranges are reused we make sure that they are unmapped from every task's page tables. This is really easy on pagetable setups where the kernel page tables are shared between all tasks - this is the case on 32-bit kernels with SHARED_KERNEL_PMD = 1. But on !SHARED_KERNEL_PMD 32-bit kernels this involves iterating over the pgd_list and clearing all pmd entries in the pgds that are cleared in the init_mm.pgd, which is the reference pagetable that the vmalloc() code uses. In that context the current practice of vmalloc_sync_all() iterating until FIX_ADDR_TOP is buggy: for (address = VMALLOC_START & PMD_MASK; address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX && address < FIXADDR_TOP; address += PMD_SIZE) { struct page *page; Because iterating up to FIXADDR_TOP will involve a lot of non-vmalloc address ranges: VMALLOC -> PKMAP -> LDT -> CPU_ENTRY_AREA -> FIX_ADDR This is mostly harmless for the FIX_ADDR and CPU_ENTRY_AREA ranges that don't clear their pmds, but it's lethal for the LDT range, which relies on having different mappings in different processes, and 'synchronizing' them in the vmalloc sense corrupts those pagetable entries (clearing them). This got particularly prominent with PTI, which turns SHARED_KERNEL_PMD off and makes this the dominant mapping mode on 32-bit. To make LDT working again vmalloc_sync_all() must only iterate over the volatile parts of the kernel address range that are identical between all processes. So the correct check in vmalloc_sync_all() is "address < VMALLOC_END" to make sure the VMALLOC areas are synchronized and the LDT mapping is not falsely overwritten. The CPU_ENTRY_AREA and the FIXMAP area are no longer synced either, but this is not really a proplem since their PMDs get established during bootup and never change. This change fixes the ldt_gdt selftest in my setup. [ mingo: Fixed up the changelog to explain the logic and modified the copying to only happen up until VMALLOC_END. ] Reported-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: hpa@zytor.com Fixes: 7757d607: ("x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191126111119.GA110513@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 05 12月, 2019 6 次提交
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由 Masami Hiramatsu 提交于
[ Upstream commit fe6e65615415987629a2dda583b4495677d8c388 ] Show x86-64 specific blacklisted symbols in debugfs. Since x86-64 prohibits probing on symbols which are in entry text, those should be shown. Tested-by: NAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/154503488425.26176.17136784384033608516.stgit@devboxSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Andrea Righi 提交于
[ Upstream commit bf9445a33ae6ac2f0822d2f1ce1365408387d568 ] Blacklist symbols in Xen probe-prohibited areas, so that user can see these prohibited symbols in debugfs. See also: a50480cb6d61. Signed-off-by: NAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com> Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
This reverts commit 7392aa08 which is commit 7671ce21b13b9596163a29f4712cb2451a9b97dc upstream. It should not have been selected for a stable kernel as it breaks the nVMX regression tests. Reported-by: NJack Wang <jack.wang.usish@gmail.com> Reported-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
This reverts commit 9fe573d5 which is commit b7031fd40fcc741b0f9b0c04c8d844e445858b84 upstream. It should not have been selected for a stable kernel as it breaks the nVMX regression tests. Reported-by: NJack Wang <jack.wang.usish@gmail.com> Reported-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jim Mattson 提交于
[ Upstream commit 0023ef39dc35c773c436eaa46ca539a26b308b55 ] RDTSCP is supported in legacy mode as well as long mode. The IA32_TSC_AUX MSR should be set to the correct guest value before entering any guest that supports RDTSCP. Fixes: 4e47c7a6 ("KVM: VMX: Add instruction rdtscp support for guest") Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Reviewed-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Xiaochen Shen 提交于
[ Upstream commit 26467b0f8407cbd628fa5b7bcfd156e772004155 ] When a mon group is being deleted, rdtgrp->flags is set to RDT_DELETED in rdtgroup_rmdir_mon() firstly. The structure of rdtgrp will be freed until rdtgrp->waitcount is dropped to 0 in rdtgroup_kn_unlock() later. During the window of deleting a mon group, if an application calls rdtgroup_mondata_show() to read mondata under this mon group, 'rdtgrp' returned from rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() is a NULL pointer when rdtgrp->flags is RDT_DELETED. And then 'rdtgrp' is passed in this path: rdtgroup_mondata_show() --> mon_event_read() --> mon_event_count(). Thus it results in NULL pointer dereference in mon_event_count(). Check 'rdtgrp' in rdtgroup_mondata_show(), and return -ENOENT immediately when reading mondata during the window of deleting a mon group. Fixes: d89b7379 ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add mon_data") Signed-off-by: NXiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: pei.p.jia@intel.com Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1572326702-27577-1-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 01 12月, 2019 9 次提交
