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  1. 28 5月, 2020 14 次提交
    • J
      mm: make do_madvise() available internally · 724746b1
      由 Jens Axboe 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit db08ca25253d56f1f76eb4b3fe32a7ac1fbab741 upstream.

This is in preparation for enabling this functionality through io_uring.
Add a helper that is just exporting what sys_madvise() does, and have the
system call use it.

No functional changes in this patch.
Reviewed-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      724746b1
    • R
      percpu_ref: release percpu memory early without PERCPU_REF_ALLOW_REINIT · 31fafee5
      由 Roman Gushchin 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit 7d9ab9b6adffd9c474c1274acb5f6208f9a09cf3 upstream.

Release percpu memory after finishing the switch to the atomic mode
if only PERCPU_REF_ALLOW_REINIT isn't set.
Signed-off-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      31fafee5
    • R
      percpu_ref: introduce PERCPU_REF_ALLOW_REINIT flag · 02f53f5e
      由 Roman Gushchin 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit 09ed79d6d75f06cc963a78f25463251b0a758dc7 upstream.

In most cases percpu reference counters are not switched to the
percpu mode after they reach the atomic mode. Some obvious exceptions
are reference counters which are initialized into the atomic
mode (using PERCPU_REF_INIT_ATOMIC and PERCPU_REF_INIT_DEAD flags),
and there are few other exceptions.

But in most cases there is no way back, and once the reference counter
is switched to the atomic mode, there is no reason to wait for
percpu_ref_exit() to release the percpu memory. Of course, the size
of a single counter is not so big, but because it can pin the whole
percpu block in memory, the memory footprint can be noticeable
(e.g. on my 32 CPUs machine a percpu block is 8Mb large).

To make releasing of the percpu memory as early as possible, let's
introduce the PERCPU_REF_ALLOW_REINIT flag with the following semantics:
it has to be set in order to switch a percpu reference counter to the
percpu mode after the initialization. PERCPU_REF_INIT_ATOMIC and
PERCPU_REF_INIT_DEAD flags will implicitly assume PERCPU_REF_ALLOW_REINIT.

This patch doesn't introduce any functional change to avoid any
regressions. It will be done later in the patchset after adjusting
all call sites, which are reviving percpu counters.
Signed-off-by: NRoman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      02f53f5e
    • T
      binder: fix use-after-free due to ksys_close() during fdget() · b0775049
      由 Todd Kjos 提交于 
      to #26323588

Cherry-pick from commit 80cd795630d6526ba729a089a435bf74a57af927 upstream.

44d8047f1d8 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")
exposed a pre-existing issue in the binder driver.

fdget() is used in ksys_ioctl() as a performance optimization.
One of the rules associated with fdget() is that ksys_close() must
not be called between the fdget() and the fdput(). There is a case
where this requirement is not met in the binder driver which results
in the reference count dropping to 0 when the device is still in
use. This can result in use-after-free or other issues.

If userpace has passed a file-descriptor for the binder driver using
a BINDER_TYPE_FDA object, then kys_close() is called on it when
handling a binder_ioctl(BC_FREE_BUFFER) command. This violates
the assumptions for using fdget().

The problem is fixed by deferring the close using task_work_add(). A
new variant of __close_fd() was created that returns a struct file
with a reference. The fput() is deferred instead of using ksys_close().

Fixes: 44d8047f1d87a ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")
Suggested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NTodd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      b0775049
    • A
      open: introduce openat2(2) syscall · 5b9369e5
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit fddb5d430ad9fa91b49b1d34d0202ffe2fa0e179 upstream.

/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].

This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).

Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.

In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.

Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).

/* Syscall Prototype. */
  /*
   * open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
   * clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
   * sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
   * extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
   * acting as a no-op default.
   */
  struct open_how { /* ... */ };

  int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
              struct open_how *how, size_t size);

/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:

  flags
    Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
    bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
    will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
    allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).

  mode
    The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

    Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

  resolve
    Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
    path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
    moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
    the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).

    RESOLVE_NO_XDEV       => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
    RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS   => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
    RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
    RESOLVE_BENEATH       => LOOKUP_BENEATH
    RESOLVE_IN_ROOT       => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT

open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.

Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).

After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.

/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.

In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).

/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).

Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.

Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).

