- 23 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Liu Bo 提交于
Xfstests btrfs/011 complains about a deadlock warning, [ 1226.649039] ========================================================= [ 1226.649039] [ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ] [ 1226.649039] 4.1.0+ #270 Not tainted [ 1226.649039] --------------------------------------------------------- [ 1226.652955] kswapd0/46 just changed the state of lock: [ 1226.652955] (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.-.}, at: [<ffffffff81458735>] __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x45/0x1d0 [ 1226.652955] but this lock took another, RECLAIM_FS-unsafe lock in the past: [ 1226.652955] (&fs_info->dev_replace.lock){+.+.+.} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. [ 1226.652955] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1226.652955] Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> &found->groups_sem --> &fs_info->dev_replace.lock [ 1226.652955] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 1226.652955] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1226.652955] ---- ---- [ 1226.652955] lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.lock); [ 1226.652955] local_irq_disable(); [ 1226.652955] lock(&delayed_node->mutex); [ 1226.652955] lock(&found->groups_sem); [ 1226.652955] <Interrupt> [ 1226.652955] lock(&delayed_node->mutex); [ 1226.652955] *** DEADLOCK *** Commit 084b6e7c ("btrfs: Fix a lockdep warning when running xfstest.") tried to fix a similar one that has the exactly same warning, but with that, we still run to this. The above lock chain comes from btrfs_commit_transaction ->btrfs_run_delayed_items ... ->__btrfs_update_delayed_inode ... ->__btrfs_cow_block ... ->find_free_extent ->cache_block_group ->load_free_space_cache ->btrfs_readpages ->submit_one_bio ... ->__btrfs_map_block ->btrfs_dev_replace_lock However, with high memory pressure, tasks which hold dev_replace.lock can be interrupted by kswapd and then kswapd is intended to release memory occupied by superblock, inodes and dentries, where we may call evict_inode, and it comes to [ 1226.652955] [<ffffffff81458735>] __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x45/0x1d0 [ 1226.652955] [<ffffffff81459e74>] btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x24/0x30 [ 1226.652955] [<ffffffff8140c5fe>] btrfs_evict_inode+0x34e/0x700 delayed_node->mutex may be acquired in __btrfs_release_delayed_node(), and it leads to a ABBA deadlock. To fix this, we can use "blocking rwlock" used in the case of extent_buffer, but things are simpler here since we only needs read's spinlock to blocking lock. With this, btrfs/011 no more produces warnings in dmesg. Signed-off-by: NLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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- 11 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 David Sterba 提交于
The value of ctx->pos in the last readdir call is supposed to be set to INT_MAX due to 32bit compatibility, unless 'pos' is intentially set to a larger value, then it's LLONG_MAX. There's a report from PaX SIZE_OVERFLOW plugin that "ctx->pos++" overflows (https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=4284), on a 64bit arch, where the value is 0x7fffffffffffffff ie. LLONG_MAX before the increment. We can get to that situation like that: * emit all regular readdir entries * still in the same call to readdir, bump the last pos to INT_MAX * next call to readdir will not emit any entries, but will reach the bump code again, finds pos to be INT_MAX and sets it to LLONG_MAX Normally this is not a problem, but if we call readdir again, we'll find 'pos' set to LLONG_MAX and the unconditional increment will overflow. The report from Victor at (http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.file-systems.btrfs/49500) with debugging print shows that pattern: Overflow: e Overflow: 7fffffff Overflow: 7fffffffffffffff PAX: size overflow detected in function btrfs_real_readdir fs/btrfs/inode.c:5760 cicus.935_282 max, count: 9, decl: pos; num: 0; context: dir_context; CPU: 0 PID: 2630 Comm: polkitd Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec #1 Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. H81ND2H/H81ND2H, BIOS F3 08/11/2015 ffffffff81901608 0000000000000000 ffffffff819015e6 ffffc90004973d48 ffffffff81742f0f 0000000000000007 ffffffff81901608 ffffc90004973d78 ffffffff811cb706 0000000000000000 ffff8800d47359e0 ffffc90004973ed8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81742f0f>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x7f [<ffffffff811cb706>] report_size_overflow+0x36/0x40 [<ffffffff812ef0bc>] btrfs_real_readdir+0x69c/0x6d0 [<ffffffff811dafc8>] iterate_dir+0xa8/0x150 [<ffffffff811e6d8d>] ? __fget_light+0x2d/0x70 [<ffffffff811dba3a>] SyS_getdents+0xba/0x1c0 Overflow: 1a [<ffffffff811db070>] ? iterate_dir+0x150/0x150 [<ffffffff81749b69>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x83 The jump from 7fffffff to 7fffffffffffffff happens when new dir entries are not yet synced and are processed from the delayed list. Then the code could go to the bump section again even though it might not emit any new dir entries from the delayed list. The fix avoids entering the "bump" section again once we've finished emitting the entries, both for synced and delayed entries. References: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=4284Reported-by: NVictor <services@swwu.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Tested-by: NHolger Hoffstätte <holger.hoffstaette@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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- 08 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
