1. 12 10月, 2019 2 次提交
    • S
      KVM: nVMX: Fix consistency check on injected exception error code · 63bb8b76
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 567926cca99ba1750be8aae9c4178796bf9bb90b ]
      
      Current versions of Intel's SDM incorrectly state that "bits 31:15 of
      the VM-Entry exception error-code field" must be zero.  In reality, bits
      31:16 must be zero, i.e. error codes are 16-bit values.
      
      The bogus error code check manifests as an unexpected VM-Entry failure
      due to an invalid code field (error number 7) in L1, e.g. when injecting
      a #GP with error_code=0x9f00.
      
      Nadav previously reported the bug[*], both to KVM and Intel, and fixed
      the associated kvm-unit-test.
      
      [*] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11124749/Reported-by: NNadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      63bb8b76
    • J
      KVM: nVMX: handle page fault in vmread fix · eff3a54a
      Jack Wang 提交于
      During backport f7eea636c3d5 ("KVM: nVMX: handle page fault in vmread"),
      there was a mistake the exception reference should be passed to function
      kvm_write_guest_virt_system, instead of NULL, other wise, we will get
      NULL pointer deref, eg
      
      kvm-unit-test triggered a NULL pointer deref below:
      [  948.518437] kvm [24114]: vcpu0, guest rIP: 0x407ef9 kvm_set_msr_common: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x3, nop
      [  949.106464] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
      [  949.106707] PGD 0 P4D 0
      [  949.106872] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
      [  949.107038] CPU: 2 PID: 24126 Comm: qemu-2.7 Not tainted 4.19.77-pserver #4.19.77-1+feature+daily+update+20191005.1625+a4168bb~deb9
      [  949.107283] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision Tower 3620/09WH54, BIOS 2.7.3 01/31/2018
      [  949.107549] RIP: 0010:kvm_write_guest_virt_system+0x12/0x40 [kvm]
      [  949.107719] Code: c0 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 83 f8 03 41 0f 94 c0 41 c1 e0 02 e9 b0 ed ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f0 c6 87 59 56 00 00 01 48 89 d6 <49> c7 00 00 00 00 00 89 ca 49 c7 40 08 00 00 00 00 49 c7 40 10 00
      [  949.108044] RSP: 0018:ffffb31b0a953cb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
      [  949.108216] RAX: 000000000046b4d8 RBX: ffff9e9f415b0000 RCX: 0000000000000008
      [  949.108389] RDX: ffffb31b0a953cc0 RSI: ffffb31b0a953cc0 RDI: ffff9e9f415b0000
      [  949.108562] RBP: 00000000d2e14928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      [  949.108733] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffc8
      [  949.108907] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff9e9f4f26f2e8 R15: 0000000000000000
      [  949.109079] FS:  00007eff8694c700(0000) GS:ffff9e9f51a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000031415928
      [  949.109318] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [  949.109495] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000003be53b002 CR4: 00000000003626e0
      [  949.109671] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      [  949.109845] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      [  949.110017] Call Trace:
      [  949.110186]  handle_vmread+0x22b/0x2f0 [kvm_intel]
      [  949.110356]  ? vmexit_fill_RSB+0xc/0x30 [kvm_intel]
      [  949.110549]  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xa98/0x1b30 [kvm]
      [  949.110725]  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x388/0x5d0 [kvm]
      [  949.110901]  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x388/0x5d0 [kvm]
      [  949.111072]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x620
      Signed-off-by: NJack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com>
      Acked-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      eff3a54a
  2. 19 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 16 9月, 2019 6 次提交
  4. 16 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • W
      KVM: Fix leak vCPU's VMCS value into other pCPU · 2bc73d91
      Wanpeng Li 提交于
      commit 17e433b54393a6269acbcb792da97791fe1592d8 upstream.
      
