These header files are typically copied from an existing architecture
into any new one, slightly modified and then remain untouched until
the end of time in the name of ABI stability.

To make it easier for future architectures, provide a sane generic
version here. In cases where multiple architectures already use
identical code, I used the most common version. In cases like
stat.h that are more or less broken everywhere, I provide a
version that is meant to be ideal for new architectures.
Signed-off-by: NRemis Lima Baima <remis.developer@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

User space can request hardware and/or software time stamping.
Reporting of the result(s) via a new control message is enabled
separately for each field in the message because some of the
fields may require additional computation and thus cause overhead.
User space can tell the different kinds of time stamps apart
and choose what suits its needs.

When a TX timestamp operation is requested, the TX skb will be cloned
and the clone will be time stamped (in hardware or software) and added
to the socket error queue of the skb, if the skb has a socket
associated with it.

The actual TX timestamp will reach userspace as a RX timestamp on the
cloned packet. If timestamping is requested and no timestamping is
done in the device driver (potentially this may use hardware
timestamping), it will be done in software after the device's
start_hard_xmit routine.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NBryan Wu <cooloney@kernel.org>

A userspace program may wish to set the mark for each packets its send
without using the netfilter MARK target. Changing the mark can be used
for mark based routing without netfilter or for packet filtering.

It requires CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Signed-off-by: NLaszlo Attila Toth <panther@balabit.hu>
Acked-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This adds support for the Analog Devices Blackfin processor architecture, and
currently supports the BF533, BF532, BF531, BF537, BF536, BF534, and BF561
(Dual Core) devices, with a variety of development platforms including those
avaliable from Analog Devices (BF533-EZKit, BF533-STAMP, BF537-STAMP,
BF561-EZKIT), and Bluetechnix!  Tinyboards.

The Blackfin architecture was jointly developed by Intel and Analog Devices
Inc.  (ADI) as the Micro Signal Architecture (MSA) core and introduced it in
December of 2000.  Since then ADI has put this core into its Blackfin
processor family of devices.  The Blackfin core has the advantages of a clean,
orthogonal,RISC-like microprocessor instruction set.  It combines a dual-MAC
(Multiply/Accumulate), state-of-the-art signal processing engine and
single-instruction, multiple-data (SIMD) multimedia capabilities into a single
instruction-set architecture.

The Blackfin architecture, including the instruction set, is described by the
ADSP-BF53x/BF56x Blackfin Processor Programming Reference
http://blackfin.uclinux.org/gf/download/frsrelease/29/2549/Blackfin_PRM.pdf

The Blackfin processor is already supported by major releases of gcc, and
there are binary and source rpms/tarballs for many architectures at:
http://blackfin.uclinux.org/gf/project/toolchain/frs There is complete
documentation, including "getting started" guides available at:
http://docs.blackfin.uclinux.org/ which provides links to the sources and
patches you will need in order to set up a cross-compiling environment for
bfin-linux-uclibc

This patch, as well as the other patches (toolchain, distribution,
uClibc) are actively supported by Analog Devices Inc, at:
http://blackfin.uclinux.org/

We have tested this on LTP, and our test plan (including pass/fails) can
be found at:
http://docs.blackfin.uclinux.org/doku.php?id=testing_the_linux_kernel

[m.kozlowski@tuxland.pl: balance parenthesis in blackfin header files]
Signed-off-by: NBryan Wu <bryan.wu@analog.com>
Signed-off-by: NMariusz Kozlowski <m.kozlowski@tuxland.pl>
Signed-off-by: NAubrey Li <aubrey.li@analog.com>
Signed-off-by: NJie Zhang <jie.zhang@analog.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Now that network timestamps use ktime_t infrastructure, we can add a new
SOL_SOCKET sockopt  SO_TIMESTAMPNS.

This command is similar to SO_TIMESTAMP, but permits transmission of
a 'timespec struct' instead of a 'timeval struct' control message.
(nanosecond resolution instead of microsecond)

Control message is labelled SCM_TIMESTAMPNS instead of SCM_TIMESTAMP

A socket cannot mix SO_TIMESTAMP and SO_TIMESTAMPNS : the two modes are
mutually exclusive.

sock_recv_timestamp() became too big to be fully inlined so I added a
__sock_recv_timestamp() helper function.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
CC: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket.  The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.

Patch design and implementation:

The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets.  Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).  To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications.  We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NAcked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Allows overriding of sysctl_{wmem,rmrm}_max
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!