Since the checksum function and the field are both __le32, don't perform endian conversion when comparing the two. This fixes mount failures on ppc64. Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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- 07 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Herton R. Krzesinski 提交于
Considering current pty code and multiple devpts instances, it's possible to umount a devpts file system while a program still has /dev/tty opened pointing to a previosuly closed pty pair in that instance. In the case all ptmx and pts/N files are closed, umount can be done. If the program closes /dev/tty after umount is done, devpts_kill_index will use now an invalid super_block, which was already destroyed in the umount operation after running ->kill_sb. This is another "use after free" type of issue, but now related to the allocated super_block instance. To avoid the problem (warning at ida_remove and potential crashes) for this specific case, I added two functions in devpts which grabs additional references to the super_block, which pty code now uses so it makes sure the super block structure is still valid until pty shutdown is done. I also moved the additional inode references to the same functions, which also covered similar case with inode being freed before /dev/tty final close/shutdown. Signed-off-by: NHerton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+ Reviewed-by: NPeter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 06 2月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Jason Baron 提交于
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for 4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter. This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases. For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do: wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait(). We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL* flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat __wait_queue_head for this. I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c), then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus, the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do so. Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup' thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads. However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be sufficient for the majority of use-cases. Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1 epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point. Signed-off-by: NJason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Tested-by: NMadars Vitolins <m@silodev.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Dmitry Monakhov 提交于
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 xuejiufei 提交于
When recovery master down, dlm_do_local_recovery_cleanup() only remove the $RECOVERY lock owned by dead node, but do not clear the refmap bit. Which will make umount thread falling in dead loop migrating $RECOVERY to the dead node. Signed-off-by: Nxuejiufei <xuejiufei@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
Previously the pfn_mkwrite() fault handler for raw block devices called bldev_dax_fault() -> __dax_fault() to do a full DAX page fault. Really what the pfn_mkwrite() fault handler needs to do is call dax_pfn_mkwrite() to make sure that the radix tree entry for the given PTE is marked as dirty so that a follow-up fsync or msync call will flush it durably to media. Fixes: 5a023cdb ("block: enable dax for raw block devices") Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 05 2月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
While doing some tests I ran into an hang on an extent buffer's rwlock that produced the following trace: [39389.800012] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#15 stuck for 22s! [fdm-stress:32166] [39389.800016] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#14 stuck for 22s! [fdm-stress:32165] [39389.800016] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_mod ppdev xor sha256_generic hmac raid6_pq drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq aes_x86_64 ablk_helper tpm_tis parport_pc i2c_core sg cryptd evdev psmouse lrw tpm parport gf128mul serio_raw pcspkr glue_helper processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [39389.800016] irq event stamp: 0 [39389.800016] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800016] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800016] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800016] softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800016] CPU: 14 PID: 32165 Comm: fdm-stress Not tainted 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [39389.800016] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [39389.800016] task: ffff880175b1ca40 ti: ffff8800a185c000 task.ti: ffff8800a185c000 [39389.800016] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810902af>] [<ffffffff810902af>] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x57/0x158 [39389.800016] RSP: 0018:ffff8800a185fb80 EFLAGS: 00000202 [39389.800016] RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff8801710c4e9c RCX: 0000000000000101 [39389.800016] RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 [39389.800016] RBP: ffff8800a185fb98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [39389.800016] R10: ffff8800a185fb68 R11: 6db6db6db6db6db7 R12: ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800016] R13: ffff880175b1ca40 R14: ffff8800a185fc10 R15: ffff880175b1ca40 [39389.800016] FS: 00007f6d37fff700(0000) GS:ffff8802be9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [39389.800016] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [39389.800016] CR2: 00007f6d300019b8 CR3: 0000000037c93000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [39389.800016] Stack: [39389.800016] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8801710c4e98 ffff880175b1ca40 ffff8800a185fbb0 [39389.800016] ffffffff81091e11 ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8800a185fbc8 ffffffff81091895 [39389.800016] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8800a185fbe8 ffffffff81486c5c ffffffffa067288c [39389.800016] Call Trace: [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81091e11>] queued_read_lock_slowpath+0x46/0x60 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81091895>] do_raw_read_lock+0x3e/0x41 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81486c5c>] _raw_read_lock+0x3d/0x44 [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa067288c>] ? btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x54/0x125 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa067288c>] btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x54/0x125 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0622ced>] ? btrfs_find_item+0xa7/0xd2 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa069363f>] btrfs_ref_to_path+0xd6/0x174 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0693730>] inode_to_path+0x53/0xa2 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0693e2e>] paths_from_inode+0x117/0x2ec [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0670cff>] btrfs_ioctl+0xd5b/0x2793 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81276727>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x15 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d [39389.800016] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [39389.800016] Code: b9 01 01 00 00 f7 c6 00 ff ff ff 75 32 83 fe 01 89 ca 89 f0 0f 45 d7 f0 0f b1 13 39 f0 74 04 89 c6 eb e2 ff ca 0f 84 fa 00 00 00 <8b> 03 84 c0 74 04 f3 90 eb f6 66 c7 03 01 00 e9 e6 00 00 00 e8 [39389.800012] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_mod ppdev xor sha256_generic hmac raid6_pq drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq aes_x86_64 ablk_helper tpm_tis parport_pc i2c_core sg cryptd evdev psmouse lrw tpm parport gf128mul serio_raw pcspkr glue_helper processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [39389.800012] irq event stamp: 0 [39389.800012] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800012] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800012] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800012] softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800012] CPU: 15 PID: 32166 Comm: fdm-stress Tainted: G L 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [39389.800012] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [39389.800012] task: ffff880179294380 ti: ffff880034a60000 task.ti: ffff880034a60000 [39389.800012] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81091e8d>] [<ffffffff81091e8d>] queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x62/0x72 [39389.800012] RSP: 0018:ffff880034a639f0 EFLAGS: 00000206 [39389.800012] RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff8801710c4e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 [39389.800012] RDX: 00000000000000ff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8801710c4e9c [39389.800012] RBP: ffff880034a639f8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [39389.800012] R10: ffff880034a639b0 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800012] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff880172cbc000 R15: ffff8801710c4e00 [39389.800012] FS: 00007f6d377fe700(0000) GS:ffff8802be9e0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [39389.800012] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [39389.800012] CR2: 00007f6d3d3c1000 CR3: 0000000037c93000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [39389.800012] Stack: [39389.800012] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff880034a63a10 ffffffff81091963 ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800012] ffff880034a63a30 ffffffff81486f1b ffffffffa0672cb3 ffff8801710c4e00 [39389.800012] ffff880034a63a78 ffffffffa0672cb3 ffff8801710c4e00 ffff880034a63a58 [39389.800012] Call Trace: [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81091963>] do_raw_write_lock+0x72/0x8c [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81486f1b>] _raw_write_lock+0x3a/0x41 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0672cb3>] ? btrfs_tree_lock+0x119/0x251 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0672cb3>] btrfs_tree_lock+0x119/0x251 