      After commit d73eb57b80b (KVM: Boost vCPUs that are delivering interrupts), a
      five years old bug is exposed. Running ebizzy benchmark in three 80 vCPUs VMs
      on one 80 pCPUs Skylake server, a lot of rcu_sched stall warning splatting
      in the VMs after stress testing:
      
       INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 4 41 57 62 77} (detected by 15, t=60004 jiffies, g=899, c=898, q=15073)
       Call Trace:
         flush_tlb_mm_range+0x68/0x140
         tlb_flush_mmu.part.75+0x37/0xe0
         tlb_finish_mmu+0x55/0x60
         zap_page_range+0x142/0x190
         SyS_madvise+0x3cd/0x9c0
         system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21
      
      swait_active() sustains to be true before finish_swait() is called in
      kvm_vcpu_block(), voluntarily preempted vCPUs are taken into account
      by kvm_vcpu_on_spin() loop greatly increases the probability condition
      kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu) is checked and can be true, when APICv
      is enabled the yield-candidate vCPU's VMCS RVI field leaks(by
      vmx_sync_pir_to_irr()) into spinning-on-a-taken-lock vCPU's current
      VMCS.
      
      This patch fixes it by checking conservatively a subset of events.
      
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Marc Zyngier <Marc.Zyngier@arm.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Fixes: 98f4a146 (KVM: add kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable() test to kvm_vcpu_on_spin() loop)
      Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2bc73d91
  5. 28 7月, 2019 2 次提交
  6. 15 5月, 2019 2 次提交
  7. 05 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  8. 20 4月, 2019 1 次提交
    • S
      KVM: nVMX: restore host state in nested_vmx_vmexit for VMFail · f35e2a68
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      [ Upstream commit bd18bffca35397214ae68d85cf7203aca25c3c1d ]
      
      A VMEnter that VMFails (as opposed to VMExits) does not touch host
      state beyond registers that are explicitly noted in the VMFail path,
      e.g. EFLAGS.  Host state does not need to be loaded because VMFail
      is only signaled for consistency checks that occur before the CPU
      starts to load guest state, i.e. there is no need to restore any
      state as nothing has been modified.  But in the case where a VMFail
      is detected by hardware and not by KVM (due to deferring consistency
      checks to hardware), KVM has already loaded some amount of guest
      state.  Luckily, "loaded" only means loaded to KVM's software model,
      i.e. vmcs01 has not been modified.  So, unwind our software model to
      the pre-VMEntry host state.
      
      Not restoring host state in this VMFail path leads to a variety of
      failures because we end up with stale data in vcpu->arch, e.g. CR0,
      CR4, EFER, etc... will all be out of sync relative to vmcs01.  Any
      significant delta in the stale data is all but guaranteed to crash
      L1, e.g. emulation of SMEP, SMAP, UMIP, WP, etc... will be wrong.
      
      An alternative to this "soft" reload would be to load host state from
      vmcs12 as if we triggered a VMExit (as opposed to VMFail), but that is
      wildly inconsistent with respect to the VMX architecture, e.g. an L1
      VMM with separate VMExit and VMFail paths would explode.
      
      Note that this approach does not mean KVM is 100% accurate with
      respect to VMX hardware behavior, even at an architectural level
      (the exact order of consistency checks is microarchitecture specific).
      But 100% emulation accuracy isn't the goal (with this patch), rather
      the goal is to be consistent in the information delivered to L1, e.g.
      a VMExit should not fall-through VMENTER, and a VMFail should not jump
      to HOST_RIP.
      
      This technically reverts commit "5af41573 (KVM: nVMX: Fix mmu
      context after VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure)", but retains the core
      aspects of that patch, just in an open coded form due to the need to
      pull state from vmcs01 instead of vmcs12.  Restoring host state
      resolves a variety of issues introduced by commit "4f350c6d
      (kvm: nVMX: Handle deferred early VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly)",
      which remedied the incorrect behavior of treating VMFail like VMExit
      but in doing so neglected to restore arch state that had been modified
      prior to attempting nested VMEnter.
      
      A sample failure that occurs due to stale vcpu.arch state is a fault
      of some form while emulating an LGDT (due to emulated UMIP) from L1
      after a failed VMEntry to L3, in this case when running the KVM unit
      test test_tpr_threshold_values in L1.  L0 also hits a WARN in this
      case due to a stale arch.cr4.UMIP.
      
      L1:
        BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90000663b9e
        PGD 276512067 P4D 276512067 PUD 276513067 PMD 274efa067 PTE 8000000271de2163
        Oops: 0009 [#1] SMP
        CPU: 5 PID: 12495 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G        W         4.18.0-rc2+ #2
        Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
        RIP: 0010:native_load_gdt+0x0/0x10
      
        ...
      
