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  1. 29 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  3. 28 7月, 2014 2 次提交
  5. 25 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  7. 23 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  9. 19 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  11. 18 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  13. 17 7月, 2014 4 次提交
  15. 09 7月, 2014 8 次提交
  17. 08 7月, 2014 6 次提交
    • D
      PKCS#7: Provide a key type for testing PKCS#7 · 22d01afb
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Provide a key type for testing the PKCS#7 parser.  It is given a non-detached
PKCS#7 message as payload:

	keyctl padd pkcs7_test a @s <stuff.pkcs7

The PKCS#7 wrapper is validated against the trusted certificates available and
then stripped off.  If successful, the key can be read, which will give the
data content of the PKCS#7 message.

A suitable message can be created by running make on the attached Makefile.
This will produce a file called stuff.pkcs7 for test loading.  The key3.x509
file should be put into the kernel source tree before it is built and
converted to DER form:

	openssl x509 -in .../pkcs7/key3.x509 -outform DER -out key3.x509

###############################################################################
#
# Create a pkcs7 message and sign it twice
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509
#
###############################################################################
stuff.pkcs7: stuff.txt key2.priv key2.x509 key4.priv key4.x509 certs
	$(RM) $@
	openssl smime -sign \
		-signer key2.x509 \
		-inkey key2.priv \
		-signer key4.x509 \
		-inkey key4.priv \
		-in stuff.txt \
		-certfile certs \
		-out $@ -binary -outform DER -nodetach
	openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7  -print_certs -noout
	openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7  -i >out

stuff.txt:
	echo "The quick red fox jumped over the lazy brown dog" >stuff.txt

certs: key1.x509 key2.x509 key3.x509 key4.x509
	cat key{1,3}.x509 >$@

###############################################################################
#
# Generate a signed key
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509
#
###############################################################################
key2.x509: key2.x509_unsigned key1.priv key1.x509
	openssl x509 \
		-req -in key2.x509_unsigned \
		-out key2.x509 \
		-extfile key2.genkey -extensions myexts \
		-CA key1.x509 \
		-CAkey key1.priv \
		-CAcreateserial

key2.priv key2.x509_unsigned: key2.genkey
	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
		-batch -outform PEM \
		-config key2.genkey \
		-keyout key2.priv \
		-out key2.x509_unsigned

key2.genkey:
	@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
	@echo  >$@ "[ req ]"
	@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
	@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
	@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
	@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
	@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
	@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
	@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 2"
	@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
	@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE"
	@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature"
	@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
	@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"

###############################################################################
#
# Generate a couple of signing keys
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key1.x509
#
###############################################################################
key1.x509: key1.x509_unsigned key4.priv key4.x509
	openssl x509 \
		-req -in key1.x509_unsigned \
		-out key1.x509 \
		-extfile key1.genkey -extensions myexts \
		-CA key4.x509 \
		-CAkey key4.priv \
		-CAcreateserial

key1.priv key1.x509_unsigned: key1.genkey
	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
		-batch -outform PEM \
		-config key1.genkey \
		-keyout key1.priv \
		-out key1.x509_unsigned

key1.genkey:
	@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
	@echo  >$@ "[ req ]"
	@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
	@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
	@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
	@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
	@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
	@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
	@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 1"
	@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
	@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
	@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
	@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
	@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"

###############################################################################
#
# Generate a signed key
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key4.x509
#
###############################################################################
key4.x509: key4.x509_unsigned key3.priv key3.x509
	openssl x509 \
		-req -in key4.x509_unsigned \
		-out key4.x509 \
		-extfile key4.genkey -extensions myexts \
		-CA key3.x509 \
		-CAkey key3.priv \
		-CAcreateserial

key4.priv key4.x509_unsigned: key4.genkey
	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
		-batch -outform PEM \
		-config key4.genkey \
		-keyout key4.priv \
		-out key4.x509_unsigned

key4.genkey:
	@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
	@echo  >$@ "[ req ]"
	@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
	@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
	@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
	@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
	@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
	@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
	@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 4"
	@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
	@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
	@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
	@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
	@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"