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由 Waiman Long 提交于
commit cd5a2aa89e847bdda7b62029d94e95488d73f6b2 upstream. Since MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related for processors that are affected by both vulnerabilities, the followiing confusing messages can be printed in the kernel log: MDS: Vulnerable MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers To avoid the first incorrect message, defer the printing of MDS mitigation after the TAA mitigation selection has been done. However, that has the side effect of printing TAA mitigation first before MDS mitigation. [ bp: Check box is affected/mitigations are disabled first before printing and massage. ] Suggested-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-3-longman@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Waiman Long 提交于
commit 64870ed1b12e235cfca3f6c6da75b542c973ff78 upstream. For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent, the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status correctly. For example, with only the "mds=off" option: vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly, the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but taa off. Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off" are present. Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective. [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ] Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort") Signed-off-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Alexander Kapshuk 提交于
commit 700c1018b86d0d4b3f1f2d459708c0cdf42b521d upstream. gawk 5.0.1 generates the following regexp warnings: GEN /home/sasha/torvalds/tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/inat-tables.c awk: ../arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk:260: warning: regexp escape sequence `\:' is not a known regexp operator awk: ../arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk:350: (FILENAME=../arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt FNR=41) warning: regexp escape sequence `\&' is not a known regexp operator Ealier versions of gawk are not known to generate these warnings. The gawk manual referenced below does not list characters ':' and '&' as needing escaping, so 'unescape' them. See https://www.gnu.org/software/gawk/manual/html_node/Escape-Sequences.html for more info. Running diff on the output generated by the script before and after applying the patch reported no differences. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] [ Caught the respective tools header discrepancy. ] Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAlexander Kapshuk <alexander.kapshuk@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190924044659.3785-1-alexander.kapshuk@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
commit a78986aae9b2988f8493f9f65a587ee433e83bc3 upstream. Explicitly exempt ZONE_DEVICE pages from kvm_is_reserved_pfn() and instead manually handle ZONE_DEVICE on a case-by-case basis. For things like page refcounts, KVM needs to treat ZONE_DEVICE pages like normal pages, e.g. put pages grabbed via gup(). But for flows such as setting A/D bits or shifting refcounts for transparent huge pages, KVM needs to to avoid processing ZONE_DEVICE pages as the flows in question lack the underlying machinery for proper handling of ZONE_DEVICE pages. This fixes a hang reported by Adam Borowski[*] in dev_pagemap_cleanup() when running a KVM guest backed with /dev/dax memory, as KVM straight up doesn't put any references to ZONE_DEVICE pages acquired by gup(). Note, Dan Williams proposed an alternative solution of doing put_page() on ZONE_DEVICE pages immediately after gup() in order to simplify the auditing needed to ensure is_zone_device_page() is called if and only if the backing device is pinned (via gup()). But that approach would break kvm_vcpu_{un}map() as KVM requires the page to be pinned from map() 'til unmap() when accessing guest memory, unlike KVM's secondary MMU, which coordinates with mmu_notifier invalidations to avoid creating stale page references, i.e. doesn't rely on pages being pinned. [*] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190919115547.GA17963@angband.plReported-by: NAdam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl> Analyzed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3565fce3 ("mm, x86: get_user_pages() for dax mappings") Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [sean: backport to 4.x; resolve conflict in mmu.c] Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jithu Joseph 提交于
