1. 06 12月, 2018 40 次提交
    • T
      x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control · 69985a2c
      Tim Chen 提交于
      commit 5bfbe3ad upstream
      
      To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task
      control of STIBP.
      
      Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if
      SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control
      code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the
      guest/host switch works properly.
      
      This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key
      which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control
      code.
      
      [ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation
        	depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional
        	update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and
        	IBPB ]
      Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      69985a2c
    • T
      x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation · 71187543
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit fa1202ef upstream
      
      Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
      mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=
      
      The initial options are:
      
          -  on:   Unconditionally enabled
          - off:   Unconditionally disabled
          -auto:   Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)
      
      When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
      implies that the application to application control follows that state even
      if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.
      Originally-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      71187543
    • T
      x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions · 8a34c706
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit 495d470e upstream
      
      There is no point in having two functions and a conditional at the call
      site.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.986890749@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      8a34c706
    • T
      x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata · 507ac84e
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit 30ba72a9 upstream
      
      No point to keep that around.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.893886356@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      507ac84e
    • T
      x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly · 275d90f0
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit 8770709f upstream
      
      checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code:
       WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const
      
      Fix up all the string arrays.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.800018931@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      275d90f0
    • T
      x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code · 10c24dc6
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit 15d6b7aa upstream
      
      Reorder the code so it is better grouped. No functional change.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.707122879@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      10c24dc6
    • T
      x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state · 1572793b
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit 130d6f94 upstream
      
      Use the now exposed real SMT state, not the SMT sysfs control knob
      state. This reflects the state of the system when the mitigation status is
      queried.
      
      This does not change the warning in the VMX launch code. There the
      dependency on the control knob makes sense because siblings could be
      brought online anytime after launching the VM.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.613357354@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1572793b
    • T
      x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change · f55e301e
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit a74cfffb upstream
      
      arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is
      changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the
      system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline.
      
      To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT
      state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled.
      
      Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU
      hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.521974984@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f55e301e
    • T
      sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key · 340693ee
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit 321a874a7ef85655e93b3206d0f36b4a6097f948 upstream
      
      Make the scheduler's 'sched_smt_present' static key globaly available, so
      it can be used in the x86 speculation control code.
      
      Provide a query function and a stub for the CONFIG_SMP=n case.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.430168326@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      340693ee
    • T
      x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled · f98bf164
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit dbe73364 upstream
      
      CONFIG_SCHED_SMT is enabled by all distros, so there is not a real point to
      have it configurable. The runtime overhead in the core scheduler code is
      minimal because the actual SMT scheduling parts are conditional on a static
      key.
      
      This allows to expose the scheduler's SMT state static key to the
      speculation control code. Alternatively the scheduler's static key could be
      made always available when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, but that's just adding an
      unused static key to every other architecture for nothing.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.337452245@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f98bf164
    • P
      sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology · a2c09481
      Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 提交于
      commit c5511d03 upstream
      
      Currently the 'sched_smt_present' static key is enabled when at CPU bringup
      SMT topology is observed, but it is never disabled. However there is demand
      to also disable the key when the topology changes such that there is no SMT
      present anymore.
      
      Implement this by making the key count the number of cores that have SMT
      enabled.
      
      In particular, the SMT topology bits are set before interrrupts are enabled
      and similarly, are cleared after interrupts are disabled for the last time
      and the CPU dies.
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.246110444@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      a2c09481
    • T
      x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update · 6308dde5
      Tim Chen 提交于
      commit 01daf568 upstream
      
      The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next
      task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out
      across multiple functions.
      
      Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into
      the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function.
      
      This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits
      in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes.
      Originally-by: NThomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.151077005@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      6308dde5
    • T
      x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions · 39402a5e
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      commit 26c4d75b upstream
      
      During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according
      to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task.
      
      Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in
      SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have
      "speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names.
      
      For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be
      updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate.
      
      Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No
      functional change.
      Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.058866968@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      39402a5e
    • T
      x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use · ca41d792
      Tim Chen 提交于
      commit 34bce7c9 upstream
      
      If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2
      user space exploits from hyperthread sibling.
      
      Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used.
      Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.966801480@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      ca41d792
    • T
      x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common() · f37b55ab
      Tim Chen 提交于
      commit a8f76ae4 upstream
      
      The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the
      various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's
      hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to
      be made for a particular method.
      
      Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper
      functions, so they can be extended later on.
      Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.874479208@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f37b55ab
    • T
      x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() · 30a8e214
      Tim Chen 提交于
      commit b86bda04 upstream
      Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.783903657@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      30a8e214
    • T
      x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() · 2ee44e2d
      Tim Chen 提交于
      commit 24848509 upstream
      
      Remove the unnecessary 'else' statement in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
      to save an indentation level.
      Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.688010903@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2ee44e2d
    • T
      x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment · e8494e5d
      Tim Chen 提交于
      commit 8eb729b7 upstream
      
      "Reduced Data Speculation" is an obsolete term. The correct new name is
      "Speculative store bypass disable" - which is abbreviated into SSBD.
      Signed-off-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.593893901@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      e8494e5d
    • Z
      x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support · 90d2c53f
      Zhenzhong Duan 提交于
      commit ef014aae upstream
      
      Now that CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depends on compiler support, there is no
      reason to keep the minimal retpoline support around which only provided
      basic protection in the assembly files.
      Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f06f0a89-5587-45db-8ed2-0a9d6638d5c0@defaultSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      90d2c53f
    • Z
      x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support · 8c4ad5d3
      Zhenzhong Duan 提交于
      commit 4cd24de3 upstream
      
      Since retpoline capable compilers are widely available, make
      CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depend on the compiler capability.
      
      Break the build when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled and the compiler does not
      support it. Emit an error message in that case:
      
       "arch/x86/Makefile:226: *** You are building kernel with non-retpoline
        compiler, please update your compiler..  Stop."
      
      [dwmw: Fail the build with non-retpoline compiler]
      Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
      Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cca0cb20-f9e2-4094-840b-fb0f8810cd34@defaultSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      8c4ad5d3
    • Z
      x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant · cbc93677
      Zhenzhong Duan 提交于
      commit 0cbb76d6 upstream
      
      ..so that they match their asm counterpart.
      
      Add the missing ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE in CALL_NOSPEC, while at it.
      Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
      Cc: dhaval.giani@oracle.com
      Cc: srinivas.eeda@oracle.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c3975665-173e-4d70-8dee-06c926ac26ee@defaultSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      cbc93677
    • J
      x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs · 44a07610
      Jiri Kosina 提交于
      commit bb4b3b77 upstream
      
      If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch
      in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks.
      
      If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pmSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      
      44a07610
    • J
      x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak · cacd9385
      Jiri Kosina 提交于
      commit dbfe2953 upstream
      
      Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
      process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
      sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
      userspace process via spectre v2.
      
      This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
      spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
      scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
      victim.
      
      In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
      spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
      processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
      such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).
      
      [ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
        PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
        fine-grained ]
      
      Fixes: 18bf3c3e ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch")
      Originally-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pmSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      
      cacd9385
    • J
      x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation · b07fc04c
      Jiri Kosina 提交于
      commit 53c613fe upstream
      
      STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
      (once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
      indirect branch predictors.
      
      Enable this feature if
      
      - the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
      - the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
      - spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)
      
      After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
      on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
      more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
      idle, etc) if needed.
      
      Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
      spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
      already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
      little bit more future-proof.
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pmSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      
      b07fc04c
    • J
      tipc: fix lockdep warning during node delete · 4e3fbd74
      Jon Maloy 提交于
      [ Upstream commit ec835f891232d7763dea9da0358f31e24ca6dfb7 ]
      
      We see the following lockdep warning:
      
