Skip to content

cloud-kernel
cloud-kernel

openanolis / cloud-kernel
1 年多 前同步成功

通知 161
Star 36
Fork 7
cloud-kernel
cloud-kernel
切换分支/标签
  1. 05 7月, 2017 21 次提交
  3. 04 7月, 2017 13 次提交
  5. 03 7月, 2017 6 次提交
    • D
      openvswitch: fix mis-ordered comment lines for ovs_skb_cb · 52427fa0
      由 Daniel Axtens 提交于 
      I was trying to wrap my head around meaning of mru, and realised
that the second line of the comment defining it had somehow
ended up after the line defining cutlen, leading to much confusion.

Reorder the lines to make sense.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      52427fa0
    • E
      net: make sk_ehashfn() static · 784c372a
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      sk_ehashfn() is only used from a single file.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      784c372a
    • E
      net: avoid one splat in fib_nl_delrule() · 5361e209
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      We need to use refcount_set() on a newly created rule to avoid
following error :

[   64.601749] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   64.601757] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6476 at lib/refcount.c:184 refcount_sub_and_test+0x75/0xa0
[   64.601758] Modules linked in: w1_therm wire cdc_acm ehci_pci ehci_hcd mlx4_en ib_uverbs mlx4_ib ib_core mlx4_core
[   64.601769] CPU: 0 PID: 6476 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W       4.12.0-smp-DEV #274
[   64.601771] task: ffff8837bf482040 task.stack: ffff8837bdc08000
[   64.601773] RIP: 0010:refcount_sub_and_test+0x75/0xa0
[   64.601774] RSP: 0018:ffff8837bdc0f5c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   64.601776] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   64.601777] RDX: 0000000000000026 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffffed06f7b81eae
[   64.601778] RBP: ffff8837bdc0f5d0 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: fffffbfff4a54c25
[   64.601779] R10: 00000000cbc500e5 R11: ffffffffa52a6128 R12: ffff881febcf6f24
[   64.601779] R13: ffff881fbf4eaf00 R14: ffff881febcf6f80 R15: ffff8837d7a4ed00
[   64.601781] FS:  00007ff5a2f6b700(0000) GS:ffff881fff800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   64.601782] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   64.601783] CR2: 00007ffcdc70d000 CR3: 0000001f9c91e000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[   64.601783] Call Trace:
[   64.601786]  refcount_dec_and_test+0x11/0x20
[   64.601790]  fib_nl_delrule+0xc39/0x1630
[   64.601793]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0xe/0x20
[   64.601795]  ? fib_nl_newrule+0x25e0/0x25e0
[   64.601798]  ? depot_save_stack+0x133/0x470
[   64.601801]  ? ns_capable+0x13/0x20
[   64.601803]  ? __netlink_ns_capable+0xcc/0x100
[   64.601806]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x23a/0x6a0
[   64.601808]  ? rtnl_newlink+0x1630/0x1630
[   64.601811]  ? memset+0x31/0x40
[   64.601813]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x2d7/0x440
[   64.601815]  ? rtnl_newlink+0x1630/0x1630
[   64.601816]  ? netlink_ack+0xaf0/0xaf0
[   64.601818]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[   64.601820]  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x4c/0x70
[   64.601821]  rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30
[   64.601823]  netlink_unicast+0x422/0x610
[   64.601824]  ? netlink_attachskb+0x650/0x650
[   64.601826]  netlink_sendmsg+0x7b7/0xb60
[   64.601828]  ? netlink_unicast+0x610/0x610
[   64.601830]  ? netlink_unicast+0x610/0x610
[   64.601832]  sock_sendmsg+0xba/0xf0
[   64.601834]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x6a9/0x8c0
[   64.601835]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x520/0x520
[   64.601837]  ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x160/0x520
[   64.601839]  ? memcg_write_event_control+0xd60/0xd60
[   64.601841]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1d50/0x1d50
[   64.601843]  ? kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
[   64.601845]  ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0xb2/0x11d0
[   64.601847]  ? lru_cache_add_active_or_unevictable+0x7d/0x1a0
[   64.601849]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1af8/0x2810
[   64.601851]  ? may_open_dev+0xc0/0xc0
[   64.601852]  ? __pmd_alloc+0x2c0/0x2c0
[   64.601853]  ? __fdget+0x13/0x20
[   64.601855]  __sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x150
[   64.601856]  ? __sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x150
[   64.601857]  ? SyS_shutdown+0x170/0x170
[   64.601859]  ? handle_mm_fault+0x28a/0x650
[   64.601861]  SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20
[   64.601863]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94

Fixes: 717d1e99 ("net: convert fib_rule.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5361e209
    • A
      net: core: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in netdev_stats_to_stats64 · 9af9959e
      由 Alban Browaeys 提交于 
      commit 9256645a ("net/core: relax BUILD_BUG_ON in
netdev_stats_to_stats64") made an attempt to read beyond
the size of the source a possibility.

