1. 28 11月, 2012 1 次提交
  2. 26 10月, 2012 2 次提交
    • H
      Makefile: Documentation for external tool should be correct · 2008713c
      H. Peter Anvin 提交于
      If one includes documentation for an external tool, it should be
      correct.  This is not:
      
      1. Overriding the input to rngd should typically be neither
         necessary nor desired.  This is especially so since newer
         versions of rngd support a number of different *types* of sources.
      2. The default kernel-exported device is called /dev/hwrng not
         /dev/hwrandom nor /dev/hw_random (both of which were used in the
         past; however, kernel and udev seem to have converged on
         /dev/hwrng.)
      
      Overall it is better if the documentation for rngd is kept with rngd
      rather than in a kernel Makefile.
      Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2008713c
    • A
      pidns: limit the nesting depth of pid namespaces · f2302505
      Andrew Vagin 提交于
      'struct pid' is a "variable sized struct" - a header with an array of
      upids at the end.
      
      The size of the array depends on a level (depth) of pid namespaces.  Now a
      level of pidns is not limited, so 'struct pid' can be more than one page.
      
      Looks reasonable, that it should be less than a page.  MAX_PIS_NS_LEVEL is
      not calculated from PAGE_SIZE, because in this case it depends on
      architectures, config options and it will be reduced, if someone adds a
      new fields in struct pid or struct upid.
      
      I suggest to set MAX_PIS_NS_LEVEL = 32, because it saves ability to expand
      "struct pid" and it's more than enough for all known for me use-cases.
      When someone finds a reasonable use case, we can add a config option or a
      sysctl parameter.
      
      In addition it will reduce the effect of another problem, when we have
      many nested namespaces and the oldest one starts dying.
      zap_pid_ns_processe will be called for each namespace and find_vpid will
      be called for each process in a namespace.  find_vpid will be called
      minimum max_level^2 / 2 times.  The reason of that is that when we found a
      bit in pidmap, we can't determine this pidns is top for this process or it
      isn't.
      
      vpid is a heavy operation, so a fork bomb, which create many nested
      namespace, can make a system inaccessible for a long time.  For example my
      system becomes inaccessible for a few minutes with 4000 processes.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: return -EINVAL in response to excessive nesting, not -ENOMEM]
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
      Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
      Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      f2302505
  3. 25 10月, 2012 1 次提交
  4. 22 10月, 2012 1 次提交
  5. 20 10月, 2012 6 次提交
  6. 17 10月, 2012 2 次提交
  7. 13 10月, 2012 5 次提交
    • J
      audit: make audit_inode take struct filename · adb5c247
      Jeff Layton 提交于
      Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.
      
      Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
      audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
      populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
      directly.
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      adb5c247
    • J
      vfs: make path_openat take a struct filename pointer · 669abf4e
      Jeff Layton 提交于
      ...and fix up the callers. For do_file_open_root, just declare a
      struct filename on the stack and fill out the .name field. For
      do_filp_open, make it also take a struct filename pointer, and fix up its
      callers to call it appropriately.
      
      For filp_open, add a variant that takes a struct filename pointer and turn
      filp_open into a wrapper around it.
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      669abf4e
    • J
      audit: allow audit code to satisfy getname requests from its names_list · 7ac86265
      Jeff Layton 提交于
      Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once,
      we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names
      records.
      
      Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname
      requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation
      and audit_names records.
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      7ac86265
    • J
      vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return it · 91a27b2a
      Jeff Layton 提交于
      getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
      kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
      however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
      the string.
      
      For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
      amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
      we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
      need to recopy it from userspace.
      
      This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
      a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
      string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.
      
      Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
      convenient.
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      91a27b2a
    • A
      infrastructure for saner ret_from_kernel_thread semantics · a74fb73c
      Al Viro 提交于
      * allow kernel_execve() leave the actual return to userland to
      caller (selected by CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE).  Callers
      updated accordingly.
      * architecture that does select GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE in its
      Kconfig should have its ret_from_kernel_thread() do this:
      	call schedule_tail
      	call the callback left for it by copy_thread(); if it ever
      returns, that's because it has just done successful kernel_execve()
      	jump to return from syscall
      IOW, its only difference from ret_from_fork() is that it does call the
      callback.
      * such an architecture should also get rid of ret_from_kernel_execve()
      and __ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE
      
      This is the last part of infrastructure patches in that area - from
      that point on work on different architectures can live independently.
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      a74fb73c
  8. 12 10月, 2012 15 次提交
  9. 10 10月, 2012 7 次提交
    • R
      MODSIGN: Make mrproper should remove generated files. · d5b71936
      Rusty Russell 提交于
      It doesn't, because the clean targets don't include kernel/Makefile, and
      because two files were missing from the list.
      Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      d5b71936
    • D
      MODSIGN: Use utf8 strings in signer's name in autogenerated X.509 certs · e7d113bc
      David Howells 提交于
      Place an indication that the certificate should use utf8 strings into the
      x509.genkey template generated by kernel/Makefile.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      e7d113bc
    • D
      MODSIGN: Use the same digest for the autogen key sig as for the module sig · 5e8cb1e4
      David Howells 提交于
      Use the same digest type for the autogenerated key signature as for the module
      signature so that the hash algorithm is guaranteed to be present in the kernel.
      