      [ 2284.078521] ======================================================
      [ 2284.078604] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
      [ 2284.078604] 4.19.0+ #42 Tainted: G            E
      [ 2284.078604] ------------------------------------------------------
      [ 2284.078604] rmmod/254 is trying to acquire lock:
      [ 2284.078604] 00000000acd94e28 ((&n->timer)#2){+.-.}, at: del_timer_sync+0x5/0xa0
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604] but task is already holding lock:
      [ 2284.078604] 00000000f997afc0 (&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: tipc_node_stop+0xac/0x190 [tipc]
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604] which lock already depends on the new lock.
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604] -> #1 (&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock){+.-.}:
      [ 2284.078604]        tipc_node_timeout+0x20a/0x330 [tipc]
      [ 2284.078604]        call_timer_fn+0xa1/0x280
      [ 2284.078604]        run_timer_softirq+0x1f2/0x4d0
      [ 2284.078604]        __do_softirq+0xfc/0x413
      [ 2284.078604]        irq_exit+0xb5/0xc0
      [ 2284.078604]        smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xac/0x210
      [ 2284.078604]        apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
      [ 2284.078604]        default_idle+0x1c/0x140
      [ 2284.078604]        do_idle+0x1bc/0x280
      [ 2284.078604]        cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
      [ 2284.078604]        start_secondary+0x187/0x1c0
      [ 2284.078604]        secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604] -> #0 ((&n->timer)#2){+.-.}:
      [ 2284.078604]        del_timer_sync+0x34/0xa0
      [ 2284.078604]        tipc_node_delete+0x1a/0x40 [tipc]
      [ 2284.078604]        tipc_node_stop+0xcb/0x190 [tipc]
      [ 2284.078604]        tipc_net_stop+0x154/0x170 [tipc]
      [ 2284.078604]        tipc_exit_net+0x16/0x30 [tipc]
      [ 2284.078604]        ops_exit_list.isra.8+0x36/0x70
      [ 2284.078604]        unregister_pernet_operations+0x87/0xd0
      [ 2284.078604]        unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1d/0x30
      [ 2284.078604]        tipc_exit+0x11/0x6f2 [tipc]
      [ 2284.078604]        __x64_sys_delete_module+0x1df/0x240
      [ 2284.078604]        do_syscall_64+0x66/0x460
      [ 2284.078604]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604] other info that might help us debug this:
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604]        CPU0                    CPU1
      [ 2284.078604]        ----                    ----
      [ 2284.078604]   lock(&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock);
      [ 2284.078604]                                lock((&n->timer)#2);
      [ 2284.078604]                                lock(&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock);
      [ 2284.078604]   lock((&n->timer)#2);
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604]  *** DEADLOCK ***
      [ 2284.078604]
      [ 2284.078604] 3 locks held by rmmod/254:
      [ 2284.078604]  #0: 000000003368be9b (pernet_ops_rwsem){+.+.}, at: unregister_pernet_subsys+0x15/0x30
      [ 2284.078604]  #1: 0000000046ed9c86 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: tipc_net_stop+0x144/0x170 [tipc]
      [ 2284.078604]  #2: 00000000f997afc0 (&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: tipc_node_stop+0xac/0x19
      [...}
      
      The reason is that the node timer handler sometimes needs to delete a
      node which has been disconnected for too long. To do this, it grabs
      the lock 'node_list_lock', which may at the same time be held by the
      generic node cleanup function, tipc_node_stop(), during module removal.
      Since the latter is calling del_timer_sync() inside the same lock, we
      have a potential deadlock.
      
      We fix this letting the timer cleanup function use spin_trylock()
      instead of just spin_lock(), and when it fails to grab the lock it
      just returns so that the timer handler can terminate its execution.
      This is safe to do, since tipc_node_stop() anyway is about to
      delete both the timer and the node instance.
      
      Fixes: 6a939f36 ("tipc: Auto removal of peer down node instance")
      Acked-by: NYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      4e3fbd74
    • H
      net: phy: add workaround for issue where PHY driver doesn't bind to the device · 38af4b90
      Heiner Kallweit 提交于
      [ Upstream commit c85ddeca ]
      
      After switching the r8169 driver to use phylib some user reported that
      their network is broken. This was caused by the genphy PHY driver being
      used instead of the dedicated PHY driver for the RTL8211B. Users
      reported that loading the Realtek PHY driver module upfront fixes the
      issue. See also this mail thread:
      https://marc.info/?t=154279781800003&r=1&w=2
      The issue is quite weird and the root cause seems to be somewhere in
      the base driver core. The patch works around the issue and may be
      removed once the actual issue is fixed.
      
      The Fixes tag refers to the first reported occurrence of the issue.
      The issue itself may have been existing much longer and it may affect
      users of other network chips as well. Users typically will recognize
      this issue only if their PHY stops working when being used with the
      genphy driver.
      
      Fixes: f1e911d5 ("r8169: add basic phylib support")
      Signed-off-by: NHeiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NAndrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      38af4b90
    • E
      tcp: defer SACK compression after DupThresh · aaa7e45c
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 86de5921a3d5dd246df661e09bdd0a6131b39ae3 ]
      
      Jean-Louis reported a TCP regression and bisected to recent SACK
      compression.
      
