REISER_FS /proc option needs to depend on PROC_FS.

fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'show_super':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:134: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'max_hash_collisions'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:134: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'breads'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:135: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'bread_miss'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:135: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'search_by_key'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:136: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'search_by_key_fs_changed'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:136: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'search_by_key_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:137: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'insert_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:137: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'paste_into_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:138: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'cut_from_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:139: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'delete_solid_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:139: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'delete_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:140: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'leaked_oid'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:140: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'leaves_removable'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'show_per_level':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:184: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'balance_at'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:185: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'sbk_read_at'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:186: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'sbk_fs_changed'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:187: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'sbk_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:188: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'free_at'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:189: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'items_at'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:190: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'can_node_be_removed'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:191: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'lnum'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:192: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'rnum'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:193: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'lbytes'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:194: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'rbytes'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:195: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'get_neighbors'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:196: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'get_neighbors_restart'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:197: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'need_l_neighbor'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:197: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'need_r_neighbor'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'show_bitmap':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:224: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'free_block'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:225: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:226: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:227: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:228: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:229: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:230: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:230: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'show_journal':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:384: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:385: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:386: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:387: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:388: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:389: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:390: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:391: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:392: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:393: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:394: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:395: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:395: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:395: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'reiserfs_proc_info_init':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:504: warning: implicit declaration of function '__PINFO'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:504: error: request for member 'lock' in something not a structure or union
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'reiserfs_proc_info_done':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:544: error: request for member 'lock' in something not a structure or union
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:545: error: request for member 'exiting' in something not a structure or union
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:546: error: request for member 'lock' in something not a structure or union
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Make miscellaneous fixes to AFS and AF_RXRPC:

 (*) Make AF_RXRPC select KEYS rather than RXKAD or AFS_FS in Kconfig.

 (*) Don't use FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA.

 (*) Remove a done 'TODO' item in a comemnt on afs_get_sb().

 (*) Don't pass a void * as the page pointer argument of kmap_atomic() as this
     breaks on m68k.  Patch from Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>.

 (*) Use match_*() functions rather than doing my own parsing.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Fixes for various arch compilation problems:

 (*) Missing module exports.

 (*) Variable name collision when rxkad and af_rxrpc both built in
     (rxrpc_debug).

 (*) Large constant representation problem (AFS_UUID_TO_UNIX_TIME).

 (*) Configuration dependencies.

 (*) printk() format warnings.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Delete the old RxRPC code as it's now no longer used.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Make the in-kernel AFS filesystem use AF_RXRPC instead of the old RxRPC code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Unmaintained for years, few if any users.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>

After temporary server or network failure and reconneciton, we were not
resending the unix capabilities via SetFSInfo - which confused Samba posix
byte range locking code.

Discovered by jra
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs.  It
manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism.
Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport.

Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK).  Under passphrase, a File
Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase
combo on mount.  This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of
each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440.  This is all
symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API.

These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK.  There is no
asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes
the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon.  After
considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various
transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication.

eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring.  These tokens
correlate with individual keys.  For passphrase mode of operation, the
authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK.  For public key, the
authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by
individual PKI modules in userspace.

Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key
mode must be running a daemon.  That daemon has the user's credentials and has
access to all of the keys to which the user should have access.  The daemon,
when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system
and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module.  Userspace utilities
register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring.
These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI
blobs.  The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI
module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption.

When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag
1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier
(signature).  The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet;
eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and
the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the
current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was
registered at the time the daemon was started by the user.

The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request
packet parsing and manages PKI modules.  libecryptfs grabs the public key
authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring.
This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request.
libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along
the PKI block from the auth tok.  The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it
should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes
the decrypted data back to libecryptfs.  libecryptfs then puts together a
reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs
module.

The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via
message context structs.  The module maintains an array of message context
structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an
allocated list.  When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx
from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires
off the message to the user's registered daemon.

When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the
msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself.  The
msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs.  It verifies
that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent
the message.  It also validates a sequence number between the received packet
and the msg ctx.  Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply
packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and
wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply.

The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open().  This process
originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in
ecryptfs_wait_for_response().  When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx
state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply
packet) and returns.  If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted
FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as
normal.

The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt
request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request.

> - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel.  Why is that
>   not suitable (or growable) for public key management?

eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state
information.  It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace
code.  The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key
management in and of itself.  What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to
communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall,
based on the UID.  Nothing running under another UID should be able to access
that channel of communication.

> - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key
> management be private to a particular fs?

The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted
into a separate kernel service.  In essence, this would be a sort of
request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon.  I am not aware
of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any
existing tools to do just what we wanted.

>   What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit
>   message?

There is a stale uid<->pid association in the hash table for that user.  When
the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and
generates a new one.  See ecryptfs_process_helo().

