1. 02 9月, 2020 29 次提交
  2. 29 6月, 2020 4 次提交
  3. 28 5月, 2020 1 次提交
    • A
      open: introduce openat2(2) syscall · 5b9369e5
      Aleksa Sarai 提交于
      to #26323588
      
      commit fddb5d430ad9fa91b49b1d34d0202ffe2fa0e179 upstream.
      
      /* Background. */
      For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
      incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
      possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
      accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
      are present[1].
      
      This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
      been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
      defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
      kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
      flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
      being added to openat(2).
      
      Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
      supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
      contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
      flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
      openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
      fool-proof.
      
      In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
      (which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
      pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
      We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.
      
      Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
      and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
      need an openat3(2).
      
      /* Syscall Prototype. */
        /*
         * open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
         * clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
         * sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
         * extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
         * acting as a no-op default.
         */
        struct open_how { /* ... */ };
      
        int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
                    struct open_how *how, size_t size);
      
      /* Description. */
      The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:
      
        flags
          Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
          bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
          will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
          allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).
      
        mode
          The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
      
          Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
      
        resolve
          Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
          path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
          moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
          the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).
      
          RESOLVE_NO_XDEV       => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
          RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS   => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
          RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
          RESOLVE_BENEATH       => LOOKUP_BENEATH
          RESOLVE_IN_ROOT       => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT
      
      open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
      little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
      runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
      though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
      which are never used in the future.
      
      Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
      is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
      always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
      seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
      this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
      openat(2) but not openat2(2).
      
      After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
      are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
      that glibc has with importing that header.
      
      /* Testing. */
      In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
      syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
      attack scenarios.
      
      In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
      convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
      because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
      must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
      syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
      verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
      usable by userspace).
      
      /* Future Work. */
      Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
      These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
      during resolution).
      
      Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
      interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
      would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
      O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.
      
      Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
      CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
      which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
      (to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
      out).
      
      [1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
      [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
      [3]: commit 629e014b ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
      [4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
      [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
      [6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVsSuggested-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      5b9369e5
  4. 28 4月, 2020 1 次提交
  5. 22 4月, 2020 1 次提交
  6. 18 3月, 2020 4 次提交
    • M
      KVM: arm64: Opportunistically turn off WFI trapping when using direct LPI injection · ff9b66b5
      Marc Zyngier 提交于
      commit ef2e78ddadbb939ce79553b10dee0131d65d8f3e upstream.
      
      Just like we do for WFE trapping, it can be useful to turn off
      WFI trapping when the physical CPU is not oversubscribed (that
      is, the vcpu is the only runnable process on this CPU) *and*
      that we're using direct injection of interrupts.
      
      The conditions are reevaluated on each vcpu_load(), ensuring that
      we don't switch to this mode on a busy system.
      
      On a GICv4 system, this has the effect of reducing the generation
      of doorbell interrupts to zero when the right conditions are
      met, which is a huge improvement over the current situation
      (where the doorbells are screaming if the CPU ever hits a
      blocking WFI).
      Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
      Reviewed-by: NZenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
      Reviewed-by: NChristoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191107160412.30301-3-maz@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NShannon Zhao <shannon.zhao@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NZou Cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
      ff9b66b5
    • T
      arm64: reliable stacktraces · 46ad7da7
      Torsten Duwe 提交于
      cherry-picked from: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10657429/
      
      Enhance the stack unwinder so that it reports whether it had to stop
      normally or due to an error condition; unwind_frame() will report
      continue/error/normal ending and walk_stackframe() will pass that
      info. __save_stack_trace() is used to check the validity of a stack;
      save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() can now trivially be implemented.
      Modify arch/arm64/kernel/time.c as the only external caller so far
      to recognise the new semantics.
      
      I had to introduce a marker symbol kthread_return_to_user to tell
      the normal origin of a kernel thread.
      Signed-off-by: NTorsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NZou Cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      46ad7da7
    • Z
      alinux: arm64: add livepatch support · 7d9b185c
      Zou Cao 提交于
      Now we support FTRACE_WITH_REGS with -fpatchable-function-entry, here
      enable the livepatch support depend on FTRACE_WITH_REGS.
      
      Use task flag bit 6 to track patch transisiton state for the consistency
      model. Add it to the work mask so it gets cleared on all kernel exits to
      userland.
      
