1. 04 7月, 2018 6 次提交
  2. 03 7月, 2018 6 次提交
    • P
      kthread, sched/core: Fix kthread_parkme() (again...) · 1cef1150
      Peter Zijlstra 提交于
      Gaurav reports that commit:
      
        85f1abe0 ("kthread, sched/wait: Fix kthread_parkme() completion issue")
      
      isn't working for him. Because of the following race:
      
      > controller Thread                               CPUHP Thread
      > takedown_cpu
      > kthread_park
      > kthread_parkme
      > Set KTHREAD_SHOULD_PARK
      >                                                 smpboot_thread_fn
      >                                                 set Task interruptible
      >
      >
      > wake_up_process
      >  if (!(p->state & state))
      >                 goto out;
      >
      >                                                 Kthread_parkme
      >                                                 SET TASK_PARKED
      >                                                 schedule
      >                                                 raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock)
      > ttwu_remote
      > waiting for __task_rq_lock
      >                                                 context_switch
      >
      >                                                 finish_lock_switch
      >
      >
      >
      >                                                 Case TASK_PARKED
      >                                                 kthread_park_complete
      >
      >
      > SET Running
      
      Furthermore, Oleg noticed that the whole scheduler TASK_PARKED
      handling is buggered because the TASK_DEAD thing is done with
      preemption disabled, the current code can still complete early on
      preemption :/
      
      So basically revert that earlier fix and go with a variant of the
      alternative mentioned in the commit. Promote TASK_PARKED to special
      state to avoid the store-store issue on task->state leading to the
      WARN in kthread_unpark() -> __kthread_bind().
      
      But in addition, add wait_task_inactive() to kthread_park() to ensure
      the task really is PARKED when we return from kthread_park(). This
      avoids the whole kthread still gets migrated nonsense -- although it
      would be really good to get this done differently.
      Reported-by: NGaurav Kohli <gkohli@codeaurora.org>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Fixes: 85f1abe0 ("kthread, sched/wait: Fix kthread_parkme() completion issue")
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      1cef1150
    • V
      sched/util_est: Fix util_est_dequeue() for throttled cfs_rq · 3482d98b
      Vincent Guittot 提交于
      When a cfs_rq is throttled, parent cfs_rq->nr_running is decreased and
      everything happens at cfs_rq level. Currently util_est stays unchanged
      in such case and it keeps accounting the utilization of throttled tasks.
      This can somewhat make sense as we don't dequeue tasks but only throttled
      cfs_rq.
      
      If a task of another group is enqueued/dequeued and root cfs_rq becomes
      idle during the dequeue, util_est will be cleared whereas it was
      accounting util_est of throttled tasks before. So the behavior of util_est
      is not always the same regarding throttled tasks and depends of side
      activity. Furthermore, util_est will not be updated when the cfs_rq is
      unthrottled as everything happens at cfs_rq level. Main results is that
      util_est will stay null whereas we now have running tasks. We have to wait
      for the next dequeue/enqueue of the previously throttled tasks to get an
      up to date util_est.
      
      Remove the assumption that cfs_rq's estimated utilization of a CPU is 0
      if there is no running task so the util_est of a task remains until the
      latter is dequeued even if its cfs_rq has been throttled.
      Signed-off-by: NVincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Reviewed-by: NPatrick Bellasi <patrick.bellasi@arm.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Fixes: 7f65ea42 ("sched/fair: Add util_est on top of PELT")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1528972380-16268-1-git-send-email-vincent.guittot@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      3482d98b
    • X
      sched/fair: Advance global expiration when period timer is restarted · f1d1be8a
      Xunlei Pang 提交于
      When period gets restarted after some idle time, start_cfs_bandwidth()
      doesn't update the expiration information, expire_cfs_rq_runtime() will
      see cfs_rq->runtime_expires smaller than rq clock and go to the clock
      drift logic, wasting needless CPU cycles on the scheduler hot path.
      
      Update the global expiration in start_cfs_bandwidth() to avoid frequent
      expire_cfs_rq_runtime() calls once a new period begins.
      Signed-off-by: NXunlei Pang <xlpang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Reviewed-by: NBen Segall <bsegall@google.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180620101834.24455-2-xlpang@linux.alibaba.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f1d1be8a
    • X
      sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift condition · 512ac999
      Xunlei Pang 提交于
      I noticed that cgroup task groups constantly get throttled even
      if they have low CPU usage, this causes some jitters on the response
      time to some of our business containers when enabling CPU quotas.
      