[ Upstream commit b61b8bba18fe2b63d38fdaf9b83de25e2d787dfe ] When the last CPU in an rdt_domain goes offline, its rdt_domain struct gets freed. Current pseudo-locking code is unaware of this scenario and tries to dereference the freed structure in a few places. Add checks to prevent pseudo-locking code from doing this. While further work is needed to seamlessly restore resource groups (not just pseudo-locking) to their configuration when the domain is brought back online, the immediate issue of invalid pointers is addressed here. Fixes: f4e80d67 ("x86/intel_rdt: Resctrl files reflect pseudo-locked information") Fixes: 443810fe ("x86/intel_rdt: Create debugfs files for pseudo-locking testing") Fixes: 746e0859 ("x86/intel_rdt: Create character device exposing pseudo-locked region") Fixes: 33dc3e41 ("x86/intel_rdt: Make CPU information accessible for pseudo-locked regions") Signed-off-by: NJithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/231f742dbb7b00a31cc104416860e27dba6b072d.1539384145.git.reinette.chatre@intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Steven Rostedt (VMware) 提交于
[ Upstream commit c2712b858187f5bcd7b042fe4daa3ba3a12635c0 ] Andy had some concerns about using regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() in a new function regs_get_kernel_argument() as if there's any error in the stack code, it could cause a bad memory access. To be on the safe side, call probe_kernel_read() on the stack address to be extra careful in accessing the memory. A helper function, regs_get_kernel_stack_nth_addr(), was added to just return the stack address (or NULL if not on the stack), that will be used to find the address (and could be used by other functions) and read the address with kernel_probe_read(). Requested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: NJoel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181017165951.09119177@gandalf.local.homeSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Uros Bizjak 提交于
[ Upstream commit 5ebb272b2ea7e02911a03a893f8d922d49f9bb4a ] Register operand size of invvpid and invept instruction in 64-bit mode has always 64 bits. Adjust inline function argument type to reflect correct size. Signed-off-by: NUros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
[ Upstream commit 7671ce21b13b9596163a29f4712cb2451a9b97dc ] In preparation of supporting checkpoint/restore for nested state, commit ca0bde28 ("kvm: nVMX: Split VMCS checks from nested_vmx_run()") modified check_vmentry_postreqs() to only perform the guest EFER consistency checks when nested_run_pending is true. But, in the normal nested VMEntry flow, nested_run_pending is only set after check_vmentry_postreqs(), i.e. the consistency check is being skipped. Alternatively, nested_run_pending could be set prior to calling check_vmentry_postreqs() in nested_vmx_run(), but placing the consistency checks in nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode() allows us to split prepare_vmcs02() and interleave the preparation with the consistency checks without having to change the call sites of nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(). In other words, the rest of the consistency check code in nested_vmx_run() will be joining the postreqs checks in future patches. Fixes: ca0bde28 ("kvm: nVMX: Split VMCS checks from nested_vmx_run()") Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
[ Upstream commit b7031fd40fcc741b0f9b0c04c8d844e445858b84 ] Reset the vm_{entry,exit}_controls_shadow variables as well as the segment cache after loading a new VMCS in vmx_switch_vmcs(). The shadows/cache track VMCS data, i.e. they're stale every time we switch to a new VMCS regardless of reason. This fixes a bug where stale control shadows would be consumed after a nested VMExit due to a failed consistency check. Suggested-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 24 11月, 2019 13 次提交
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由 Reinette Chatre 提交于
[ Upstream commit 52eb74339a6233c69f4e3794b69ea7c98eeeae1b ] rdt_find_domain() returns an ERR_PTR() that is generated from a provided domain id when the value is negative. Care needs to be taken when creating an ERR_PTR() from this value because a subsequent check using IS_ERR() expects the error to be within the MAX_ERRNO range. Using an invalid domain id as an ERR_PTR() does work at this time since this is currently always -1. Using this undocumented assumption is fragile since future users of rdt_find_domain() may not be aware of thus assumption. Two related issues are addressed: - Ensure that rdt_find_domain() always returns a valid error value by forcing the error to be -ENODEV when a negative domain id is provided. - In a few instances the return value of rdt_find_domain() is just checked for NULL - fix these to include a check of ERR_PTR. Fixes: d89b7379 ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add mon_data") Fixes: 521348b011d6 ("x86/intel_rdt: Introduce utility to obtain CDP peer") Signed-off-by: NReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b88cd4ff6a75995bf8db9b0ea546908fe50f69f3.1544479852.git.reinette.chatre@intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