> - _why_ does it use netlink?

Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of
the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user).  I
explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to
introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down
channels for the daemons.  We do not have to worry about any of that with
netlink.
Signed-off-by: NMichael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove the kernel config option ZISOFS_FS, since it appears that the actual
option is simply ZISOFS.
Signed-off-by: NRobert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

OCFS2: drop 'depends on INET' since local mounts are now allowed.
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>

Mark JFFS as broken and provide a warning to users that it is deprecated
and scheduled for removal in 2.6.21
Signed-off-by: NJosh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Standardize the miniscule percentage of occurrences of "depends" in
Kconfig files to "depends on", and update kconfig-language.txt to
reflect that.
Signed-off-by: NRobert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@gmx.de>
Acked-by: NDave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

Changes persistant -> persistent. www.dictionary.com does not know
persistant (with an A), but should it be one of those things you can
spell in more than one correct way, let me know.
Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

Fix various Kconfig typos.
Signed-off-by: NMatt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com>
Acked-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

Amend the text of AFS configuration options.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

CRYPTO_MANAGER is selected automatically by CONFIG_ECB and CONFIG_CBC.

config CRYPTO_ECB
        tristate "ECB support"
        select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
        select CRYPTO_MANAGER


I've added CONFIG_ECB to the ones you mentioned and CONFIG_CBC to
gssapi.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

GENERIC_ACL shouldn't be under Network File Systems (which made it depend
on NET) as far as I can tell.  Having it there and having many (FS) config
symbols disabled gives this (which the patch fixes):

mm/built-in.o: In function `shmem_check_acl':
shmem_acl.c:(.text.shmem_check_acl+0x33): undefined reference to `posix_acl_permission'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_get':
(.text.generic_acl_get+0x30): undefined reference to `posix_acl_to_xattr'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_set':
(.text.generic_acl_set+0x75): undefined reference to `posix_acl_from_xattr'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_set':
(.text.generic_acl_set+0x94): undefined reference to `posix_acl_valid'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_set':
(.text.generic_acl_set+0xc1): undefined reference to `posix_acl_equiv_mode'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_init':
(.text.generic_acl_init+0x7a): undefined reference to `posix_acl_clone'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_init':
(.text.generic_acl_init+0xb4): undefined reference to `posix_acl_clone'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_init':
(.text.generic_acl_init+0xc8): undefined reference to `posix_acl_create_masq'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_chmod':
(.text.generic_acl_chmod+0x49): undefined reference to `posix_acl_clone'
fs/built-in.o: In function `generic_acl_chmod':
(.text.generic_acl_chmod+0x76): undefined reference to `posix_acl_chmod_masq'
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

`select' is a bit obnoxious: the option keeps on coming back
and it's hard to work out what to do to make it go away again.
The use of `depends on' is preferred (although it has
usability problems too..)
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Reworked from a patch by Mingming Cao and Randy Dunlap
Signed-off-By: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: NMingming Cao <cmm@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Originally part of a patch from Mingming Cao and Randy Dunlap.  Reorganized
by Shaggy.
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Mingming Cao<cmm@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux.  It is derived from
Erez Zadok's Cryptfs, implemented through the FiST framework for generating
stacked filesystems.  eCryptfs extends Cryptfs to provide advanced key
management and policy features.  eCryptfs stores cryptographic metadata in the
header of each file written, so that encrypted files can be copied between
hosts; the file will be decryptable with the proper key, and there is no need
to keep track of any additional information aside from what is already in the
encrypted file itself.

[akpm@osdl.org: updates for ongoing API changes]
[bunk@stusta.de: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: alpha build fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[tytso@mit.edu: inode-diet updates]
[pbadari@us.ibm.com: generic_file_*_read/write() interface updates]
[rdunlap@xenotime.net: printk format fixes]
[akpm@osdl.org: make slab creation and teardown table-driven]
Signed-off-by: NPhillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: NMichael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NErez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NBadari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

Make it possible to disable the block layer.  Not all embedded devices require
it, some can make do with just JFFS2, NFS, ramfs, etc - none of which require
the block layer to be present.

This patch does the following:

 (*) Introduces CONFIG_BLOCK to disable the block layer, buffering and blockdev
     support.

 (*) Adds dependencies on CONFIG_BLOCK to any configuration item that controls
     an item that uses the block layer.  This includes:

     (*) Block I/O tracing.

     (*) Disk partition code.

     (*) All filesystems that are block based, eg: Ext3, ReiserFS, ISOFS.

     (*) The SCSI layer.  As far as I can tell, even SCSI chardevs use the
     	 block layer to do scheduling.  Some drivers that use SCSI facilities -
     	 such as USB storage - end up disabled indirectly from this.