      Without this, the X.509 certificate loader may reject the X.509 certificate so
      generated because it was self-signed and the signature will be checked against
      itself - but this won't work if the digest algorithm must be loaded as a
      module.
      
      The symptom is that the key fails to load with the following message emitted
      into the kernel log:
      
      	MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-65)
      
      the error in brackets being -ENOPKG.  What you should see is something like:
      
      	MODSIGN: Loaded cert 'Magarathea: Glacier signing key: 9588321144239a119d3406d4c4cf1fbae1836fa0'
      
      Note that this doesn't apply to certificates that are not self-signed as we
      don't check those currently as they require the parent CA certificate to be
      available.
      Reported-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      5e8cb1e4
    • D
      MODSIGN: Implement module signature checking · 48ba2462
      David Howells 提交于
      Check the signature on the module against the keys compiled into the kernel or
      available in a hardware key store.
      
      Currently, only RSA keys are supported - though that's easy enough to change,
      and the signature is expected to contain raw components (so not a PGP or
      PKCS#7 formatted blob).
      
      The signature blob is expected to consist of the following pieces in order:
      
       (1) The binary identifier for the key.  This is expected to match the
           SubjectKeyIdentifier from an X.509 certificate.  Only X.509 type
           identifiers are currently supported.
      
       (2) The signature data, consisting of a series of MPIs in which each is in
           the format of a 2-byte BE word sizes followed by the content data.
      
       (3) A 12 byte information block of the form:
      
      	struct module_signature {
      		enum pkey_algo		algo : 8;
      		enum pkey_hash_algo	hash : 8;
      		enum pkey_id_type	id_type : 8;
      		u8			__pad;
      		__be32			id_length;
      		__be32			sig_length;
      	};
      
           The three enums are defined in crypto/public_key.h.
      
           'algo' contains the public-key algorithm identifier (0->DSA, 1->RSA).
      
           'hash' contains the digest algorithm identifier (0->MD4, 1->MD5, 2->SHA1,
            etc.).
      
           'id_type' contains the public-key identifier type (0->PGP, 1->X.509).
      
           '__pad' should be 0.
      
           'id_length' should contain in the binary identifier length in BE form.
      
           'sig_length' should contain in the signature data length in BE form.
      
           The lengths are in BE order rather than CPU order to make dealing with
           cross-compilation easier.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> (minor Kconfig fix)
      48ba2462
    • D
      MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel · 631cc66e
      David Howells 提交于
      Include a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module
      verification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring
      during boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public
      keys found in the PGP keyring.
      
      These can be seen by root:
      
      [root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys
      07ad4ee0 I-----     1 perm 3f010000     0     0 crypto    modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd []
      15c7f8c3 I-----     1 perm 1f030000     0     0 keyring   .module_sign: 1/4
      ...
      
      It is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in
      their removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      631cc66e
    • D
      MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing · d441108c
      David Howells 提交于
      Automatically generate keys for module signing if they're absent so that
      allyesconfig doesn't break.  The builder should consider generating their own
      key and certificate, however, so that the keys are appropriately named.
      
      The private key for the module signer should be placed in signing_key.priv
      (unencrypted!) and the public key in an X.509 certificate as signing_key.x509.
      
      If a transient key is desired for signing the modules, a config file for
      'openssl req' can be placed in x509.genkey, looking something like the
      following:
      
      	[ req ]
      	default_bits = 4096
      	distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
      	prompt = no
      	x509_extensions = myexts
      
      	[ req_distinguished_name ]
      	O = Magarathea
      	CN = Glacier signing key
      	emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2
      
      	[ myexts ]
      	basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE
      	keyUsage=digitalSignature
      	subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
      	authorityKeyIdentifier=hash
      
      The build process will use this to configure:
      
      	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 -batch \
      		-x509 -config x509.genkey \
      		-outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
      		-keyout signing_key.priv
      
      to generate the key.
      
      Note that it is required that the X.509 certificate have a subjectKeyIdentifier
      and an authorityKeyIdentifier.  Without those, the certificate will be
      rejected.  These can be used to check the validity of a certificate.
      
      Note that 'make distclean' will remove signing_key.{priv,x509} and x509.genkey,
      whether or not they were generated automatically.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      d441108c
    • D
      MODSIGN: Add FIPS policy · 1d0059f3
      David Howells 提交于
      If we're in FIPS mode, we should panic if we fail to verify the signature on a
      module or we're asked to load an unsigned module in signature enforcing mode.
      Possibly FIPS mode should automatically enable enforcing mode.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      1d0059f3