      After a loss episode (receiver not able to keep up and dropping
      packets because its backlog is full), linux TCP stack is sending
      a single SACK (DUPACK).
      
      Sender waits a full RTO timer before recovering losses.
      
      While RFC 6675 says in section 5, "Algorithm Details",
      
         (2) If DupAcks < DupThresh but IsLost (HighACK + 1) returns true --
             indicating at least three segments have arrived above the current
             cumulative acknowledgment point, which is taken to indicate loss
             -- go to step (4).
      ...
         (4) Invoke fast retransmit and enter loss recovery as follows:
      
      there are old TCP stacks not implementing this strategy, and
      still counting the dupacks before starting fast retransmit.
      
      While these stacks probably perform poorly when receivers implement
      LRO/GRO, we should be a little more gentle to them.
      
      This patch makes sure we do not enable SACK compression unless
      3 dupacks have been sent since last rcv_nxt update.
      
      Ideally we should even rearm the timer to send one or two
      more DUPACK if no more packets are coming, but that will
      be work aiming for linux-4.21.
      
      Many thanks to Jean-Louis for bisecting the issue, providing
      packet captures and testing this patch.
      
      Fixes: 5d9f4262 ("tcp: add SACK compression")
      Reported-by: NJean-Louis Dupond <jean-louis@dupond.be>
      Tested-by: NJean-Louis Dupond <jean-louis@dupond.be>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      aaa7e45c
    • T
      net/dim: Update DIM start sample after each DIM iteration · b8e07695
      Tal Gilboa 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 0211dda6 ]
      
      On every iteration of net_dim, the algorithm may choose to
      check for the system state by comparing current data sample
      with previous data sample. After each of these comparison,
      regardless of the action taken, the sample used as baseline
      is needed to be updated.
      
      This patch fixes a bug that causes DIM to take wrong decisions,
      due to never updating the baseline sample for comparison between
      iterations. This way, DIM always compares current sample with
      zeros.
      
      Although this is a functional fix, it also improves and stabilizes
      performance as the algorithm works properly now.
      
      Performance:
      Tested single UDP TX stream with pktgen:
      samples/pktgen/pktgen_sample03_burst_single_flow.sh -i p4p2 -d 1.1.1.1
      -m 24:8a:07:88:26:8b -f 3 -b 128
      
      ConnectX-5 100GbE packet rate improved from 15-19Mpps to 19-20Mpps.
      Also, toggling between profiles is less frequent with the fix.
      
      Fixes: 8115b750 ("net/dim: use struct net_dim_sample as arg to net_dim")
      Signed-off-by: NTal Gilboa <talgi@mellanox.com>
      Reviewed-by: NTariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b8e07695
    • J
      virtio-net: fail XDP set if guest csum is negotiated · b06510bf
      Jason Wang 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 18ba58e1c234ea1a2d9835ac8c1735d965ce4640 ]
      
      We don't support partial csumed packet since its metadata will be lost
      or incorrect during XDP processing. So fail the XDP set if guest_csum
      feature is negotiated.
      
      Fixes: f600b690 ("virtio_net: Add XDP support")
      Reported-by: NJesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
      Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b06510bf
    • J
      virtio-net: disable guest csum during XDP set · 1af400be
      Jason Wang 提交于
      [ Upstream commit e59ff2c49ae16e1d179de679aca81405829aee6c ]
      
      We don't disable VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM if XDP was set. This means we
      can receive partial csumed packets with metadata kept in the
      vnet_hdr. This may have several side effects:
      
      - It could be overridden by header adjustment, thus is might be not
        correct after XDP processing.
      - There's no way to pass such metadata information through
        XDP_REDIRECT to another driver.
      - XDP does not support checksum offload right now.
      
      So simply disable guest csum if possible in this the case of XDP.
      
      Fixes: 3f93522f ("virtio-net: switch off offloads on demand if possible on XDP set")
      Reported-by: NJesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
      Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1af400be
    • P
      net: skb_scrub_packet(): Scrub offload_fwd_mark · 4aaa233c
      Petr Machata 提交于
      [ Upstream commit b5dd186d ]
      
      When a packet is trapped and the corresponding SKB marked as
      already-forwarded, it retains this marking even after it is forwarded
      across veth links into another bridge. There, since it ingresses the
      bridge over veth, which doesn't have offload_fwd_mark, it triggers a
      warning in nbp_switchdev_frame_mark().
      
