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  1. 03 7月, 2019 26 次提交
  3. 25 6月, 2019 14 次提交
    • G
      Linux 4.19.56 · aec3002d
      由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
      aec3002d
    • M
      powerpc/mm/64s/hash: Reallocate context ids on fork · cd3e4939
      由 Michael Ellerman 提交于 
      commit ca72d88378b2f2444d3ec145dd442d449d3fefbc upstream.

When using the Hash Page Table (HPT) MMU, userspace memory mappings
are managed at two levels. Firstly in the Linux page tables, much like
other architectures, and secondly in the SLB (Segment Lookaside
Buffer) and HPT. It's the SLB and HPT that are actually used by the
hardware to do translations.

As part of the series adding support for 4PB user virtual address
space using the hash MMU, we added support for allocating multiple
"context ids" per process, one for each 512TB chunk of address space.
These are tracked in an array called extended_id in the mm_context_t
of a process that has done a mapping above 512TB.

If such a process forks (ie. clone(2) without CLONE_VM set) it's mm is
copied, including the mm_context_t, and then init_new_context() is
called to reinitialise parts of the mm_context_t as appropriate to
separate the address spaces of the two processes.

The key step in ensuring the two processes have separate address
spaces is to allocate a new context id for the process, this is done
at the beginning of hash__init_new_context(). If we didn't allocate a
new context id then the two processes would share mappings as far as
the SLB and HPT are concerned, even though their Linux page tables
would be separate.

For mappings above 512TB, which use the extended_id array, we
neglected to allocate new context ids on fork, meaning the parent and
child use the same ids and therefore share those mappings even though
they're supposed to be separate. This can lead to the parent seeing
writes done by the child, which is essentially memory corruption.

There is an additional exposure which is that if the child process
exits, all its context ids are freed, including the context ids that
are still in use by the parent for mappings above 512TB. One or more
of those ids can then be reallocated to a third process, that process
can then read/write to the parent's mappings above 512TB. Additionally
if the freed id is used for the third process's primary context id,
then the parent is able to read/write to the third process's mappings
*below* 512TB.

All of these are fundamental failures to enforce separation between
processes. The only mitigating factor is that the bug only occurs if a
process creates mappings above 512TB, and most applications still do
not create such mappings.

Only machines using the hash page table MMU are affected, eg. PowerPC
970 (G5), PA6T, Power5/6/7/8/9. By default Power9 bare metal machines
(powernv) use the Radix MMU and are not affected, unless the machine
has been explicitly booted in HPT mode (using disable_radix on the
kernel command line). KVM guests on Power9 may be affected if the host
or guest is configured to use the HPT MMU. LPARs under PowerVM on
Power9 are affected as they always use the HPT MMU. Kernels built with
PAGE_SIZE=4K are not affected.

The fix is relatively simple, we need to reallocate context ids for
all extended mappings on fork.

Fixes: f384796c ("powerpc/mm: Add support for handling > 512TB address in SLB miss")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      cd3e4939
    • J
      x86/resctrl: Don't stop walking closids when a locksetup group is found · 8c4fe200
      由 James Morse 提交于 
      commit 87d3aa28f345bea77c396855fa5d5fec4c24461f upstream.

When a new control group is created __init_one_rdt_domain() walks all
the other closids to calculate the sets of used and unused bits.

If it discovers a pseudo_locksetup group, it breaks out of the loop.  This
means any later closid doesn't get its used bits added to used_b.  These
bits will then get set in unused_b, and added to the new control group's
configuration, even if they were marked as exclusive for a later closid.

When encountering a pseudo_locksetup group, we should continue. This is
because "a resource group enters 'pseudo-locked' mode after the schemata is
written while the resource group is in 'pseudo-locksetup' mode." When we
find a pseudo_locksetup group, its configuration is expected to be
overwritten, we can skip it.

Fixes: dfe9674b ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable entering of pseudo-locksetup mode")
Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H Peter Avin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190603172531.178830-1-james.morse@arm.com
[Dropped comment due to lack of space]
Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      8c4fe200
    • J
      mac80211: Do not use stack memory with scatterlist for GMAC · d451b505
      由 Jouni Malinen 提交于 
      commit a71fd9dac23613d96ba3c05619a8ef4fd6cdf9b9 upstream.

ieee80211_aes_gmac() uses the mic argument directly in sg_set_buf() and
that does not allow use of stack memory (e.g., BUG_ON() is hit in
sg_set_buf() with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG). BIP GMAC TX side is fine for this
since it can use the skb data buffer, but the RX side was using a stack
variable for deriving the local MIC value to compare against the
received one.

Fix this by allocating heap memory for the mic buffer.

This was found with hwsim test case ap_cipher_bip_gmac_128 hitting that
BUG_ON() and kernel panic.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      d451b505
    • A
      nl80211: fix station_info pertid memory leak · 72dc6786
      由 Andy Strohman 提交于 
      commit f77bf4863dc2218362f4227d56af4a5f3f08830c upstream.

When dumping stations, memory allocated for station_info's
pertid member will leak if the nl80211 header cannot be added to
the sk_buff due to insufficient tail room.

I noticed this leak in the kmalloc-2048 cache.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8689c051 ("cfg80211: dynamically allocate per-tid stats for station info")
Signed-off-by: NAndy Strohman <andy@uplevelsystems.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      72dc6786
    • Y
      mac80211: handle deauthentication/disassociation from TDLS peer · 1e1007ac
      由 Yu Wang 提交于 
      commit 79c92ca42b5a3e0ea172ea2ce8df8e125af237da upstream.

When receiving a deauthentication/disassociation frame from a TDLS
peer, a station should not disconnect the current AP, but only
disable the current TDLS link if it's enabled.