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061aeba>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x5d [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061ce13>] ? btrfs_root_node+0xda/0xe6 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061ce83>] btrfs_lock_root_node+0x22/0x42 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa062046b>] btrfs_search_slot+0x1b8/0x758 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff810fc6b0>] ? time_hardirqs_on+0x15/0x28 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa06365db>] btrfs_lookup_inode+0x31/0x95 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108d62f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8148482b>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x397/0x3bc [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa068821b>] __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x59/0x1c0 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa068858e>] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x194/0x5aa [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81486ab7>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x31/0x44 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0688a48>] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0xa4/0x15c [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0688d62>] btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x11/0x13 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa064048e>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x234/0x96e [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0618d10>] btrfs_sync_fs+0x145/0x1ad [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0671176>] btrfs_ioctl+0x11d2/0x2793 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81140261>] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0xa7 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81140261>] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0xa7 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d [39389.800012] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [39389.800012] Code: f0 0f b1 13 85 c0 75 ef eb 2a f3 90 8a 03 84 c0 75 f8 f0 0f b0 13 84 c0 75 f0 ba ff 00 00 00 eb 0a f0 0f b1 13 ff c8 74 0b f3 90 <8b> 03 83 f8 01 75 f7 eb ed c6 43 04 00 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 This happens because in the code path executed by the inode_paths ioctl we end up nesting two calls to read lock a leaf's rwlock when after the first call to read_lock() and before the second call to read_lock(), another task (running the delayed items as part of a transaction commit) has already called write_lock() against the leaf's rwlock. This situation is illustrated by the following diagram: Task A Task B btrfs_ref_to_path() btrfs_commit_transaction() read_lock(&eb->lock); btrfs_run_delayed_items() __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items() __btrfs_update_delayed_inode() btrfs_lookup_inode() write_lock(&eb->lock); --> task waits for lock read_lock(&eb->lock); --> makes this task hang forever (and task B too of course) So fix this by avoiding doing the nested read lock, which is easily avoidable. This issue does not happen if task B calls write_lock() after task A does the second call to read_lock(), however there does not seem to exist anything in the documentation that mentions what is the expected behaviour for recursive locking of rwlocks (leaving the idea that doing so is not a good usage of rwlocks). Also, as a side effect necessary for this fix, make sure we do not needlessly read lock extent buffers when the input path has skip_locking set (used when called from send). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
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由 Yan, Zheng 提交于
Signed-off-by: NYan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
ceph_osdc_alloc_request() returns NULL on error, it never returns error pointers. Fixes: 5be0389d ('ceph: re-send AIO write request when getting -EOLDSNAP error') Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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- 04 2月, 2016 6 次提交
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
Not needed after the previous patch named "Btrfs: fix page reading in extent_same ioctl leading to csum errors". Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
In the extent_same ioctl, we were grabbing the pages (locked) and attempting to read them without bothering about any concurrent IO against them. That is, we were not checking for any ongoing ordered extents nor waiting for them to complete, which leads to a race where the extent_same() code gets a checksum verification error when it reads the pages, producing a message like the following in dmesg and making the operation fail to user space with -ENOMEM: [18990.161265] BTRFS warning (device sdc): csum failed ino 259 off 495616 csum 685204116 expected csum 1515870868 Fix this by using btrfs_readpage() for reading the pages instead of extent_read_full_page_nolock(), which waits for any concurrent ordered extents to complete and locks the io range. Also do better error handling and don't treat all failures as -ENOMEM, as that's clearly misleasing, becoming identical to the checks and operation of prepare_uptodate_page(). The use of extent_read_full_page_nolock() was required before commit f4414602 ("btrfs: fix deadlock with extent-same and readpage"), as we had the range locked in an inode's io tree before attempting to read the pages. Fixes: f4414602 ("btrfs: fix deadlock with extent-same and readpage") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+ Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