      Then nbp_switchdev_allowed_egress() decides not to allow egress from
      this bridge through another veth, because the SKB is already marked, and
      the mark (of 0) of course matches. Thus the packet is incorrectly
      blocked.
      
      Solve by resetting offload_fwd_mark() in skb_scrub_packet(). That
      function is called from tunnels and also from veth, and thus catches the
      cases where traffic is forwarded between bridges and transformed in a
      way that invalidates the marking.
      
      Fixes: 6bc506b4 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for stacked devices")
      Fixes: abf4bb6b ("skbuff: Add the offload_mr_fwd_mark field")
      Signed-off-by: NPetr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com>
      Suggested-by: NIdo Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
      Acked-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      4aaa233c
    • L
      net: thunderx: set xdp_prog to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails · 2f6cfb8e
      Lorenzo Bianconi 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 6d0f60b0 ]
      
      Set xdp_prog pointer to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails since that routine
      reports the error code instead of NULL in case of failure and xdp_prog
      pointer value is used in the driver to verify if XDP is currently
      enabled.
      Moreover report the error code to userspace if nicvf_xdp_setup fails
      
      Fixes: 05c773f5 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support")
      Signed-off-by: NLorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2f6cfb8e
    • B
      usbnet: ipheth: fix potential recvmsg bug and recvmsg bug 2 · 535b494a
      Bernd Eckstein 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 45611c61dd503454b2edae00aabe1e429ec49ebe ]
      
      The bug is not easily reproducable, as it may occur very infrequently
      (we had machines with 20minutes heavy downloading before it occurred)
      However, on a virual machine (VMWare on Windows 10 host) it occurred
      pretty frequently (1-2 seconds after a speedtest was started)
      
      dev->tx_skb mab be freed via dev_kfree_skb_irq on a callback
      before it is set.
      
      This causes the following problems:
      - double free of the skb or potential memory leak
      - in dmesg: 'recvmsg bug' and 'recvmsg bug 2' and eventually
        general protection fault
      
