The cost is the the same and this removes the need
to worry about complications that come from de_thread
and group_leader changing.

__task_pid_nr_ns has been updated to take advantage of this change.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.

To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.

Fixes: 712f4aad ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: NDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There are a mix of function prototypes with and without extern
in the kernel sources.  Standardize on not using extern for
function prototypes.

Function prototypes don't need to be written with extern.
extern is assumed by the compiler.  Its use is as unnecessary as
using auto to declare automatic/local variables in a block.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 257b5358 ("scm: Capture the full credentials of the scm
sender") changed the credentials passing code to pass in the effective
uid/gid instead of the real uid/gid.

Obviously this doesn't matter most of the time (since normally they are
the same), but it results in differences for suid binaries when the wrong
uid/gid ends up being used.

This just undoes that (presumably unintentional) part of the commit.
Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Now that uids and gids are completely encapsulated in kuid_t
and kgid_t we no longer need to pass struct cred which allowed
us to test both the uid and the user namespace for equality.

Passing struct cred potentially allows us to pass the entire group
list as BSD does but I don't believe the cost of cache line misses
justifies retaining code for a future potential application.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

All callers provide a non-NULL scm argument.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Passing uids and gids on NETLINK_CB from a process in one user
namespace to a process in another user namespace can result in the
wrong uid or gid being presented to userspace.  Avoid that problem by
passing kuids and kgids instead.

- define struct scm_creds for use in scm_cookie and netlink_skb_parms
  that holds uid and gid information in kuid_t and kgid_t.

- Modify scm_set_cred to fill out scm_creds by heand instead of using
  cred_to_ucred to fill out struct ucred.  This conversion ensures
  userspace does not get incorrect uid or gid values to look at.

- Modify scm_recv to convert from struct scm_creds to struct ucred
  before copying credential values to userspace.

- Modify __scm_send to populate struct scm_creds on in the scm_cookie,
  instead of just copying struct ucred from userspace.

- Modify netlink_sendmsg to copy scm_creds instead of struct ucred
  into the NETLINK_CB.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug.  The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).

This bug was introduced in commit 16e57262
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)

This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.

Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.

With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek

This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

recursion in __scm_destroy() will be cut by delaying final fput()
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Since commit 7361c36c (af_unix: Allow credentials to work across
user and pid namespaces) af_unix performance dropped a lot.

This is because we now take a reference on pid and cred in each write(),
and release them in read(), usually done from another process,
eventually from another cpu. This triggers false sharing.

# Events: 154K cycles
#
# Overhead  Command       Shared Object        Symbol
# ........  .......  ..................  .........................
#
    10.40%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] put_pid
     8.60%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] unix_stream_recvmsg
     7.87%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] unix_stream_sendmsg
     6.11%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] do_raw_spin_lock
     4.95%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] unix_scm_to_skb
     4.87%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] pid_nr_ns
     4.34%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] cred_to_ucred
     2.39%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] unix_destruct_scm
     2.24%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] sub_preempt_count
     1.75%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] fget_light
     1.51%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k]
__mutex_lock_interruptible_slowpath
     1.42%  hackbench  [kernel.kallsyms]   [k] sock_alloc_send_pskb

This patch includes SCM_CREDENTIALS information in a af_unix message/skb
only if requested by the sender, [man 7 unix for details how to include
ancillary data using sendmsg() system call]

Note: This might break buggy applications that expected SCM_CREDENTIAL
from an unaware write() system call, and receiver not using SO_PASSCRED
socket option.

If SOCK_PASSCRED is set on source or destination socket, we still
include credentials for mere write() syscalls.

Performance boost in hackbench : more than 50% gain on a 16 thread
machine (2 quad-core cpus, 2 threads per core)

hackbench 20 thread 2000

4.228 sec instead of 9.102 sec
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This reverts commit 0856a304.

As requested by Eric Dumazet, it has various ref-counting
problems and has introduced regressions.  Eric will add
a more suitable version of this performance fix.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Patch series 109f6e39..7361c36c back in 2.6.36 added functionality to
allow credentials to work across pid namespaces for packets sent via
UNIX sockets.  However, the atomic reference counts on pid and
credentials caused plenty of cache bouncing when there are numerous
threads of the same pid sharing a UNIX socket.  This patch mitigates the
problem by eliminating extraneous reference counts on pid and
credentials on both send and receive path of UNIX sockets. I found a 2x
improvement in hackbench's threaded case.