###############################################################################
#
# Generate a couple of signing keys
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key3.x509
#
###############################################################################
key3.priv key3.x509: key3.genkey
	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
		-batch -x509 -outform PEM \
		-config key3.genkey \
		-keyout key3.priv \
		-out key3.x509

key3.genkey:
	@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
	@echo  >$@ "[ req ]"
	@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
	@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
	@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
	@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
	@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
	@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
	@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 3"
	@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
	@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
	@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
	@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
	@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"

clean:
	$(RM) *~
	$(RM) key1.* key2.* key3.* key4.* stuff.* out certs
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      22d01afb
    • D
      PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and known, trusted keys · 08815b62
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7
message and a set of keys that we already know and trust.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      08815b62
    • D
      PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chain · 8c76d793
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7
message as far as possible.  If any signature that we should be able to verify
fails, we reject the whole lot.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      8c76d793
    • D
      PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature · a4730357
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with
it.  There may be several keys in there forming a chain.  Any link in that
chain or the root of that chain may be in our keyrings.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      a4730357
    • D
      PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data message · 9f0d3314
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the
public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      9f0d3314
    • D
      PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315] · 2e3fadbf
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of
RFC 2315.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      2e3fadbf
  19. 03 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  21. 01 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  23. 24 11月, 2013 1 次提交
    • L
      Revert "KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key" · 4c1cc40a
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      This reverts commit 09fbc473, which
caused the following build errors:

  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c: In function ‘x509_key_preparse’:
  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:237:35: error: ‘system_trusted_keyring’ undeclared (first use in this function)
   ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, system_trusted_keyring);
                                   ^
  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:237:35: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in

reported by Jim Davis. Mimi says:

 "I made the classic mistake of requesting this patch to be upstreamed
  at the last second, rather than waiting until the next open window.

  At this point, the best course would probably be to revert the two
  commits and fix them for the next open window"
Reported-by: NJim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4c1cc40a
  25. 01 11月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB · dbed7141
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB directly in Kconfig as the
'select' directive is not recursive and is thus MPILIB is not enabled by
selecting MPILIB_EXTRA.

Without this, the following errors can occur:

	crypto/built-in.o: In function `RSA_verify_signature':
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d347): undefined reference to `mpi_get_nbits'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d354): undefined reference to `mpi_get_nbits'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d36e): undefined reference to `mpi_cmp_ui'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d382): undefined reference to `mpi_cmp'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d391): undefined reference to `mpi_alloc'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d3b0): undefined reference to `mpi_powm'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d3c3): undefined reference to `mpi_free'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d3d8): undefined reference to `mpi_get_buffer'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d4d4): undefined reference to `mpi_free'
	rsa.c:(.text+0x1d503): undefined reference to `mpi_get_nbits'
Reported-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      dbed7141
  27. 26 10月, 2013 2 次提交
  29. 07 10月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      crypto: crypto_memneq - add equality testing of memory regions w/o timing leaks · 6bf37e5a
      由 James Yonan 提交于 
      When comparing MAC hashes, AEAD authentication tags, or other hash
values in the context of authentication or integrity checking, it
is important not to leak timing information to a potential attacker,
i.e. when communication happens over a network.

Bytewise memory comparisons (such as memcmp) are usually optimized so
that they return a nonzero value as soon as a mismatch is found. E.g,
on x86_64/i5 for 512 bytes this can be ~50 cyc for a full mismatch
and up to ~850 cyc for a full match (cold). This early-return behavior
can leak timing information as a side channel, allowing an attacker to
iteratively guess the correct result.

This patch adds a new method crypto_memneq ("memory not equal to each
other") to the crypto API that compares memory areas of the same length
in roughly "constant time" (cache misses could change the timing, but
since they don't reveal information about the content of the strings
being compared, they are effectively benign). Iow, best and worst case
behaviour take the same amount of time to complete (in contrast to
memcmp).

Note that crypto_memneq (unlike memcmp) can only be used to test for
equality or inequality, NOT for lexicographical order. This, however,
is not an issue for its use-cases within the crypto API.

We tried to locate all of the places in the crypto API where memcmp was
being used for authentication or integrity checking, and convert them
over to crypto_memneq.

crypto_memneq is declared noinline, placed in its own source file,
and compiled with optimizations that might increase code size disabled
("Os") because a smart compiler (or LTO) might notice that the return
value is always compared against zero/nonzero, and might then
reintroduce the same early-return optimization that we are trying to
avoid.

Using #pragma or __attribute__ optimization annotations of the code
for disabling optimization was avoided as it seems to be considered
broken or unmaintained for long time in GCC [1]. Therefore, we work
around that by specifying the compile flag for memneq.o directly in
the Makefile. We found that this seems to be most appropriate.

As we use ("Os"), this patch also provides a loop-free "fast-path" for
frequently used 16 byte digests. Similarly to kernel library string
functions, leave an option for future even further optimized architecture
specific assembler implementations.

This was a joint work of James Yonan and Daniel Borkmann. Also thanks
for feedback from Florian Weimer on this and earlier proposals [2].

  [1] http://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc/2012-07/msg00211.html
  [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/2/10/131Signed-off-by: NJames Yonan <james@openvpn.net>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      6bf37e5a
  31. 26 9月, 2013 8 次提交