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  1. 16 2月, 2018 6 次提交
  3. 14 2月, 2018 3 次提交
  5. 16 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  7. 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • G
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于 
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b2441318
  9. 29 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 17 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 19 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption · aca20d54
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
"in place."
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5f0da2fd4cce63f556117549e2c89c170072209f.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      aca20d54
  15. 18 7月, 2017 3 次提交
    • T
      x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly · b9d05200
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.

For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
properly.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb0d430b41efefd45ee515aaf0979dcfda8b6a44.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      b9d05200
    • T
      x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption · 21729f81
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros.  Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
without the encryption mask before SME becomes active.  Two new pgprot()
macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.

The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO.  SME does
not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
mask from the page attribute.

Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
creating a physical address with the encryption mask.  These are used when
working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
__va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
for that physical location or not.

Also, an early initialization function is added for SME.  If SME is active,
this function:

 - Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
   with the encryption mask.

 - Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.

 - Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
   that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
   applied.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      21729f81
    • T
      x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing · 5868f365
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.

The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      5868f365
  17. 20 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  19. 13 6月, 2017 4 次提交
  21. 14 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  23. 28 1月, 2017 1 次提交
    • I
      x86/boot/e820: Move asm/e820.h to asm/e820/api.h · 66441bd3
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      In line with asm/e820/types.h, move the e820 API declarations to
asm/e820/api.h and update all usage sites.

This is just a mechanical, obviously correct move & replace patch,
there will be subsequent changes to clean up the code and to make
better use of the new header organization.

Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      66441bd3
  25. 11 8月, 2016 1 次提交
  27. 21 7月, 2016 1 次提交
    • I
      x86/boot: Reorganize and clean up the BIOS area reservation code · edce2121
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      So the reserve_ebda_region() code has accumulated a number of
problems over the years that make it really difficult to read
and understand:

- The calculation of 'lowmem' and 'ebda_addr' is an unnecessarily
  interleaved mess of first lowmem, then ebda_addr, then lowmem tweaks...

- 'lowmem' here means 'super low mem' - i.e. 16-bit addressable memory. In other
  parts of the x86 code 'lowmem' means 32-bit addressable memory... This makes it
  super confusing to read.

- It does not help at all that we have various memory range markers, half of which
  are 'start of range', half of which are 'end of range' - but this crucial
  property is not obvious in the naming at all ... gave me a headache trying to
  understand all this.

- Also, the 'ebda_addr' name sucks: it highlights that it's an address (which is
  obvious, all values here are addresses!), while it does not highlight that it's
  the _start_ of the EBDA region ...

- 'BIOS_LOWMEM_KILOBYTES' says a lot of things, except that this is the only value
  that is a pointer to a value, not a memory range address!

- The function name itself is a misnomer: it says 'reserve_ebda_region()' while
  its main purpose is to reserve all the firmware ROM typically between 640K and
  1MB, while the 'EBDA' part is only a small part of that ...

- Likewise, the paravirt quirk flag name 'ebda_search' is misleading as well: this
  too should be about whether to reserve firmware areas in the paravirt case.

- In fact thinking about this as 'end of RAM' is confusing: what this function
  *really* wants to reserve is firmware data and code areas! Once the thinking is
  inverted from a mixed 'ram' and 'reserved firmware area' notion to a pure
  'reserved area' notion everything becomes a lot clearer.

To improve all this rewrite the whole code (without changing the logic):

- Firstly invert the naming from 'lowmem end' to 'BIOS reserved area start'
  and propagate this concept through all the variable names and constants.

	BIOS_RAM_SIZE_KB_PTR		// was: BIOS_LOWMEM_KILOBYTES

	BIOS_START_MIN			// was: INSANE_CUTOFF

	ebda_start			// was: ebda_addr
	bios_start			// was: lowmem

	BIOS_START_MAX			// was: LOWMEM_CAP

- Then clean up the name of the function itself by renaming it
  to reserve_bios_regions() and renaming the ::ebda_search paravirt
  flag to ::reserve_bios_regions.