      Tell livepatch regs->pc + 2*AARCH64_INSN_SIZE is the place to change the
      return address.
      
      these codes have a big change against reference link, beacause we use new
      gcc featrue.
      
      References:
      https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10657431/
      
      Based-on-code-from: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NZou Cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      7d9b185c
    • J
      arm64: mm: add missing PTE_SPECIAL in pte_mkdevmap on arm64 · f72a099b
      Jia He 提交于
      commit 30e235389faadb9e3d918887b1f126155d7d761d upstream.
      
      Without this patch, the MAP_SYNC test case will cause a print_bad_pte
      warning on arm64 as follows:
      
      [   25.542693] BUG: Bad page map in process mapdax333 pte:2e8000448800f53 pmd:41ff5f003
      [   25.546360] page:ffff7e0010220000 refcount:1 mapcount:-1 mapping:ffff8003e29c7440 index:0x0
      [   25.550281] ext4_dax_aops
      [   25.550282] name:"__aaabbbcccddd__"
      [   25.551553] flags: 0x3ffff0000001002(referenced|reserved)
      [   25.555802] raw: 03ffff0000001002 ffff8003dfffa908 0000000000000000 ffff8003e29c7440
      [   25.559446] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001fffffffe 0000000000000000
      [   25.563075] page dumped because: bad pte
      [   25.564938] addr:0000ffffbe05b000 vm_flags:208000fb anon_vma:0000000000000000 mapping:ffff8003e29c7440 index:0
      [   25.574272] file:__aaabbbcccddd__ fault:ext4_dax_fault mmmmap:ext4_file_mmap readpage:0x0
      [   25.578799] CPU: 1 PID: 1180 Comm: mapdax333 Not tainted 5.2.0+ #21
      [   25.581702] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
      [   25.585624] Call trace:
      [   25.587008]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x178
      [   25.588799]  show_stack+0x24/0x30
      [   25.590328]  dump_stack+0xa8/0xcc
      [   25.591901]  print_bad_pte+0x18c/0x218
      [   25.593628]  unmap_page_range+0x778/0xc00
      [   25.595506]  unmap_single_vma+0x94/0xe8
      [   25.597304]  unmap_vmas+0x90/0x108
      [   25.598901]  unmap_region+0xc0/0x128
      [   25.600566]  __do_munmap+0x284/0x3f0
      [   25.602245]  __vm_munmap+0x78/0xe0
      [   25.603820]  __arm64_sys_munmap+0x34/0x48
      [   25.605709]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x168
      [   25.607956]  el0_svc_handler+0x34/0x90
      [   25.609698]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
      [...]
      
      The root cause is in _vm_normal_page, without the PTE_SPECIAL bit,
      the return value will be incorrectly set to pfn_to_page(pfn) instead
      of NULL. Besides, this patch also rewrite the pmd_mkdevmap to avoid
      setting PTE_SPECIAL for pmd
      
      The MAP_SYNC test case is as follows(Provided by Yibo Cai)
      $#include <stdio.h>
      $#include <string.h>
      $#include <unistd.h>
      $#include <sys/file.h>
      $#include <sys/mman.h>
      
      $#ifndef MAP_SYNC
      $#define MAP_SYNC 0x80000
      $#endif
      
      /* mount -o dax /dev/pmem0 /mnt */
      $#define F "/mnt/__aaabbbcccddd__"
      
      int main(void)
      {
          int fd;
          char buf[4096];
          void *addr;
      
          if ((fd = open(F, O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_RDWR, 0644)) < 0) {
              perror("open1");
              return 1;
          }
      
          if (write(fd, buf, 4096) != 4096) {
              perror("lseek");
              return 1;
          }
      
          addr = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED|MAP_SYNC, fd, 0);
          if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
              perror("mmap");
              printf("did you mount with '-o dax'?\n");
              return 1;
          }
      
          memset(addr, 0x55, 4096);
      
          if (munmap(addr, 4096) == -1) {
              perror("munmap");
              return 1;
          }
      
          close(fd);
      
          return 0;
      }
      
      Fixes: 73b20c84d42d ("arm64: mm: implement pte_devmap support")
      Reported-by: NYibo Cai <Yibo.Cai@arm.com>
      Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: NRobin Murphy <Robin.Murphy@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJia He <justin.he@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NShannon Zhao <shannon.zhao@linux.alibaba.com>
      Reviewed-by: NYang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
      f72a099b