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  1. 19 6月, 2009 4 次提交
  3. 05 6月, 2009 1 次提交
    • O
      ptrace: revert "ptrace_detach: the wrong wakeup breaks the ERESTARTxxx logic" · edaba2c5
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      Commit 95a3540d ("ptrace_detach: the wrong
wakeup breaks the ERESTARTxxx logic") removed the "extra"
wake_up_process() from ptrace_detach(), but as Jan pointed out this breaks
the compatibility.

I believe the changelog is right and this wake_up() is wrong in many
ways, but GDB assumes that ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child, 0, 0) always
wakes up the tracee.

Despite the fact this breaks SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED/group_stop_count logic,
and despite the fact this wake_up_process() can break another
assumption: PTRACE_DETACH with SIGSTOP should leave the tracee in
TASK_STOPPED case.  Because the untraced child can dequeue SIGSTOP and
call do_signal_stop() before ptrace_detach() calls wake_up_process().

Revert this change for now.  We need some fixes even if we we want to keep
the current behaviour, but these fixes are not for 2.6.30.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      edaba2c5
  5. 11 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  7. 27 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  9. 14 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  11. 09 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  13. 07 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  15. 03 4月, 2009 5 次提交
  17. 10 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  19. 14 1月, 2009 1 次提交
  21. 20 12月, 2008 1 次提交
    • M
      x86, bts: add fork and exit handling · bf53de90
      由 Markus Metzger 提交于 
      Impact: introduce new ptrace facility

Add arch_ptrace_untrace() function that is called when the tracer
detaches (either voluntarily or when the tracing task dies);
ptrace_disable() is only called on a voluntary detach.

Add ptrace_fork() and arch_ptrace_fork(). They are called when a
traced task is forked.

Clear DS and BTS related fields on fork.

Release DS resources and reclaim memory in ptrace_untrace(). This
releases resources already when the tracing task dies. We used to do
that when the traced task dies.
Signed-off-by: NMarkus Metzger <markus.t.metzger@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      bf53de90
  23. 01 12月, 2008 1 次提交
  25. 14 11月, 2008 4 次提交
    • D
      CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials · d84f4f99
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      d84f4f99
    • D
      CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds · c69e8d9c
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      c69e8d9c
    • D
      CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct · b6dff3ec
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      b6dff3ec
    • D
      CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel · 76aac0e9
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      76aac0e9
  27. 20 10月, 2008 1 次提交
  29. 14 8月, 2008 1 次提交
    • D
      security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() · 5cd9c58f
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.

__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags.  This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.

This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:

 (1) security_ptrace_may_access().  This passes judgement on whether one
     process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
     PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
     current is the parent.

 (2) security_ptrace_traceme().  This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
     and takes only a pointer to the parent process.  current is the child.

     In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
     the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
     This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().

Of the places that were using __capable():

 (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
     process.  All of these now use has_capability().

 (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
     whether the parent was allowed to trace any process.  As mentioned above,
     these have been split.  For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
     used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.

 (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().

 (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
     after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
     switched and capable() is used instead.

 (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
     receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.

 (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
     whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.

I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5cd9c58f
  31. 27 7月, 2008 1 次提交
  33. 17 7月, 2008 1 次提交
    • R
      ptrace children revamp · f470021a
      由 Roland McGrath 提交于 
      ptrace no longer fiddles with the children/sibling links, and the
old ptrace_children list is gone.  Now ptrace, whether of one's own
children or another's via PTRACE_ATTACH, just uses the new ptraced
list instead.

There should be no user-visible difference that matters.  The only
change is the order in which do_wait() sees multiple stopped
children and stopped ptrace attachees.  Since wait_task_stopped()
was changed earlier so it no longer reorders the children list, we
already know this won't cause any new problems.
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
      f470021a
  35. 14 7月, 2008 1 次提交
    • S
      Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach · 006ebb40
      由 Stephen Smalley 提交于 
      Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.

Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.

In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit).  At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).

This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).

Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0).  I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      006ebb40
  37. 02 5月, 2008 1 次提交
  39. 30 4月, 2008 3 次提交
  41. 29 4月, 2008 1 次提交
  43. 22 4月, 2008 1 次提交
    • R
      ptrace: compat_ptrace_request siginfo · e16b2781
      由 Roland McGrath 提交于 
      This adds support for PTRACE_GETSIGINFO and PTRACE_SETSIGINFO in
compat_ptrace_request.  It relies on existing arch definitions for
copy_siginfo_to_user32 and copy_siginfo_from_user32.

On powerpc, this fixes a longstanding regression of 32-bit ptrace
calls on 64-bit kernels vs native calls (64-bit calls or 32-bit
kernels).  This can be seen in a 32-bit call using PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
to examine e.g. siginfo_t.si_addr from a signal that sets it.
(This was broken as of 2.6.24 and, I presume, many or all prior versions.)
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e16b2781
  45. 09 2月, 2008 2 次提交
  47. 07 2月, 2008 2 次提交
  49. 30 1月, 2008 2 次提交