[ Upstream commit c200dac78fec66d87ef262cac38cfe4feabdf737 ] PCI BIOS requires the BIOS area 0x0A0000-0x0FFFFFF to be mapped W+X for various legacy reasons. When CONFIG_DEBUG_WX is enabled, this triggers the WX warning, but this is misleading because the mapping is required and is not a result of an accidental oversight. Prevent the full warning when PCI BIOS is enabled and the detected WX mapping is in the BIOS area. Just emit a pr_warn() which denotes the fact. This is partially duplicating the info which the PCI BIOS code emits when it maps the area as executable, but that info is not in the context of the WX checking output. Remove the extra %p printout in the WARN_ONCE() while at it. %pS is enough. Reported-by: NPaul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1810082151160.2455@nanos.tec.linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Bjorn Helgaas 提交于
[ Upstream commit 51fbf14f2528a8c6401290e37f1c893a2412f1d3 ] The only use of KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END is as an argument to walk_system_ram_res(): int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image) { ... walk_system_ram_res(KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_START, KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END, image, determine_backup_region); walk_system_ram_res() expects "start, end" arguments that are inclusive, i.e., the range to be walked includes both the start and end addresses. KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END was previously defined as (640 * 1024UL), which is the first address *past* the desired 0-640KB range. Define KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END as (640 * 1024UL - 1) so the KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC region is [0-0x9ffff], not [0-0xa0000]. Fixes: dd5f7260 ("kexec: support for kexec on panic using new system call") Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> CC: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com> CC: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> CC: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> CC: baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com CC: bhe@redhat.com CC: dan.j.williams@intel.com CC: dyoung@redhat.com CC: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153805811578.1157.6948388946904655969.stgit@bhelgaas-glaptop.roam.corp.google.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Reinette Chatre 提交于
[ Upstream commit e5f3530c391105fdd6174852e3ea6136d073b45a ] The CBM overlap test is used to manage the allocations of RDT resources where overlap is possible between resource groups. When a resource group is in exclusive mode then there should be no overlap between resource groups. The current overlap test only considers overlap between the same resources, for example, that usage of a RDT_RESOURCE_L2DATA resource in one resource group does not overlap with usage of a RDT_RESOURCE_L2DATA resource in another resource group. The problem with this is that it allows overlap between a RDT_RESOURCE_L2DATA resource in one resource group with a RDT_RESOURCE_L2CODE resource in another resource group - even if both resource groups are in exclusive mode. This is a problem because even though these appear to be different resources they end up sharing the same underlying hardware and thus does not fulfill the user's request for exclusive use of hardware resources. Fix this by including the CDP peer (if there is one) in every CBM overlap test. This does not impact the overlap between resources within the same exclusive resource group that is allowed. Fixes: 49f7b4ef ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable setting of exclusive mode") Reported-by: NJithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NJithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com> Acked-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e538b7f56f7ca15963dce2e00ac3be8edb8a68e1.1538603665.git.reinette.chatre@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Reinette Chatre 提交于