In the extent_same ioctl we are getting the pages for the source and target ranges and unlocking them immediately after, which is incorrect because later we attempt to map them (with kmap_atomic) and access their contents at btrfs_cmp_data(). When we do such access the pages might have been relocated or removed from memory, which leads to an invalid memory access. This issue is detected on a kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y which produces a trace like the following: 186736.677437] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [186736.680382] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_flakey dm_mod ppdev xor raid6_pq sha256_generic hmac drbg ansi_cprng acpi_cpufreq evdev sg aesni_intel aes_x86_64 parport_pc ablk_helper tpm_tis psmouse parport i2c_piix4 tpm cryptd i2c_core lrw processor button serio_raw pcspkr gf128mul glue_helper loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [186736.681319] CPU: 13 PID: 10222 Comm: duperemove Tainted: G W 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [186736.681319] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [186736.681319] task: ffff880132600400 ti: ffff880362284000 task.ti: ffff880362284000 [186736.681319] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81264d00>] [<ffffffff81264d00>] memcmp+0xb/0x22 [186736.681319] RSP: 0018:ffff880362287d70 EFLAGS: 00010287 [186736.681319] RAX: 000002c002468acf RBX: 0000000012345678 RCX: 0000000000000000 [186736.681319] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 0005d129c5cf9000 RDI: 0005d129c5cf9000 [186736.681319] RBP: ffff880362287d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000001000 [186736.681319] R10: ffff880000000000 R11: 0000000000000476 R12: 0000000000001000 [186736.681319] R13: ffff8802f91d4c88 R14: ffff8801f2a77830 R15: ffff880352e83e40 [186736.681319] FS: 00007f27b37fe700(0000) GS:ffff88043dda0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [186736.681319] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [186736.681319] CR2: 00007f27a406a000 CR3: 0000000217421000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [186736.681319] Stack: [186736.681319] ffff880362287ea0 ffffffffa048d0bd 000000000009f000 0000000000001000 [186736.681319] 0100000000000000 ffff8801f2a77850 ffff8802f91d49b0 ffff880132600400 [186736.681319] 00000000000004f8 ffff8801c1efbe41 0000000000000000 0000000000000038 [186736.681319] Call Trace: [186736.681319] [<ffffffffa048d0bd>] btrfs_ioctl+0x24cb/0x2731 [btrfs] [186736.681319] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [186736.681319] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d [186736.681319] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea [186736.681319] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71 [186736.681319] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79 [186736.681319] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [186736.681319] Code: 0a 3c 6e 74 0d 3c 79 74 04 3c 59 75 0c c6 06 01 eb 03 c6 06 00 31 c0 eb 05 b8 ea ff ff ff 5d c3 55 31 c9 48 89 e5 48 39 d1 74 13 <0f> b6 04 0f 44 0f b6 04 0e 48 ff c1 44 29 c0 74 ea eb 02 31 c0 (gdb) list *(btrfs_ioctl+0x24cb) 0x5e0e1 is in btrfs_ioctl (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2972). 2967 dst_addr = kmap_atomic(dst_page); 2968 2969 flush_dcache_page(src_page); 2970 flush_dcache_page(dst_page); 2971 2972 if (memcmp(addr, dst_addr, cmp_len)) 2973 ret = BTRFS_SAME_DATA_DIFFERS; 2974 2975 kunmap_atomic(addr); 2976 kunmap_atomic(dst_addr); So fix this by making sure we keep the pages locked and respect the same locking order as everywhere else: get and lock the pages first and then lock the range in the inode's io tree (like for example at __btrfs_buffered_write() and extent_readpages()). If an ordered extent is found after locking the range in the io tree, unlock the range, unlock the pages, wait for the ordered extent to complete and repeat the entire locking process until no overlapping ordered extents are found. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+ Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
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由 Johannes Weiner 提交于
Commit b7643757 ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc/<pid>/maps") added [stack:TID] annotation to /proc/<pid>/maps. Finding the task of a stack VMA requires walking the entire thread list, turning this into quadratic behavior: a thousand threads means a thousand stacks, so the rendering of /proc/<pid>/maps needs to look at a million combinations. The cost is not in proportion to the usefulness as described in the patch. Drop the [stack:TID] annotation to make /proc/<pid>/maps (and /proc/<pid>/numa_maps) usable again for higher thread counts. The [stack] annotation inside /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/maps is retained, as identifying the stack VMA there is an O(1) operation. Siddesh said: "The end users needed a way to identify thread stacks programmatically and there wasn't a way to do that. I'm afraid I no longer remember (or have access to the resources that would aid my memory since I changed employers) the details of their requirement. However, I did do this on my own time because I thought it was an interesting project for me and nobody really gave any feedback then as to its utility, so as far as I am concerned you could roll back the main thread maps information since the information is available in the thread-specific files" Signed-off-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Michael Holzheu 提交于