[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014b ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVsSuggested-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      5b9369e5
    • A
      lib: introduce copy_struct_from_user() helper · 915ddf4c
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit f5a1a536fa14895ccff4e94e6a5af90901ce86aa upstream.

A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a
struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields
result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and
kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases).

While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only
one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for
(userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to
userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an
error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very
syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls
(a good example of this problem is [1]).

Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented
the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls
implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future
patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of
copy_struct_from_user().

Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and
various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage.

[1]: commit 1251201c0d34 ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and
     robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code")

[2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do
     similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2)
     always rejects differently-sized struct arguments.
Suggested-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.comSigned-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      915ddf4c
    • A
      namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution · 685c60ef
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit 8db52c7e7ee1bd861b6096fcafc0fe7d0f24a994 upstream.

/* Background. */
Container runtimes or other administrative management processes will
often interact with root filesystems while in the host mount namespace,
because the cost of doing a chroot(2) on every operation is too
prohibitive (especially in Go, which cannot safely use vfork). However,
a malicious program can trick the management process into doing
operations on files outside of the root filesystem through careful
crafting of symlinks.

Most programs that need this feature have attempted to make this process
safe, by doing all of the path resolution in userspace (with symlinks
being scoped to the root of the malicious root filesystem).
Unfortunately, this method is prone to foot-guns and usually such
implementations have subtle security bugs.

Thus, what userspace needs is a way to resolve a path as though it were
in a chroot(2) -- with all absolute symlinks being resolved relative to
the dirfd root (and ".." components being stuck under the dirfd root).
It is much simpler and more straight-forward to provide this
functionality in-kernel (because it can be done far more cheaply and
correctly).

More classical applications that also have this problem (which have
their own potentially buggy userspace path sanitisation code) include
web servers, archive extraction tools, network file servers, and so on.

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW),
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, any path component which attempts to cross the
starting point of the pathname lookup (the dirfd passed to openat) will
remain at the starting point. Thus, all absolute paths and symlinks will
be scoped within the starting point.

There is a slight change in behaviour regarding pathnames -- if the
pathname is absolute then the dirfd is still used as the root of
resolution of LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is specified (this is to avoid obvious
foot-guns, at the cost of a minor API inconsistency).

As with LOOKUP_BENEATH, Jann's security concern about ".."[1] applies to
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT -- therefore ".." resolution is blocked. This restriction
will be lifted in a future patch, but requires more work to ensure that
permitting ".." is done safely.

Magic-link jumps are also blocked, because they can beam the path lookup
across the starting point. It would be possible to detect and block
only the "bad" crossings with path_is_under() checks, but it's unclear
whether it makes sense to permit magic-links at all. However, userspace
is recommended to pass LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS if they want to ensure that
magic-link crossing is entirely disabled.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1jzNvxB+bfOBnERFGp=oMM0vHWuLD6EULmne3R6xa53w@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      685c60ef
    • A
      namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution · 31084d4b
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit adb21d2b526f7f196b2f3fdca97d80ba05dd14a0 upstream.

/* Background. */
There are many circumstances when userspace wants to resolve a path and
ensure that it doesn't go outside of a particular root directory during
resolution. Obvious examples include archive extraction tools, as well as
other security-conscious userspace programs. FreeBSD spun out O_BENEATH
from their Capsicum project[1,2], so it also seems reasonable to
implement similar functionality for Linux.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[3] (which was a
variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4], which in turn was
based on the Capsicum project[5]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_BENEATH will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW),
LOOKUP_BENEATH applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_BENEATH, any path component which attempts to "escape" the
starting point of the filesystem lookup (the dirfd passed to openat)
will yield -EXDEV. Thus, all absolute paths and symlinks are disallowed.

Due to a security concern brought up by Jann[6], any ".." path
components are also blocked. This restriction will be lifted in a future
patch, but requires more work to ensure that permitting ".." is done
safely.

Magic-link jumps are also blocked, because they can beam the path lookup
across the starting point. It would be possible to detect and block
only the "bad" crossings with path_is_under() checks, but it's unclear
whether it makes sense to permit magic-links at all. However, userspace
is recommended to pass LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS if they want to ensure that
magic-link crossing is entirely disabled.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_BENEATH is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2808
[2]: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17547
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170429220414.GT29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1415094884-18349-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1404124096-21445-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/
[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1jzNvxB+bfOBnERFGp=oMM0vHWuLD6EULmne3R6xa53w@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Suggested-by: NDavid Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Suggested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      31084d4b
    • A
      fs/namei.c: keep track of nd->root refcount status · 0a73d163
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit 84a2bd39405ffd5fa6d6d77e408c5b9210da98de upstream.