      Example dmesg output:
      [  134.841986] ------------[ cut here ]------------
      [  134.841987] recvmsg bug: copied 9C24A555 seq 9C24B557 rcvnxt 9C25A6B3 fl 0
      [  134.841993] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2629 at /build/linux-hwe-On9fm7/linux-hwe-4.15.0/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1865 tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0
      [  134.841994] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi
      [  134.842046] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G        W  OE    4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu
      [  134.842046] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
      [  134.842048] RIP: 0010:tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0
      [  134.842048] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bcc8 EFLAGS: 00010286
      [  134.842049] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff997616f4f200 RCX: 0000000000000006
      [  134.842049] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: ffff9976257d6490
      [  134.842050] RBP: ffffa6630422bd98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000004bba4
      [  134.842050] R10: 0000000001e00c6f R11: 000000000004bba4 R12: ffff99760dee3000
      [  134.842051] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee3514 R15: 0000000000000000
      [  134.842051] FS:  00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      [  134.842052] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [  134.842053] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
      [  134.842055] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      [  134.842055] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      [  134.842057] Call Trace:
      [  134.842060]  ? aa_sk_perm+0x53/0x1a0
      [  134.842064]  inet_recvmsg+0x51/0xc0
      [  134.842066]  sock_recvmsg+0x43/0x50
      [  134.842070]  SYSC_recvfrom+0xe4/0x160
      [  134.842072]  ? __schedule+0x3de/0x8b0
      [  134.842075]  ? ktime_get_ts64+0x4c/0xf0
      [  134.842079]  SyS_recvfrom+0xe/0x10
      [  134.842082]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
      [  134.842086]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
      [  134.842086] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a81d
      [  134.842088] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da98398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
      [  134.842090] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 00007fe331f5a81d
      [  134.842094] RDX: 00000000000003fb RSI: 0000000001e00874 RDI: 0000000000000003
      [  134.842095] RBP: 00007fe32f642c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      [  134.842097] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe332347698
      [  134.842099] R13: 0000000001b7e0a0 R14: 0000000001e00874 R15: 0000000000000000
      [  134.842103] Code: 24 fd ff ff e9 cc fe ff ff 48 89 d8 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00 00 44 8b 45 80 48 c7 c7 08 bd 59 8b 48 89 85 68 ff ff ff e8 b3 c4 7d ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 85 68 ff ff ff e9 e9 fe ff ff 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00
      [  134.842126] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c83147f ]---
      [  134.842144] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
      [  134.842145] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi
      [  134.842161] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G        W  OE    4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu
      [  134.842162] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
      [  134.842164] RIP: 0010:tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440
      [  134.842165] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bde8 EFLAGS: 00010202
      [  134.842167] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff99760dee3000 RCX: 0000000180400034
      [  134.842168] RDX: 5c4afd407207a6c4 RSI: ffffe868495bd300 RDI: ffff997616f4f200
      [  134.842169] RBP: ffffa6630422be08 R08: 0000000016f4d401 R09: 0000000180400034
      [  134.842169] R10: ffffa6630422bd98 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000600c
      [  134.842170] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee30c8 R15: ffff9975bd44fe00
      [  134.842171] FS:  00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      [  134.842173] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [  134.842174] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
      [  134.842177] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      [  134.842178] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      [  134.842179] Call Trace:
      [  134.842181]  inet_release+0x42/0x70
      [  134.842183]  __sock_release+0x42/0xb0
      [  134.842184]  sock_close+0x15/0x20
      [  134.842187]  __fput+0xea/0x220
      [  134.842189]  ____fput+0xe/0x10
      [  134.842191]  task_work_run+0x8a/0xb0
      [  134.842193]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc4/0xd0
      [  134.842195]  do_syscall_64+0xf4/0x130
      [  134.842197]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
      [  134.842197] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a560
      [  134.842198] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da982e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
      [  134.842200] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fe32f642c70 RCX: 00007fe331f5a560
      [  134.842201] RDX: 00000000008f5320 RSI: 0000000001cd4b50 RDI: 0000000000000003
      [  134.842202] RBP: 00007fe32f6500f8 R08: 000000000000003c R09: 00000000009343c0
      [  134.842203] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe32f6500d0
      [  134.842204] R13: 00000000008f5320 R14: 00000000008f5320 R15: 0000000001cd4770
      [  134.842205] Code: c8 00 00 00 45 31 e4 49 39 fe 75 4d eb 50 83 ab d8 00 00 00 01 48 8b 17 48 8b 47 08 48 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 0f b6 57 34 8b 47 2c 2b 47 28 83 e2 01 80
      [  134.842226] RIP: tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440 RSP: ffffa6630422bde8
      [  134.842227] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c831480 ]---
      
      The proposed patch eliminates a potential racing condition.
      Before, usb_submit_urb was called and _after_ that, the skb was attached
      (dev->tx_skb). So, on a callback it was possible, however unlikely that the
      skb was freed before it was set. That way (because dev->tx_skb was not set
      to NULL after it was freed), it could happen that a skb from a earlier
      transmission was freed a second time (and the skb we should have freed did
      not get freed at all)
      
      Now we free the skb directly in ipheth_tx(). It is not passed to the
      callback anymore, eliminating the posibility of a double free of the same
      skb. Depending on the retval of usb_submit_urb() we use dev_kfree_skb_any()
      respectively dev_consume_skb_any() to free the skb.
      Signed-off-by: NOliver Zweigle <Oliver.Zweigle@faro.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBernd Eckstein <3ernd.Eckstein@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      535b494a
    • J
      s390/qeth: fix length check in SNMP processing · 711e3d37
      Julian Wiedmann 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 9a764c1e59684c0358e16ccaafd870629f2cfe67 ]
      
      The response for a SNMP request can consist of multiple parts, which
      the cmd callback stages into a kernel buffer until all parts have been
      received. If the callback detects that the staging buffer provides
      insufficient space, it bails out with error.
      This processing is buggy for the first part of the response - while it
      initially checks for a length of 'data_len', it later copies an
      additional amount of 'offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data)' bytes.
      
      Fix the calculation of 'data_len' for the first part of the response.
      This also nicely cleans up the memcpy code.
      
      Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
      Signed-off-by: NJulian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
      Reviewed-by: NUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      711e3d37
    • P
      rapidio/rionet: do not free skb before reading its length · 720e0d05
      Pan Bian 提交于
      [ Upstream commit cfc435198f53a6fa1f656d98466b24967ff457d0 ]
      
      skb is freed via dev_kfree_skb_any, however, skb->len is read then. This
      may result in a use-after-free bug.
      
