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  1. 24 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  3. 13 9月, 2013 2 次提交
  5. 07 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  7. 05 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 04 9月, 2013 3 次提交
  11. 03 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • L
      lockref: implement lockless reference count updates using cmpxchg() · bc08b449
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Instead of taking the spinlock, the lockless versions atomically check
that the lock is not taken, and do the reference count update using a
cmpxchg() loop.  This is semantically identical to doing the reference
count update protected by the lock, but avoids the "wait for lock"
contention that you get when accesses to the reference count are
contended.

Note that a "lockref" is absolutely _not_ equivalent to an atomic_t.
Even when the lockref reference counts are updated atomically with
cmpxchg, the fact that they also verify the state of the spinlock means
that the lockless updates can never happen while somebody else holds the
spinlock.

So while "lockref_put_or_lock()" looks a lot like just another name for
"atomic_dec_and_lock()", and both optimize to lockless updates, they are
fundamentally different: the decrement done by atomic_dec_and_lock() is
truly independent of any lock (as long as it doesn't decrement to zero),
so a locked region can still see the count change.

The lockref structure, in contrast, really is a *locked* reference
count.  If you hold the spinlock, the reference count will be stable and
you can modify the reference count without using atomics, because even
the lockless updates will see and respect the state of the lock.

In order to enable the cmpxchg lockless code, the architecture needs to
do three things:

 (1) Make sure that the "arch_spinlock_t" and an "unsigned int" can fit
     in an aligned u64, and have a "cmpxchg()" implementation that works
     on such a u64 data type.

 (2) define a helper function to test for a spinlock being unlocked
     ("arch_spin_value_unlocked()")

 (3) select the "ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF" config variable in its
     Kconfig file.

This enables it for x86-64 (but not 32-bit, we'd need to make sure
cmpxchg() turns into the proper cmpxchg8b in order to enable it for
32-bit mode).
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      bc08b449
  13. 02 9月, 2013 5 次提交
  15. 30 8月, 2013 4 次提交
  17. 29 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  19. 28 8月, 2013 3 次提交
  21. 26 8月, 2013 4 次提交
  23. 23 8月, 2013 4 次提交
  25. 22 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  27. 21 8月, 2013 3 次提交
  29. 20 8月, 2013 6 次提交
    • S
      xen/m2p: use GNTTABOP_unmap_and_replace to reinstate the original mapping · ee072640
      由 Stefano Stabellini 提交于 
      GNTTABOP_unmap_grant_ref unmaps a grant and replaces it with a 0
mapping instead of reinstating the original mapping.
Doing so separately would be racy.

To unmap a grant and reinstate the original mapping atomically we use
GNTTABOP_unmap_and_replace.
GNTTABOP_unmap_and_replace doesn't work with GNTMAP_contains_pte, so
don't use it for kmaps.  GNTTABOP_unmap_and_replace zeroes the mapping
passed in new_addr so we have to reinstate it, however that is a
per-cpu mapping only used for balloon scratch pages, so we can be sure that
it's not going to be accessed while the mapping is not valid.
Signed-off-by: NStefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CC: alex@alex.org.uk
CC: dcrisan@flexiant.com

[v1: Konrad fixed up the conflicts]
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
      ee072640
    • C
      xen/smp: initialize IPI vectors before marking CPU online · fc78d343
      由 Chuck Anderson 提交于 
      An older PVHVM guest (v3.0 based) crashed during vCPU hot-plug with:

	kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events.c:1328!

RCU has detected that a CPU has not entered a quiescent state within the
grace period.  It needs to send the CPU a reschedule IPI if it is not
offline.  rcu_implicit_offline_qs() does this check:

	/*
	 * If the CPU is offline, it is in a quiescent state.  We can
	 * trust its state not to change because interrupts are disabled.
	 */
	if (cpu_is_offline(rdp->cpu)) {
		rdp->offline_fqs++;
		return 1;
	}

	Else the CPU is online.  Send it a reschedule IPI.

