1. 02 9月, 2020 2 次提交
  2. 22 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 15 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  4. 20 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  5. 25 4月, 2018 1 次提交
    • E
      signal: Ensure every siginfo we send has all bits initialized · 3eb0f519
      Eric W. Biederman 提交于
      Call clear_siginfo to ensure every stack allocated siginfo is properly
      initialized before being passed to the signal sending functions.
      
      Note: It is not safe to depend on C initializers to initialize struct
      siginfo on the stack because C is allowed to skip holes when
      initializing a structure.
      
      The initialization of struct siginfo in tracehook_report_syscall_exit
      was moved from the helper user_single_step_siginfo into
      tracehook_report_syscall_exit itself, to make it clear that the local
      variable siginfo gets fully initialized.
      
      In a few cases the scope of struct siginfo has been reduced to make it
      clear that siginfo siginfo is not used on other paths in the function
      in which it is declared.
      
      Instances of using memset to initialize siginfo have been replaced
      with calls clear_siginfo for clarity.
      Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      3eb0f519
  6. 24 3月, 2018 1 次提交
  7. 15 2月, 2018 1 次提交
  8. 23 12月, 2017 2 次提交
    • T
      x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap · 92a0f81d
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Put the cpu_entry_area into a separate P4D entry. The fixmap gets too big
      and 0-day already hit a case where the fixmap PTEs were cleared by
      cleanup_highmap().
      
      Aside of that the fixmap API is a pain as it's all backwards.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      92a0f81d
    • T
      x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it to a separate unit · ed1bbc40
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Separate the cpu_entry_area code out of cpu/common.c and the fixmap.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ed1bbc40
  9. 17 12月, 2017 6 次提交
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only · c482feef
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
      is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR.  Make it
      read-only on x86_64.
      
      On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
      switches, and we use a task gate for double faults.  I'd also be
      nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
      without double fault handling.
      
      [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO.  So
        	it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
        	might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
        	confirmation. ]
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      c482feef
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary · 7fbbd5cb
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Now that the SYSENTER stack has a guard page, there's no need for a canary
      to detect overflow after the fact.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.572577316@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7fbbd5cb
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area · 40e7f949
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The IST stacks are needed when an IST exception occurs and are accessed
      before any kernel code at all runs.  Move them into struct cpu_entry_area.
      
      The IST stacks are unlike the rest of cpu_entry_area: they're used even for
      entries from kernel mode.  This means that they should be set up before we
      load the final IDT.  Move cpu_entry_area setup to trap_init() for the boot
      CPU and set it up for all possible CPUs at once in native_smp_prepare_cpus().
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.480598743@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      40e7f949
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries · 7f2590a1
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Historically, IDT entries from usermode have always gone directly
      to the running task's kernel stack.  Rearrange it so that we enter on
      a per-CPU trampoline stack and then manually switch to the task's stack.
      This touches a couple of extra cachelines, but it gives us a chance
      to run some code before we touch the kernel stack.
      
      The asm isn't exactly beautiful, but I think that fully refactoring
      it can wait.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.225330557@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7f2590a1
    • A
      x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack · 6d9256f0
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      When we start using an entry trampoline, a #GP from userspace will
      be delivered on the entry stack, not on the task stack.  Fix the
      espfix64 #DF fixup to set up #GP according to TSS.SP0, rather than
      assuming that pt_regs + 1 == SP0.  This won't change anything
      without an entry stack, but it will make the code continue to work
      when an entry stack is added.
      
      While we're at it, improve the comments to explain what's actually
      going on.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.130778051@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6d9256f0
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack · 1a79797b
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      This will simplify future changes that want scratch variables early in
      the SYSENTER handler -- they'll be able to spill registers to the
      stack.  It also lets us get rid of a SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK user.
      
      This does not depend on CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=y because we'll want the
      stack space even without IA32 emulation.
      
      As far as I can tell, the reason that this wasn't done from day 1 is
      that we use IST for #DB and #BP, which is IMO rather nasty and causes
      a lot more problems than it solves.  But, since #DB uses IST, we don't
      actually need a real stack for SYSENTER (because SYSENTER with TF set
      will invoke #DB on the IST stack rather than the SYSENTER stack).
      