        Call Trace:
         load_fixmap_gdt+0x22/0x30
         __vmx_load_host_state+0x10e/0x1c0 [kvm_intel]
         vmx_switch_vmcs+0x2d/0x50 [kvm_intel]
         nested_vmx_vmexit+0x222/0x9c0 [kvm_intel]
         vmx_handle_exit+0x246/0x15a0 [kvm_intel]
         kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x850/0x1830 [kvm]
         kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3a1/0x5c0 [kvm]
         do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f/0x600
         ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
         do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      
      L0:
        WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3529 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:6618 handle_desc+0x28/0x30 [kvm_intel]
        ...
        CPU: 2 PID: 3529 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.17.2-coffee+ #76
        Hardware name: Intel Corporation Kabylake Client platform/KBL S
        RIP: 0010:handle_desc+0x28/0x30 [kvm_intel]
      
        ...
      
        Call Trace:
         kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x863/0x1840 [kvm]
         kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3a1/0x5c0 [kvm]
         do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f/0x5e0
         ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
         do_syscall_64+0x49/0xf0
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      
      Fixes: 5af41573 (KVM: nVMX: Fix mmu context after VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure)
      Fixes: 4f350c6d (kvm: nVMX: Handle deferred early VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly)
      Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Cc: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Radim KrÄmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      f35e2a68
  9. 17 4月, 2019 3 次提交
    • M
      KVM: x86: nVMX: fix x2APIC VTPR read intercept · 59bf185a
      Marc Orr 提交于
      commit c73f4c998e1fd4249b9edfa39e23f4fda2b9b041 upstream.
      
      Referring to the "VIRTUALIZING MSR-BASED APIC ACCESSES" chapter of the
      SDM, when "virtualize x2APIC mode" is 1 and "APIC-register
      virtualization" is 0, a RDMSR of 808H should return the VTPR from the
      virtual APIC page.
      
      However, for nested, KVM currently fails to disable the read intercept
      for this MSR. This means that a RDMSR exit takes precedence over
      "virtualize x2APIC mode", and KVM passes through L1's TPR to L2,
      instead of sourcing the value from L2's virtual APIC page.
      
      This patch fixes the issue by disabling the read intercept, in VMCS02,
      for the VTPR when "APIC-register virtualization" is 0.
      
      The issue described above and fix prescribed here, were verified with
      a related patch in kvm-unit-tests titled "Test VMX's virtualize x2APIC
      mode w/ nested".
      Signed-off-by: NMarc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Fixes: c992384b ("KVM: vmx: speed up MSR bitmap merge")
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      59bf185a
    • M
      KVM: x86: nVMX: close leak of L0's x2APIC MSRs (CVE-2019-3887) · 119031be
      Marc Orr 提交于
      commit acff78477b9b4f26ecdf65733a4ed77fe837e9dc upstream.
      
      The nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap() function doesn't directly guard the
      x2APIC MSR intercepts with the "virtualize x2APIC mode" MSR. As a
      result, we discovered the potential for a buggy or malicious L1 to get
      access to L0's x2APIC MSRs, via an L2, as follows.
      
      1. L1 executes WRMSR(IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1). This causes the spec_ctrl
      variable, in nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap() to become true.
      2. L1 disables "virtualize x2APIC mode" in VMCS12.
      3. L1 enables "APIC-register virtualization" in VMCS12.
      
      Now, KVM will set VMCS02's x2APIC MSR intercepts from VMCS12, and then
      set "virtualize x2APIC mode" to 0 in VMCS02. Oops.
      
      This patch closes the leak by explicitly guarding VMCS02's x2APIC MSR
      intercepts with VMCS12's "virtualize x2APIC mode" control.
      
      The scenario outlined above and fix prescribed here, were verified with
      a related patch in kvm-unit-tests titled "Add leak scenario to
      virt_x2apic_mode_test".
      
      Note, it looks like this issue may have been introduced inadvertently
      during a merge---see 15303ba5.
      Signed-off-by: NMarc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      119031be
    • J
      kvm: nVMX: NMI-window and interrupt-window exiting should wake L2 from HLT · 646f8e01
      Jim Mattson 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 9ebdfe5230f2e50e3ba05c57723a06e90946815a ]
      
      According to the SDM, "NMI-window exiting" VM-exits wake a logical
      processor from the same inactive states as would an NMI and
      "interrupt-window exiting" VM-exits wake a logical processor from the
      same inactive states as would an external interrupt. Specifically, they
      wake a logical processor from the shutdown state and from the states
      entered using the HLT and MWAIT instructions.
      
