This option was never used to my knowledge. Remove it before someone
does...
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

When you look in /proc/mounts, the address of the server gets displayed
as "addr=". That's really a better option to use anyway since it's more
generic. What if we eventually want to support non-IP transports? It
also makes CIFS option consistent with the NFS option of the same name.

Begin the migration to that option name by adding an alias for ip=
called addr=.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Also update fs/cifs/CHANGES
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

We have a bit of a problem with the uid= option. The basic issue is that
it means too many things and has too many side-effects.

It's possible to allow an unprivileged user to mount a filesystem if the
user owns the mountpoint, /bin/mount is setuid root, and the mount is
set up in /etc/fstab with the "user" option.

When doing this though, /bin/mount automatically adds the "uid=" and
"gid=" options to the share. This is fortunate since the correct uid=
option is needed in order to tell the upcall what user's credcache to
use when generating the SPNEGO blob.

On a mount without unix extensions this is fine -- you generally will
want the files to be owned by the "owner" of the mount. The problem
comes in on a mount with unix extensions. With those enabled, the
uid/gid options cause the ownership of files to be overriden even though
the server is sending along the ownership info.

This means that it's not possible to have a mount by an unprivileged
user that shows the server's file ownership info. The result is also
inode permissions that have no reflection at all on the server. You
simply cannot separate ownership from the mode in this fashion.

This behavior also makes MultiuserMount option less usable. Once you
pass in the uid= option for a mount, then you can't use unix ownership
info and allow someone to share the mount.

While I'm not thrilled with it, the only solution I can see is to stop
making uid=/gid= force the overriding of ownership on mounts, and to add
new mount options that turn this behavior on.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

For IPv6 the userspace mount helper sends an address in the "ip="
option.  This check fails if the length is > 35 characters. I have no
idea where the magic 35 character limit came from, but it's clearly not
enough for IPv6. Fix it by making it use the INET6_ADDRSTRLEN #define.

While we're at it, use the same #define for the address length in SPNEGO
upcalls.
Reported-by: NCharles R. Anderson <cra@wpi.edu>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Thus spake Christoph:

"But this whole set_cifs_acl function is a real mess anyway and needs
some splitting up."

With this change too, it's possible to call acl_to_uid_mode() with a
NULL inode pointer. That (or something close to it) will eventually be
necessary when cifs_get_inode_info is reorganized.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

The current cifs_iget isn't suitable for anything but the root inode.
Rename it with a more appropriate name.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

The callers primarily end up converting the args from le anyway. Also,
most of the callers end up needing to add an offset to the result. The
exception to these rules is cnvrtDosCifsTm, but there are no callers of
that function, so we might as well remove it.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

...and just have the function call le64_to_cpu.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

The current default file mode is 02767 and dir mode is 0777. This is
extremely "loose". Given that CIFS is a single-user protocol, these
permissions allow anyone to use the mount -- in effect, giving anyone on
the machine access to the credentials used to mount the share.

Change this by making the default permissions restrict write access to
the default owner of the mount. Give read and execute permissions to
everyone else. These are the same permissions that VFAT mounts get by
default so there is some precedent here.

Note that this patch also removes the mandatory locking flags from the
default file_mode. After having looked at how these flags are used by
the kernel, I don't think that keeping them as the default offers any
real benefit. That flag combination makes it so that the kernel enforces
mandatory locking.

Since the server is going to do that for us anyway, I don't think we
want the client to enforce this by default on applications that just
want advisory locks. Anyone that does want this behavior can always
enable it by setting the file_mode appropriately.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

There's no reason to limit the size of a symlink that we can read to
4000 bytes. That may be nowhere near PATH_MAX if the server is sending
UCS2 strings. CIFS should be able to read in a symlink up to the size of
the buffer. The size of the header has already been accounted for when
creating the slabcache, so CIFSMaxBufSize should be the correct size to
pass in.

Fixes samba bug #6384.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Small change (mostly formatting) to limit lookup based open calls to
file create only.

After discussion yesteday on samba-technical about the posix lookup
regression,  and looking at a problem with cifs posix open to one
particular Samba version, Jeff and JRA realized that Samba server's
behavior changed in this area (posix open behavior on files vs.
directories).   To make this behavior consistent, JRA just made a
fix to Samba server to alter how it handles open of directories (now
returning the equivalent of EISDIR instead of success). Since we don't
know at lookup time whether the inode is a directory or file (and
thus whether posix open will succeed with most current Samba server),
this change avoids the posix open code on lookup open (just issues
posix open on creates).    This gets the semantic benefits we want
(atomicity, posix byte range locks, improved write semantics on newly
created files) and file create still is fast, and we avoid the problem
that Jeff noticed yesterday with "openat" (and some open directory
calls) of non-cached directories to one version of Samba server, and
will work with future Samba versions (which include the fix jra just
pushed into Samba server).  I confirmed this approach with jra
yesterday and with Shirish today.

