Commit 6f5317e7 introduced a bug in the
handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg
when XSELinux is enabled.  Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return
SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class.
Reported-by: N"Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The socket SID would be computed on creation and no longer inherit
its creator's SID by default. Socket may have a different type but
needs to retain the creator's role and MLS attribute in order not
to break labeled networking and network access control.

The kernel value for a class would be used to determine if the class
if one of socket classes. If security_compute_sid is called from
userspace the policy value for a class would be mapped to the relevant
kernel value first.
Signed-off-by: NHarry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria.
The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent
directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.)  This patch
adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between
creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd.

There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical.  Either the
policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't.
This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new
rules.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

The sym_val_to_name type array can be quite large as it grows linearly with
the number of types.  With known policies having over 5k types these
allocations are growing large enough that they are likely to fail.  Convert
those to flex_array so no allocation is larger than PAGE_SIZE
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

In rawhide type_val_to_struct will allocate 26848 bytes, an order 3
allocations.  While this hasn't been seen to fail it isn't outside the
realm of possibiliy on systems with severe memory fragmentation.  Convert
to flex_array so no allocation will ever be bigger than PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid is difficult to follow, especially the
return codes.  Try to make the function obvious.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error.  For the most part transition to

	rc=errno
	if (failure)
		goto out;
[...]
out:
	cleanup()
	return rc;

Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options.  This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_user (fixes ppc build warning).
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

/selinux/policy allows a user to copy the policy back out of the kernel.
This patch allows userspace to actually mmap that file and use it directly.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was
loaded into the kernel.  The patch creates a new selinuxfs file
/selinux/policy which can be read by userspace.  The actual policy that is
loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string.  The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen.  This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
  struct selinux_kernel_status
  {
          u32     length;         /* length of this structure */
          u32     sequence;       /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
          u32     enforcing;      /* current setting of enforcing mode */
          u32     policyload;     /* times of policy reloaded */
          u32     deny_unknown;   /* current setting of deny_unknown */
  };

When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.

If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.

A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
 security/selinux/include/security.h |   21 ++++++
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |   56 +++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/Makefile        |    2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |    3 +
 security/selinux/ss/status.c        |  129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types.  The type_attr_map in
policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap)
(12 on x86_64).  Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length
3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes.  The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running
system is 16k.  Most of the time a 32k allocation will work.  But on long
running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly.
In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use
flex_arrays.  Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE
pieces.

-v2
rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj)
drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly

-v3
make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes)
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some
other reason (usually ENOMEM).  This patch passes error codes back up the
stack where they will make their way to userspace.  This might help in
debugging future problems with policy load.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix coding style in security/
Signed-off-by: NZhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch revert the commit of 7d52a155
which removed a part of type_attribute_bounds_av as a dead code.
However, at that time, we didn't find out the target side boundary allows
to handle some of pseudo /proc/<pid>/* entries with its process's security
context well.
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix a couple of sparse warnings for callers of
context_struct_to_string, which takes a *u32, not an *int.

These cases are harmless as the values are not used.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>

Allow runtime switching between different policy types (e.g. from a MLS/MCS
policy to a non-MLS/non-MCS policy or viceversa).
Signed-off-by: NGuido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Always load the initial SIDs, even in the case of a policy
reload and not just at the initial policy load. This comes
particularly handy after the introduction of a recent
patch for enabling runtime switching between different
policy types, although this patch is in theory independent
from that feature.
Signed-off-by: NGuido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch removes dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av().

Due to the historical reason, the type boundary feature is delivered
from hierarchical types in libsepol, it has supported boundary features
both of subject type (domain; in most cases) and target type.

However, we don't have any actual use cases in bounded target types,
and it tended to make conceptual confusion.
So, this patch removes the dead code to apply boundary checks on the
target types. I makes clear the TYPEBOUNDS restricts privileges of
a certain domain bounded to any other domain.
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   43 +++------------------------------------
 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

If allow_unknown==deny, SELinux treats an undefined kernel security
class as an error condition rather than as a typical permission denial
and thus does not allow permissions on undefined classes even when in
permissive mode.  Change the SELinux logic so that this case is handled
as a typical permission denial, subject to the usual permissive mode and
permissive domain handling.

Also drop the 'requested' argument from security_compute_av() and
helpers as it is a legacy of the original security server interface and
is unused.

Changes:
- Handle permissive domains consistently by moving up the test for a
permissive domain.
- Make security_compute_av_user() consistent with security_compute_av();
the only difference now is that security_compute_av() performs mapping
between the kernel-private class and permission indices and the policy
values.  In the userspace case, this mapping is handled by libselinux.
- Moved avd_init inside the policy lock.

Based in part on a patch by Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>.
Reported-by: NAndrew Worsley <amworsley@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The size argument to kcalloc should be the size of desired structure,
not the pointer to it.