      Fixes: 6dfacadd ("KVM: nVMX: Add support for activity state HLT")
      Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com>
      Suggested-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      [Squashed comments of two Jim's patches and used the simplified code
       hunk provided by Sean. - Radim]
      Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      646f8e01
  10. 03 4月, 2019 1 次提交
  11. 24 3月, 2019 3 次提交
    • S
      KVM: nVMX: Ignore limit checks on VMX instructions using flat segments · 5ffb710b
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      commit 34333cc6c2cb021662fd32e24e618d1b86de95bf upstream.
      
      Regarding segments with a limit==0xffffffff, the SDM officially states:
      
          When the effective limit is FFFFFFFFH (4 GBytes), these accesses may
          or may not cause the indicated exceptions.  Behavior is
          implementation-specific and may vary from one execution to another.
      
      In practice, all CPUs that support VMX ignore limit checks for "flat
      segments", i.e. an expand-up data or code segment with base=0 and
      limit=0xffffffff.  This is subtly different than wrapping the effective
      address calculation based on the address size, as the flat segment
      behavior also applies to accesses that would wrap the 4g boundary, e.g.
      a 4-byte access starting at 0xffffffff will access linear addresses
      0xffffffff, 0x0, 0x1 and 0x2.
      
      Fixes: f9eb4af6 ("KVM: nVMX: VMX instructions: add checks for #GP/#SS exceptions")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      5ffb710b
    • S
      KVM: nVMX: Apply addr size mask to effective address for VMX instructions · 29b515c2
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      commit 8570f9e881e3fde98801bb3a47eef84dd934d405 upstream.
      
      The address size of an instruction affects the effective address, not
      the virtual/linear address.  The final address may still be truncated,
      e.g. to 32-bits outside of long mode, but that happens irrespective of
      the address size, e.g. a 32-bit address size can yield a 64-bit virtual
      address when using FS/GS with a non-zero base.
      
      Fixes: 064aea77 ("KVM: nVMX: Decoding memory operands of VMX instructions")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      29b515c2
    • S
      KVM: nVMX: Sign extend displacements of VMX instr's mem operands · 9ce0ffeb
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      commit 946c522b603f281195af1df91837a1d4d1eb3bc9 upstream.
      
      The VMCS.EXIT_QUALIFCATION field reports the displacements of memory
      operands for various instructions, including VMX instructions, as a
      naturally sized unsigned value, but masks the value by the addr size,
      e.g. given a ModRM encoded as -0x28(%ebp), the -0x28 displacement is
      reported as 0xffffffd8 for a 32-bit address size.  Despite some weird
      wording regarding sign extension, the SDM explicitly states that bits
      beyond the instructions address size are undefined:
      
          In all cases, bits of this field beyond the instruction’s address
          size are undefined.
      
      Failure to sign extend the displacement results in KVM incorrectly
      treating a negative displacement as a large positive displacement when
      the address size of the VMX instruction is smaller than KVM's native
      size, e.g. a 32-bit address size on a 64-bit KVM.
      
      The very original decoding, added by commit 064aea77 ("KVM: nVMX:
      Decoding memory operands of VMX instructions"), sort of modeled sign
      extension by truncating the final virtual/linear address for a 32-bit
      address size.  I.e. it messed up the effective address but made it work
      by adjusting the final address.
      
      When segmentation checks were added, the truncation logic was kept
      as-is and no sign extension logic was introduced.  In other words, it
      kept calculating the wrong effective address while mostly generating
      the correct virtual/linear address.  As the effective address is what's
      used in the segment limit checks, this results in KVM incorreclty
      injecting #GP/#SS faults due to non-existent segment violations when
      a nested VMM uses negative displacements with an address size smaller
      than KVM's native address size.
      
      Using the -0x28(%ebp) example, an EBP value of 0x1000 will result in
      KVM using 0x100000fd8 as the effective address when checking for a
      segment limit violation.  This causes a 100% failure rate when running
      a 32-bit KVM build as L1 on top of a 64-bit KVM L0.
      
      Fixes: f9eb4af6 ("KVM: nVMX: VMX instructions: add checks for #GP/#SS exceptions")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      9ce0ffeb
  12. 20 2月, 2019 2 次提交
  13. 13 2月, 2019 2 次提交
    • J
      cpu/hotplug: Fix "SMT disabled by BIOS" detection for KVM · 97a7fa90
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit b284909abad48b07d3071a9fc9b5692b3e64914b upstream.
      
