Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers
can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce
events.

Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a
connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes.
Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all
QPs on that device when the notification is received.

Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC
cache changes or setenforce is cleared.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded.
For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability
name and the value set in the policy.  For policy capabilities that are
set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy
capability index, since this is the only information presently available
in the policy.

Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined
that is not known to the kernel:
SELinux:  policy capability network_peer_controls=1
SELinux:  policy capability open_perms=1
SELinux:  policy capability extended_socket_class=1
SELinux:  policy capability always_check_network=0
SELinux:  policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0
SELinux:  unknown policy capability 5

Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which
describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory.  Since
these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so
that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection.
This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also
constifies tree_descr.name.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

A string which did not contain data format specifications should be put
into a sequence. Thus use the corresponding function "seq_puts".

This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: NMarkus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

commit 1ea0ce40 ("selinux: allow
changing labels for cgroupfs") broke the Android init program,
which looks up security contexts whenever creating directories
and attempts to assign them via setfscreatecon().
When creating subdirectories in cgroup mounts, this would previously
be ignored since cgroup did not support userspace setting of security
contexts.  However, after the commit, SELinux would attempt to honor
the requested context on cgroup directories and fail due to permission
denial.  Avoid breaking existing userspace/policy by wrapping this change
with a conditional on a new cgroup_seclabel policy capability.  This
preserves existing behavior until/unless a new policy explicitly enables
this capability.
Reported-by: NJohn Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

->fault(), ->page_mkwrite(), and ->pfn_mkwrite() calls do not need to
take a vma and vmf parameter when the vma already resides in vmf.

Remove the vma parameter to simplify things.

[arnd@arndb.de: fix ARM build]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170125223558.1451224-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148521301778.19116.10840599906674778980.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.comSigned-off-by: NDave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Use SECINITSID_SECURITY as the default SID for booleans which don't have
a matching SID returned from security_genfs_sid(), also update the
error message to a warning which matches this.

This prevents the policy failing to load (and consequently the system
failing to boot) when there is no default genfscon statement matched for
the selinuxfs in the new policy.
Signed-off-by: NGary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Adds error logging to the code paths which can fail when loading a new
policy in sel_write_load().  If the policy fails to be loaded from
userspace then a warning message is printed, whereas if a failure occurs
after loading policy from userspace an error message will be printed
with details on where policy loading failed (recreating one of /classes/,
/policy_capabilities/, /booleans/ in the SELinux fs).

Also, if sel_make_bools() fails to obtain an SID for an entry in
/booleans/* an error will be printed indicating the path of the
boolean.
Signed-off-by: NGary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when
it could/should use the "subjective" credentials.  This was sometimes
hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers
to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something
other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current.  Inline
various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a
single avc_has_perm() call.

Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter
its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same
as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely
should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write()
and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only
serve to confuse things.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Extend SELinux to support distinctions among all network address families
implemented by the kernel by defining new socket security classes
and mapping to them. Otherwise, many sockets are mapped to the generic
socket class and are indistinguishable in policy.  This has come up
previously with regard to selectively allowing access to bluetooth sockets,
and more recently with regard to selectively allowing access to AF_ALG
sockets.  Guido Trentalancia submitted a patch that took a similar approach
to add only support for distinguishing AF_ALG sockets, but this generalizes
his approach to handle all address families implemented by the kernel.
Socket security classes are also added for ICMP and SCTP sockets.
Socket security classes were not defined for AF_* values that are reserved
but unimplemented in the kernel, e.g. AF_NETBEUI, AF_SECURITY, AF_ASH,
AF_ECONET, AF_SNA, AF_WANPIPE.

Backward compatibility is provided by only enabling the finer-grained
socket classes if a new policy capability is set in the policy; older
policies will behave as before.  The legacy redhat1 policy capability
that was only ever used in testing within Fedora for ptrace_child
is reclaimed for this purpose; as far as I can tell, this policy
capability is not enabled in any supported distro policy.

Add a pair of conditional compilation guards to detect when new AF_* values
are added so that we can update SELinux accordingly rather than having to
belatedly update it long after new address families are introduced.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

At present, one can write any signed integer value to
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce and it will be stored,
e.g. echo -1 > /sys/fs/selinux/enforce or echo 2 >
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce. This makes no real difference
to the kernel, since it only ever cares if it is zero or non-zero,
but some userspace code compares it with 1 to decide if SELinux
is enforcing, and this could confuse it. Only a process that is
already root and is allowed the setenforce permission in SELinux
policy can write to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce, so this is not considered
to be a security issue, but it should be fixed.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Fix the comment for function __inode_security_revalidate, which returns
an integer.