      It's very simple to reproduce:
      
        mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test
        cd /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test
        echo 100000 > cpu.cfs_quota_us
        echo $$ > tasks
      
      then repeat:
      
        cat cpu.stat | grep nr_throttled  # nr_throttled will increase steadily
      
      After some analysis, we found that cfs_rq::runtime_remaining will
      be cleared by expire_cfs_rq_runtime() due to two equal but stale
      "cfs_{b|q}->runtime_expires" after period timer is re-armed.
      
      The current condition to judge clock drift in expire_cfs_rq_runtime()
      is wrong, the two runtime_expires are actually the same when clock
      drift happens, so this condtion can never hit. The orginal design was
      correctly done by this commit:
      
        a9cf55b2 ("sched: Expire invalid runtime")
      
      ... but was changed to be the current implementation due to its locking bug.
      
      This patch introduces another way, it adds a new field in both structures
      cfs_rq and cfs_bandwidth to record the expiration update sequence, and
      uses them to figure out if clock drift happens (true if they are equal).
      Signed-off-by: NXunlei Pang <xlpang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Reviewed-by: NBen Segall <bsegall@google.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Fixes: 51f2176d ("sched/fair: Fix unlocked reads of some cfs_b->quota/period")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180620101834.24455-1-xlpang@linux.alibaba.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      512ac999
    • V
      sched/rt: Fix call to cpufreq_update_util() · 296b2ffe
      Vincent Guittot 提交于
      With commit:
      
        8f111bc3 ("cpufreq/schedutil: Rewrite CPUFREQ_RT support")
      
      the schedutil governor uses rq->rt.rt_nr_running to detect whether an
      RT task is currently running on the CPU and to set frequency to max
      if necessary.
      
      cpufreq_update_util() is called in enqueue/dequeue_top_rt_rq() but
      rq->rt.rt_nr_running has not been updated yet when dequeue_top_rt_rq() is
      called so schedutil still considers that an RT task is running when the
      last task is dequeued. The update of rq->rt.rt_nr_running happens later
      in dequeue_rt_stack().
      
      In fact, we can take advantage of the sequence that the dequeue then
      re-enqueue rt entities when a rt task is enqueued or dequeued;
      As a result enqueue_top_rt_rq() is always called when a task is
      enqueued or dequeued and also when groups are throttled or unthrottled.
      The only place that not use enqueue_top_rt_rq() is when root rt_rq is
      throttled.
      Signed-off-by: NVincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: efault@gmx.de
      Cc: juri.lelli@redhat.com
      Cc: patrick.bellasi@arm.com
      Cc: viresh.kumar@linaro.org
      Fixes: 8f111bc3 ('cpufreq/schedutil: Rewrite CPUFREQ_RT support')
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1530021202-21695-1-git-send-email-vincent.guittot@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      296b2ffe
    • F
      sched/nohz: Skip remote tick on idle task entirely · d9c0ffca
      Frederic Weisbecker 提交于
      Some people have reported that the warning in sched_tick_remote()
      occasionally triggers, especially in favour of some RCU-Torture
      pressure:
      
      	WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 906 at kernel/sched/core.c:3138 sched_tick_remote+0xb6/0xc0
      	Modules linked in:
      	CPU: 11 PID: 906 Comm: kworker/u32:3 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2+ #1
      	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
      	Workqueue: events_unbound sched_tick_remote
      	RIP: 0010:sched_tick_remote+0xb6/0xc0
      	Code: e8 0f 06 b8 00 c6 03 00 fb eb 9d 8b 43 04 85 c0 75 8d 48 8b 83 e0 0a 00 00 48 85 c0 75 81 eb 88 48 89 df e8 bc fe ff ff eb aa <0f> 0b eb
      	+c5 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 bf 17 00 00 00 e8 b6 2e fe ff 0f b6
      	Call Trace:
      	 process_one_work+0x1df/0x3b0
      	 worker_thread+0x44/0x3d0
      	 kthread+0xf3/0x130
      	 ? set_worker_desc+0xb0/0xb0
      	 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
      	 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
      
      This happens when the remote tick applies on an idle task. Usually the
      idle_cpu() check avoids that, but it is performed before we lock the
      runqueue and it is therefore racy. It was intended to be that way in
      order to prevent from useless runqueue locks since idle task tick
      callback is a no-op.
      
