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  1. 28 1月, 2014 8 次提交
  3. 22 11月, 2013 2 次提交
    • J
      ipc,shm: correct error return value in shmctl (SHM_UNLOCK) · 3a72660b
      由 Jesper Nilsson 提交于 
      Commit 2caacaa8 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
restructured the ipc shm to shorten critical region, but introduced a
path where the return value could be -EPERM, even if the operation
actually was performed.

Before the commit, the err return value was reset by the return value
from security_shm_shmctl() after the if (!ns_capable(...)) statement.

Now, we still exit the if statement with err set to -EPERM, and in the
case of SHM_UNLOCK, it is not reset at all, and used as the return value
from shmctl.

To fix this, we only set err when errors occur, leaving the fallthrough
case alone.
Signed-off-by: NJesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[3.12.x]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3a72660b
    • G
      ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races · a399b29d
      由 Greg Thelen 提交于 
      When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).

Here's the race before this patch:

  TASK 1                     TASK 2
  ------                     ------
  shm_rmid()
    ipc_lock_object()
                             shmctl()
                             shp = shm_obtain_object_check()

    shm_destroy()
      shum_unlock()
      fput(shp->shm_file)
                             ipc_lock_object()
                             shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
                             <OOPS>

The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock.  fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2.  I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu

This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
   ipc_object_lock().

Example workloads, which each trigger oops...

Workload 1:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shm_rmid $id &
    shmlock $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
    _raw_spin_lock
    shmem_lock
    SyS_shmctl

Workload 2:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shmat $id 4096 &
    shm_rmid $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
    touch_atime
    shmem_mmap
    shm_mmap
    mmap_region
    do_mmap_pgoff
    do_shmat
    SyS_shmat

Workload 3:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shmlock $id
    shm_rmid $id &
    shmunlock $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode.  The
  first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
  a get_file() and queued this fput():
    locks_remove_flock
    __fput
    ____fput
    task_work_run
    do_notify_resume
    int_signal

Fixes: c2c737a0 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa8 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: NGreg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>  # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      a399b29d
  5. 13 11月, 2013 2 次提交
    • M
      ipc, msg: fix message length check for negative values · 4e9b45a1
      由 Mathias Krause 提交于 
      On 64 bit systems the test for negative message sizes is bogus as the
size, which may be positive when evaluated as a long, will get truncated
to an int when passed to load_msg().  So a long might very well contain a
positive value but when truncated to an int it would become negative.

That in combination with a small negative value of msg_ctlmax (which will
be promoted to an unsigned type for the comparison against msgsz, making
it a big positive value and therefore make it pass the check) will lead to
two problems: 1/ The kmalloc() call in alloc_msg() will allocate a too
small buffer as the addition of alen is effectively a subtraction.  2/ The
copy_from_user() call in load_msg() will first overflow the buffer with
userland data and then, when the userland access generates an access
violation, the fixup handler copy_user_handle_tail() will try to fill the
remainder with zeros -- roughly 4GB.  That almost instantly results in a
system crash or reset.

  ,-[ Reproducer (needs to be run as root) ]--
  | #include <sys/stat.h>
  | #include <sys/msg.h>
  | #include <unistd.h>
  | #include <fcntl.h>
  |
  | int main(void) {
  |     long msg = 1;
  |     int fd;
  |
  |     fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/msgmax", O_WRONLY);
  |     write(fd, "-1", 2);
  |     close(fd);
  |
  |     msgsnd(0, &msg, 0xfffffff0, IPC_NOWAIT);
  |
  |     return 0;
  | }
  '---

Fix the issue by preventing msgsz from getting truncated by consistently
using size_t for the message length.  This way the size checks in
do_msgsnd() could still be passed with a negative value for msg_ctlmax but
we would fail on the buffer allocation in that case and error out.

Also change the type of m_ts from int to size_t to avoid similar nastiness
in other code paths -- it is used in similar constructs, i.e.  signed vs.
unsigned checks.  It should never become negative under normal
circumstances, though.

Setting msg_ctlmax to a negative value is an odd configuration and should
be prevented.  As that might break existing userland, it will be handled
in a separate commit so it could easily be reverted and reworked without
reintroducing the above described bug.

Hardening mechanisms for user copy operations would have catched that bug
early -- e.g.  checking slab object sizes on user copy operations as the
usercopy feature of the PaX patch does.  Or, for that matter, detect the
long vs.  int sign change due to truncation, as the size overflow plugin
of the very same patch does.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 min() warnings]
Signed-off-by: NMathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[ v2.3.27+ -- yes, that old ;) ]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4e9b45a1
    • X
      ipc/util.c: remove unnecessary work pending test · 206fa940
      由 Xie XiuQi 提交于 
      Remove unnecessary work pending test before calling schedule_work().  It
has been tested in queue_work_on() already.  No functional changed.
Signed-off-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      206fa940
  7. 09 11月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      locks: break delegations on unlink · b21996e3
      由 J. Bruce Fields 提交于 
      We need to break delegations on any operation that changes the set of
links pointing to an inode.  Start with unlink.