The CPU is in the middle of being hot-plugged and has been marked online
(!cpu_is_offline()).  See start_secondary():

	set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), true);
	...
	per_cpu(cpu_state, smp_processor_id()) = CPU_ONLINE;

start_secondary() then waits for the CPU bringing up the hot-plugged CPU to
mark it as active:

	/*
	 * Wait until the cpu which brought this one up marked it
	 * online before enabling interrupts. If we don't do that then
	 * we can end up waking up the softirq thread before this cpu
	 * reached the active state, which makes the scheduler unhappy
	 * and schedule the softirq thread on the wrong cpu. This is
	 * only observable with forced threaded interrupts, but in
	 * theory it could also happen w/o them. It's just way harder
	 * to achieve.
	 */
	while (!cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), cpu_active_mask))
		cpu_relax();

	/* enable local interrupts */
	local_irq_enable();

The CPU being hot-plugged will be marked active after it has been fully
initialized by the CPU managing the hot-plug.  In the Xen PVHVM case
xen_smp_intr_init() is called to set up the hot-plugged vCPU's
XEN_RESCHEDULE_VECTOR.

The hot-plugging CPU is marked online, not marked active and does not have
its IPI vectors set up.  rcu_implicit_offline_qs() sees the hot-plugging
cpu is !cpu_is_offline() and tries to send it a reschedule IPI:
This will lead to:

	kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events.c:1328!

	xen_send_IPI_one()
	xen_smp_send_reschedule()
	rcu_implicit_offline_qs()
	rcu_implicit_dynticks_qs()
	force_qs_rnp()
	force_quiescent_state()
	__rcu_process_callbacks()
	rcu_process_callbacks()
	__do_softirq()
	call_softirq()
	do_softirq()
	irq_exit()
	xen_evtchn_do_upcall()

because xen_send_IPI_one() will attempt to use an uninitialized IRQ for
the XEN_RESCHEDULE_VECTOR.

There is at least one other place that has caused the same crash:

	xen_smp_send_reschedule()
	wake_up_idle_cpu()
	add_timer_on()
	clocksource_watchdog()
	call_timer_fn()
	run_timer_softirq()
	__do_softirq()
	call_softirq()
	do_softirq()
	irq_exit()
	xen_evtchn_do_upcall()
	xen_hvm_callback_vector()

clocksource_watchdog() uses cpu_online_mask to pick the next CPU to handle
a watchdog timer:

	/*
	 * Cycle through CPUs to check if the CPUs stay synchronized
	 * to each other.
	 */
	next_cpu = cpumask_next(raw_smp_processor_id(), cpu_online_mask);
	if (next_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
		next_cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);
	watchdog_timer.expires += WATCHDOG_INTERVAL;
	add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, next_cpu);

This resulted in an attempt to send an IPI to a hot-plugging CPU that
had not initialized its reschedule vector. One option would be to make
the RCU code check to not check for CPU offline but for CPU active.
As becoming active is done after a CPU is online (in older kernels).

But Srivatsa pointed out that "the cpu_active vs cpu_online ordering has been
completely reworked - in the online path, cpu_active is set *before* cpu_online,
and also, in the cpu offline path, the cpu_active bit is reset in the CPU_DYING
notification instead of CPU_DOWN_PREPARE." Drilling in this the bring-up
path: "[brought up CPU].. send out a CPU_STARTING notification, and in response
to that, the scheduler sets the CPU in the cpu_active_mask. Again, this mask
is better left to the scheduler alone, since it has the intelligence to use it
judiciously."

The conclusion was that:
"
1. At the IPI sender side:

   It is incorrect to send an IPI to an offline CPU (cpu not present in
   the cpu_online_mask). There are numerous places where we check this
   and warn/complain.

2. At the IPI receiver side:

   It is incorrect to let the world know of our presence (by setting
   ourselves in global bitmasks) until our initialization steps are complete
   to such an extent that we can handle the consequences (such as
   receiving interrupts without crashing the sender etc.)
" (from Srivatsa)

As the native code enables the interrupts at some point we need to be
able to service them. In other words a CPU must have valid IPI vectors
if it has been marked online.

It doesn't need to handle the IPI (interrupts may be disabled) but needs
to have valid IPI vectors because another CPU may find it in cpu_online_mask
and attempt to send it an IPI.