      Now if the racy check slips out of our hands and we end up remotely
      ticking an idle task, the empty task_tick_idle() is harmless. Still
      it won't pass the WARN_ON_ONCE() test that ensures rq_clock_task() is
      not too far from curr->se.exec_start because update_curr_idle() doesn't
      update the exec_start value like other scheduler policies. Hence the
      reported false positive.
      
      So let's have another check, while the rq is locked, to make sure we
      don't remote tick on an idle task. The lockless idle_cpu() still applies
      to avoid unecessary rq lock contention.
      Reported-by: NJacek Tomaka <jacekt@dug.com>
      Reported-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Reported-by: NAnna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1530203381-31234-1-git-send-email-frederic@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      d9c0ffca
  3. 01 7月, 2018 4 次提交
    • J
      bpf: sockhash, add release routine · caac76a5
      John Fastabend 提交于
      Add map_release_uref pointer to hashmap ops. This was dropped when
      original sockhash code was ported into bpf-next before initial
      commit.
      
      Fixes: 81110384 ("bpf: sockmap, add hash map support")
      Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      caac76a5
    • J
      bpf: sockhash fix omitted bucket lock in sock_close · e9db4ef6
      John Fastabend 提交于
      First the sk_callback_lock() was being used to protect both the
      sock callback hooks and the psock->maps list. This got overly
      convoluted after the addition of sockhash (in sockmap it made
      some sense because masp and callbacks were tightly coupled) so
      lets split out a specific lock for maps and only use the callback
      lock for its intended purpose. This fixes a couple cases where
      we missed using maps lock when it was in fact needed. Also this
      makes it easier to follow the code because now we can put the
      locking closer to the actual code its serializing.
      
      Next, in sock_hash_delete_elem() the pattern was as follows,
      
        sock_hash_delete_elem()
           [...]
           spin_lock(bucket_lock)
           l = lookup_elem_raw()
           if (l)
              hlist_del_rcu()
              write_lock(sk_callback_lock)
               .... destroy psock ...
              write_unlock(sk_callback_lock)
           spin_unlock(bucket_lock)
      
      The ordering is necessary because we only know the {p}sock after
      dereferencing the hash table which we can't do unless we have the
      bucket lock held. Once we have the bucket lock and the psock element
      it is deleted from the hashmap to ensure any other path doing a lookup
      will fail. Finally, the refcnt is decremented and if zero the psock
      is destroyed.
      
      In parallel with the above (or free'ing the map) a tcp close event
      may trigger tcp_close(). Which at the moment omits the bucket lock
      altogether (oops!) where the flow looks like this,
      
        bpf_tcp_close()
           [...]
           write_lock(sk_callback_lock)
           for each psock->maps // list of maps this sock is part of
               hlist_del_rcu(ref_hash_node);
               .... destroy psock ...
           write_unlock(sk_callback_lock)
      
      Obviously, and demonstrated by syzbot, this is broken because
      we can have multiple threads deleting entries via hlist_del_rcu().
      
      To fix this we might be tempted to wrap the hlist operation in a
      bucket lock but that would create a lock inversion problem. In
      summary to follow locking rules the psocks maps list needs the
      sk_callback_lock (after this patch maps_lock) but we need the bucket
      lock to do the hlist_del_rcu.
      
      To resolve the lock inversion problem pop the head of the maps list
      repeatedly and remove the reference until no more are left. If a
      delete happens in parallel from the BPF API that is OK as well because
      it will do a similar action, lookup the lock in the map/hash, delete
      it from the map/hash, and dec the refcnt. We check for this case
      before doing a destroy on the psock to ensure we don't have two
      threads tearing down a psock. The new logic is as follows,
      
        bpf_tcp_close()
        e = psock_map_pop(psock->maps) // done with map lock
        bucket_lock() // lock hash list bucket
        l = lookup_elem_raw(head, hash, key, key_size);
        if (l) {
           //only get here if elmnt was not already removed
           hlist_del_rcu()
           ... destroy psock...
        }
        bucket_unlock()
      
      And finally for all the above to work add missing locking around  map
      operations per above. Then add RCU annotations and use
      rcu_dereference/rcu_assign_pointer to manage values relying on RCU so
      that the object is not free'd from sock_hash_free() while it is being
      referenced in bpf_tcp_close().
      
