commit 833f4154ed560232120bc475935ee1d6a20e159f upstream.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b53119f13a04879c3bf502828d99d13726639ead upstream.

aio_poll() is not the only case that needs file pinned; worse, while
aio_read()/aio_write() can live without pinning iocb itself, the
proof is rather brittle and can easily break on later changes.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 84c4e1f89fefe70554da0ab33be72c9be7994379 upstream.

Al Viro root-caused a race where the IOCB_CMD_POLL handling of
fget/fput() could cause us to access the file pointer after it had
already been freed:

 "In more details - normally IOCB_CMD_POLL handling looks so:

   1) io_submit(2) allocates aio_kiocb instance and passes it to
      aio_poll()

   2) aio_poll() resolves the descriptor to struct file by req->file =
      fget(iocb->aio_fildes)

   3) aio_poll() sets ->woken to false and raises ->ki_refcnt of that
      aio_kiocb to 2 (bumps by 1, that is).

   4) aio_poll() calls vfs_poll(). After sanity checks (basically,
      "poll_wait() had been called and only once") it locks the queue.
      That's what the extra reference to iocb had been for - we know we
      can safely access it.

   5) With queue locked, we check if ->woken has already been set to
      true (by aio_poll_wake()) and, if it had been, we unlock the
      queue, drop a reference to aio_kiocb and bugger off - at that
      point it's a responsibility to aio_poll_wake() and the stuff
      called/scheduled by it. That code will drop the reference to file
      in req->file, along with the other reference to our aio_kiocb.

   6) otherwise, we see whether we need to wait. If we do, we unlock the
      queue, drop one reference to aio_kiocb and go away - eventual
      wakeup (or cancel) will deal with the reference to file and with
      the other reference to aio_kiocb

   7) otherwise we remove ourselves from waitqueue (still under the
      queue lock), so that wakeup won't get us. No async activity will
      be happening, so we can safely drop req->file and iocb ourselves.

  If wakeup happens while we are in vfs_poll(), we are fine - aio_kiocb
  won't get freed under us, so we can do all the checks and locking
  safely. And we don't touch ->file if we detect that case.

  However, vfs_poll() most certainly *does* touch the file it had been
  given. So wakeup coming while we are still in ->poll() might end up
  doing fput() on that file. That case is not too rare, and usually we
  are saved by the still present reference from descriptor table - that
  fput() is not the final one.

  But if another thread closes that descriptor right after our fget()
  and wakeup does happen before ->poll() returns, we are in trouble -
  final fput() done while we are in the middle of a method:

Al also wrote a patch to take an extra reference to the file descriptor
to fix this, but I instead suggested we just streamline the whole file
pointer handling by submit_io() so that the generic aio submission code
simply keeps the file pointer around until the aio has completed.

Fixes: bfe4037e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL")
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+503d4cc169fcec1cb18c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit ec51f8ee1e63498e9f521ec0e5a6d04622bb2c67 upstream.

A recent optimization had left private uninitialized.

Fixes: 2bc4ca9bb600 ("aio: don't zero entire aio_kiocb aio_get_req()")
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NMike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 875736bb3f3ded168469f6a14df7a938416a99d5 upstream.
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 88a6f18b950e2e4dce57d31daa151105f4f3dcff upstream.

In preparation of handing in iocbs in a different fashion as well. Also
make it clear that the iocb being passed in isn't modified, by marking
it const throughout.
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 71ebc6fef0f53459f37fb39e1466792232fa52ee upstream.

Replace the percpu_ref_put() + kmem_cache_free() with a call to
iocb_put() instead.
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 2bc4ca9bb600cbe36941da2b2a67189fc4302a04 upstream.

It's 192 bytes, fairly substantial. Most items don't need to be cleared,
especially not upfront. Clear the ones we do need to clear, and leave
the other ones for setup when the iocb is prepared and submitted.
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 432c79978c33ecef91b1b04cea6936c20810da29 upstream.