Such operations also hold the i_mutex on a parent directory.  Breaking a
delegation may require waiting for a timeout (by default 90 seconds) in
the case of a unresponsive NFS client.  To avoid blocking all directory
operations, we therefore drop locks before waiting for the delegation.
The logic then looks like:

	acquire locks
	...
	test for delegation; if found:
		take reference on inode
		release locks
		wait for delegation break
		drop reference on inode
		retry

It is possible this could never terminate.  (Even if we take precautions
to prevent another delegation being acquired on the same inode, we could
get a different inode on each retry.)  But this seems very unlikely.

The initial test for a delegation happens after the lock on the target
inode is acquired, but the directory inode may have been acquired
further up the call stack.  We therefore add a "struct inode **"
argument to any intervening functions, which we use to pass the inode
back up to the caller in the case it needs a delegation synchronously
broken.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      b21996e3
  9. 04 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  11. 17 10月, 2013 2 次提交
  13. 01 10月, 2013 5 次提交
    • D
      ipc,msg: prevent race with rmid in msgsnd,msgrcv · 4271b05a
      由 Davidlohr Bueso 提交于 
      This fixes a race in both msgrcv() and msgsnd() between finding the msg
and actually dealing with the queue, as another thread can delete shmid
underneath us if we are preempted before acquiring the
kern_ipc_perm.lock.

Manfred illustrates this nicely:

Assume a preemptible kernel that is preempted just after

    msq = msq_obtain_object_check(ns, msqid)

in do_msgrcv().  The only lock that is held is rcu_read_lock().

Now the other thread processes IPC_RMID.  When the first task is
resumed, then it will happily wait for messages on a deleted queue.

Fix this by checking for if the queue has been deleted after taking the
lock.
Signed-off-by: NDavidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Reported-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 	[3.11]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4271b05a
    • M
      ipc/sem.c: update sem_otime for all operations · 0e8c6656
      由 Manfred Spraul 提交于 
      In commit 0a2b9d4c ("ipc/sem.c: move wake_up_process out of the
spinlock section"), the update of semaphore's sem_otime(last semop time)
was moved to one central position (do_smart_update).

But since do_smart_update() is only called for operations that modify
the array, this means that wait-for-zero semops do not update sem_otime
anymore.

The fix is simple:
Non-alter operations must update sem_otime.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Reported-by: NJia He <jiakernel@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NJia He <jiakernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0e8c6656
    • M
      ipc/sem.c: synchronize the proc interface · d8c63376
      由 Manfred Spraul 提交于 
      The proc interface is not aware of sem_lock(), it instead calls
ipc_lock_object() directly.  This means that simple semop() operations
can run in parallel with the proc interface.  Right now, this is
uncritical, because the implementation doesn't do anything that requires
a proper synchronization.

But it is dangerous and therefore should be fixed.
Signed-off-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      d8c63376
    • M
      ipc/sem.c: optimize sem_lock() · 6d07b68c
      由 Manfred Spraul 提交于 
      Operations that need access to the whole array must guarantee that there
are no simple operations ongoing.  Right now this is achieved by
spin_unlock_wait(sem->lock) on all semaphores.

If complex_count is nonzero, then this spin_unlock_wait() is not
necessary, because it was already performed in the past by the thread
that increased complex_count and even though sem_perm.lock was dropped
inbetween, no simple operation could have started, because simple
operations cannot start when complex_count is non-zero.
Signed-off-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6d07b68c
    • M
      ipc/sem.c: fix race in sem_lock() · 5e9d5275
      由 Manfred Spraul 提交于 
      The exclusion of complex operations in sem_lock() is insufficient: after
acquiring the per-semaphore lock, a simple op must first check that
sem_perm.lock is not locked and only after that test check
complex_count.  The current code does it the other way around - and that
creates a race.  Details are below.

The patch is a complete rewrite of sem_lock(), based in part on the code
from Mike Galbraith.  It removes all gotos and all loops and thus the
risk of livelocks.

I have tested the patch (together with the next one) on my i3 laptop and
it didn't cause any problems.

The bug is probably also present in 3.10 and 3.11, but for these kernels
it might be simpler just to move the test of sma->complex_count after
the spin_is_locked() test.

Details of the bug:

Assume:
 - sma->complex_count = 0.
 - Thread 1: semtimedop(complex op that must sleep)
 - Thread 2: semtimedop(simple op).

Pseudo-Trace:

Thread 1: sem_lock(): acquire sem_perm.lock
Thread 1: sem_lock(): check for ongoing simple ops
			Nothing ongoing, thread 2 is still before sem_lock().
Thread 1: try_atomic_semop()
	<<< preempted.