When working with hugetlbfs ptes (which are actually pmds) is not valid to directly use pte functions like pte_present() because the hardware bit layout of pmds and ptes can be different. This is the case on s390. Therefore we have to convert the hugetlbfs ptes first into a valid pte encoding with huge_ptep_get(). Currently the /proc/<pid>/numa_maps code uses hugetlbfs ptes without huge_ptep_get(). On s390 this leads to the following two problems: 1) The pte_present() function returns false (instead of true) for PROT_NONE hugetlb ptes. Therefore PROT_NONE vmas are missing completely in the "numa_maps" output. 2) The pte_dirty() function always returns false for all hugetlb ptes. Therefore these pages are reported as "mapped=xxx" instead of "dirty=xxx". Therefore use huge_ptep_get() to correctly convert the hugetlb ptes. Signed-off-by: NMichael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NGerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.3+] Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Joseph Qi 提交于
o2hb_region_release currently doesn't free o2hb_debug_buf hr_db_elapsed_time and hr_db_pinned malloced in o2hb_debug_create. Also we should call debugfs_remove before freeing its data, to prevent the risk accessing debugfs rightly after its data has been freed. Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJiufei Xue <xuejiufei@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 31 1月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Dan Williams 提交于
Avoid populating pagecache when the block device is in DAX mode. Otherwise these page cache entries collide with the fsync/msync implementation and break data durability guarantees. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: NMatthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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由 Dan Williams 提交于
Dynamically enabling DAX requires that the page cache first be flushed and invalidated. This must occur atomically with the change of DAX mode otherwise we confuse the fsync/msync tracking and violate data durability guarantees. Eliminate the possibilty of DAX-disabled to DAX-enabled transitions for now and revisit this for the next cycle. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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- 30 1月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Chris Mason 提交于
This reverts commit 14e46e04. This ends up doing sysfs operations from deep in balance (where we should be GFP_NOFS) and under heavy balance load, we're making races against sysfs internals. Revert it for now while we figure things out. Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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- 28 1月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN_BEFORE_CLOSE is being used to signal that a layoutreturn is needed, either due to a layout recall or to a layout error. Rename it to NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN_REQUESTED in order to clarify its purpose. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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- 27 1月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Marcel Holtmann 提交于
The HCIUARTGETDEVICE, HCIUARTSETFLAGS and HCIUARTGETFLAGS ioctl are missing the COMPATIBLE_IOCTL declaration. Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
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由 Chris Mason 提交于
This was copied incorrectly from the __vmalloc call. Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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由 David Sterba 提交于
If the mount phase is not finished, we can't update the sysfs files. Reported-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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由 Trond Myklebust 提交于
The layoutreturn code currently relies on pnfs_put_lseg() to initiate the RPC call when conditions are right. A problem arises when we want to free the layout segment from inside an inode->i_lock section (e.g. in pnfs_clear_request_commit()), since we cannot sleep. The workaround is to move the actual call to pnfs_send_layoutreturn() to pnfs_put_layout_hdr(), which doesn't have this restriction. Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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- 26 1月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 David Sterba 提交于