      Fixes: e6161d64 ("rapidio/rionet: rework driver initialization and removal")
      Signed-off-by: NPan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      720e0d05
    • W
      packet: copy user buffers before orphan or clone · f2a67e68
      Willem de Bruijn 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 5cd8d46ea1562be80063f53c7c6a5f40224de623 ]
      
      tpacket_snd sends packets with user pages linked into skb frags. It
      notifies that pages can be reused when the skb is released by setting
      skb->destructor to tpacket_destruct_skb.
      
      This can cause data corruption if the skb is orphaned (e.g., on
      transmit through veth) or cloned (e.g., on mirror to another psock).
      
      Create a kernel-private copy of data in these cases, same as tun/tap
      zerocopy transmission. Reuse that infrastructure: mark the skb as
      SKBTX_ZEROCOPY_FRAG, which will trigger copy in skb_orphan_frags(_rx).
      
      Unlike other zerocopy packets, do not set shinfo destructor_arg to
      struct ubuf_info. tpacket_destruct_skb already uses that ptr to notify
      when the original skb is released and a timestamp is recorded. Do not
      change this timestamp behavior. The ubuf_info->callback is not needed
      anyway, as no zerocopy notification is expected.
      
      Mark destructor_arg as not-a-uarg by setting the lower bit to 1. The
      resulting value is not a valid ubuf_info pointer, nor a valid
      tpacket_snd frame address. Add skb_zcopy_.._nouarg helpers for this.
      
      The fix relies on features introduced in commit 52267790 ("sock:
      add MSG_ZEROCOPY"), so can be backported as is only to 4.14.
      
      Tested with from `./in_netns.sh ./txring_overwrite` from
      http://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tests
      
      Fixes: 69e3c75f ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
      Reported-by: NAnand H. Krishnan <anandhkrishnan@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f2a67e68
    • L
      net: thunderx: set tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue · abc963e4
      Lorenzo Bianconi 提交于
      [ Upstream commit ef2a7cf1d8831535b8991459567b385661eb4a36 ]
      
      Reset snd_queue tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue routine
      since it is used to check if tso dma descriptor queue has been previously
      allocated. The issue can be triggered with the following reproducer:
      
      $ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv obj xdp_dummy.o
      $ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv off
      
      [  341.467649] WARNING: CPU: 74 PID: 2158 at mm/vmalloc.c:1511 __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
      [  341.515010] Hardware name: GIGABYTE H270-T70/MT70-HD0, BIOS T49 02/02/2018
      [  341.521874] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
      [  341.526654] pc : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
      [  341.530132] lr : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
      [  341.533609] sp : ffff00001c5db860
      [  341.536913] x29: ffff00001c5db860 x28: 0000000000020000
      [  341.542214] x27: ffff810feb5090b0 x26: ffff000017e57000
      [  341.547515] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000fbd00000
      [  341.552816] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff810feb5090b0
      [  341.558117] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000
      [  341.563418] x19: ffff000017e57000 x18: 0000000000000000
      [  341.568719] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
      [  341.574020] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: ffffffffffffffff
      [  341.579321] x13: ffff00008985eb27 x12: ffff00000985eb2f
      [  341.584622] x11: ffff0000096b3000 x10: ffff00001c5db510
      [  341.589923] x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 x8 : ffff0000086868e8
      [  341.595224] x7 : 3430303030303030 x6 : 00000000000006ef
      [  341.600525] x5 : 00000000003fffff x4 : 0000000000000000
      [  341.605825] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff
      [  341.611126] x1 : ffff0000096b3728 x0 : 0000000000000038
      [  341.616428] Call trace:
      [  341.618866]  __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
      [  341.621997]  vunmap+0x3c/0x50
      [  341.624961]  arch_dma_free+0x68/0xa0
      [  341.628534]  dma_direct_free+0x50/0x80
      [  341.632285]  nicvf_free_resources+0x160/0x2d8 [nicvf]
      [  341.637327]  nicvf_config_data_transfer+0x174/0x5e8 [nicvf]
      [  341.642890]  nicvf_stop+0x298/0x340 [nicvf]
      [  341.647066]  __dev_close_many+0x9c/0x108
      [  341.650977]  dev_close_many+0xa4/0x158
      [  341.654720]  rollback_registered_many+0x140/0x530
      [  341.659414]  rollback_registered+0x54/0x80
      [  341.663499]  unregister_netdevice_queue+0x9c/0xe8
      [  341.668192]  unregister_netdev+0x28/0x38
      [  341.672106]  nicvf_remove+0xa4/0xa8 [nicvf]
      [  341.676280]  nicvf_shutdown+0x20/0x30 [nicvf]
      [  341.680630]  pci_device_shutdown+0x44/0x88
      [  341.684720]  device_shutdown+0x144/0x250
      [  341.688640]  kernel_restart_prepare+0x44/0x50
      [  341.692986]  kernel_restart+0x20/0x68
      [  341.696638]  __se_sys_reboot+0x210/0x238
      [  341.700550]  __arm64_sys_reboot+0x24/0x30
      [  341.704555]  el0_svc_handler+0x94/0x110
      [  341.708382]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
      [  341.711252] ---[ end trace 3f4019c8439959c9 ]---
      [  341.715874] page:ffff7e0003ef4000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x4
      [  341.723872] flags: 0x1fffe000000000()
      [  341.727527] raw: 001fffe000000000 ffff7e0003f1a008 ffff7e0003ef4048 0000000000000000
      [  341.735263] raw: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
      [  341.742994] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0)
      