This is in preparation for certain types of IO not needing a ring
reserveration.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit bc9bff61624ac33b7c95861abea1af24ee7a94fc upstream.

We know this is a read/write request, but in preparation for
having different kinds of those, ensure that we call the assigned
handler instead of assuming it's aio_complete_rq().
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 154989e45fd8de9bfb52bbd6e5ea763e437e54c5 upstream.

No one is going to poll for aio (yet), so we must clear the HIPRI
flag, as we would otherwise send it down the poll queues, where no
one will be polling for completions.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

IOCB_HIPRI, not RWF_HIPRI.
Reviewed-by: NJohannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d3d6a18d7d351cbcc9b33dbedf710e65f8ce1595 upstream.

wake_up_locked() may but does not have to be called with interrupts
disabled. Since the fuse filesystem calls wake_up_locked() without
disabling interrupts aio_poll_wake() may be called with interrupts
enabled. Since the kioctx.ctx_lock may be acquired from IRQ context,
all code that acquires that lock from thread context must disable
interrupts. Hence change the spin_trylock() call in aio_poll_wake()
into a spin_trylock_irqsave() call. This patch fixes the following
lockdep complaint:

=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
5.0.0-rc4-next-20190131 #23 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
syz-executor2/13779 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
0000000098ac1230 (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:329 [inline]
0000000098ac1230 (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1772 [inline]
0000000098ac1230 (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one fs/aio.c:1875 [inline]
0000000098ac1230 (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: io_submit_one+0xedf/0x1cf0 fs/aio.c:1908

and this task is already holding:
000000003c46111c (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
000000003c46111c (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1771 [inline]
000000003c46111c (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one fs/aio.c:1875 [inline]
000000003c46111c (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: io_submit_one+0xeb6/0x1cf0 fs/aio.c:1908
which would create a new lock dependency:
 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}

but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}

... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at:
  lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
  __raw_spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:128 [inline]
  _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x60/0x80 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160
  spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
  free_ioctx_users+0x2d/0x4a0 fs/aio.c:610
  percpu_ref_put_many include/linux/percpu-refcount.h:285 [inline]
  percpu_ref_put include/linux/percpu-refcount.h:301 [inline]
  percpu_ref_call_confirm_rcu lib/percpu-refcount.c:123 [inline]
  percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0x3e7/0x520 lib/percpu-refcount.c:158
  __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:240 [inline]
  rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2486 [inline]
  invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2799 [inline]
  rcu_core+0x928/0x1390 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2780
  __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:292
  run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:654 [inline]
  run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:646
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x6ab/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164
  kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:247
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
 (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}

... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at:
...
  lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
  __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
  _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144
  spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:329 [inline]
  flush_bg_queue+0x1f3/0x3c0 fs/fuse/dev.c:415
  fuse_request_queue_background+0x2d1/0x580 fs/fuse/dev.c:676
  fuse_request_send_background+0x58/0x120 fs/fuse/dev.c:687
  fuse_send_init fs/fuse/inode.c:989 [inline]
  fuse_fill_super+0x13bb/0x1730 fs/fuse/inode.c:1214
  mount_nodev+0x68/0x110 fs/super.c:1392
  fuse_mount+0x2d/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1239
  legacy_get_tree+0xf2/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:590
  vfs_get_tree+0x123/0x450 fs/super.c:1481
  do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2610 [inline]
  do_mount+0x1436/0x2c40 fs/namespace.c:2932
  ksys_mount+0xdb/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3148
  __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3162 [inline]
  __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3159 [inline]
  __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3159
  do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&fiq->waitq);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock);
                               lock(&fiq->waitq);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor2/13779:
 #0: 000000003c46111c (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
 #0: 000000003c46111c (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1771 [inline]
 #0: 000000003c46111c (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one fs/aio.c:1875 [inline]
 #0: 000000003c46111c (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: io_submit_one+0xeb6/0x1cf0 fs/aio.c:1908