[ Upstream commit 521348b011d64cf3febb10b64ba5b472681bef94 ] Introduce a utility that, when provided with a RDT resource and an instance of this RDT resource (a RDT domain), would return pointers to the RDT resource and RDT domain that share the same hardware. This is specific to the CDP resources that share the same hardware. For example, if a pointer to the RDT_RESOURCE_L2DATA resource (struct rdt_resource) and a pointer to an instance of this resource (struct rdt_domain) is provided, then it will return a pointer to the RDT_RESOURCE_L2CODE resource as well as the specific instance that shares the same hardware as the provided rdt_domain. This utility is created in support of the "exclusive" resource group mode where overlap of resource allocation between resource groups need to be avoided. The overlap test need to consider not just the matching resources, but also the resources that share the same hardware. Temporarily mark it as unused in support of patch testing to avoid compile warnings until it is used. Fixes: 49f7b4ef ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable setting of exclusive mode") Signed-off-by: NReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NJithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com> Acked-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9b4bc4d59ba2e903b6a3eb17e16ef41a8e7b7c3e.1538603665.git.reinette.chatre@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
[ Upstream commit 07e1d88adaaeab247b300926f78cc3f950dbeda3 ] On 64-bit kernels ptrace can read the FS/GS base using the register access APIs (PTRACE_PEEKUSER, etc.) or PTRACE_ARCH_PRCTL. Make both of these mechanisms return the actual FS/GS base. This will improve debuggability by providing the correct information to ptracer such as GDB. [ chang: Rebased and revised patch description. ] [ mingo: Revised the changelog some more. ] Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NChang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Markus T Metzger <markus.t.metzger@intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537312139-5580-2-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
[ Upstream commit fa112cf1e8bc693d5a666b1c479a2859c8b6e0f1 ] When building a 32-bit config which has the above MFD item as module but OLPC_XO1_PM is enabled =y - which is bool, btw - the kernel fails building with: ld: arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.o: in function `xo1_pm_remove': /home/boris/kernel/linux/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c:159: undefined reference to `mfd_cell_disable' ld: arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.o: in function `xo1_pm_probe': /home/boris/kernel/linux/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c:133: undefined reference to `mfd_cell_enable' make: *** [Makefile:1030: vmlinux] Error 1 Force MFD_CS5535 to y if OLPC_XO1_PM is enabled. Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005131750.GA5366@zn.tnicSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Chen Yu 提交于
[ Upstream commit 749fa17093ff67b31dea864531a3698b6a95c26c ] Currently if get_e820_md5() fails, then it will hibernate nevertheless. Actually the error code should be propagated to upper caller so that the hibernation could be aware of the result and terminates the process if md5 digest fails. Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: NChen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Jon Derrick 提交于
[ Upstream commit 4f475e8e0a6d4f5d430350d1f74f7e4899fb1692 ] A root port Device ID changed between simulation and production. Rather than match Device IDs which may not be future-proof if left unmaintained, match all root ports which exist in a VMD domain. Signed-off-by: NJon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Wang YanQing 提交于
commit 711aef1bbf88212a21f7103e88f397b47a528805 upstream. The current method to compare 64-bit numbers for conditional jump is: 1) Compare the high 32-bit first. 2) If the high 32-bit isn't the same, then goto step 4. 3) Compare the low 32-bit. 4) Check the desired condition. This method is right for unsigned comparison, but it is buggy for signed comparison, because it does signed comparison for low 32-bit too. There is only one sign bit in 64-bit number, that is the MSB in the 64-bit number, it is wrong to treat low 32-bit as signed number and do the signed comparison for it. This patch fixes the bug and adds a testcase in selftests/bpf for such bug. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205469Reported-by: NTony Ambardar <itugrok@yahoo.com> Cc: Tony Ambardar <itugrok@yahoo.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.19 Signed-off-by: NWang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Luke Nelson 提交于
commit 6fa632e719eec4d1b1ebf3ddc0b2d667997b057b upstream. The current x32 BPF JIT does not correctly compile shift operations when the immediate shift amount is 0. The expected behavior is for this to be a no-op. The following program demonstrates the bug. The expexceted result is 1, but the current JITed code returns 2. r0 = 1 r1 = 1 r1 <<= 0 if r1 == 1 goto end r0 = 2 end: exit This patch simplifies the code and fixes the bug. Fixes: 03f5781b ("bpf, x86_32: add eBPF JIT compiler for ia32") Co-developed-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NLuke Nelson <luke.r.nels@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: NWang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Luke Nelson 提交于