      I want to remove IST usage from these vectors some day, and this patch
      is a prerequisite for that as well.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.312726423@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      1a79797b
  10. 15 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 16 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  12. 10 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 08 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • R
      x86/traps: Fix up general protection faults caused by UMIP · 6fc9dc81
      Ricardo Neri 提交于
      If the User-Mode Instruction Prevention CPU feature is available and
      enabled, a general protection fault will be issued if the instructions
      sgdt, sldt, sidt, str or smsw are executed from user-mode context
      (CPL > 0). If the fault was caused by any of the instructions protected
      by UMIP, fixup_umip_exception() will emulate dummy results for these
      instructions as follows: in virtual-8086 and protected modes, sgdt, sidt
      and smsw are emulated; str and sldt are not emulated. No emulation is done
      for user-space long mode processes.
      
      If emulation is successful, the emulated result is passed to the user space
      program and no SIGSEGV signal is emitted.
      Signed-off-by: NRicardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
      Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
      Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
      Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-11-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
      [ Added curly braces. ]
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6fc9dc81
  14. 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  15. 30 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  16. 26 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  17. 29 8月, 2017 8 次提交
  18. 13 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  19. 11 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  20. 27 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0 · 9a93848f
      Peter Zijlstra 提交于
      By using "UD0" for WARN()s we remove the function call and its possible
      __FILE__ and __LINE__ immediate arguments from the instruction stream.
      
      Total image size will not change much, what we win in the instruction
      stream we'll lose because of the __bug_table entries. Still, saves on
      I$ footprint and the total image size does go down a bit.
      
            text    data       filename
        10702123    4530992    defconfig-build/vmlinux.orig
        10682460    4530992    defconfig-build/vmlinux.patched
      
      (UML didn't seem to use GENERIC_BUG at all, so remove it)
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      9a93848f
  21. 02 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  22. 04 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  23. 01 11月, 2016 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/fpu: Handle #NM without FPU emulation as an error · bef8b6da
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Don't use CR0.TS.  Make it an error rather than making nonsensical
      changes to the FPU state.
      
      (The cond_local_irq_enable() appears to have been pointless, too.)
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f1ee6bf73ed1025fccaab321ba43d0594245f927.1477951965.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      bef8b6da
  24. 08 9月, 2016 1 次提交
  25. 24 8月, 2016 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y) · e37e43a4
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      This allows x86_64 kernels to enable vmapped stacks by setting
      HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y - which enables the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
      high level Kconfig option.
      
      There are a couple of interesting bits:
      
      First, x86 lazily faults in top-level paging entries for the vmalloc
      area.  This won't work if we get a page fault while trying to access
      the stack: the CPU will promote it to a double-fault and we'll die.
      To avoid this problem, probe the new stack when switching stacks and
      forcibly populate the pgd entry for the stack when switching mms.
      
      Second, once we have guard pages around the stack, we'll want to
      detect and handle stack overflow.
      
      I didn't enable it on x86_32.  We'd need to rework the double-fault
      code a bit and I'm concerned about running out of vmalloc virtual
      addresses under some workloads.
      
      This patch, by itself, will behave somewhat erratically when the
      stack overflows while RSP is still more than a few tens of bytes
      above the bottom of the stack.  Specifically, we'll get #PF and make
      it to no_context and them oops without reliably triggering a
      double-fault, and no_context doesn't know about stack overflows.
      The next patch will improve that case.
      
      Thank you to Nadav and Brian for helping me pay enough attention to
      the SDM to hopefully get this right.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c88f3e2920b18e6cc621d772a04a62c06869037e.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org
      [ Minor edits. ]
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      e37e43a4
  26. 14 7月, 2016 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/kernel: Audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h · 186f4360
      Paul Gortmaker 提交于
      Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
      a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
      support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends.  That changed
      when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
      
      This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
      in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.  The advantage
      in doing so is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers;
      adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what
      headers we are effectively using.
      
      Since module.h was the source for init.h (for __init) and for
      export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each obj-y/bool instance
      for the presence of either and replace as needed.  Build testing
      revealed some implicit header usage that was fixed up accordingly.
      
      Note that some bool/obj-y instances remain since module.h is
      the header for some exception table entry stuff, and for things
      like __init_or_module (code that is tossed when MODULES=n).
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160714001901.31603-4-paul.gortmaker@windriver.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      186f4360