the dependencies between SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock and the holding lock:
-> (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} {
   IN-SOFTIRQ-W at:
                    lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
                    __raw_spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:128 [inline]
                    _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x60/0x80 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160
                    spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
                    free_ioctx_users+0x2d/0x4a0 fs/aio.c:610
                    percpu_ref_put_many include/linux/percpu-refcount.h:285 [inline]
                    percpu_ref_put include/linux/percpu-refcount.h:301 [inline]
                    percpu_ref_call_confirm_rcu lib/percpu-refcount.c:123 [inline]
                    percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0x3e7/0x520 lib/percpu-refcount.c:158
                    __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:240 [inline]
                    rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2486 [inline]
                    invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2799 [inline]
                    rcu_core+0x928/0x1390 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2780
                    __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:292
                    run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:654 [inline]
                    run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:646
                    smpboot_thread_fn+0x6ab/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164
                    kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:247
                    ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
                   __raw_spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:128 [inline]
                   _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x60/0x80 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160
                   spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
                   __do_sys_io_cancel fs/aio.c:2052 [inline]
                   __se_sys_io_cancel fs/aio.c:2035 [inline]
                   __x64_sys_io_cancel+0xd5/0x5a0 fs/aio.c:2035
                   do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
                   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
 }
 ... key      at: [<ffffffff8a574140>] __key.52370+0x0/0x40
 ... acquired at:
   lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
   __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
   _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144
   spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:329 [inline]
   aio_poll fs/aio.c:1772 [inline]
   __io_submit_one fs/aio.c:1875 [inline]
   io_submit_one+0xedf/0x1cf0 fs/aio.c:1908
   __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:1953 [inline]
   __se_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:1923 [inline]
   __x64_sys_io_submit+0x1bd/0x580 fs/aio.c:1923
   do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