      With the following commit:
      
        73d5e2b4 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
      
      ... the hotplug code attempted to detect when SMT was disabled by BIOS,
      in which case it reported SMT as permanently disabled.  However, that
      code broke a virt hotplug scenario, where the guest is booted with only
      primary CPU threads, and a sibling is brought online later.
      
      The problem is that there doesn't seem to be a way to reliably
      distinguish between the HW "SMT disabled by BIOS" case and the virt
      "sibling not yet brought online" case.  So the above-mentioned commit
      was a bit misguided, as it permanently disabled SMT for both cases,
      preventing future virt sibling hotplugs.
      
      Going back and reviewing the original problems which were attempted to
      be solved by that commit, when SMT was disabled in BIOS:
      
        1) /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control showed "on" instead of
           "notsupported"; and
      
        2) vmx_vm_init() was incorrectly showing the L1TF_MSG_SMT warning.
      
      I'd propose that we instead consider #1 above to not actually be a
      problem.  Because, at least in the virt case, it's possible that SMT
      wasn't disabled by BIOS and a sibling thread could be brought online
      later.  So it makes sense to just always default the smt control to "on"
      to allow for that possibility (assuming cpuid indicates that the CPU
      supports SMT).
      
      The real problem is #2, which has a simple fix: change vmx_vm_init() to
      query the actual current SMT state -- i.e., whether any siblings are
      currently online -- instead of looking at the SMT "control" sysfs value.
      
      So fix it by:
      
        a) reverting the original "fix" and its followup fix:
      
           73d5e2b4 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
           bc2d8d26 ("cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation")
      
           and
      
        b) changing vmx_vm_init() to query the actual current SMT state --
           instead of the sysfs control value -- to determine whether the L1TF
           warning is needed.  This also requires the 'sched_smt_present'
           variable to exported, instead of 'cpu_smt_control'.
      
      Fixes: 73d5e2b4 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
      Reported-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e3a85d585da28cc333ecbc1e78ee9216e6da9396.1548794349.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      
      97a7fa90
    • P
      KVM: nVMX: unconditionally cancel preemption timer in free_nested (CVE-2019-7221) · 236fd677
      Peter Shier 提交于
      commit ecec76885bcfe3294685dc363fd1273df0d5d65f upstream.
      
      Bugzilla: 1671904
      
      There are multiple code paths where an hrtimer may have been started to
      emulate an L1 VMX preemption timer that can result in a call to free_nested
      without an intervening L2 exit where the hrtimer is normally
      cancelled. Unconditionally cancel in free_nested to cover all cases.
      
      Embargoed until Feb 7th 2019.
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com>
      Reported-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Reported-by: NFelix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      Message-Id: <20181011184646.154065-1-pshier@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      236fd677
  14. 31 1月, 2019 2 次提交
  15. 10 1月, 2019 1 次提交
  16. 29 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • C
      KVM: Fix UAF in nested posted interrupt processing · 1972ca04
      Cfir Cohen 提交于
      commit c2dd5146 upstream.
      
      nested_get_vmcs12_pages() processes the posted_intr address in vmcs12. It
      caches the kmap()ed page object and pointer, however, it doesn't handle
      errors correctly: it's possible to cache a valid pointer, then release
      the page and later dereference the dangling pointer.
      
      I was able to reproduce with the following steps:
      
      1. Call vmlaunch with valid posted_intr_desc_addr but an invalid
      MSR_EFER. This causes nested_get_vmcs12_pages() to cache the kmap()ed
      pi_desc_page and pi_desc. Later the invalid EFER value fails
      check_vmentry_postreqs() which fails the first vmlaunch.
      
      2. Call vmlanuch with a valid EFER but an invalid posted_intr_desc_addr
      (I set it to 2G - 0x80). The second time we call nested_get_vmcs12_pages
      pi_desc_page is unmapped and released and pi_desc_page is set to NULL
      (the "shouldn't happen" clause). Due to the invalid
      posted_intr_desc_addr, kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page() fails and
      nested_get_vmcs12_pages() returns. It doesn't return an error value so
      vmlaunch proceeds. Note that at this time we have a dangling pointer in
      vmx->nested.pi_desc and POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR in L0's vmcs.
      
      3. Issue an IPI in L2 guest code. This triggers a call to
      vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() and pi_test_and_clear_on() which
      dereferences the dangling pointer.
      