- Fix up all the comments (fix typos), harmonize and simplify their
  formulation and remove comments that become unnecessary due to
  the much better naming all around.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      edce2121
  29. 22 4月, 2016 1 次提交
    • L
      x86/rtc: Replace paravirt rtc check with platform legacy quirk · 8d152e7a
      由 Luis R. Rodriguez 提交于 
      We have 4 types of x86 platforms that disable RTC:

  * Intel MID
  * Lguest - uses paravirt
  * Xen dom-U - uses paravirt
  * x86 on legacy systems annotated with an ACPI legacy flag

We can consolidate all of these into a platform specific legacy
quirk set early in boot through i386_start_kernel() and through
x86_64_start_reservations(). This deals with the RTC quirks which
we can rely on through the hardware subarch, the ACPI check can
be dealt with separately.

For Xen things are bit more complex given that the @X86_SUBARCH_XEN
x86_hardware_subarch is shared on for Xen which uses the PV path for
both domU and dom0. Since the semantics for differentiating between
the two are Xen specific we provide a platform helper to help override
default legacy features -- x86_platform.set_legacy_features(). Use
of this helper is highly discouraged, its only purpose should be
to account for the lack of semantics available within your given
x86_hardware_subarch.

As per 0-day, this bumps the vmlinux size using i386-tinyconfig as
follows:

TOTAL   TEXT   init.text    x86_early_init_platform_quirks()
+70     +62    +62          +43

Only 8 bytes overhead total, as the main increase in size is
all removed via __init.
Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com
Cc: ffainelli@freebox.fr
Cc: george.dunlap@citrix.com
Cc: glin@suse.com
Cc: jlee@suse.com
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: julien.grall@linaro.org
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: kozerkov@parallels.com
Cc: lenb@kernel.org
Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lv.zheng@intel.com
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Cc: mbizon@freebox.fr
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: robert.moore@intel.com
Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au
Cc: tiwai@suse.de
Cc: toshi.kani@hp.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460592286-300-5-git-send-email-mcgrof@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8d152e7a
  31. 09 2月, 2016 1 次提交
  33. 30 1月, 2016 1 次提交
  35. 19 1月, 2016 1 次提交
  37. 06 7月, 2015 2 次提交
    • A
      x86/kasan: Fix KASAN shadow region page tables · 5d5aa3cf
      由 Alexander Popov 提交于 
      Currently KASAN shadow region page tables created without
respect of physical offset (phys_base). This causes kernel halt
when phys_base is not zero.

So let's initialize KASAN shadow region page tables in
kasan_early_init() using __pa_nodebug() which considers
phys_base.

This patch also separates x86_64_start_kernel() from KASAN low
level details by moving kasan_map_early_shadow(init_level4_pgt)
into kasan_early_init().

Remove the comment before clear_bss() which stopped bringing
much profit to the code readability. Otherwise describing all
the new order dependencies would be too verbose.
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1435828178-10975-3-git-send-email-a.ryabinin@samsung.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      5d5aa3cf
    • A
      x86/init: Clear 'init_level4_pgt' earlier · d0f77d4d
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      Currently x86_64_start_kernel() has two KASAN related
function calls. The first call maps shadow to early_level4_pgt,
the second maps shadow to init_level4_pgt.

If we move clear_page(init_level4_pgt) earlier, we could hide
KASAN low level detail from generic x86_64 initialization code.
The next patch will do it.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1435828178-10975-2-git-send-email-a.ryabinin@samsung.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      d0f77d4d
  39. 02 6月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/asm/irq: Stop relying on magic JMP behavior for early_idt_handlers · 425be567
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      The early_idt_handlers asm code generates an array of entry
points spaced nine bytes apart.  It's not really clear from that
code or from the places that reference it what's going on, and
the code only works in the first place because GAS never
generates two-byte JMP instructions when jumping to global
labels.

Clean up the code to generate the correct array stride (member size)
explicitly. This should be considerably more robust against
screw-ups, as GAS will warn if a .fill directive has a negative
count.  Using '. =' to advance would have been even more robust
(it would generate an actual error if it tried to move
backwards), but it would pad with nulls, confusing anyone who
tries to disassemble the code.  The new scheme should be much
clearer to future readers.

While we're at it, improve the comments and rename the array and
common code.

Binutils may start relaxing jumps to non-weak labels.  If so,
this change will fix our build, and we may need to backport this
change.