the dependencies between the lock to be acquired
 and SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
-> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} {
   HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                    lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
                    __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144
                    spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:329 [inline]
                    flush_bg_queue+0x1f3/0x3c0 fs/fuse/dev.c:415
                    fuse_request_queue_background+0x2d1/0x580 fs/fuse/dev.c:676
                    fuse_request_send_background+0x58/0x120 fs/fuse/dev.c:687
                    fuse_send_init fs/fuse/inode.c:989 [inline]
                    fuse_fill_super+0x13bb/0x1730 fs/fuse/inode.c:1214
                    mount_nodev+0x68/0x110 fs/super.c:1392
                    fuse_mount+0x2d/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1239
                    legacy_get_tree+0xf2/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:590
                    vfs_get_tree+0x123/0x450 fs/super.c:1481
                    do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2610 [inline]
                    do_mount+0x1436/0x2c40 fs/namespace.c:2932
                    ksys_mount+0xdb/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3148
                    __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3162 [inline]
                    __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3159 [inline]
                    __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3159
                    do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
                    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
   SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
                    lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
                    __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144
                    spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:329 [inline]
                    flush_bg_queue+0x1f3/0x3c0 fs/fuse/dev.c:415
                    fuse_request_queue_background+0x2d1/0x580 fs/fuse/dev.c:676
                    fuse_request_send_background+0x58/0x120 fs/fuse/dev.c:687
                    fuse_send_init fs/fuse/inode.c:989 [inline]
                    fuse_fill_super+0x13bb/0x1730 fs/fuse/inode.c:1214
                    mount_nodev+0x68/0x110 fs/super.c:1392
                    fuse_mount+0x2d/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1239
                    legacy_get_tree+0xf2/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:590
                    vfs_get_tree+0x123/0x450 fs/super.c:1481
                    do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2610 [inline]
                    do_mount+0x1436/0x2c40 fs/namespace.c:2932
                    ksys_mount+0xdb/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3148
                    __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3162 [inline]
                    __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3159 [inline]
                    __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3159
                    do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
                    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
                   __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
                   _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144
                   spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:329 [inline]
                   flush_bg_queue+0x1f3/0x3c0 fs/fuse/dev.c:415
                   fuse_request_queue_background+0x2d1/0x580 fs/fuse/dev.c:676
                   fuse_request_send_background+0x58/0x120 fs/fuse/dev.c:687
                   fuse_send_init fs/fuse/inode.c:989 [inline]
                   fuse_fill_super+0x13bb/0x1730 fs/fuse/inode.c:1214
                   mount_nodev+0x68/0x110 fs/super.c:1392
                   fuse_mount+0x2d/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1239
                   legacy_get_tree+0xf2/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:590
                   vfs_get_tree+0x123/0x450 fs/super.c:1481
                   do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2610 [inline]
                   do_mount+0x1436/0x2c40 fs/namespace.c:2932
                   ksys_mount+0xdb/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3148
                   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3162 [inline]
                   __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3159 [inline]
                   __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3159
                   do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
                   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
 }
 ... key      at: [<ffffffff8a60dec0>] __key.43450+0x0/0x40
 ... acquired at:
   lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
   __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
   _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144
   spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:329 [inline]
   aio_poll fs/aio.c:1772 [inline]
   __io_submit_one fs/aio.c:1875 [inline]
   io_submit_one+0xedf/0x1cf0 fs/aio.c:1908
   __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:1953 [inline]
   __se_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:1923 [inline]
   __x64_sys_io_submit+0x1bd/0x580 fs/aio.c:1923
   do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 13779 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc4-next-20190131 #23
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_bad_irq_dependency kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1573 [inline]
 check_usage.cold+0x60f/0x940 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1605
 check_irq_usage kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1650 [inline]
 check_prev_add_irq kernel/locking/lockdep_states.h:8 [inline]
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1860 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1968 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2339 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x4790 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3320
 lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3826
 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144
 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:329 [inline]
 aio_poll fs/aio.c:1772 [inline]
 __io_submit_one fs/aio.c:1875 [inline]
 io_submit_one+0xedf/0x1cf0 fs/aio.c:1908
 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:1953 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:1923 [inline]
 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x1bd/0x580 fs/aio.c:1923
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: e8693bcf ("aio: allow direct aio poll comletions for keyed wakeups") # v4.19
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
[ bvanassche: added a comment ]
Reluctantly-Acked-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NBart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a538e3ff upstream.

Matthew pointed out that the ioctx_table is susceptible to spectre v1,
because the index can be controlled by an attacker.  The below patch
should mitigate the attack for all of the aio system calls.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NMatthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 53fffe29 ]

If the ioprio capability check fails, we return without putting
the file pointer.

Fixes: d9a08a9e ("fs: Add aio iopriority support")
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

If we get a keyed wakeup for a aio poll waitqueue and wake can acquire the
ctx_lock without spinning we can just complete the iocb straight from the
wakeup callback to avoid a context switch.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Tested-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>

Simple one-shot poll through the io_submit() interface.  To poll for
a file descriptor the application should submit an iocb of type
IOCB_CMD_POLL.  It will poll the fd for the events specified in the
the first 32 bits of the aio_buf field of the iocb.

Unlike poll or epoll without EPOLLONESHOT this interface always works
in one shot mode, that is once the iocb is completed, it will have to be
resubmitted.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Tested-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>

This is needed to prevent races caused by the way the ->poll API works.
To avoid introducing overhead for other users of the iocbs we initialize
it to zero and only do refcount operations if it is non-zero in the
completion path.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Tested-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>

glibc uses a different defintion of sigset_t than the kernel does,
and the current version would pull in both.  To fix this just do not
expose the type at all - this somewhat mirrors pselect() where we
do not even have a type for the magic sigmask argument, but just
use pointer arithmetics.

