1. 23 5月, 2019 3 次提交
  2. 18 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 16 5月, 2019 27 次提交
  4. 15 5月, 2019 9 次提交
    • G
      Linux 4.19.43 · 3351e9d3
      Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
      3351e9d3
    • J
      x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo · b21bde49
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit 95310e348a321b45fb746c176961d4da72344282 upstream
      
      Fix a minor typo in the MDS documentation: "eanbled" -> "enabled".
      Reported-by: NJeff Bastian <jbastian@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b21bde49
    • T
      Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values · 8e65568e
      Tyler Hicks 提交于
      commit ea01668f9f43021b28b3f4d5ffad50106a1e1301 upstream
      
      Adjust the last two rows in the table that display possible values when
      MDS mitigation is enabled. They both were slightly innacurate.
      
      In addition, convert the table of possible values and their descriptions
      to a list-table. The simple table format uses the top border of equals
      signs to determine cell width which resulted in the first column being
      far too wide in comparison to the second column that contained the
      majority of the text.
      Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      8e65568e
    • S
      x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation · 2e4c5489
      speck for Pawan Gupta 提交于
      commit e672f8bf71c66253197e503f75c771dd28ada4a0 upstream
      
      Updated the documentation for a new CVE-2019-11091 Microarchitectural Data
      Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) which is a variant of
      Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is a family of side channel
      attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs.
      
      MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
      memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
      structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
      MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS. There are no new code changes expected for MDSUM.
      The existing mitigation for MDS applies to MDSUM as well.
      Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2e4c5489
    • J
      x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS · 12a0dad7
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit 5c14068f87d04adc73ba3f41c2a303d3c3d1fa12 upstream
      
      Add MDS to the new 'mitigations=' cmdline option.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      12a0dad7
    • J
      s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option · 59a14fb5
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit 0336e04a6520bdaefdb0769d2a70084fa52e81ed upstream
      
      Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
      with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Spectre v1 and
      Spectre v2.
      
      The default behavior is unchanged.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
      Reviewed-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
      Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4a161805458a5ec88812aac0307ae3908a030fc.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      59a14fb5
    • J
      powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option · 74857f69
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit 782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9 upstream
      
      Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
      with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
      v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
      
      The default behavior is unchanged.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
      Reviewed-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
      Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      74857f69
    • J
      x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option · af5332dd
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 upstream
      
      Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
      the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
      Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
      
      The default behavior is unchanged.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
      Reviewed-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
      Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      af5332dd
    • J
      cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option · 8cb932ac
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream
      
      Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
      bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
      complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
      architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
      have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
      
      Most users fall into a few basic categories:
      
      a) they want all mitigations off;
      
      b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
         it's vulnerable; or
      
      c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
         vulnerable.
      
      Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
      aggregation of existing options:
      
      - mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
      
      - mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
        leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
      
      - mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
        SMT if needed by a mitigation.
      
      Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
      anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
      Reviewed-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
      Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      8cb932ac