This patch will change the order of the Xen vCPU bring-up functions so that
Xen vectors have been set up before start_secondary() is called.
It also will not continue to bring up a Xen vCPU if xen_smp_intr_init() fails
to initialize it.

Orabug 13823853
Signed-off-by Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NSrivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      fc78d343
    • D
      x86/xen: during early setup, only 1:1 map the ISA region · e201bfcc
      由 David Vrabel 提交于 
      During early setup, when the reserved regions and MMIO holes are being
setup as 1:1 in the p2m, clear any mappings instead of making them 1:1
(execept for the ISA region which is expected to be mapped).

This fixes a regression introduced in 3.5 by 83d51ab4 (xen/setup:
update VA mapping when releasing memory during setup) which caused
hosts with tboot to fail to boot.

tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel
would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable
regions to be mapped by guests.

(XEN)  0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable)
(XEN)  0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved)
(XEN)  0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable)
(XEN)  0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable)
(XEN)  0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable)

tboot marked this region as unusable.

(XEN)  0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable)
(XEN)  00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved)
(XEN)  00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data)
(XEN)  00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved)
(XEN)  00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved)
(XEN)  00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved)
(XEN)  0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable)
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      e201bfcc
    • D
      x86/xen: disable premption when enabling local irqs · fb58e300
      由 David Vrabel 提交于 
      If CONFIG_PREEMPT is enabled then xen_enable_irq() (and
xen_restore_fl()) could be preempted and rescheduled on a different
VCPU in between the clear of the mask and the check for pending
events.  This may result in events being lost as the upcall will check
for pending events on the wrong VCPU.

Fix this by disabling preemption around the unmask and check for
events.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      fb58e300
    • D
      x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 · 3bc38cbc
      由 David Vrabel 提交于 
      If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will
attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel
will crash.

There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0
kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and
treat it as RAM.

We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up.
A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map
and would need to be handled in another patch.

This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot.

tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel
would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable
regions to be mapped by guests.

  (XEN)  0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable)
  (XEN)  0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable)
  (XEN)  0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable)
  (XEN)  0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable)

tboot marked this region as unusable.

  (XEN)  0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable)
  (XEN)  00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data)
  (XEN)  00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved)
  (XEN)  0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable)
Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
[v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions]
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      3bc38cbc
    • Y
      x86/mm: Fix boot crash with DEBUG_PAGE_ALLOC=y and more than 512G RAM · 527bf129
      由 Yinghai Lu 提交于 
      Dave Hansen reported that systems between 500G and 600G RAM
crash early if DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is selected.

 > [    0.000000] init_memory_mapping: [mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff]
 > [    0.000000]  [mem 0x00000000-0x000fffff] page 4k
 > [    0.000000] BRK [0x02086000, 0x02086fff] PGTABLE
 > [    0.000000] BRK [0x02087000, 0x02087fff] PGTABLE
 > [    0.000000] BRK [0x02088000, 0x02088fff] PGTABLE
 > [    0.000000] init_memory_mapping: [mem 0xe80ee00000-0xe80effffff]
 > [    0.000000]  [mem 0xe80ee00000-0xe80effffff] page 4k
 > [    0.000000] BRK [0x02089000, 0x02089fff] PGTABLE
 > [    0.000000] BRK [0x0208a000, 0x0208afff] PGTABLE
 > [    0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: alloc_low_page: ran out of memory

It turns out that we missed increasing needed pages in BRK to
mapping initial 2M and [0,1M) when we switched to use the #PF
handler to set memory mappings:

 > commit 8170e6be
 > Author: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
 > Date:   Thu Jan 24 12:19:52 2013 -0800
 >
 >     x86, 64bit: Use a #PF handler to materialize early mappings on demand

Before that, we had the maping from [0,512M) in head_64.S, and we
can spare two pages [0-1M).  After that change, we can not reuse
pages anymore.

When we have more than 512M ram, we need an extra page for pgd page
with [512G, 1024g).

Increase pages in BRK for page table to solve the boot crash.
Reported-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Bisected-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Tested-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.9 and later
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1376351004-4015-1-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      527bf129