1. 22 9月, 2016 8 次提交
  2. 21 9月, 2016 5 次提交
    • L
      Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux · 7d1e0423
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Pull usercopy hardening fix from Kees Cook:
       "Expand the arm64 vmalloc check to include skipping the module space
        too"
      
      * tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
        mm: usercopy: Check for module addresses
      7d1e0423
    • A
      fix fault_in_multipages_...() on architectures with no-op access_ok() · e23d4159
      Al Viro 提交于
      Switching iov_iter fault-in to multipages variants has exposed an old
      bug in underlying fault_in_multipages_...(); they break if the range
      passed to them wraps around.  Normally access_ok() done by callers will
      prevent such (and it's a guaranteed EFAULT - ERR_PTR() values fall into
      such a range and they should not point to any valid objects).
      
      However, on architectures where userland and kernel live in different
      MMU contexts (e.g. s390) access_ok() is a no-op and on those a range
      with a wraparound can reach fault_in_multipages_...().
      
      Since any wraparound means EFAULT there, the fix is trivial - turn
      those
      
          while (uaddr <= end)
      	    ...
      into
      
          if (unlikely(uaddr > end))
      	    return -EFAULT;
          do
      	    ...
          while (uaddr <= end);
      Reported-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.5+
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e23d4159
    • L
      mm: usercopy: Check for module addresses · aa4f0601
      Laura Abbott 提交于
      While running a compile on arm64, I hit a memory exposure
      
      usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from fffffc0000f3b1a8 (buffer_head) (1 bytes)
      ------------[ cut here ]------------
      kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!
      Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
      Modules linked in: ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT
      nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_broute bridge stp
      llc ebtable_nat ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_nat
      nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle
      iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4
      nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle
      ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables vfat fat xgene_edac
      xgene_enet edac_core i2c_xgene_slimpro i2c_core at803x realtek xgene_dma
      mdio_xgene gpio_dwapb gpio_xgene_sb xgene_rng mailbox_xgene_slimpro nfsd
      auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc xfs libcrc32c sdhci_of_arasan
      sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core xhci_plat_hcd gpio_keys
      CPU: 0 PID: 19744 Comm: updatedb Tainted: G        W 4.8.0-rc3-threadinfo+ #1
      Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.12 Aug 12 2016
      task: fffffe03df944c00 task.stack: fffffe00d128c000
      PC is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
      LR is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
      ...
      [<fffffc00082b4280>] __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
      [<fffffc00082cdc30>] filldir64+0x158/0x1a0
      [<fffffc0000f327e8>] __fat_readdir+0x4a0/0x558 [fat]
      [<fffffc0000f328d4>] fat_readdir+0x34/0x40 [fat]
      [<fffffc00082cd8f8>] iterate_dir+0x190/0x1e0
      [<fffffc00082cde58>] SyS_getdents64+0x88/0x120
      [<fffffc0008082c70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
      
      fffffc0000f3b1a8 is a module address. Modules may have compiled in
      strings which could get copied to userspace. In this instance, it
      looks like "." which matches with a size of 1 byte. Extend the
      is_vmalloc_addr check to be is_vmalloc_or_module_addr to cover
      all possible cases.
      Signed-off-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      aa4f0601
    • J
      fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data · df04abfd
      Jiri Olsa 提交于
      We hit hardened usercopy feature check for kernel text access by reading
      kcore file:
      
        usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffffffff8179a01f (<kernel text>) (4065 bytes)
        kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!
      
      Bypassing this check for kcore by adding bounce buffer for ktext data.
      Reported-by: NSteve Best <sbest@redhat.com>
      Fixes: f5509cc1 ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
      Suggested-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      df04abfd
    • J
      fs/proc/kcore.c: Make bounce buffer global for read · f5beeb18
      Jiri Olsa 提交于
      Next patch adds bounce buffer for ktext area, so it's
      convenient to have single bounce buffer for both
      vmalloc/module and ktext cases.
      Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      f5beeb18
  3. 20 9月, 2016 25 次提交
  4. 19 9月, 2016 2 次提交