Posix open is only called (at lookup time) for file create now.
For opens (rather than creates), because we do not know if it
is a file or directory yet, and current Samba no longer allows
us to do posix open on dirs, we could end up wasting an open call
on what turns out to be a dir. For file opens, we wait to call posix
open till cifs_open.  It could be added here (lookup) in the future
but the performance tradeoff of the extra network request when EISDIR
or EACCES is returned would have to be weighed against the 50%
reduction in network traffic in the other paths.
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
CC: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Posix open code was not properly adding the file to the
list of open files.  Fix  allocating cifsFileInfo
more than once, and adding twice to flist and tlist.
Also fix mode setting to be done in one place in these
paths.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NLuca Tettamanti <kronos.it@gmail.com>

This is the third respin of the patch posted yesterday to fix the error
handling in cifs_follow_symlink. It also includes a fix for a bogus NULL
pointer check in CIFSSMBQueryUnixSymLink that Jeff Moyer spotted.

It's possible for CIFSSMBQueryUnixSymLink to return without setting
target_path to a valid pointer. If that happens then the current value
to which we're initializing this pointer could cause an oops when it's
kfree'd.

This patch is a little more comprehensive than the last patches. It
reorganizes cifs_follow_link a bit for (hopefully) better readability.
It should also eliminate the uneeded allocation of full_path on servers
without unix extensions (assuming they can get to this point anyway, of
which I'm not convinced).

On a side note, I'm not sure I agree with the logic of enabling this
query even when unix extensions are disabled on the client. It seems
like that should disable this as well. But, changing that is outside the
scope of this fix, so I've left it alone for now.
Reported-by: NJeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@inraded.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

cifs_strndup_from_ucs returns NULL on error, not an ERR_PTR
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Push BKL down into ->umount_begin()
Signed-off-by: NAlessio Igor Bogani <abogani@texware.it>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Remove adding open file entry twice to lists in the file
Do not fill file info twice in case of posix opens and creates
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

On mount, "sec=ntlmssp" can now be specified to allow
"rawntlmssp" security to be enabled during
CIFS session establishment/authentication (ntlmssp used to
require specifying krb5 which was counterintuitive).
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

We were not setting the SMB uid in NTLMSSP authenticate
request which could lead to INVALID_PARAMETER error
on 2nd session setup.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

The NTLMSSP code was removed from fs/cifs/connect.c and merged
(75% smaller, cleaner) into fs/cifs/sess.c

As with the old code it requires that cifs be built with
CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL, the /proc/fs/cifs/Experimental flag
must be set to 2, and mount must turn on extended security
(e.g. with sec=krb5).

Although NTLMSSP encapsulated in SPNEGO is not enabled yet,
"raw" ntlmssp is common and useful in some cases since it
offers more complete security negotiation, and is the
default way of negotiating security for many Windows systems.
SPNEGO encapsulated NTLMSSP will be able to reuse the same
code.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Remove dead NTLMSSP support from connect.c prior to addition of
the new code to replace it.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

When multiply mounting from the same client to the same server, with
different userids, we create a vcnum which should be unique if
possible (this is not the same as the smb uid, which is the handle
to the security context).  We were not endian converting additional
(beyond the first which is zero) vcnum properly.

CC: Stable <stable@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Removes two sparse CHECK_ENDIAN warnings from Jeffs earlier patch,
and removes the dead readlink code (after noting where in
findfirst we will need to add something like that in the future
to handle the newly discovered unexpected error on FindFirst of NTFS symlinks.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

The earlier patch to move this code to use the new unicode helpers
assumed that the filename strings would be null terminated. That's not
always the case.

Instead of passing "max_len" to the string converter, pass "min(len,
max_len)", which makes it do the right thing while still keeping the
parser confined to the response. Also fix up the prototypes of this
function and the callers so that max_len is unsigned (like len is).
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

In most cases, cifs_strndup is converting from Unicode (UCS2 / UTF-32) to
the configured local code page for the Linux mount (usually UTF8), so
Jeff suggested that to make it more clear that cifs_strndup is doing
a conversion not just memory allocation and copy, rename the function
to including "from_ucs" (ie Unicode)
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Added loop check when mounting DFS tree. mount will fail with
ELOOP if referral walks exceed MAX_NESTED_LINK count.
Signed-off-by: NIgor Mammedov <niallain@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Having remote dfs root support in cifs_mount, we can
afford to pass into it UNC that is remote.
Signed-off-by: NIgor Mammedov <niallain@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Two years ago, when the session setup code in cifs was rewritten and moved
to fs/cifs/sess.c, we were asked to keep the old code for a release or so
(which could be reenabled at runtime) since it was such a large change and
because the asn (SPNEGO) and NTLMSSP code was not rewritten and needed to
be. This was useful to avoid regressions, but is long overdue to be removed.
Now that the Kerberos (asn/spnego) code is working in fs/cifs/sess.c,
and the NTLMSSP code moved (NTLMSSP blob setup be rewritten with the
next patch in this series) quite a bit of dead code from fs/cifs/connect.c
now can be removed.

This old code should have been removed last year, but the earlier krb5
patches did not move/remove the NTLMSSP code which we had asked to
be done first.  Since no one else volunteered, I am doing it now.

It is extremely important that we continue to examine the documentation
for this area, to make sure our code continues to be uptodate with
changes since Windows 2003.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>