This reverts commit 69624913. The cleaner thread can block freezing when there's a snapshot cleaning in progress and the other threads get suspended first. From the logs provided by Martin we're waiting for reading extent pages: kernel: PM: Syncing filesystems ... done. kernel: Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.015 seconds) done. kernel: Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... kernel: Freezing of tasks failed after 20.003 seconds (1 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0): kernel: btrfs-cleaner D ffff88033dd13bc0 0 152 2 0x00000000 kernel: ffff88032ebc2e00 ffff88032e750000 ffff88032e74fa50 7fffffffffffffff kernel: ffffffff814a58df 0000000000000002 ffffea000934d580 ffffffff814a5451 kernel: 7fffffffffffffff ffffffff814a6e8f 0000000000000000 0000000000000020 kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<ffffffff814a58df>] ? bit_wait+0x2c/0x2c kernel: [<ffffffff814a5451>] ? schedule+0x6f/0x7c kernel: [<ffffffff814a6e8f>] ? schedule_timeout+0x2f/0xd8 kernel: [<ffffffff81076f94>] ? timekeeping_get_ns+0xa/0x2e kernel: [<ffffffff81077603>] ? ktime_get+0x36/0x44 kernel: [<ffffffff814a4f6c>] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x94/0xf2 kernel: [<ffffffff814a4f6c>] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x94/0xf2 kernel: [<ffffffff814a590b>] ? bit_wait_io+0x2c/0x30 kernel: [<ffffffff814a5694>] ? __wait_on_bit+0x41/0x73 kernel: [<ffffffff8109eba8>] ? wait_on_page_bit+0x6d/0x72 kernel: [<ffffffff8105d718>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x2a/0x2a kernel: [<ffffffff811a02d7>] ? read_extent_buffer_pages+0x1bd/0x203 kernel: [<ffffffff8117d9e9>] ? free_root_pointers+0x4c/0x4c kernel: [<ffffffff8117e831>] ? btree_read_extent_buffer_pages.constprop.57+0x5a/0xe9 kernel: [<ffffffff8117f4f3>] ? read_tree_block+0x2d/0x45 kernel: [<ffffffff8116782a>] ? read_block_for_search.isra.34+0x22a/0x26b kernel: [<ffffffff811656c3>] ? btrfs_set_path_blocking+0x1e/0x4a kernel: [<ffffffff8116919b>] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x648/0x736 kernel: [<ffffffff81170559>] ? btrfs_lookup_extent_info+0xb7/0x2c7 kernel: [<ffffffff81170ee5>] ? walk_down_proc+0x9c/0x1ae kernel: [<ffffffff81171c9d>] ? walk_down_tree+0x40/0xa4 kernel: [<ffffffff8117375f>] ? btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x2da/0x664 kernel: [<ffffffff8104ff21>] ? finish_task_switch+0x126/0x167 kernel: [<ffffffff811850f8>] ? btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0xa6/0xb0 kernel: [<ffffffff8117eaba>] ? cleaner_kthread+0x13e/0x17b kernel: [<ffffffff8117e97c>] ? btrfs_item_end+0x33/0x33 kernel: [<ffffffff8104d256>] ? kthread+0x95/0x9d kernel: [<ffffffff8104d1c1>] ? kthread_parkme+0x16/0x16 kernel: [<ffffffff814a7b5f>] ? ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel: [<ffffffff8104d1c1>] ? kthread_parkme+0x16/0x16 As this affects a released kernel (4.4) we need a minimal fix for stable kernels. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108361Reported-by: NMartin Ziegler <ziegler@uni-freiburg.de> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4 CC: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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由 Qu Wenruo 提交于
Parameter of trace_btrfs_work_queued() can be freed in its workqueue. So no one use use that pointer after queue_work(). Fix the user-after-free bug by move the trace line before queue_work(). Reported-by: NDave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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由 Filipe Manana 提交于
An fsync, using the fast path, can race with a concurrent lockless direct IO write and end up logging a file extent item that points to an extent that wasn't written to yet. This is because the fast fsync path collects ordered extents into a local list and then collects all the new extent maps to log file extent items based on them, while the direct IO write path creates the new extent map before it creates the corresponding ordered extent (and submitting the respective bio(s)). So fix this by making the direct IO write path create ordered extents before the extent maps and make the fast fsync path collect any new ordered extents after it collects the extent maps. Note that making the fsync handler call inode_dio_wait() (after acquiring the inode's i_mutex) would not work and lead to a deadlock when doing AIO, as through AIO we end up in a path where the fsync handler is called (through dio_aio_complete_work() -> dio_complete() -> vfs_fsync_range()) before the inode's dio counter is decremented (inode_dio_wait() waits for this counter to have a value of zero). Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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- 25 1月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 David Sterba 提交于
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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由 David Sterba 提交于
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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- 23 1月, 2016 10 次提交
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
If the program running dedupe receives a fatal signal during the dedupe loop, we should bail out to avoid tying up the system. Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
There are many locations that do if (memory_was_allocated_by_vmalloc) vfree(ptr); else kfree(ptr); but kvfree() can handle both kmalloc()ed memory and vmalloc()ed memory using is_vmalloc_addr(). Unless callers have special reasons, we can replace this branch with kvfree(). Please check and reply if you found problems. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.com> Acked-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: NAndreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@intel.com> Acked-by: N"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Oleg Drokin <oleg.drokin@intel.com> Cc: Boris Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