Before, on x86_64:

  0000000000000000 <early_idt_handlers>:
     0:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
     2:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
     4:   e9 00 00 00 00          jmpq   9 <early_idt_handlers+0x9>
                          5: R_X86_64_PC32        early_idt_handler-0x4
  ...
    48:   66 90                   xchg   %ax,%ax
    4a:   6a 08                   pushq  $0x8
    4c:   e9 00 00 00 00          jmpq   51 <early_idt_handlers+0x51>
                          4d: R_X86_64_PC32       early_idt_handler-0x4
  ...
   117:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
   119:   6a 1f                   pushq  $0x1f
   11b:   e9 00 00 00 00          jmpq   120 <early_idt_handler>
                          11c: R_X86_64_PC32      early_idt_handler-0x4

After:

  0000000000000000 <early_idt_handler_array>:
     0:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
     2:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
     4:   e9 14 01 00 00          jmpq   11d <early_idt_handler_common>
  ...
    48:   6a 08                   pushq  $0x8
    4a:   e9 d1 00 00 00          jmpq   120 <early_idt_handler_common>
    4f:   cc                      int3
    50:   cc                      int3
  ...
   117:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
   119:   6a 1f                   pushq  $0x1f
   11b:   eb 03                   jmp    120 <early_idt_handler_common>
   11d:   cc                      int3
   11e:   cc                      int3
   11f:   cc                      int3
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Binutils <binutils@sourceware.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ac027962af343b0c599cbfcf50b945ad2ef3d7a8.1432336324.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      425be567
  41. 24 5月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/asm/irq: Stop relying on magic JMP behavior for early_idt_handlers · cdeb6048
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      The early_idt_handlers asm code generates an array of entry
points spaced nine bytes apart.  It's not really clear from that
code or from the places that reference it what's going on, and
the code only works in the first place because GAS never
generates two-byte JMP instructions when jumping to global
labels.

Clean up the code to generate the correct array stride (member size)
explicitly. This should be considerably more robust against
screw-ups, as GAS will warn if a .fill directive has a negative
count.  Using '. =' to advance would have been even more robust
(it would generate an actual error if it tried to move
backwards), but it would pad with nulls, confusing anyone who
tries to disassemble the code.  The new scheme should be much
clearer to future readers.

While we're at it, improve the comments and rename the array and
common code.

Binutils may start relaxing jumps to non-weak labels.  If so,
this change will fix our build, and we may need to backport this
change.

Before, on x86_64:

  0000000000000000 <early_idt_handlers>:
     0:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
     2:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
     4:   e9 00 00 00 00          jmpq   9 <early_idt_handlers+0x9>
                          5: R_X86_64_PC32        early_idt_handler-0x4
  ...
    48:   66 90                   xchg   %ax,%ax
    4a:   6a 08                   pushq  $0x8
    4c:   e9 00 00 00 00          jmpq   51 <early_idt_handlers+0x51>
                          4d: R_X86_64_PC32       early_idt_handler-0x4
  ...
   117:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
   119:   6a 1f                   pushq  $0x1f
   11b:   e9 00 00 00 00          jmpq   120 <early_idt_handler>
                          11c: R_X86_64_PC32      early_idt_handler-0x4

After:

  0000000000000000 <early_idt_handler_array>:
     0:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
     2:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
     4:   e9 14 01 00 00          jmpq   11d <early_idt_handler_common>
  ...
    48:   6a 08                   pushq  $0x8
    4a:   e9 d1 00 00 00          jmpq   120 <early_idt_handler_common>
    4f:   cc                      int3
    50:   cc                      int3
  ...
   117:   6a 00                   pushq  $0x0
   119:   6a 1f                   pushq  $0x1f
   11b:   eb 03                   jmp    120 <early_idt_handler_common>
   11d:   cc                      int3
   11e:   cc                      int3
   11f:   cc                      int3
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Binutils <binutils@sourceware.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ac027962af343b0c599cbfcf50b945ad2ef3d7a8.1432336324.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      cdeb6048
  43. 17 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  45. 14 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      x86_64: add KASan support · ef7f0d6a
      由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于 
      This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer.

16TB of virtual addressed used for shadow memory.  It's located in range
[ffffec0000000000 - fffffc0000000000] between vmemmap and %esp fixup
stacks.

At early stage we map whole shadow region with zero page.  Latter, after
pages mapped to direct mapping address range we unmap zero pages from
corresponding shadow (see kasan_map_shadow()) and allocate and map a real
shadow memory reusing vmemmap_populate() function.

Also replace __pa with __pa_nodebug before shadow initialized.  __pa with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y make external function call (__phys_addr)
__phys_addr is instrumented, so __asan_load could be called before shadow
area initialized.
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ef7f0d6a
  47. 04 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  49. 05 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  51. 06 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  53. 09 11月, 2013 1 次提交