The rules for nd->root are messy:
	* if we have LOOKUP_ROOT, it doesn't contribute to refcounts
	* if we have LOOKUP_RCU, it doesn't contribute to refcounts
	* if nd->root.mnt is NULL, it doesn't contribute to refcounts
	* otherwise it does contribute

terminate_walk() needs to drop the references if they are contributing.
So everything else should be careful not to confuse it, leading to
rather convoluted code.

It's easier to keep track of whether we'd grabbed the reference(s)
explicitly.  Use a new flag for that.  Don't bother with zeroing
nd->root.mnt on unlazy failures and in terminate_walk - it's not
needed anymore (terminate_walk() won't care and the next path_init()
will zero nd->root in !LOOKUP_ROOT case anyway).

Resulting rules for nd->root refcounts are much simpler: they are
contributing iff LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED is set in nd->flags.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      0a73d163
    • A
      namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing · 38549ac1
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit 72ba29297e1439efaa54d9125b866ae9d15df339 upstream.

/* Background. */
The need to contain path operations within a mountpoint has been a
long-standing usecase that userspace has historically implemented
manually with liberal usage of stat(). find, rsync, tar and
many other programs implement these semantics -- but it'd be much
simpler to have a fool-proof way of refusing to open a path if it
crosses a mountpoint.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[1] (which was a
variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[2], which in turn was
based on the Capsicum project[3]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW),
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_NO_XDEV, any path component which crosses a mount-point
during path resolution (including "..") will yield an -EXDEV. Absolute
paths, absolute symlinks, and magic-links will only yield an -EXDEV if
the jump involved changing mount-points.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170429220414.GT29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1415094884-18349-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1404124096-21445-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/

Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Suggested-by: NDavid Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Suggested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      38549ac1
    • A
      namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution · 773b3516
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit 4b99d4996979d582859c5a49072e92de124bf691 upstream.

/* Background. */
There has always been a special class of symlink-like objects in procfs
(and a few other pseudo-filesystems) which allow for non-lexical
resolution of paths using nd_jump_link(). These "magic-links" do not
follow traditional mount namespace boundaries, and have been used
consistently in container escape attacks because they can be used to
trick unsuspecting privileged processes into resolving unexpected paths.

It is also non-trivial for userspace to unambiguously avoid resolving
magic-links, because they do not have a reliable indication that they
are a magic-link (in order to verify them you'd have to manually open
the path given by readlink(2) and then verify that the two file
descriptors reference the same underlying file, which is plagued with
possible race conditions or supplementary attack scenarios).

It would therefore be very helpful for userspace to be able to avoid
these symlinks easily, thus hopefully removing a tool from attackers'
toolboxes.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[1] (which was a
variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[2], which in turn was
based on the Capsicum project[3]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW),
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, any magic-link path component encountered
during path resolution will yield -ELOOP. The handling of ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW
for a trailing magic-link is identical to LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS.

LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170429220414.GT29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1415094884-18349-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1404124096-21445-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/

Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Suggested-by: NDavid Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Suggested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      773b3516
    • A
      namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution · 35e8a4ee
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit 278121417a72d87fb29dd8c48801f80821e8f75a upstream.

/* Background. */
Userspace cannot easily resolve a path without resolving symlinks, and
would have to manually resolve each path component with O_PATH and
O_NOFOLLOW. This is clearly inefficient, and can be fairly easy to screw
up (resulting in possible security bugs). Linus has mentioned that Git
has a particular need for this kind of flag[1]. It also resolves a
fairly long-standing perceived deficiency in O_NOFOLLOw -- that it only
blocks the opening of trailing symlinks.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[2] (which was a
variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[3], which in turn was
based on the Capsicum project[4]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW),
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS, any symlink path component encountered during
path resolution will yield -ELOOP. If the trailing component is a
symlink (and no other components were symlinks), then O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW
will not error out and will instead provide a handle to the trailing
symlink -- without resolving it.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyOKM7DW7+0sdDFKdZFXgptb5r1id9=Wvhd8AgSP7qjwQ@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170429220414.GT29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1415094884-18349-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1404124096-21445-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/

Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Suggested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      35e8a4ee
    • A
      namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors · b63f56c4
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit 1bc82070fa2763bdca626fa8bde72b35f11e8960 upstream.