The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// <smpl>
@expression@
expression *x;
@@

x =
 <+...
-sizeof(x)
+sizeof(*x)
...+>// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: NJulia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

That is "success", "unknown", "through", "performance", "[re|un]mapping"
, "access", "default", "reasonable", "[con]currently", "temperature"
, "channel", "[un]used", "application", "example","hierarchy", "therefore"
, "[over|under]flow", "contiguous", "threshold", "enough" and others.
Signed-off-by: NAndré Goddard Rosa <andre.goddard@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

Historically we've seen cases where permissions are requested for classes
where they do not exist.  In particular we have seen CIFS forget to set
i_mode to indicate it is a directory so when we later check something like
remove_name we have problems since it wasn't defined in tclass file.  This
used to result in a avc which included the permission 0x2000 or something.
Currently the kernel will deny the operations (good thing) but will not
print ANY information (bad thing).  First the auditdeny field is no
extended to include unknown permissions.  After that is fixed the logic in
avc_dump_query to output this information isn't right since it will remove
the permission from the av and print the phrase "<NULL>".  This takes us
back to the behavior before the classmap rewrite.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Ensure that we release the policy read lock on all exit paths from
security_compute_av.
Signed-off-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Drop remapping of netlink classes and bypass of permission checking
based on netlink message type for policy version < 18.  This removes
compatibility code introduced when the original single netlink
security class used for all netlink sockets was split into
finer-grained netlink classes based on netlink protocol and when
permission checking was added based on netlink message type in Linux
2.6.8.  The only known distribution that shipped with SELinux and
policy < 18 was Fedora Core 2, which was EOL'd on 2005-04-11.

Given that the remapping code was never updated to address the
addition of newer netlink classes, that the corresponding userland
support was dropped in 2005, and that the assumptions made by the
remapping code about the fixed ordering among netlink classes in the
policy may be violated in the future due to the dynamic class/perm
discovery support, we should drop this compatibility code now.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
logic from libselinux.  A mapping is created between kernel-private
class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
policy values used within the security server.

The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC.  The
interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user
suffix.

The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
thus the kernel class index values are compressed.  The flask.h
definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers.  Going
forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
tied to the policy values.  The next patch introduces a utility to
automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
classmap.h definitions.

The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
policy load to generate the mapping.  The old kernel class validation
logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.

The handle unknown logic is reworked.  reject_unknown=1 is handled
when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
handling by the class validation logic.  allow_unknown=1 is handled
when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
automatically added to the allowed vector.  If the class was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.

avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.

The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
kernel.  It should be noted that this policy will not include any
userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
the kernel-private indices).
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The attached patch adds support to generate audit messages on two cases.

The first one is a case when a multi-thread process tries to switch its
performing security context using setcon(3), but new security context is
not bounded by the old one.

  type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245311998.599:17):        \
      op=security_bounded_transition result=denied      \
      oldcontext=system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0           \
      newcontext=system_u:system_r:guest_webapp_t:s0

The other one is a case when security_compute_av() masked any permissions
due to the type boundary violation.

  type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245312836.035:32):	\
      op=security_compute_av reason=bounds              \
      scontext=system_u:object_r:user_webapp_t:s0       \
      tcontext=system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0:c0         \
      tclass=file perms=getattr,open
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

It is a cleanup patch to cut down a line within 80 columns.
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |    6 +++---
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly.

Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive
domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode,
even if the global setting is enforcing mode.
However, we don't have an application program interface to inform
what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not.
It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL
and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly.

This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access
interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace.
If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required
access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should
allow any required actions, as the kernel doing.

This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at
context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions
without read_lock(&policy_rwlock).
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
 security/selinux/avc.c              |    2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    4 +++-
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |    4 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   30 +++++-------------------------
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

It appears there was an intention to have the security server only decide
certain permissions and leave other for later as some sort of a portential
performance win.  We are currently always deciding all 32 bits of
permissions and this is a useless couple of branches and wasted space.
This patch completely drops the av.decided concept.

This in a 17% reduction in the time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit
based on oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Don't store the field->op in the messy (and very inconvenient for e.g.
audit_comparator()) form; translate to dense set of values and do full
validation of userland-submitted value while we are at it.

->audit_init_rule() and ->audit_match_rule() get new values now; in-tree
instances updated.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This patch provides support for including the LSM's secid in addition to
the LSM's MLS information in the NetLabel security attributes structure.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Currently when SELinux fails to allocate memory in
security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() the NetLabel LSM domain field is set to
NULL which triggers the default NetLabel LSM domain mapping which may not
always be the desired mapping.  This patch fixes this by returning an error
when the kernel is unable to allocate memory.  This could result in more
failures on a system with heavy memory pressure but it is the "correct"
thing to do.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field.  The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used.  This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.

Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field.  The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used.  This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.

Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix a bug and a philosophical decision about who handles errors.

security_context_to_sid_core() was leaking a context in the common case.
This was causing problems on fedora systems which recently have started
making extensive use of this function.

In discussion it was decided that if string_to_context_struct() had an
error it was its own responsibility to clean up any mess it created
along the way.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context
under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application
to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and
helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request.

When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider
permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process
shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context
also means another thread can easily refer violated information.

The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain
has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign
a per-thread security context.

Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can
never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two
explicit or implicit ways.

The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define
a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of
existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated
name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t".

This feature requires a new policy version.
The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into
kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it.
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Replace "thing != NULL" comparisons with just "thing" to make
the code look more uniform (mixed styles were used even in the
same source file).
Signed-off-by: NVesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This reverts commit 811f3799.

From Eric Paris:

"Please drop this patch for now.  It deadlocks on ntfs-3g.  I need to
rework it to handle fuse filesystems better.  (casey was right)"