Thread 2: sem_lock():
        static inline int sem_lock(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
                                      int nsops)
        {
                int locknum;
         again:
                if (nsops == 1 && !sma->complex_count) {
                        struct sem *sem = sma->sem_base + sops->sem_num;

                        /* Lock just the semaphore we are interested in. */
                        spin_lock(&sem->lock);

                        /*
                         * If sma->complex_count was set while we were spinning,
                         * we may need to look at things we did not lock here.
                         */
                        if (unlikely(sma->complex_count)) {
                                spin_unlock(&sem->lock);
                                goto lock_array;
                        }
        <<<<<<<<<
	<<< complex_count is still 0.
	<<<
        <<< Here it is preempted
        <<<<<<<<<

Thread 1: try_atomic_semop() returns, notices that it must sleep.
Thread 1: increases sma->complex_count.
Thread 1: drops sem_perm.lock
Thread 2:
                /*
                 * Another process is holding the global lock on the
                 * sem_array; we cannot enter our critical section,
                 * but have to wait for the global lock to be released.
                 */
                if (unlikely(spin_is_locked(&sma->sem_perm.lock))) {
                        spin_unlock(&sem->lock);
                        spin_unlock_wait(&sma->sem_perm.lock);
                        goto again;
                }
	<<< sem_perm.lock already dropped, thus no "goto again;"

                locknum = sops->sem_num;
Signed-off-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[3.10+]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5e9d5275
  15. 25 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      ipc: fix race with LSMs · 53dad6d3
      由 Davidlohr Bueso 提交于 
      Currently, IPC mechanisms do security and auditing related checks under
RCU.  However, since security modules can free the security structure,
for example, through selinux_[sem,msg_queue,shm]_free_security(), we can
race if the structure is freed before other tasks are done with it,
creating a use-after-free condition.  Manfred illustrates this nicely,
for instance with shared mem and selinux:

 -> do_shmat calls rcu_read_lock()
 -> do_shmat calls shm_object_check().
     Checks that the object is still valid - but doesn't acquire any locks.
     Then it returns.
 -> do_shmat calls security_shm_shmat (e.g. selinux_shm_shmat)
 -> selinux_shm_shmat calls ipc_has_perm()
 -> ipc_has_perm accesses ipc_perms->security

shm_close()
 -> shm_close acquires rw_mutex & shm_lock
 -> shm_close calls shm_destroy
 -> shm_destroy calls security_shm_free (e.g. selinux_shm_free_security)
 -> selinux_shm_free_security calls ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm)
 -> ipc_free_security calls kfree(ipc_perms->security)

This patch delays the freeing of the security structures after all RCU
readers are done.  Furthermore it aligns the security life cycle with
that of the rest of IPC - freeing them based on the reference counter.
For situations where we need not free security, the current behavior is
kept.  Linus states:

 "... the old behavior was suspect for another reason too: having the
  security blob go away from under a user sounds like it could cause
  various other problems anyway, so I think the old code was at least
  _prone_ to bugs even if it didn't have catastrophic behavior."

I have tested this patch with IPC testcases from LTP on both my
quad-core laptop and on a 64 core NUMA server.  In both cases selinux is
enabled, and tests pass for both voluntary and forced preemption models.
While the mentioned races are theoretical (at least no one as reported
them), I wanted to make sure that this new logic doesn't break anything
we weren't aware of.
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Acked-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      53dad6d3
  17. 12 9月, 2013 15 次提交
  19. 04 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • M
      ipc/msg.c: Fix lost wakeup in msgsnd(). · bebcb928
      由 Manfred Spraul 提交于 
      The check if the queue is full and adding current to the wait queue of
pending msgsnd() operations (ss_add()) must be atomic.

Otherwise:
 - the thread that performs msgsnd() finds a full queue and decides to
   sleep.
 - the thread that performs msgrcv() first reads all messages from the
   queue and then sleeps, because the queue is empty.
 - the msgrcv() calls do not perform any wakeups, because the msgsnd()
   task has not yet called ss_add().
 - then the msgsnd()-thread first calls ss_add() and then sleeps.

Net result: msgsnd() and msgrcv() both sleep forever.

Observed with msgctl08 from ltp with a preemptible kernel.

Fix: Call ipc_lock_object() before performing the check.

The patch also moves security_msg_queue_msgsnd() under ipc_lock_object:
 - msgctl(IPC_SET) explicitely mentions that it tries to expunge any
   pending operations that are not allowed anymore with the new
   permissions.  If security_msg_queue_msgsnd() is called without locks,
   then there might be races.
 - it makes the patch much simpler.
Reported-and-tested-by: NVineet Gupta <Vineet.Gupta1@synopsys.com>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org  # for 3.11
Signed-off-by: NManfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      bebcb928
  21. 31 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  23. 29 8月, 2013 1 次提交