Previously in DAX we assumed that calls to get_block() would set bh.b_bdev, and we would then use that value even in error cases for debugging. This caused a NULL pointer dereference in __dax_dbg() which was fixed by a previous commit, but that commit only changed the one place where we were hitting an error. Instead, update dax.c so that we always initialize bh.b_bdev as best we can based on the information that DAX has. get_block() may or may not update to a new value, but this at least lets us get something helpful from bh.b_bdev for error messages and not have to worry about whether it was set by get_block() or not. Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
To properly support the new DAX fsync/msync infrastructure filesystems need to call dax_pfn_mkwrite() so that DAX can track when user pages are dirtied. Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
To properly support the new DAX fsync/msync infrastructure filesystems need to call dax_pfn_mkwrite() so that DAX can track when user pages are dirtied. Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
To properly support the new DAX fsync/msync infrastructure filesystems need to call dax_pfn_mkwrite() so that DAX can track when user pages are dirtied. Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
To properly handle fsync/msync in an efficient way DAX needs to track dirty pages so it is able to flush them durably to media on demand. The tracking of dirty pages is done via the radix tree in struct address_space. This radix tree is already used by the page writeback infrastructure for tracking dirty pages associated with an open file, and it already has support for exceptional (non struct page*) entries. We build upon these features to add exceptional entries to the radix tree for DAX dirty PMD or PTE pages at fault time. [dan.j.williams@intel.com: fix dax_pmd_dbg build warning] Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
Add support for tracking dirty DAX entries in the struct address_space radix tree. This tree is already used for dirty page writeback, and it already supports the use of exceptional (non struct page*) entries. In order to properly track dirty DAX pages we will insert new exceptional entries into the radix tree that represent dirty DAX PTE or PMD pages. These exceptional entries will also contain the writeback addresses for the PTE or PMD faults that we can use at fsync/msync time. There are currently two types of exceptional entries (shmem and shadow) that can be placed into the radix tree, and this adds a third. We rely on the fact that only one type of exceptional entry can be found in a given radix tree based on its usage. This happens for free with DAX vs shmem but we explicitly prevent shadow entries from being added to radix trees for DAX mappings. The only shadow entries that would be generated for DAX radix trees would be to track zero page mappings that were created for holes. These pages would receive minimal benefit from having shadow entries, and the choice to have only one type of exceptional entry in a given radix tree makes the logic simpler both in clear_exceptional_entry() and in the rest of DAX. Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
When we get a DAX PMD fault for a write it is possible that there could be some number of 4k zero pages already present for the same range that were inserted to service reads from a hole. These 4k zero pages need to be unmapped from the VMAs and removed from the struct address_space radix tree before the real DAX PMD entry can be inserted. For PTE faults this same use case also exists and is handled by a combination of unmap_mapping_range() to unmap the VMAs and delete_from_page_cache() to remove the page from the address_space radix tree. For PMD faults we do have a call to unmap_mapping_range() (protected by a buffer_new() check), but nothing clears out the radix tree entry. The buffer_new() check is also incorrect as the current ext4 and XFS filesystem code will never return a buffer_head with BH_New set, even when allocating new blocks over a hole. Instead the filesystem will zero the blocks manually and return a buffer_head with only BH_Mapped set. Fix this situation by removing the buffer_new() check and adding a call to truncate_inode_pages_range() to clear out the radix tree entries before we insert the DAX PMD. Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Tested-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ross Zwisler 提交于
In __dax_pmd_fault() we currently assume that get_block() will always set bh.b_bdev and we unconditionally dereference it in __dax_dbg(). This assumption isn't always true - when called for reads of holes ext4_dax_mmap_get_block() returns a buffer head where bh->b_bdev is never set. I hit this BUG while testing the DAX PMD fault path. Instead, initialize bh.b_bdev before passing bh into get_block(). It is possible that the filesystem's get_block() will update bh.b_bdev, and this is fine - we just want to initialize bh.b_bdev to something reasonable so that the calls to __dax_dbg() work and print something useful. Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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