Fix to only copy src size to dest. As dest might be bigger than src.

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30 at addr ffff8801be248b20
 Read of size 192 by task VBoxNetAdpCtl/6734
 CPU: 1 PID: 6734 Comm: VBoxNetAdpCtl Tainted: G           O    4.11.4prahal+intel+ #118
 Hardware name: LENOVO 20CDCTO1WW/20CDCTO1WW, BIOS GQET52WW (1.32 ) 05/04/2017
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x63/0x86
  kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70
  kasan_report+0x270/0x520
  ? netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x190
  ? __module_address+0x3e/0x3b0
  ? unwind_next_frame+0x1ea/0xb00
  check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
  memcpy+0x23/0x50
  netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30
  dev_get_stats+0x1b9/0x230
  rtnl_fill_stats+0x44/0xc00
  ? nla_put+0xc6/0x130
  rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xe9e/0x3700
  ? rtnl_fill_vfinfo+0xde0/0xde0
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock_local+0x120/0x130
  ? __module_address+0x3e/0x3b0
  ? unwind_next_frame+0x1ea/0xb00
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x190
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? depot_save_stack+0x1d8/0x4a0
  ? depot_save_stack+0x34f/0x4a0
  ? depot_save_stack+0x34f/0x4a0
  ? save_stack+0xb1/0xd0
  ? save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x10d/0x350
  ? __kmalloc_reserve.isra.36+0x2c/0xc0
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x61/0x120
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo.part.25+0x16/0xb0
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo+0x47/0x70
  ? register_netdev+0x15/0x30
  ? vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0xc0/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  ? vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  ? SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  ? do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  ? init_object+0x64/0xa0
  ? ___slab_alloc+0x1ae/0x5c0
  ? ___slab_alloc+0x1ae/0x5c0
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x246/0x350
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
  ? memset+0x31/0x40
  ? __alloc_skb+0x31f/0x560
  ? napi_consume_skb+0x320/0x320
  ? br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0xb7/0x120 [bridge]
  ? if_nlmsg_size+0x440/0x630
  rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x83/0x120
  rtmsg_ifinfo.part.25+0x16/0xb0
  rtmsg_ifinfo+0x47/0x70
  register_netdevice+0xa2b/0xe50
  ? __kmalloc+0x171/0x2d0
  ? netdev_change_features+0x80/0x80
  register_netdev+0x15/0x30
  vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0xc0/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  ? vboxNetAdpComposeMACAddress+0x1d0/0x1d0 [vboxnetadp]
  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
  VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxOpen+0x20/0x20 [vboxnetadp]
  ? lock_acquire+0x11c/0x270
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  ? ioctl_preallocate+0x1d0/0x1d0
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  ? kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x250
  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x537/0xd00
  ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x100/0x100
  SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  ? do_sys_open+0x350/0x350
  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xff0/0xff0
  do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
 RIP: 0033:0x7f7e39a1ae07
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc6f04c6d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc6f04c730 RCX: 00007f7e39a1ae07
 RDX: 00007ffc6f04c730 RSI: 00000000c0207601 RDI: 0000000000000007
 RBP: 00007ffc6f04c700 R08: 00007ffc6f04c780 R09: 0000000000000008
 R10: 0000000000000541 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000007
 R13: 00000000c0207601 R14: 00007ffc6f04c730 R15: 0000000000000012
 Object at ffff8801be248008, in cache kmalloc-4096 size: 4096
 Allocated:
 PID = 6734
  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
  __kmalloc+0x171/0x2d0
  alloc_netdev_mqs+0x8a7/0xbe0
  vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0x65/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
 Freed:
 PID = 5600
  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
  kfree+0xe4/0x220
  kvfree+0x25/0x30
  single_release+0x74/0xb0
  __fput+0x265/0x6b0
  ____fput+0x9/0x10
  task_work_run+0xd5/0x150
  exit_to_usermode_loop+0xe2/0x100
  do_syscall_64+0x26c/0x390
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff8801be248a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8801be248b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff8801be248b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc
                                                     ^
  ffff8801be248c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ffff8801be248c80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ==================================================================
Signed-off-by: NAlban Browaeys <alban.browaeys@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9af9959e
    • D
      iucv: Convert sk_wmem_alloc accesses to refcount_t. · b2c9c5df
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b2c9c5df
    • D
      bpf: simplify narrower ctx access · f96da094
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      This work tries to make the semantics and code around the
narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now
everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset
matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning
writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only
on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read
case that supports narrower access we must check for
offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) +
sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of
individual members that don't support narrower access (like
packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow
access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo,
bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower
access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the
access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have
to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>)
as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter
one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus
for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match
and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and
converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at
the same location.

We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes
simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data
and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size
right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier
be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size
that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on
ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges
and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size
for the relevant instruction.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f96da094