      Reported-by: syzbot+0ce137753c78f7b6acc1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
      Fixes: 81110384 ("bpf: sockmap, add hash map support")
      Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      e9db4ef6
    • J
      bpf: sockmap, fix smap_list_map_remove when psock is in many maps · 54fedb42
      John Fastabend 提交于
      If a hashmap is free'd with open socks it removes the reference to
      the hash entry from the psock. If that is the last reference to the
      psock then it will also be free'd by the reference counting logic.
      However the current logic that removes the hash reference from the
      list of references is broken. In smap_list_remove() we first check
      if the sockmap entry matches and then check if the hashmap entry
      matches. But, the sockmap entry sill always match because its NULL in
      this case which causes the first entry to be removed from the list.
      If this is always the "right" entry (because the user adds/removes
      entries in order) then everything is OK but otherwise a subsequent
      bpf_tcp_close() may reference a free'd object.
      
      To fix this create two list handlers one for sockmap and one for
      sockhash.
      
      Reported-by: syzbot+0ce137753c78f7b6acc1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
      Fixes: 81110384 ("bpf: sockmap, add hash map support")
      Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      54fedb42
    • J
      bpf: sockmap, fix crash when ipv6 sock is added · 9901c5d7
      John Fastabend 提交于
      This fixes a crash where we assign tcp_prot to IPv6 sockets instead
      of tcpv6_prot.
      
      Previously we overwrote the sk->prot field with tcp_prot even in the
      AF_INET6 case. This patch ensures the correct tcp_prot and tcpv6_prot
      are used.
      
      Tested with 'netserver -6' and 'netperf -H [IPv6]' as well as
      'netperf -H [IPv4]'. The ESTABLISHED check resolves the previously
      crashing case here.
      
      Fixes: 174a79ff ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support")
      Reported-by: syzbot+5c063698bdbfac19f363@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
      Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      9901c5d7
  4. 30 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • D
      bpf: undo prog rejection on read-only lock failure · 85782e03
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      Partially undo commit 9facc336 ("bpf: reject any prog that failed
      read-only lock") since it caused a regression, that is, syzkaller was
      able to manage to cause a panic via fault injection deep in set_memory_ro()
      path by letting an allocation fail: In x86's __change_page_attr_set_clr()
      it was able to change the attributes of the primary mapping but not in
      the alias mapping via cpa_process_alias(), so the second, inner call
      to the __change_page_attr() via __change_page_attr_set_clr() had to split
      a larger page and failed in the alloc_pages() with the artifically triggered
      allocation error which is then propagated down to the call site.
      
      Thus, for set_memory_ro() this means that it returned with an error, but
      from debugging a probe_kernel_write() revealed EFAULT on that memory since
      the primary mapping succeeded to get changed. Therefore the subsequent
      hdr->locked = 0 reset triggered the panic as it was performed on read-only
      memory, so call-site assumptions were infact wrong to assume that it would
      either succeed /or/ not succeed at all since there's no such rollback in
      set_memory_*() calls from partial change of mappings, in other words, we're
      left in a state that is "half done". A later undo via set_memory_rw() is
      succeeding though due to matching permissions on that part (aka due to the
      try_preserve_large_page() succeeding). While reproducing locally with
      explicitly triggering this error, the initial splitting only happens on
      rare occasions and in real world it would additionally need oom conditions,
      but that said, it could partially fail. Therefore, it is definitely wrong
      to bail out on set_memory_ro() error and reject the program with the
      set_memory_*() semantics we have today. Shouldn't have gone the extra mile
      since no other user in tree today infact checks for any set_memory_*()
      errors, e.g. neither module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro() for module
      RO/NX handling which is mostly default these days nor kprobes core with
      alloc_insn_page() / free_insn_page() as examples that could be invoked long
      after bootup and original 314beb9b ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit
      against spraying attacks") did neither when it got first introduced to BPF
      so "improving" with bailing out was clearly not right when set_memory_*()
      cannot handle it today.
      