Without this change, a TDLS issue can be reproduced by following the
steps as below:

1. STA-1 and STA-2 are connected to AP, bidirection traffic is running
   between STA-1 and STA-2.
2. Set up TDLS link between STA-1 and STA-2, stay for a while, then
   teardown TDLS link.
3. Repeat step #2 and monitor the connection between STA and AP.

During the test, one STA may send a deauthentication/disassociation
frame to another, after TDLS teardown, with reason code 6/7, which
means: Class 2/3 frame received from nonassociated STA.

On receive this frame, the receiver STA will disconnect the current
AP and then reconnect. It's not a expected behavior, purpose of this
frame should be disabling the TDLS link, not the link with AP.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NYu Wang <yyuwang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1e1007ac
    • M
      {nl,mac}80211: allow 4addr AP operation on crypto controlled devices · ccf6a155
      由 Manikanta Pubbisetty 提交于 
      commit 33d915d9e8ce811d8958915ccd18d71a66c7c495 upstream.

As per the current design, in the case of sw crypto controlled devices,
it is the device which advertises the support for AP/VLAN iftype based
on it's ability to tranmsit packets encrypted in software
(In VLAN functionality, group traffic generated for a specific
VLAN group is always encrypted in software). Commit db3bdcb9
("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
has introduced this change.

Since 4addr AP operation also uses AP/VLAN iftype, this conditional
way of advertising AP/VLAN support has broken 4addr AP mode operation on
crypto controlled devices which do not support VLAN functionality.

In the case of ath10k driver, not all firmwares have support for VLAN
functionality but all can support 4addr AP operation. Because AP/VLAN
support is not advertised for these devices, 4addr AP operations are
also blocked.

Fix this by allowing 4addr operation on devices which do not support
AP/VLAN iftype but can support 4addr AP operation (decision is based on
the wiphy flag WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: db3bdcb9 ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
Signed-off-by: NManikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      ccf6a155
    • J
      mac80211: drop robust management frames from unknown TA · 0e879ef1
      由 Johannes Berg 提交于 
      commit 588f7d39b3592a36fb7702ae3b8bdd9be4621e2f upstream.

When receiving a robust management frame, drop it if we don't have
rx->sta since then we don't have a security association and thus
couldn't possibly validate the frame.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      0e879ef1
    • E
      cfg80211: fix memory leak of wiphy device name · 17d941dc
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      commit 4f488fbca2a86cc7714a128952eead92cac279ab upstream.

In wiphy_new_nm(), if an error occurs after dev_set_name() and
device_initialize() have already been called, it's necessary to call
put_device() (via wiphy_free()) to avoid a memory leak.

Reported-by: syzbot+7fddca22578bc67c3fe4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1f87f7d3 ("cfg80211: add rfkill support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      17d941dc
    • S
      SMB3: retry on STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES instead of failing write · 5293c79c
      由 Steve French 提交于 
      commit 8d526d62db907e786fd88948c75d1833d82bd80e upstream.

Some servers such as Windows 10 will return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES
as the number of simultaneous SMB3 requests grows (even though the client
has sufficient credits).  Return EAGAIN on STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES
so that we can retry writes which fail with this status code.

This (for example) fixes large file copies to Windows 10 on fast networks.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      5293c79c
    • M
      Bluetooth: Fix regression with minimum encryption key size alignment · db7f1076
      由 Marcel Holtmann 提交于 
      commit 693cd8ce3f882524a5d06f7800dd8492411877b3 upstream.

When trying to align the minimum encryption key size requirement for
Bluetooth connections, it turns out doing this in a central location in
the HCI connection handling code is not possible.

Original Bluetooth version up to 2.0 used a security model where the
L2CAP service would enforce authentication and encryption.  Starting
with Bluetooth 2.1 and Secure Simple Pairing that model has changed into
that the connection initiator is responsible for providing an encrypted
ACL link before any L2CAP communication can happen.

Now connecting Bluetooth 2.1 or later devices with Bluetooth 2.0 and
before devices are causing a regression.  The encryption key size check
needs to be moved out of the HCI connection handling into the L2CAP
channel setup.

To achieve this, the current check inside hci_conn_security() has been
moved into l2cap_check_enc_key_size() helper function and then called
from four decisions point inside L2CAP to cover all combinations of
Secure Simple Pairing enabled devices and device using legacy pairing
and legacy service security model.

Fixes: d5bb334a8e17 ("Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203643Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      db7f1076
    • M
      Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections · 5e9a6c68
      由 Marcel Holtmann 提交于 
      commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      5e9a6c68
    • G
      staging: erofs: add requirements field in superblock · 64e37023
      由 Gao Xiang 提交于 
      commit 5efe5137f05bbb4688890620934538c005e7d1d6 upstream.

There are some backward incompatible features pending
for months, mainly due to on-disk format expensions.

However, we should ensure that it cannot be mounted with
old kernels. Otherwise, it will causes unexpected behaviors.

Fixes: ba2b77a8 ("staging: erofs: add super block operations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NGao Xiang <gaoxiang25@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      64e37023
    • T
      drm/vmwgfx: Use the backdoor port if the HB port is not available · e6803ce3
      由 Thomas Hellstrom 提交于 
      commit cc0ba0d8624f210995924bb57a8b181ce8976606 upstream.

The HB port may not be available for various reasons. Either it has been
disabled by a config option or by the hypervisor for other reasons.
In that case, make sure we have a backup plan and use the backdoor port
instead with a performance penalty.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 89da76fd ("drm/vmwgfx: Add VMWare host messaging capability")
Signed-off-by: NThomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: NDeepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      e6803ce3