Before unlinking the inode, reset the current permissions of possible
references like hardlinks, so granted permissions can not be retained
across the device lifetime by creating hardlinks, in the unusual case
that there is a user-writable directory on the same filesystem.
Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 05:26:20PM +0530, Sachin Sant wrote:
> Hello Heiko,
>
> Today while trying to boot next-20100118 i came across
> the following Oops :
>
> Brought up 4 CPUs
> Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference at virtual kernel address 0000000000
> 543000
> Oops: 0004 #1 SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 0 Not tainted 2.6.33-rc4-autotest-next-20100118-5-default #1
> Process swapper (pid: 1, task: 00000000fd792038, ksp: 00000000fd797a30)
> Krnl PSW : 0704200180000000 00000000001eb0b8 (shmem_parse_options+0xc0/0x328)
>           R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:0 CC:2 PM:0 EA:3
> Krnl GPRS: 000000000054388a 000000000000003d 0000000000543836 000000000000003d
>           0000000000000000 0000000000483f28 0000000000536112 00000000fd797d00
>           00000000fd4ba100 0000000000000100 0000000000483978 0000000000543832
>           0000000000000000 0000000000465958 00000000001eb0b0 00000000fd797c58
> Krnl Code: 00000000001eb0aa: c0e5000994f1       brasl   %r14,31da8c
>           00000000001eb0b0: b9020022           ltgr    %r2,%r2
>           00000000001eb0b4: a784010b           brc     8,1eb2ca
>          >00000000001eb0b8: 92002000           mvi     0(%r2),0
>           00000000001eb0bc: a7080000           lhi     %r0,0
>           00000000001eb0c0: 41902001           la      %r9,1(%r2)
>           00000000001eb0c4: b9040016           lgr     %r1,%r6
>           00000000001eb0c8: b904002b           lgr     %r2,%r11
> Call Trace:
> (<00000000fd797c50> 0xfd797c50)
> <00000000001eb5da> shmem_fill_super+0x13a/0x25c
> <0000000000228cfa> get_sb_single+0xbe/0xdc
> <000000000034ffc0> dev_get_sb+0x2c/0x38
> <000000000066c602> devtmpfs_init+0x46/0xc0
> <000000000066c53e> driver_init+0x22/0x60
> <000000000064d40a> kernel_init+0x24e/0x3d0
> <000000000010a7ea> kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc
> <000000000010a7e4> kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc
>
> I never tried to boot a kernel with DEVTMPFS enabled on a s390 box.
> So am wondering if this is supported or not ? If you think this
> is supported i will send a mail to community on this.

There is nothing arch specific to devtmpfs. This part crashes because the
kernel tries to modify the data read-only section which is write protected
on s390.
Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

Reported-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

devtmpfs has a rw_lock dirlock which serializes delete_path and
create_path.

This code was obviously never tested with the usual set of debugging
facilities enabled. In the dirlock held sections the code calls:

 - vfs functions which take mutexes
 - kmalloc(, GFP_KERNEL)

In both code pathes the might sleep warning triggers and spams dmesg.

Convert the rw_lock to a mutex. There is no reason why this needs to
be a rwlock.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Mark Rosenstand <rosenstand@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

This allows subsytems to provide devtmpfs with non-default permissions
for the device node. Instead of the default mode of 0600, null, zero,
random, urandom, full, tty, ptmx now have a mode of 0666, which allows
non-privileged processes to access standard device nodes in case no
other userspace process applies the expected permissions.

This also fixes a wrong assignment in pktcdvd and a checkpatch.pl complain.
Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

Devtmpfs lets the kernel create a tmpfs instance called devtmpfs
very early at kernel initialization, before any driver-core device
is registered. Every device with a major/minor will provide a
device node in devtmpfs.

Devtmpfs can be changed and altered by userspace at any time,
and in any way needed - just like today's udev-mounted tmpfs.
Unmodified udev versions will run just fine on top of it, and will
recognize an already existing kernel-created device node and use it.
The default node permissions are root:root 0600. Proper permissions
and user/group ownership, meaningful symlinks, all other policy still
needs to be applied by userspace.

If a node is created by devtmps, devtmpfs will remove the device node
when the device goes away. If the device node was created by
userspace, or the devtmpfs created node was replaced by userspace, it
will no longer be removed by devtmpfs.

If it is requested to auto-mount it, it makes init=/bin/sh work
without any further userspace support. /dev will be fully populated
and dynamic, and always reflect the current device state of the kernel.
With the commonly used dynamic device numbers, it solves the problem
where static devices nodes may point to the wrong devices.

It is intended to make the initial bootup logic simpler and more robust,
by de-coupling the creation of the inital environment, to reliably run
userspace processes, from a complex userspace bootstrap logic to provide
a working /dev.
Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: NJan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Tested-By: NHarald Hoyer <harald@redhat.com>
Tested-By: NScott James Remnant <scott@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>