      Kees suggested that if set_memory_*() can fail, we should annotate it with
      __must_check, and all callers need to deal with it gracefully given those
      set_memory_*() markings aren't "advisory", but they're expected to actually
      do what they say. This might be an option worth to move forward in future
      but would at the same time require that set_memory_*() calls from supporting
      archs are guaranteed to be "atomic" in that they provide rollback if part
      of the range fails, once that happened, the transition from RW -> RO could
      be made more robust that way, while subsequent RO -> RW transition /must/
      continue guaranteeing to always succeed the undo part.
      
      Reported-by: syzbot+a4eb8c7766952a1ca872@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
      Reported-by: syzbot+d866d1925855328eac3b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
      Fixes: 9facc336 ("bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock")
      Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      85782e03
  5. 28 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  6. 27 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  7. 26 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • S
      bpf: fix attach type BPF_LIRC_MODE2 dependency wrt CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF · fdb5c453
      Sean Young 提交于
      If the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF not enabled, it is not
      possible to attach, detach or query IR BPF programs to /dev/lircN devices,
      making them impossible to use. For embedded devices, it should be possible
      to use IR decoding without cgroups or CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF enabled.
      
      This change requires some refactoring, since bpf_prog_{attach,detach,query}
      functions are now always compiled, but their code paths for cgroups need
      moving out. Rather than a #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF in kernel/bpf/syscall.c,
      moving them to kernel/bpf/cgroup.c and kernel/bpf/sockmap.c does not
      require #ifdefs since that is already conditionally compiled.
      
      Fixes: f4364dcf ("media: rc: introduce BPF_PROG_LIRC_MODE2")
      Signed-off-by: NSean Young <sean@mess.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      fdb5c453
  8. 23 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • W
      rseq: Avoid infinite recursion when delivering SIGSEGV · 784e0300
      Will Deacon 提交于
      When delivering a signal to a task that is using rseq, we call into
      __rseq_handle_notify_resume() so that the registers pushed in the
      sigframe are updated to reflect the state of the restartable sequence
      (for example, ensuring that the signal returns to the abort handler if
      necessary).
      
      However, if the rseq management fails due to an unrecoverable fault when
      accessing userspace or certain combinations of RSEQ_CS_* flags, then we
      will attempt to deliver a SIGSEGV. This has the potential for infinite
      recursion if the rseq code continuously fails on signal delivery.
      
      Avoid this problem by using force_sigsegv() instead of force_sig(), which
      is explicitly designed to reset the SEGV handler to SIG_DFL in the case
      of a recursive fault. In doing so, remove rseq_signal_deliver() from the
      internal rseq API and have an optional struct ksignal * parameter to
      rseq_handle_notify_resume() instead.
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Cc: peterz@infradead.org
      Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
      Cc: boqun.feng@gmail.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1529664307-983-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
      784e0300
  9. 22 6月, 2018 7 次提交
  10. 20 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  11. 19 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  12. 16 6月, 2018 5 次提交
  13. 15 6月, 2018 5 次提交
    • M
      sched/core / kcov: avoid kcov_area during task switch · 0ed557aa
      Mark Rutland 提交于
      During a context switch, we first switch_mm() to the next task's mm,
      then switch_to() that new task.  This means that vmalloc'd regions which
      had previously been faulted in can transiently disappear in the context
      of the prev task.
      
      Functions instrumented by KCOV may try to access a vmalloc'd kcov_area
      during this window, and as the fault handling code is instrumented, this
      results in a recursive fault.
      
      We must avoid accessing any kcov_area during this window.  We can do so
      with a new flag in kcov_mode, set prior to switching the mm, and cleared
      once the new task is live.  Since task_struct::kcov_mode isn't always a
      specific enum kcov_mode value, this is made an unsigned int.
      
      The manipulation is hidden behind kcov_{prepare,finish}_switch() helpers,
      which are empty for !CONFIG_KCOV kernels.
      
      The code uses macros because I can't use static inline functions without a
      circular include dependency between <linux/sched.h> and <linux/kcov.h>,
      since the definition of task_struct uses things defined in <linux/kcov.h>
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-4-mark.rutland@arm.comSigned-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Acked-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0ed557aa
    • M
      kcov: prefault the kcov_area · dc55daff
      Mark Rutland 提交于
      On many architectures the vmalloc area is lazily faulted in upon first
      access.  This is problematic for KCOV, as __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc
      accesses the (vmalloc'd) kcov_area, and fault handling code may be
      instrumented.  If an access to kcov_area faults, this will result in
      mutual recursion through the fault handling code and
      __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), eventually leading to stack corruption
      and/or overflow.
      
