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  1. 27 3月, 2013 4 次提交
    • E
      userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted · 87a8ebd6
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.

proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.

Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.

In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      87a8ebd6
    • E
      vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces · 132c94e3
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.

Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.

When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.

This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      132c94e3
    • E
      vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts · 90563b19
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher
privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged
user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only
restriction.

Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must
remain read-only.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      90563b19
    • E
      userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted · 3151527e
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.

Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.

For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace.  Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.

Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead.  With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      3151527e
  3. 16 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • L
      Btrfs: fix warning of free_extent_map · 3b277594
      由 Liu Bo 提交于 
      Users report that an extent map's list is still linked when it's actually
going to be freed from cache.

The story is that

a) when we're going to drop an extent map and may split this large one into
smaller ems, and if this large one is flagged as EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING which means
that it's on the list to be logged, then the smaller ems split from it will also
be flagged as EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING, and this is _not_ expected.

b) we'll keep ems from unlinking the list and freeing when they are flagged with
EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING, because the log code holds one reference.

The end result is the warning, but the truth is that we set the flag
EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING only during fsync.

So clear flag EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING for extent maps split from a large one.
Reported-by: NJohannes Hirte <johannes.hirte@fem.tu-ilmenau.de>
Reported-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
      3b277594
  5. 15 3月, 2013 6 次提交
  7. 14 3月, 2013 2 次提交
  9. 13 3月, 2013 3 次提交
    • J
      ext2: Fix BUG_ON in evict() on inode deletion · c288d296
      由 Jan Kara 提交于 
      Commit 8e3dffc6 introduced a regression where deleting inode with
large extended attributes leads to triggering
  BUG_ON(inode->i_state != (I_FREEING | I_CLEAR))
in fs/inode.c:evict(). That happens because freeing of xattr block
dirtied the inode and it happened after clear_inode() has been called.

Fix the issue by moving removal of xattr block into ext2_evict_inode()
before clear_inode() call close to a place where data blocks are
truncated. That is also more logical place and removes surprising
requirement that ext2_free_blocks() mustn't dirty the inode.
Reported-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      c288d296
    • E
      fs: Readd the fs module aliases. · fa7614dd
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      I had assumed that the only use of module aliases for filesystems
prior to "fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules."
was in request_module.  It turns out I was wrong.  At least mkinitcpio
in Arch linux uses these aliases.

So readd the preexising aliases, to keep from breaking userspace.

Userspace eventually will have to follow and use the same aliases the
kernel does.  So at some point we may be delete these aliases without
problems.  However that day is not today.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      fa7614dd
    • M
      Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, writev, and security keys · 8aec0f5d
      由 Mathieu Desnoyers 提交于 
      Looking at mm/process_vm_access.c:process_vm_rw() and comparing it to
compat_process_vm_rw() shows that the compatibility code requires an
explicit "access_ok()" check before calling
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(). The same difference seems to appear when
we compare fs/read_write.c:do_readv_writev() to
fs/compat.c:compat_do_readv_writev().

This subtle difference between the compat and non-compat requirements
should probably be debated, as it seems to be error-prone. In fact,
there are two others sites that use this function in the Linux kernel,
and they both seem to get it wrong:

Now shifting our attention to fs/aio.c, we see that aio_setup_iocb()
also ends up calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() through
aio_setup_vectored_rw(). Unfortunately, the access_ok() check appears to
be missing. Same situation for
security/keys/compat.c:compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov().

I propose that we add the access_ok() check directly into
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(), so callers don't have to worry about it,
and it therefore makes the compat call code similar to its non-compat
counterpart. Place the access_ok() check in the same location where
copy_from_user() can trigger a -EFAULT error in the non-compat code, so
the ABI behaviors are alike on both compat and non-compat.

While we are here, fix compat_do_readv_writev() so it checks for
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() negative return values.

And also, fix a memory leak in compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() error
handling.
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8aec0f5d
  11. 12 3月, 2013 4 次提交
  13. 11 3月, 2013 2 次提交
  15. 09 3月, 2013 2 次提交
  17. 07 3月, 2013 8 次提交
  19. 06 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  21. 05 3月, 2013 7 次提交