Fixes: 7a074e96 ("aio: implement io_pgetevents")
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reported-by: NAdrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

takes inode, vfsmount, name, O_... flags and file_operations and
either returns a new struct file (in which case inode reference we
held is consumed) or returns ERR_PTR(), in which case no refcounts
are altered.

converted aio_private_file() and sock_alloc_file() to it
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... so that it could set both ->f_flags and ->f_mode, without callers
having to set ->f_flags manually.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The poll() changes were not well thought out, and completely
unexplained.  They also caused a huge performance regression, because
"->poll()" was no longer a trivial file operation that just called down
to the underlying file operations, but instead did at least two indirect
calls.

Indirect calls are sadly slow now with the Spectre mitigation, but the
performance problem could at least be largely mitigated by changing the
"->get_poll_head()" operation to just have a per-file-descriptor pointer
to the poll head instead.  That gets rid of one of the new indirections.

But that doesn't fix the new complexity that is completely unwarranted
for the regular case.  The (undocumented) reason for the poll() changes
was some alleged AIO poll race fixing, but we don't make the common case
slower and more complex for some uncommon special case, so this all
really needs way more explanations and most likely a fundamental
redesign.

[ This revert is a revert of about 30 different commits, not reverted
  individually because that would just be unnecessarily messy  - Linus ]

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The ->poll_mask() operation has a mask of events that the caller
is interested in, but not all implementations might take it into
account.  Mask the return value to only the requested events,
similar to what the poll and epoll code does.
Reported-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Previously the value was ignored.
Signed-off-by: NAdam Manzanares <adam.manzanares@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This is the per-I/O equivalent of the ioprio_set system call.

When IOCB_FLAG_IOPRIO is set on the iocb aio_flags field, then we set the
newly added kiocb ki_ioprio field to the value in the iocb aio_reqprio field.

This patch depends on block: add ioprio_check_cap function.
Signed-off-by: NAdam Manzanares <adam.manzanares@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

In order to avoid kiocb bloat for per command iopriority support, rw_hint
is converted from enum to a u16. Added a guard around ki_hint assignment.
Signed-off-by: NAdam Manzanares <adam.manzanares@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

as it is, the logics in native io_submit(2) is "if asked for
more than LONG_MAX/sizeof(pointer) iocbs to submit, don't
bother with more than LONG_MAX/sizeof(pointer)" (i.e.
512M requests on 32bit and 1E requests on 64bit) while
compat io_submit(2) goes with "stop after the first
PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(pointer) iocbs", i.e. 1K or so.  Which is
	* inconsistent
	* *way* too much in native case
	* possibly too little in compat one
and
	* wrong anyway, since the natural point where we
ought to stop bothering is ctx->nr_events
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

get rid of insane "copy array of 32bit pointers into an array of
native ones" glue.
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The logics for 'avail' is
	* not past the tail of cyclic buffer
	* no more than asked
	* not past the end of buffer
	* not past the end of a page

Unobfuscate the last part.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... so just make them return 0 when caller does not need to destroy iocb
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

We really want iocb out of io_cancel(2) reach before we start tearing
it down.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Looks like this got lost in a merge.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

If we can acquire ctx_lock without spinning we can just remove our
iocb from the active_reqs list, and thus complete the iocbs from the
wakeup context.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Simple one-shot poll through the io_submit() interface.  To poll for
a file descriptor the application should submit an iocb of type
IOCB_CMD_POLL.  It will poll the fd for the events specified in the
the first 32 bits of the aio_buf field of the iocb.

Unlike poll or epoll without EPOLLONESHOT this interface always works
in one shot mode, that is once the iocb is completed, it will have to be
resubmitted.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>

With the current aio code there is no need for the magic KIOCB_CANCELLED
value, as a cancelation just kicks the driver to queue the completion
ASAP, with all actual completion handling done in another thread. Given
that both the completion path and cancelation take the context lock there
is no need for magic cmpxchg loops either.  If we remove iocbs from the
active list after calling ->ki_cancel (but with ctx_lock still held), we
can also rely on the invariant thay anything found on the list has a
->ki_cancel callback and can be cancelled, further simplifing the code.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