      Vulnerable code requires nested and enable_apicv variables to be set to
      true. The host CPU must also support posted interrupts.
      
      Fixes: 5e2f30b7 "KVM: nVMX: get rid of nested_get_page()"
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Reviewed-by: NAndy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1972ca04
  17. 17 12月, 2018 2 次提交
    • Y
      x86/kvm/vmx: fix old-style function declaration · bf1b47f3
      Yi Wang 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 1e4329ee2c52692ea42cc677fb2133519718b34a ]
      
      The inline keyword which is not at the beginning of the function
      declaration may trigger the following build warnings, so let's fix it:
      
      arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:1309:1: warning: ‘inline’ is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration]
      arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:5947:1: warning: ‘inline’ is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration]
      arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:5985:1: warning: ‘inline’ is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration]
      arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:6023:1: warning: ‘inline’ is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration]
      Signed-off-by: NYi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      bf1b47f3
    • L
      KVM: VMX: Update shared MSRs to be saved/restored on MSR_EFER.LMA changes · 3c7670d5
      Liran Alon 提交于
      [ Upstream commit f48b4711dd6e1cf282f9dfd159c14a305909c97c ]
      
      When guest transitions from/to long-mode by modifying MSR_EFER.LMA,
      the list of shared MSRs to be saved/restored on guest<->host
      transitions is updated (See vmx_set_efer() call to setup_msrs()).
      
      On every entry to guest, vcpu_enter_guest() calls
      vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(). This function should also take care
      of setting the shared MSRs to be saved/restored. However, the
      function does nothing in case we are already running with loaded
      guest state (vmx->loaded_cpu_state != NULL).
      
      This means that even when guest modifies MSR_EFER.LMA which results
      in updating the list of shared MSRs, it isn't being taken into account
      by vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest() because it happens while we are
      running with loaded guest state.
      
      To fix above mentioned issue, add a flag to mark that the list of
      shared MSRs has been updated and modify vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest()
      to set shared MSRs when running with host state *OR* list of shared
      MSRs has been updated.
      
      Note that this issue was mistakenly introduced by commit
      678e315e ("KVM: vmx: add dedicated utility to access guest's
      kernel_gs_base") because previously vmx_set_efer() always called
      vmx_load_host_state() which resulted in vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest() to
      set shared MSRs.
      
      Fixes: 678e315e ("KVM: vmx: add dedicated utility to access guest's kernel_gs_base")
      Reported-by: NEyal Moscovici <eyal.moscovici@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      3c7670d5
  18. 06 12月, 2018 2 次提交
  19. 14 11月, 2018 2 次提交
  20. 13 10月, 2018 1 次提交
  21. 04 10月, 2018 2 次提交
    • P
      kvm: nVMX: fix entry with pending interrupt if APICv is enabled · 7e712684
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      Commit b5861e5c introduced a check on
      the interrupt-window and NMI-window CPU execution controls in order to
      inject an external interrupt vmexit before the first guest instruction
      executes.  However, when APIC virtualization is enabled the host does not
      need a vmexit in order to inject an interrupt at the next interrupt window;
      instead, it just places the interrupt vector in RVI and the processor will
      inject it as soon as possible.  Therefore, on machines with APICv it is
      not enough to check the CPU execution controls: the same scenario can also
      happen if RVI>vPPR.
      
      Fixes: b5861e5cReviewed-by: NNikita Leshchenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
      Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      7e712684
    • P
      KVM: VMX: hide flexpriority from guest when disabled at the module level · 2cf7ea9f
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      As of commit 8d860bbe ("kvm: vmx: Basic APIC virtualization controls
      have three settings"), KVM will disable VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES when
      a nested guest writes APIC_BASE MSR and kvm-intel.flexpriority=0,
      whereas previously KVM would allow a nested guest to enable
      VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES so long as it's supported in hardware.  That is,
      KVM now advertises VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES to a guest but doesn't
      (always) allow setting it when kvm-intel.flexpriority=0, and may even
      initially allow the control and then clear it when the nested guest
      writes APIC_BASE MSR, which is decidedly odd even if it doesn't cause
      functional issues.
      
      Hide the control completely when the module parameter is cleared.
      reported-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Fixes: 8d860bbe ("kvm: vmx: Basic APIC virtualization controls have three settings")
      Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      2cf7ea9f