     (*) Various block-based device drivers, such as IDE and the old CDROM
     	 drivers.

     (*) MTD blockdev handling and FTL.

     (*) JFFS - which uses set_bdev_super(), something it could avoid doing by
     	 taking a leaf out of JFFS2's book.

 (*) Makes most of the contents of linux/blkdev.h, linux/buffer_head.h and
     linux/elevator.h contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK being set.  sector_div() is,
     however, still used in places, and so is still available.

 (*) Also made contingent are the contents of linux/mpage.h, linux/genhd.h and
     parts of linux/fs.h.

 (*) Makes a number of files in fs/ contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK.

 (*) Makes mm/bounce.c (bounce buffering) contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK.

 (*) set_page_dirty() doesn't call __set_page_dirty_buffers() if CONFIG_BLOCK
     is not enabled.

 (*) fs/no-block.c is created to hold out-of-line stubs and things that are
     required when CONFIG_BLOCK is not set:

     (*) Default blockdev file operations (to give error ENODEV on opening).

 (*) Makes some /proc changes:

     (*) /proc/devices does not list any blockdevs.

     (*) /proc/diskstats and /proc/partitions are contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK.

 (*) Makes some compat ioctl handling contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK.

 (*) If CONFIG_BLOCK is not defined, makes sys_quotactl() return -ENODEV if
     given command other than Q_SYNC or if a special device is specified.

 (*) In init/do_mounts.c, no reference is made to the blockdev routines if
     CONFIG_BLOCK is not defined.  This does not prohibit NFS roots or JFFS2.

 (*) The bdflush, ioprio_set and ioprio_get syscalls can now be absent (return
     error ENOSYS by way of cond_syscall if so).

 (*) The seclvl_bd_claim() and seclvl_bd_release() security calls do nothing if
     CONFIG_BLOCK is not set, since they can't then happen.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Add access control lists for tmpfs.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The patches solve the following problem: We want to grant access to devices
based on who is logged in from where, etc.  This includes switching back and
forth between multiple user sessions, etc.

Using ACLs to define device access for logged-in users gives us all the
flexibility we need in order to fully solve the problem.

Device special files nowadays usually live on tmpfs, hence tmpfs ACLs.

Different distros have come up with solutions that solve the problem to
different degrees: SUSE uses a resource manager which tracks login sessions
and sets ACLs on device inodes as appropriate.  RedHat uses pam_console, which
changes the primary file ownership to the logged-in user.  Others use a set of
groups that users must be in in order to be granted the appropriate accesses.

The freedesktop.org project plans to implement a combination of a
console-tracker and a HAL-device-list based solution to grant access to
devices to users, and more distros will likely follow this approach.

These patches have first been posted here on 2 February 2005, and again
on 8 January 2006. We have been shipping them in SLES9 and SLES10 with
no problems reported.  The previous submission is archived here:

   http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/8/229
   http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/8/230
   http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/8/231

This patch:

Add some infrastructure for access control lists on in-memory
filesystems such as tmpfs.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Since sys_sysctl is deprecated start allow it to be compiled out.  This
should catch any remaining user space code that cares, and paves the way
for further sysctl cleanups.

[akpm@osdl.org: If sys_sysctl() is not compiled-in, emit a warning]
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Remove the EXPERIMENTAL flag from the NFS_DIRECTIO option.

Test plan:
Unset the EXPERIMENTAL kernel build option and check to see that the NFS
direct I/O option is still available.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Things have been working pretty well for a while now.

We should've probably done this at least one kernel
revision ago, but it doesn't hurt to be paranoid.
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>

Give gcc the chance to compile out the debug logging code in ocfs2.
This saves some size at the expense of being able to debug the code.
Signed-off-by: NJoel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>

Drop '&& !JFFS2_FS_WRITEBUFFER' from fs/Kconfig.
The series of previous patches enables to use those
functionality at same time.
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

I noticed recently that my CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5 turned into a y again instead
of m.  It turns out that CONFIG_NFSD_V4 is selecting it to be y even though
I've chosen to compile nfsd as a module.

In general when we have a bool sitting under a tristate it is better to
select things you need from the tristate rather than the bool since that
allows the things you select to be modules.

The following patch does it for nfsd.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Make procfs non-optional unless EMBEDDED is set, just like sysfs.  procfs
is already de facto required for a large subset of Linux functionality.
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Currently to turn on debug mode "user" has to edit ~10 files, to turn off he
has to do it again.

This patch introduce such changes:
1)turn on(off) debug messages via ".config"
2)remove unnecessary duplication of code
3)make "UFSD" macros more similar to function
4)fix some compiler warnings
Signed-off-by: NEvgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

To find new bugs, I suggest revert this patch:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/31/275 in -mm tree.

So others can test "write support" of UFS.
Signed-off-by: NEvgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>