In preparation for LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, it's necessary to add the
ability for nd_jump_link() to return an error which the corresponding
get_link() caller must propogate back up to the VFS.
Suggested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      b63f56c4
    • A
      nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int · 39f702ab
      由 Aleksa Sarai 提交于 
      to #26323588

commit ce623f89872df4253719be71531116751eeab85f upstream.

ns_get_path() and ns_get_path_cb() only ever return either NULL or an
ERR_PTR. It is far more idiomatic to simply return an integer, and it
makes all of the callers of ns_get_path() more straightforward to read.

Fixes: e149ed2b ("take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs")
Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      39f702ab
  3. 27 5月, 2020 3 次提交
  5. 08 5月, 2020 1 次提交
    • N
      mm: zero remaining unavailable struct pages · f8521831
      由 Naoya Horiguchi 提交于 
      to #26809468

commit 907ec5fca3dc38d37737de826f06f25b063aa08e upstream.

Patch series "mm: Fix for movable_node boot option", v3.

This patch series contains a fix for the movable_node boot option issue
which was introduced by commit 124049de ("x86/e820: put !E820_TYPE_RAM
regions into memblock.reserved").

The commit breaks the option because it changed the memory gap range to
reserved memblock.  So, the node is marked as Normal zone even if the SRAT
has Hot pluggable affinity.

First and second patch fix the original issue which the commit tried to
fix, then revert the commit.

This patch (of 3):

There is a kernel panic that is triggered when reading /proc/kpageflags on
the kernel booted with kernel parameter 'memmap=nn[KMG]!ss[KMG]':

  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffffffffffe
  PGD 9b20e067 P4D 9b20e067 PUD 9b210067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 2 PID: 1728 Comm: page-types Not tainted 4.17.0-rc6-mm1-v4.17-rc6-180605-0816-00236-g2dfb086ef02c+ #160
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.fc28 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:stable_page_flags+0x27/0x3c0
  Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 0f 84 a0 03 00 00 41 54 55 49 89 fc 53 48 8b 57 08 48 8b 2f 48 8d 42 ff 83 e2 01 48 0f 44 c7 <48> 8b 00 f6 c4 01 0f 84 10 03 00 00 31 db 49 8b 54 24 08 4c 89 e7
  RSP: 0018:ffffbbd44111fde0 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: fffffffffffffffe RBX: 00007fffffffeff9 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffffed1182fff5c0
  RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
  R10: ffffbbd44111fed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffed1182fff5c0
  R13: 00000000000bffd7 R14: 0000000002fff5c0 R15: ffffbbd44111ff10
  FS:  00007efc4335a500(0000) GS:ffff93a5bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: fffffffffffffffe CR3: 00000000b2a58000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
  Call Trace:
   kpageflags_read+0xc7/0x120
   proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x60
   __vfs_read+0x36/0x170
   vfs_read+0x89/0x130
   ksys_pread64+0x71/0x90
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  RIP: 0033:0x7efc42e75e23
  Code: 09 00 ba 9f 01 00 00 e8 ab 81 f4 ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 83 3d 29 0a 2d 00 00 75 13 49 89 ca b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 34 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 db d3 01 00 48 89 04 24

According to kernel bisection, this problem became visible due to commit
f7f99100 which changes how struct pages are initialized.

Memblock layout affects the pfn ranges covered by node/zone.  Consider
that we have a VM with 2 NUMA nodes and each node has 4GB memory, and the
default (no memmap= given) memblock layout is like below:

  MEMBLOCK configuration:
   memory size = 0x00000001fff75c00 reserved size = 0x000000000300c000
   memory.cnt  = 0x4
   memory[0x0]     [0x0000000000001000-0x000000000009efff], 0x000000000009e000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x1]     [0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffd6fff], 0x00000000bfed7000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x2]     [0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff], 0x0000000040000000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x3]     [0x0000000140000000-0x000000023fffffff], 0x0000000100000000 bytes on node 1 flags: 0x0
   ...