On the receive path in unix_dgram_recvmsg, currently there is an
increment of reference count on pid and credentials in scm_set_cred.
Then there are two decrement of the reference counts.  Once in scm_recv
and once when skb_free_datagram call skb->destructor function
unix_destruct_scm.  One pair of increment and decrement of ref count on
pid and credentials can be eliminated from the receive path.  Until we
destroy the skb, we already set a reference when we created the skb on
the send side.

On the send path, there are two increments of ref count on pid and
credentials, once in scm_send and once in unix_scm_to_skb.  Then there
is a decrement of the reference counts in scm_destroy's call to
scm_destroy_cred at the end of unix_dgram_sendmsg functions.   One pair
of increment and decrement of the reference counts can be removed so we
only need to increment the ref counts once.

By incorporating these changes, for hackbench running on a 4 socket
NHM-EX machine with 40 cores, the execution of hackbench on
50 groups of 20 threads sped up by factor of 2.

Hackbench command used for testing:
./hackbench 50 thread 2000
Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Lower SCM_MAX_FD from 255 to 253 so that allocations for scm_fp_list are
halved. (commit f8d570a4 added two pointers in this structure)

scm_fp_dup() should not copy whole structure (and trigger kmemcheck
warnings), but only the used part. While we are at it, only allocate
needed size.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Start capturing not only the userspace pid, uid and gid values of the
sending process but also the struct pid and struct cred of the sending
process as well.

This is in preparation for properly supporting SCM_CREDENTIALS for
sockets that have different uid and/or pid namespaces at the different
ends.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Reorder the fields in scm_cookie so they pack better on 64bit.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This cleanup patch puts struct/union/enum opening braces,
in first line to ease grep games.

struct something
{

becomes :

struct something {
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch removes an unused member (seq) scm_cookie; besides initialized
to 0 in the header file, it is not used.
Signed-off-by: NRami Rosen <ramirose@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

__scm_destroy() walks the list of file descriptors in the scm_fp_list
pointed to by the scm_cookie argument.

Those, in turn, can close sockets and invoke __scm_destroy() again.

There is nothing which limits how deeply this can occur.

The idea for how to fix this is from Linus.  Basically, we do all of
the fput()s at the top level by collecting all of the scm_fp_list
objects hit by an fput().  Inside of the initial __scm_destroy() we
keep running the list until it is empty.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

__scm_destroy() walks the list of file descriptors in the scm_fp_list
pointed to by the scm_cookie argument.

Those, in turn, can close sockets and invoke __scm_destroy() again.

There is nothing which limits how deeply this can occur.

The idea for how to fix this is from Linus.  Basically, we do all of
the fput()s at the top level by collecting all of the scm_fp_list
objects hit by an fput().  Inside of the initial __scm_destroy() we
keep running the list until it is empty.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This is the largest patch in the set. Make all (I hope) the places where
the pid is shown to or get from user operate on the virtual pids.

The idea is:
 - all in-kernel data structures must store either struct pid itself
   or the pid's global nr, obtained with pid_nr() call;
 - when seeking the task from kernel code with the stored id one
   should use find_task_by_pid() call that works with global pids;
 - when showing pid's numerical value to the user the virtual one
   should be used, but however when one shows task's pid outside this
   task's namespace the global one is to be used;
 - when getting the pid from userspace one need to consider this as
   the virtual one and use appropriate task/pid-searching functions.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: nuther build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: yet nuther build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded casts]
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The OPEN_MAX constant is an arbitrary number with no useful relation to
anything.  Nothing should be using it.  SCM_MAX_FD is just an arbitrary
constant and it should be clear that its value is chosen in net/scm.h
and not actually derived from anything else meaningful in the system.
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>

This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the
original unix datagram getpeersec patch.  Instead of creating a
security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the
security context when the receiver requests it.

This new design requires modification of the current
unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,
secid_to_secctx and release_secctx.  The former retrieves the security
context and the latter releases it.  A hook is required for releasing
the security context because it is up to the security module to decide
how that's done.  In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree
operation.
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket.  The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.

Patch design and implementation:

The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets.  Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).  To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications.  We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NAcked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Instead of doing a memset then initialization of the fields of the scm
structure, just initialize all the members explicitly.  Prevent reloading
of current on x86 and x86-64 by storing the value in a local variable for
subsequent dereferences.  This is worth a ~7KB/s increase in af_unix
bandwidth.  Note that we avoid the issues surrounding potentially
uninitialized members of the ucred structure by constructing a struct
ucred instead of assigning the members individually, which forces the
compiler to zero any padding.

[ I modified the patch not to use the aggregate assignment since
  gcc-3.4.x and earlier cannot optimize that properly at all even
  though gcc-4.0.x and later can -DaveM ]
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin LaHaise <benjamin.c.lahaise@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!