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  1. 24 9月, 2008 17 次提交
  3. 18 9月, 2008 1 次提交
  5. 10 9月, 2008 14 次提交
  7. 09 9月, 2008 8 次提交
    • H
      ipsec: Restore larval states and socket policies in dump · 225f4005
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      The commit commit 4c563f76 ("[XFRM]:
Speed up xfrm_policy and xfrm_state walking") inadvertently removed
larval states and socket policies from netlink dumps.  This patch
restores them.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      225f4005
    • P
      [S390] cio: allow offline processing for disconnected devices · b301ea8c
      由 Peter Oberparleiter 提交于 
      When disconnected ccw devices are removed, the device has to be set
offline, otherwise there will be side effects including a reference
count imbalance. This patch modifies ccw_device_offline to work for
devices in disconnecte/not operational state. ccw_device_offline is
called by cio for devices which are online during device removal.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Oberparleiter <peter.oberparleiter@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      b301ea8c
    • C
      [S390] cio: handle ssch() return codes correctly. · c91ebe49
      由 Cornelia Huck 提交于 
      ssch() has two classes of return codes:
- condition codes (0-3) which need to be translated to Linux
  error codes
- Linux error codes (-EIO on exceptions) which should be passed
  to the caller (instead of erronously being handled like
  condition code 3)
Signed-off-by: NCornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      c91ebe49
    • C
      [S390] cio: Correct cleanup on error. · a2164b81
      由 Cornelia Huck 提交于 
      Fix cleanup on error in chp_new() and init_channel_subsystem()
(must not call kfree() on structures that had been registered).
Signed-off-by: NCornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      a2164b81
    • J
      [S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode · 3d6e48f4
      由 Jarod Wilson 提交于 
      When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.

This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.

Test case available here:
http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/user-area-padding.c?cvsroot=systemtap

Steps to reproduce:
1) wget the above
2) gcc -o user-area-padding-31bit user-area-padding.c -Wall -ggdb2 -D_GNU_SOURCE -m31
3) ./user-area-padding-31bit
<panic>

Test status
-----------
Without patch, both s390 and s390x kernels panic. With patch, the test case,
as well as the gdb testsuite, pass without incident, padding area reads
returning zero, writes ignored.

Nb: original version returned -EINVAL on write attempts, which broke the
gdb test and made the test case slightly unhappy, Jan Kratochvil suggested
the change to return 0 on write attempts.
Signed-off-by: NJarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NJan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      3d6e48f4
    • D
      Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/holtmann/bluetooth-2.6 · fd9ec7d3
      由 David S. Miller 提交于
      fd9ec7d3
    • M
      [Bluetooth] Reject L2CAP connections on an insecure ACL link · e7c29cb1
      由 Marcel Holtmann 提交于 
      The Security Mode 4 of the Bluetooth 2.1 specification has strict
authentication and encryption requirements. It is the initiators job
to create a secure ACL link. However in case of malicious devices, the
acceptor has to make sure that the ACL is encrypted before allowing
any kind of L2CAP connection. The only exception here is the PSM 1 for
the service discovery protocol, because that is allowed to run on an
insecure ACL link.

Previously it was enough to reject a L2CAP connection during the
connection setup phase, but with Bluetooth 2.1 it is forbidden to
do any L2CAP protocol exchange on an insecure link (except SDP).

The new hci_conn_check_link_mode() function can be used to check the
integrity of an ACL link. This functions also takes care of the cases
where Security Mode 4 is disabled or one of the devices is based on
an older specification.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      e7c29cb1
    • M
      [Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements · 09ab6f4c
      由 Marcel Holtmann 提交于 
      With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the
Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator
requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can
be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service
discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption
since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0
and before handle connections on PSM 1.

For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between
no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer
wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it
should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication
requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used,
but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding.

If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it
also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on
requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM
protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive
operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice
during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing
a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected
Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known
up-front and so enforce them.

To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended
with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside
the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any
time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in
the expected behavior.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      09ab6f4c