If you give memmap=1G!4G (so it just covers memory[0x2]),
the range [0x100000000-0x13fffffff] is gone:

  MEMBLOCK configuration:
   memory size = 0x00000001bff75c00 reserved size = 0x000000000300c000
   memory.cnt  = 0x3
   memory[0x0]     [0x0000000000001000-0x000000000009efff], 0x000000000009e000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x1]     [0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffd6fff], 0x00000000bfed7000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x2]     [0x0000000140000000-0x000000023fffffff], 0x0000000100000000 bytes on node 1 flags: 0x0
   ...

This causes shrinking node 0's pfn range because it is calculated by the
address range of memblock.memory.  So some of struct pages in the gap
range are left uninitialized.

We have a function zero_resv_unavail() which does zeroing the struct pages
outside memblock.memory, but currently it covers only the reserved
unavailable range (i.e.  memblock.memory && !memblock.reserved).  This
patch extends it to cover all unavailable range, which fixes the reported
issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002143821.5112-2-msys.mizuma@gmail.com
Fixes: f7f99100 ("mm: stop zeroing memory during allocation in vmemmap")
Signed-off-by: NNaoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by-by: NMasayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: NOscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Tested-by: NMasayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Tatashin <pavel.tatashin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NXu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      f8521831
  7. 06 5月, 2020 1 次提交
  9. 30 4月, 2020 3 次提交
  11. 29 4月, 2020 2 次提交
    • A
      new helper: lookup_positive_unlocked() · ec6880e8
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      fix #27211210

commit 6c2d4798a8d16cf4f3a28c3cd4af4f1dcbbb4d04 upstream.

Most of the callers of lookup_one_len_unlocked() treat negatives are
ERR_PTR(-ENOENT).  Provide a helper that would do just that.  Note
that a pinned positive dentry remains positive - it's ->d_inode is
stable, etc.; a pinned _negative_ dentry can become positive at any
point as long as you are not holding its parent at least shared.
So using lookup_one_len_unlocked() needs to be careful;
lookup_positive_unlocked() is safer and that's what the callers
end up open-coding anyway.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      ec6880e8
    • A
      fs/namei.c: pull positivity check into follow_managed() · da2c0773
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      fix #27211210

commit d41efb522e902364ab09c782d511c1bedc388ddd upstream.

There are 4 callers; two proceed to check if result is positive and
fail with ENOENT if it isn't; one (in handle_lookup_down()) is
guaranteed to yield positive and one (in lookup_fast()) is _preceded_
by positivity check.

However, follow_managed() on a negative dentry is a (fairly cheap)
no-op on anything other than autofs.  And negative autofs dentries
are never hashed, so lookup_fast() is not going to run into one
of those.  Moreover, successful follow_managed() on a _positive_
dentry never yields a negative one (and we significantly rely upon
that in callers of lookup_fast()).

In other words, we can easily transpose the positivity check and
the call of follow_managed() in lookup_fast().  And that allows
to fold the positivity check *into* follow_managed(), simplifying
life for the code downstream of its calls.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      da2c0773
  13. 28 4月, 2020 1 次提交
    • B
      x86/resctrl: Rename the config option INTEL_RDT to RESCTRL · fce127d5
      由 Babu Moger 提交于 
      to #26613714

commit 6fe07ce35e8ad870ba1cf82e0481e0fc0f526eff upstream.

The resource control feature is supported by both Intel and AMD. So,
rename CONFIG_INTEL_RDT to the vendor-neutral CONFIG_RESCTRL.

Now CONFIG_RESCTRL will be used for both Intel and AMD to enable
Resource Control support. Update the texts in config and condition
accordingly.

 [ bp: Simplify Kconfig text. ]
Signed-off-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Rian Hunter <rian@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121202811.4492-9-babu.moger@amd.com

[ Shile: fixed conflict in arch/x86/Kconfig ]
Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: NWANG Siyuan <Siyuan.Wang@amd.com>
Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      fce127d5
  15. 26 4月, 2020 1 次提交
  17. 24 4月, 2020 5 次提交
  19. 23 4月, 2020 3 次提交
  21. 22 4月, 2020 2 次提交
  23. 17 4月, 2020 2 次提交
  25. 16 4月, 2020 2 次提交