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  1. 03 12月, 2006 4 次提交
  3. 02 12月, 2006 2 次提交
  5. 26 11月, 2006 1 次提交
  7. 10 11月, 2006 1 次提交
  9. 06 11月, 2006 3 次提交
  11. 23 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  13. 22 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  15. 20 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  17. 19 10月, 2006 2 次提交
  19. 17 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  21. 16 10月, 2006 3 次提交
  23. 12 10月, 2006 5 次提交
    • Y
      [NET]: Introduce protocol-specific destructor for time-wait sockets. · 42b6785e
      由 YOSHIFUJI Hideaki 提交于 
      Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      42b6785e
    • V
      [SCTP]: Fix receive buffer accounting. · 331c4ee7
      由 Vlad Yasevich 提交于 
      When doing receiver buffer accounting, we always used skb->truesize.
This is problematic when processing bundled DATA chunks because for
every DATA chunk that could be small part of one large skb, we would
charge the size of the entire skb.  The new approach is to store the
size of the DATA chunk we are accounting for in the sctp_ulpevent
structure and use that stored value for accounting.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NSridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      331c4ee7
    • V
      IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matching · 5b368e61
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.

The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.

This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).

Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL.  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.

The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).

This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.

This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.

Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5b368e61
    • J
      IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup · 134b0fc5
      由 James Morris 提交于 
      When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission
(or other error).  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.

The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via
flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because
the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver.

However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when
calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is
interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated
policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without
transformation.

The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      134b0fc5
    • P
      NetLabel: fix a cache race condition · ffb733c6
      由 paul.moore@hp.com 提交于 
      Testing revealed a problem with the NetLabel cache where a cached entry could
be freed while in use by the LSM layer causing an oops and other problems.
This patch fixes that problem by introducing a reference counter to the cache
entry so that it is only freed when it is no longer in use.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      ffb733c6
  25. 04 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  27. 01 10月, 2006 2 次提交
  29. 30 9月, 2006 1 次提交
  31. 29 9月, 2006 11 次提交