Some minor cleanups: i) Remove the unlikely() from fd array map lookups
and let the CPU branch predictor do its job, scenarios where there is not
always a map entry are very well valid. ii) Move the attribute type check
in the bpf_perf_event_read() helper a bit earlier so it's consistent wrt
checks with bpf_perf_event_output() helper as well. iii) remove some
comments that are self-documenting in kprobe_prog_is_valid_access() and
therefore make it consistent to tp_prog_is_valid_access() as well.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Start address randomization and blinding in BPF currently use
prandom_u32(). prandom_u32() values are not exposed to unpriviledged
user space to my knowledge, but given other kernel facilities such as
ASLR, stack canaries, etc make use of stronger get_random_int(), we
better make use of it here as well given blinding requests successively
new random values. get_random_int() has minimal entropy pool depletion,
is not cryptographically secure, but doesn't need to be for our use
cases here.
Suggested-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers
that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through
blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT
spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were
changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset
in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We
have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers.
Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read
only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86,
arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by
default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore,
we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our
todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and
first implementation since around netconf 2016.

We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF
code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit
to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger
programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some
part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved
guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase
to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test
case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which
can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this,
additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump
(and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally
the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default.

For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option
bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so
that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons,
the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants
for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off
performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added
the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which
is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no
further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended,
rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this
functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT
compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a
generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is
then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few
changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one.

This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390
without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF
can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can
be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that
bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(),
and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the
passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the
process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter.
Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we
return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning,
interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as
usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of
a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal
to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like
in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers
when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one
abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT
phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written
program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture.

The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32
and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a
small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this
is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND,
and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register
is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on
BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is
newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction.
64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and
patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to
call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other()
pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register.

Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT:

echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden

  ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>:
  [...]
  39:   mov    $0xa8909090,%eax
  3e:   mov    $0xa8909090,%eax
  43:   mov    $0xa8ff3148,%eax
  48:   mov    $0xa89081b4,%eax
  4d:   mov    $0xa8900bb0,%eax
  52:   mov    $0xa810e0c1,%eax
  57:   mov    $0xa8908eb4,%eax
  5c:   mov    $0xa89020b0,%eax
  [...]

echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden

  ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>:
  [...]
  39:   mov    $0xe1192563,%r10d
  3f:   xor    $0x4989b5f3,%r10d
  46:   mov    %r10d,%eax
  49:   mov    $0xb8296d93,%r10d
  4f:   xor    $0x10b9fd03,%r10d
  56:   mov    %r10d,%eax
  59:   mov    $0x8c381146,%r10d
  5f:   xor    $0x24c7200e,%r10d
  66:   mov    %r10d,%eax
  69:   mov    $0xeb2a830e,%r10d
  6f:   xor    $0x43ba02ba,%r10d
  76:   mov    %r10d,%eax
  79:   mov    $0xd9730af,%r10d
  7f:   xor    $0xa5073b1f,%r10d
  86:   mov    %r10d,%eax
  89:   mov    $0x9a45662b,%r10d
  8f:   xor    $0x325586ea,%r10d
  96:   mov    %r10d,%eax
  [...]

As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden
when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based
to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective.
Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and
over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded.

Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just
JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we
still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal
use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing
up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko
suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding
was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in
the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance
for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case,
f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT),
35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter).

BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various
bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were
running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and
redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests
pass.

  [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html
  [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/
  [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: NElena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Since the blinding is strictly only called from inside eBPF JITs,
we need to change signatures for bpf_int_jit_compile() and
bpf_prog_select_runtime() first in order to prepare that the
eBPF program we're dealing with can change underneath. Hence,
for call sites, we need to return the latest prog. No functional
change in this patch.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Move the functionality to patch instructions out of the verifier
code and into the core as the new bpf_patch_insn_single() helper
will be needed later on for blinding as well. No changes in
functionality.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Besides others, remove redundant comments where the code is self
documenting enough, and properly indent various bpf_verifier_ops
and bpf_prog_type_list declarations. Moreover, remove two exports
that actually have no module user.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access
packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs,
but due to their design they have to do length check for every access.
When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT
is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing
the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses.
One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW
with similar usage as skb_header_pointer().
The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such
new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if
access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround
plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient.

Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly:
int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
  struct iphdr *ip;

  if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end)
      /* packet too small */
      return 0;

  ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN;

  /* access IP header fields with direct loads */
  if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001)
      return 1;
  [...]
}

This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays
the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard
to prove safety of the above program.

For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well.

The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check
the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted
incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases
and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access

[1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dwSigned-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch adds a new helper for cls/act programs that can push events
to user space applications. For networking, this can be f.e. for sampling,
debugging, logging purposes or pushing of arbitrary wake-up events. The
idea is similar to a43eec30 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output()
helper") and 39111695 ("samples: bpf: add bpf_perf_event_output example").

The eBPF program utilizes a perf event array map that user space populates
with fds from perf_event_open(), the eBPF program calls into the helper
f.e. as skb_event_output(skb, &my_map, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, raw, sizeof(raw))
so that the raw data is pushed into the fd f.e. at the map index of the
current CPU.

User space can poll/mmap/etc on this and has a data channel for receiving
events that can be post-processed. The nice thing is that since the eBPF
program and user space application making use of it are tightly coupled,
they can define their own arbitrary raw data format and what/when they
want to push.