No need to pass the key field to lookup_iocb to compare it with KIOCB_KEY,
as we can do that right after retrieving it from userspace.  Also move the
KIOCB_KEY definition to aio.c as it is an internal value not used by any
other place in the kernel.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

If io_destroy() gets to cancelling everything that can be cancelled and
gets to kiocb_cancel() calling the function driver has left in ->ki_cancel,
it becomes vulnerable to a race with IO completion.  At that point req
is already taken off the list and aio_complete() does *NOT* spin until
we (in free_ioctx_users()) releases ->ctx_lock.  As the result, it proceeds
to kiocb_free(), freing req just it gets passed to ->ki_cancel().

Fix is simple - remove from the list after the call of kiocb_cancel().  All
instances of ->ki_cancel() already have to cope with the being called with
iocb still on list - that's what happens in io_cancel(2).

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 0460fef2 "aio: use cancellation list lazily"
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

kill_ioctx() used to have an explicit RCU delay between removing the
reference from ->ioctx_table and percpu_ref_kill() dropping the refcount.
At some point that delay had been removed, on the theory that
percpu_ref_kill() itself contained an RCU delay.  Unfortunately, that was
the wrong kind of RCU delay and it didn't care about rcu_read_lock() used
by lookup_ioctx().  As the result, we could get ctx freed right under
lookup_ioctx().  Tejun has fixed that in a6d7cff4 ("fs/aio: Add explicit
RCU grace period when freeing kioctx"); however, that fix is not enough.

Suppose io_destroy() from one thread races with e.g. io_setup() from another;
CPU1 removes the reference from current->mm->ioctx_table[...] just as CPU2
has picked it (under rcu_read_lock()).  Then CPU1 proceeds to drop the
refcount, getting it to 0 and triggering a call of free_ioctx_users(),
which proceeds to drop the secondary refcount and once that reaches zero
calls free_ioctx_reqs().  That does
        INIT_RCU_WORK(&ctx->free_rwork, free_ioctx);
        queue_rcu_work(system_wq, &ctx->free_rwork);
and schedules freeing the whole thing after RCU delay.

In the meanwhile CPU2 has gotten around to percpu_ref_get(), bumping the
refcount from 0 to 1 and returned the reference to io_setup().

Tejun's fix (that queue_rcu_work() in there) guarantees that ctx won't get
freed until after percpu_ref_get().  Sure, we'd increment the counter before
ctx can be freed.  Now we are out of rcu_read_lock() and there's nothing to
stop freeing of the whole thing.  Unfortunately, CPU2 assumes that since it
has grabbed the reference, ctx is *NOT* going away until it gets around to
dropping that reference.

The fix is obvious - use percpu_ref_tryget_live() and treat failure as miss.
It's not costlier than what we currently do in normal case, it's safe to
call since freeing *is* delayed and it closes the race window - either
lookup_ioctx() comes before percpu_ref_kill() (in which case ctx->users
won't reach 0 until the caller of lookup_ioctx() drops it) or lookup_ioctx()
fails, ctx->users is unaffected and caller of lookup_ioctx() doesn't see
the object in question at all.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: a6d7cff4 "fs/aio: Add explicit RCU grace period when freeing kioctx"
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This is the io_getevents equivalent of ppoll/pselect and allows to
properly mix signals and aio completions (especially with IOCB_CMD_POLL)
and atomically executes the following sequence:

	sigset_t origmask;

	pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, &origmask);
	ret = io_getevents(ctx, min_nr, nr, events, timeout);
	pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &origmask, NULL);

Note that unlike many other signal related calls we do not pass a sigmask
size, as that would get us to 7 arguments, which aren't easily supported
by the syscall infrastructure.  It seems a lot less painful to just add a
new syscall variant in the unlikely case we're going to increase the
sigset size.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>

Simple workqueue offload for now, but prepared for adding a real aio_fsync
method if the need arises.  Based on an earlier patch from Dave Chinner.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>