1. 20 5月, 2009 2 次提交
    • E
      TPM: get_event_name stack corruption · fbaa5869
      Eric Paris 提交于
      get_event_name uses sprintf to fill a buffer declared on the stack.  It fills
      the buffer 2 bytes at a time.  What the code doesn't take into account is that
      sprintf(buf, "%02x", data) actually writes 3 bytes.  2 bytes for the data and
      then it nul terminates the string.  Since we declare buf to be 40 characters
      long and then we write 40 bytes of data into buf sprintf is going to write 41
      characters.  The fix is to leave room in buf for the nul terminator.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      fbaa5869
    • L
      Avoid ICE in get_random_int() with gcc-3.4.5 · 26a9a418
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Martin Knoblauch reports that trying to build 2.6.30-rc6-git3 with
      RHEL4.3 userspace (gcc (GCC) 3.4.5 20051201 (Red Hat 3.4.5-2)) causes an
      internal compiler error (ICE):
      
          drivers/char/random.c: In function `get_random_int':
          drivers/char/random.c:1672: error: unrecognizable insn:
          (insn 202 148 150 0 /scratch/build/linux-2.6.30-rc6-git3/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h:23 (set (reg:SI 0 ax [91])
                  (subreg:SI (plus:DI (plus:DI (reg:DI 0 ax [88])
                              (subreg:DI (reg:SI 6 bp) 0))
                          (const_int -4 [0xfffffffffffffffc])) 0)) -1 (nil)
              (nil))
          drivers/char/random.c:1672: internal compiler error: in extract_insn, at recog.c:2083
      
      and after some debugging it turns out that it's due to the code trying
      to figure out the rough value of the current stack pointer by taking an
      address of an uninitialized variable and casting that to an integer.
      
      This is clearly a compiler bug, but it's not worth fighting - while the
      current stack kernel pointer might be somewhat hard to predict in user
      space, it's also not generally going to change for a lot of the call
      chains for a particular process.
      
      So just drop it, and mumble some incoherent curses at the compiler.
      Tested-by: NMartin Knoblauch <spamtrap@knobisoft.de>
      Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      26a9a418
  2. 15 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  3. 08 5月, 2009 1 次提交
    • L
      random: make get_random_int() more random · 8a0a9bd4
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      It's a really simple patch that basically just open-codes the current
      "secure_ip_id()" call, but when open-coding it we now use a _static_
      hashing area, so that it gets updated every time.
      
      And to make sure somebody can't just start from the same original seed of
      all-zeroes, and then do the "half_md4_transform()" over and over until
      they get the same sequence as the kernel has, each iteration also mixes in
      the same old "current->pid + jiffies" we used - so we should now have a
      regular strong pseudo-number generator, but we also have one that doesn't
      have a single seed.
      
      Note: the "pid + jiffies" is just meant to be a tiny tiny bit of noise. It
      has no real meaning. It could be anything. I just picked the previous
      seed, it's just that now we keep the state in between calls and that will
      feed into the next result, and that should make all the difference.
      
      I made that hash be a per-cpu data just to avoid cache-line ping-pong:
      having multiple CPU's write to the same data would be fine for randomness,
      and add yet another layer of chaos to it, but since get_random_int() is
      supposed to be a fast interface I did it that way instead. I considered
      using "__raw_get_cpu_var()" to avoid any preemption overhead while still
      getting the hash be _mostly_ ping-pong free, but in the end good taste won
      out.
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8a0a9bd4
  4. 07 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  5. 25 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  6. 22 4月, 2009 5 次提交
  7. 20 4月, 2009 2 次提交
  8. 14 4月, 2009 2 次提交
  9. 10 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  10. 07 4月, 2009 9 次提交
  11. 03 4月, 2009 5 次提交
  12. 01 4月, 2009 10 次提交