      We can avoid this by faulting in the kcov_area before
      __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is permitted to access it.  Once it has been
      faulted in, it will remain present in the process page tables, and will
      not fault again.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: code cleanup]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment explaining kcov_fault_in_area()]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fancier code comment from Mark]
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-3-mark.rutland@arm.comSigned-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Acked-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      dc55daff
    • M
      kcov: ensure irq code sees a valid area · c9484b98
      Mark Rutland 提交于
      Patch series "kcov: fix unexpected faults".
      
      These patches fix a few issues where KCOV code could trigger recursive
      faults, discovered while debugging a patch enabling KCOV for arch/arm:
      
      * On CONFIG_PREEMPT kernels, there's a small race window where
        __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() can see a bogus kcov_area.
      
      * Lazy faulting of the vmalloc area can cause mutual recursion between
        fault handling code and __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc().
      
      * During the context switch, switching the mm can cause the kcov_area to
        be transiently unmapped.
      
      These are prerequisites for enabling KCOV on arm, but the issues
      themsevles are generic -- we just happen to avoid them by chance rather
      than design on x86-64 and arm64.
      
      This patch (of 3):
      
      For kernels built with CONFIG_PREEMPT, some C code may execute before or
      after the interrupt handler, while the hardirq count is zero.  In these
      cases, in_task() can return true.
      
      A task can be interrupted in the middle of a KCOV_DISABLE ioctl while it
      resets the task's kcov data via kcov_task_init().  Instrumented code
      executed during this period will call __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), and as
      in_task() returns true, will inspect t->kcov_mode before trying to write
      to t->kcov_area.
      
      In kcov_init_task() we update t->kcov_{mode,area,size} with plain stores,
      which may be re-ordered, torn, etc.  Thus __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() may
      see bogus values for any of these fields, and may attempt to write to
      memory which is not mapped.
      
      Let's avoid this by using WRITE_ONCE() to set t->kcov_mode, with a
      barrier() to ensure this is ordered before we clear t->kov_{area,size}.
      This ensures that any code execute while kcov_init_task() is preempted
      will either see valid values for t->kcov_{area,size}, or will see that
      t->kcov_mode is KCOV_MODE_DISABLED, and bail out without touching
      t->kcov_area.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-2-mark.rutland@arm.comSigned-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Acked-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c9484b98
    • S
      kernel/relay.c: change return type to vm_fault_t · 3fb3894b
      Souptick Joarder 提交于
      Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler.  For now, this is just
      documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an
      errno.  Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a
      distinct type.
      
      commit 1c8f4220 ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t")
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180510140335.GA25363@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PCSigned-off-by: NSouptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMatthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
      Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3fb3894b
    • T
      mm: check for SIGKILL inside dup_mmap() loop · 655c79bb
      Tetsuo Handa 提交于
      As a theoretical problem, dup_mmap() of an mm_struct with 60000+ vmas
      can loop while potentially allocating memory, with mm->mmap_sem held for
      write by current thread.  This is bad if current thread was selected as
      an OOM victim, for current thread will continue allocations using memory
      reserves while OOM reaper is unable to reclaim memory.
      
      As an actually observable problem, it is not difficult to make OOM
      reaper unable to reclaim memory if the OOM victim is blocked at
      i_mmap_lock_write() in this loop.  Unfortunately, since nobody can
      explain whether it is safe to use killable wait there, let's check for
      SIGKILL before trying to allocate memory.  Even without an OOM event,
      there is no point with continuing the loop from the beginning if current
      thread is killed.
      
      I tested with debug printk().  This patch should be safe because we
      already fail if security_vm_enough_memory_mm() or
      kmem_cache_alloc(GFP_KERNEL) fails and exit_mmap() handles it.
      
         ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
         ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
         ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
         ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
         ***** Aborting exit_mmap() due to NULL mmap *****
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment]
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201804071938.CDE04681.SOFVQJFtMHOOLF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jpSigned-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
      Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      655c79bb