commit 68a8357ec15bdce55266e9fba8b8b3b8143fa7d2 upstream. The current x32 BPF JIT for shift operations is not correct when the shift amount in a register is 0. The expected behavior is a no-op, whereas the current implementation changes bits in the destination register. The following example demonstrates the bug. The expected result of this program is 1, but the current JITed code returns 2. r0 = 1 r1 = 1 r2 = 0 r1 <<= r2 if r1 == 1 goto end r0 = 2 end: exit The bug is caused by an incorrect assumption by the JIT that a shift by 32 clear the register. On x32 however, shifts use the lower 5 bits of the source, making a shift by 32 equivalent to a shift by 0. This patch fixes the bug using double-precision shifts, which also simplifies the code. Fixes: 03f5781b ("bpf, x86_32: add eBPF JIT compiler for ia32") Co-developed-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NLuke Nelson <luke.r.nels@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: NWang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Wang YanQing 提交于
commit b9aa0b35d878dff9ed19f94101fe353a4de00cc4 upstream. The current implementation has two errors: 1: The second xor instruction will clear carry flag which is necessary for following sbb instruction. 2: The select coding for sbb instruction is wrong, the coding is "sbb dreg_hi,ecx", but what we need is "sbb ecx,dreg_hi". This patch rewrites the implementation and fixes the errors. This patch fixes below errors reported by bpf/test_verifier in x32 platform when the jit is enabled: " 0: (b4) w1 = 4 1: (b4) w2 = 4 2: (1f) r2 -= r1 3: (4f) r2 |= r1 4: (87) r2 = -r2 5: (c7) r2 s>>= 63 6: (5f) r1 &= r2 7: (bf) r0 = r1 8: (95) exit processed 9 insns (limit 131072), stack depth 0 0: (b4) w1 = 4 1: (b4) w2 = 4 2: (1f) r2 -= r1 3: (4f) r2 |= r1 4: (87) r2 = -r2 5: (c7) r2 s>>= 63 6: (5f) r1 &= r2 7: (bf) r0 = r1 8: (95) exit processed 9 insns (limit 131072), stack depth 0 ...... Summary: 1189 PASSED, 125 SKIPPED, 15 FAILED " Signed-off-by: NWang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 21 11月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Dexuan Cui 提交于
[ Upstream commit 2f285f46240d67060061d153786740d4df53cd78 ] A Generation-2 Linux VM on Hyper-V doesn't have the legacy PCI bus, and users always see the scary warning, which is actually harmless. Suppress it. Signed-off-by: NDexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: "devel@linuxdriverproject.org" <devel@linuxdriverproject.org> Cc: Olaf Aepfle <olaf@aepfle.de> Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Marcelo Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com> Cc: Josh Poulson <jopoulso@microsoft.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ <KU1P153MB0166D977DC930996C4BF538ABF1D0@KU1P153MB0166.APCP153.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Matthew Whitehead 提交于
[ Upstream commit 2893cc8ff892fa74972d8dc0e1d0dc65116daaa3 ] Presently we check first if CPUID is enabled. If it is not already enabled, then we next call identify_cpu_without_cpuid() and clear X86_FEATURE_CPUID. Unfortunately, identify_cpu_without_cpuid() is the function where CPUID becomes _enabled_ on Cyrix 6x86/6x86L CPUs. Reverse the calling sequence so that CPUID is first enabled, and then check a second time to see if the feature has now been activated. [ bp: Massage commit message and remove trailing whitespace. ] Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: NMatthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180921212041.13096-3-tedheadster@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Matthew Whitehead 提交于
[ Upstream commit 03b099bdcdf7125d4a63dc9ddeefdd454e05123d ] There are comments in processor-cyrix.h advising you to _not_ make calls using the deprecated macros in this style: setCx86_old(CX86_CCR4, getCx86_old(CX86_CCR4) | 0x80); This is because it expands the macro into a non-functioning calling sequence. The calling order must be: outb(CX86_CCR2, 0x22); inb(0x23); From the comments: * When using the old macros a line like * setCx86(CX86_CCR2, getCx86(CX86_CCR2) | 0x88); * gets expanded to: * do { * outb((CX86_CCR2), 0x22); * outb((({ * outb((CX86_CCR2), 0x22); * inb(0x23); * }) | 0x88), 0x23); * } while (0); The new macros fix this problem, so use them instead. Signed-off-by: NMatthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180921212041.13096-2-tedheadster@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
[ Upstream commit 7401a633c34adc7aefd3edfec60074cb0475a3e8 ] Clear the MCE struct which is used for collecting the injection details after injection. Also, populate it with more details from the machine. Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180905081954.10391-1-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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