Use the LABEL_* constants consistently for isec->initialized.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.

CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.

This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.

Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.
Signed-off-by: NDeepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: NFelipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSteven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRyusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

avc_cache_threshold is of type unsigned int.  Do not use a signed
new_value in sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value).
Signed-off-by: NHeinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
[PM: subject prefix fix, description cleanup]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Nothing in there gives a damn about the buffer alignment - it
just parses its contents.  So the use of get_zeroed_page()
doesn't buy us anything - might as well had been kmalloc(),
which makes that code equivalent to open-coded memdup_user_nul()
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Make validatetrans decisions available through selinuxfs.
"/validatetrans" is added to selinuxfs for this purpose.
This functionality is needed by file system servers
implemented in userspace or kernelspace without the VFS
layer.

Writing "$oldcontext $newcontext $tclass $taskcontext"
to /validatetrans is expected to return 0 if the transition
is allowed and -EPERM otherwise.
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru>
CC: andrew.perepechko@seagate.com
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).

Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.
Signed-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct
structs should be constant.
Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This allows for better documentation in the code and
it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of
fs_fully_visible to be written.

The mount points converted and their filesystems are:
/sys/hypervisor/s390/       s390_hypfs
/sys/kernel/config/         configfs
/sys/kernel/debug/          debugfs
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/  efivarfs
/sys/fs/fuse/connections/   fusectl
/sys/fs/pstore/             pstore
/sys/kernel/tracing/        tracefs
/sys/fs/cgroup/             cgroup
/sys/kernel/security/       securityfs
/sys/fs/selinux/            selinuxfs
/sys/fs/smackfs/            smackfs

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

... except where that code acts as a filesystem driver, rather than
working with dentries given to it.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Return a negative error value like the rest of the entries in this function.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: tweaked subject line]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)

Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.

CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: NJingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables.  Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.

Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and
treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or
labeled IPSEC configuration.

Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which
exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct.

The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel
change fell on the floor.
Signed-off-by: NChris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

A long time ago, in v2.4, VM_RESERVED kept swapout process off VMA,
currently it lost original meaning but still has some effects:

 | effect                 | alternative flags
-+------------------------+---------------------------------------------
1| account as reserved_vm | VM_IO
2| skip in core dump      | VM_IO, VM_DONTDUMP
3| do not merge or expand | VM_IO, VM_DONTEXPAND, VM_HUGETLB, VM_PFNMAP
4| do not mlock           | VM_IO, VM_DONTEXPAND, VM_HUGETLB, VM_PFNMAP

This patch removes reserved_vm counter from mm_struct.  Seems like nobody
cares about it, it does not exported into userspace directly, it only
reduces total_vm showed in proc.

Thus VM_RESERVED can be replaced with VM_IO or pair VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP.

remap_pfn_range() and io_remap_pfn_range() set VM_IO|VM_DONTEXPAND|VM_DONTDUMP.
remap_vmalloc_range() set VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c fixup]
Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

a) %d does _not_ produce a page worth of output
b) snprintf() doesn't return negatives - it used to in old glibc, but
that's the kernel...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the
number of entries in these arrays to 0.  If we error out and then get back
into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief
that they are non-zero length.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
cc: stable@kernel.org

I'm not really sure what the idea behind the sel_div function is, but it's
useless.  Since a and b are both unsigned, it's impossible for a % b < 0.
That means that part of the function never does anything.  Thus it's just a
normal /.  Just do that instead.  I don't even understand what that operation
was supposed to mean in the signed case however....

If it was signed:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((-2 / 4) - ((-2 % 4) < 0))
		  ((0)      - ((-2)     < 0))
		  ((0)      - (1))
		  (-1)

What actually happens:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((18446744073709551614 / 4) - ((18446744073709551614 % 4) < 0))
		  ((4611686018427387903)      - ((2 < 0))
		  (4611686018427387903        - 0)
		  ((unsigned int)4611686018427387903)
		  (4294967295)

Neither makes a whole ton of sense to me.  So I'm getting rid of the
function entirely.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

There is no reason the DAC perms on reading the policy file need to be root
only.  There are selinux checks which should control this access.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

sesearch uses:
lseek(3, 0, SEEK_SET)                   = -1 ESPIPE (Illegal seek)

Make that work.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Fixes several sparse warnings for selinuxfs.c
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>