      where xdp_dummy.c is a simple bpf program that forwards the incoming
      frames to the network stack (available here:
      https://github.com/altoor/xdp_walkthrough_examples/blob/master/sample_1/xdp_dummy.c)
      
      Fixes: 05c773f5 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support")
      Fixes: 4863dea3 ("net: Adding support for Cavium ThunderX network controller")
      Signed-off-by: NLorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      abc963e4
    • A
      net: gemini: Fix copy/paste error · cfbee9e9
      Andreas Fiedler 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 07093b76476903f820d83d56c3040e656fb4d9e3 ]
      
      The TX stats should be started with the tx_stats_syncp,
      there seems to be a copy/paste error in the driver.
      Signed-off-by: NAndreas Fiedler <andreas.fiedler@gmx.net>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      cfbee9e9
    • P
      net: don't keep lonely packets forever in the gro hash · b24a813e
      Paolo Abeni 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 605108acfe6233b72e2f803aa1cb59a2af3001ca ]
      
      Eric noted that with UDP GRO and NAPI timeout, we could keep a single
      UDP packet inside the GRO hash forever, if the related NAPI instance
      calls napi_gro_complete() at an higher frequency than the NAPI timeout.
      Willem noted that even TCP packets could be trapped there, till the
      next retransmission.
      This patch tries to address the issue, flushing the old packets -
      those with a NAPI_GRO_CB age before the current jiffy - before scheduling
      the NAPI timeout. The rationale is that such a timeout should be
      well below a jiffy and we are not flushing packets eligible for sane GRO.
      
      v1  -> v2:
       - clarified the commit message and comment
      
      RFC -> v1:
       - added 'Fixes tags', cleaned-up the wording.
      Reported-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
      Fixes: 3b47d303 ("net: gro: add a per device gro flush timer")
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b24a813e
    • B
      lan743x: fix return value for lan743x_tx_napi_poll · 18dd9bf5
      Bryan Whitehead 提交于
      [ Upstream commit cc5922054131f9abefdc0622ae64fc55e6b2671d ]
      
      The lan743x driver, when under heavy traffic load, has been noticed
      to sometimes hang, or cause a kernel panic.
      
      Debugging reveals that the TX napi poll routine was returning
      the wrong value, 'weight'. Most other drivers return 0.
      And call napi_complete, instead of napi_complete_done.
      
      Additionally when creating the tx napi poll routine.
      Changed netif_napi_add, to netif_tx_napi_add.
      
      Updates for v3:
          changed 'fixes' tag to match defined format
      
      Updates for v2:
      use napi_complete, instead of napi_complete_done in
          lan743x_tx_napi_poll
      use netif_tx_napi_add, instead of netif_napi_add for
          registration of tx napi poll routine
      
      fixes: 23f0703c ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver")
      Signed-off-by: NBryan Whitehead <Bryan.Whitehead@microchip.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      18dd9bf5