1. 07 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  2. 28 2月, 2013 1 次提交
    • S
      hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators · b67bfe0d
      Sasha Levin 提交于
      I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived
      
              list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)
      
      The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter:
      
              hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member)
      
      Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only
      they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking
      exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate.
      
      Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required:
      
       - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h
       - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones.
       - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this
       was modified to use 'obj->member' instead.
       - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator
       properly, so those had to be fixed up manually.
      
      The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here:
      
      @@
      iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host;
      
      type T;
      expression a,c,d,e;
      identifier b;
      statement S;
      @@
      
      -T b;
          <+... when != b
      (
      hlist_for_each_entry(a,
      - b,
      c, d) S
      |
      hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      hlist_for_each_entry_from(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a,
      - b,
      c, d) S
      |
      hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a,
      - b,
      c, d) S
      |
      hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      for_each_busy_worker(a, c,
      - b,
      d) S
      |
      ax25_uid_for_each(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      ax25_for_each(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      sctp_for_each_hentry(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      sk_for_each(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      sk_for_each_rcu(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      sk_for_each_from
      -(a, b)
      +(a)
      S
      + sk_for_each_from(a) S
      |
      sk_for_each_safe(a,
      - b,
      c, d) S
      |
      sk_for_each_bound(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a,
      - b,
      c, d, e) S
      |
      hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      nr_neigh_for_each(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a,
      - b,
      c, d) S
      |
      nr_node_for_each(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      nr_node_for_each_safe(a,
      - b,
      c, d) S
      |
      - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S
      + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S
      |
      - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S
      + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S
      |
      for_each_host(a,
      - b,
      c) S
      |
      for_each_host_safe(a,
      - b,
      c, d) S
      |
      for_each_mesh_entry(a,
      - b,
      c, d) S
      )
          ...+>
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings]
      [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes]
      Tested-by: NPeter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
      Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
      Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
      Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b67bfe0d
  3. 23 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  4. 13 2月, 2013 4 次提交
  5. 06 12月, 2012 1 次提交
  6. 29 9月, 2012 1 次提交
  7. 25 9月, 2012 7 次提交
  8. 20 8月, 2012 1 次提交
  9. 28 7月, 2012 3 次提交
  10. 25 7月, 2012 3 次提交
  11. 24 7月, 2012 1 次提交
  12. 14 7月, 2012 1 次提交
  13. 27 2月, 2012 1 次提交
    • P
      CIFS: Fix mkdir/rmdir bug for the non-POSIX case · 6de2ce42
      Pavel Shilovsky 提交于
      Currently we do inc/drop_nlink for a parent directory for every
      mkdir/rmdir calls. That's wrong when Unix extensions are disabled
      because in this case a server doesn't follow the same semantic and
      returns the old value on the next QueryInfo request. As the result,
      we update our value with the server one and then decrement it on
      every rmdir call - go to negative nlink values.
      
      Fix this by removing inc/drop_nlink for the parent directory from
      mkdir/rmdir, setting it for a revalidation and ignoring NumberOfLinks
      for directories when Unix extensions are disabled.
      Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
      Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
      6de2ce42
  14. 04 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  15. 02 11月, 2011 1 次提交
  16. 23 10月, 2011 1 次提交
  17. 17 10月, 2011 1 次提交
    • S
      cifs: Call id to SID mapping functions to change owner/group (try #4 repost) · a5ff3769
      Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
      Now build security descriptor to change either owner or group at the
      server.  Initially security descriptor was built to change only
      (D)ACL, that functionality has been extended.
      
      When either an Owner or a Group of a file object at the server is changed,
      rest of security descriptor remains same (DACL etc.).
      
      To set security descriptor, it is necessary to open that file
      with permission bits of either WRITE_DAC if DACL is being modified or
      WRITE_OWNER (Take Ownership) if Owner or Group is being changed.
      
      It is the server that decides whether a set security descriptor with
      either owner or group change succeeds or not.
      Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
      a5ff3769
  18. 05 8月, 2011 1 次提交
  19. 27 5月, 2011 4 次提交
  20. 26 5月, 2011 3 次提交
  21. 21 5月, 2011 1 次提交
  22. 19 5月, 2011 1 次提交