While f.e. packet headers could be one part of the meta data that is being
pushed, this is not a substitute for things like packet sockets as whole
packet is not being pushed and push is only done in a single direction.
Intention is more of a generically usable, efficient event pipe to applications.
Workflow is that tc can pin the map and applications can attach themselves
e.g. after cls/act setup to one or multiple map slots, demuxing is done by
the eBPF program.

Adding this facility is with minimal effort, it reuses the helper
introduced in a43eec30 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper")
and we get its functionality for free by overloading its BPF_FUNC_ identifier
for cls/act programs, ctx is currently unused, but will be made use of in
future. Example will be added to iproute2's BPF example files.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

objtool reports the following false positive warnings:

  kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x5c: sibling call from callable instruction with changed frame pointer
  kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x60: function has unreachable instruction
  kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x64: function has unreachable instruction
  [...]

It's confused by the following dynamic jump instruction in
__bpf_prog_run()::

  jmp     *(%r12,%rax,8)

which corresponds to the following line in the C code:

  goto *jumptable[insn->code];

There's no way for objtool to deterministically find all possible
branch targets for a dynamic jump, so it can't verify this code.

In this case the jumps all stay within the function, and there's nothing
unusual going on related to the stack, so we can whitelist the function.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b90e6bf3fdbfb5c4cc1b164b965502e53cf48935.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Back in the days where eBPF (or back then "internal BPF" ;->) was not
exposed to user space, and only the classic BPF programs internally
translated into eBPF programs, we missed the fact that for classic BPF
A and X needed to be cleared. It was fixed back then via 83d5b7ef
("net: filter: initialize A and X registers"), and thus classic BPF
specifics were added to the eBPF interpreter core to work around it.

This added some confusion for JIT developers later on that take the
eBPF interpreter code as an example for deriving their JIT. F.e. in
f75298f5 ("s390/bpf: clear correct BPF accumulator register"), at
least X could leak stack memory. Furthermore, since this is only needed
for classic BPF translations and not for eBPF (verifier takes care
that read access to regs cannot be done uninitialized), more complexity
is added to JITs as they need to determine whether they deal with
migrations or native eBPF where they can just omit clearing A/X in
their prologue and thus reduce image size a bit, see f.e. cde66c2d
("s390/bpf: Only clear A and X for converted BPF programs"). In other
cases (x86, arm64), A and X is being cleared in the prologue also for
eBPF case, which is unnecessary.

Lets move this into the BPF migration in bpf_convert_filter() where it
actually belongs as long as the number of eBPF JITs are still few. It
can thus be done generically; allowing us to remove the quirk from
__bpf_prog_run() and to slightly reduce JIT image size in case of eBPF,
while reducing code duplication on this matter in current(/future) eBPF
JITs.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: NMichael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NYang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NZi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We currently have duplicated cleanup code in bpf_prog_put() and
bpf_prog_put_rcu() cleanup paths. Back then we decided that it was
not worth it to make it a common helper called by both, but with
the recent addition of resource charging, we could have avoided
the fix in commit ac00737f ("bpf: Need to call bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock
from bpf_prog_put") if we would have had only a single, common path.
We can simplify it further by assigning aux->prog only once during
allocation time.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

While recently arguing on a seccomp discussion that raw prandom_u32()
access shouldn't be exposed to unpriviledged user space, I forgot the
fact that SKF_AD_RANDOM extension actually already does it for some time
in cBPF via commit 4cd3675e ("filter: added BPF random opcode").

Since prandom_u32() is being used in a lot of critical networking code,
lets be more conservative and split their states. Furthermore, consolidate
eBPF and cBPF prandom handlers to use the new internal PRNG. For eBPF,
bpf_get_prandom_u32() was only accessible for priviledged users, but
should that change one day, we also don't want to leak raw sequences
through things like eBPF maps.

One thought was also to have own per bpf_prog states, but due to ABI
reasons this is not easily possible, i.e. the program code currently
cannot access bpf_prog itself, and copying the rnd_state to/from the
stack scratch space whenever a program uses the prng seems not really
worth the trouble and seems too hacky. If needed, taus113 could in such
cases be implemented within eBPF using a map entry to keep the state
space, or get_random_bytes() could become a second helper in cases where
performance would not be critical.

Both sides can trigger a one-time late init via prandom_init_once() on
the shared state. Performance-wise, there should even be a tiny gain
as bpf_user_rnd_u32() saves one function call. The PRNG needs to live
inside the BPF core since kernels could have a NET-less config as well.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Chema Gonzalez <chema@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As we need to add further flags to the bpf_prog structure, lets migrate
both bools to a bitfield representation. The size of the base structure
(excluding insns) remains unchanged at 40 bytes.

Add also tags for the kmemchecker, so that it doesn't throw false
positives. Even in case gcc would generate suboptimal code, it's not
being accessed in performance critical paths.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

All the map backends are of generic nature. In order to avoid
adding much special code into the eBPF core, rewrite part of
the bpf_prog_array map code and make it more generic. So the
new perf_event_array map type can reuse most of code with
bpf_prog_array map and add fewer lines of special code.
Signed-off-by: NWang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NKaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

improve accuracy of timing in test_bpf and add two stress tests:
- {skb->data[0], get_smp_processor_id} repeated 2k times
- {skb->data[0], vlan_push} x 68 followed by {skb->data[0], vlan_pop} x 68

1st test is useful to test performance of JIT implementation of BPF_LD_ABS
together with BPF_CALL instructions.
2nd test is stressing skb_vlan_push/pop logic together with skb->data access
via BPF_LD_ABS insn which checks that re-caching of skb->data is done correctly.

In order to call bpf_skb_vlan_push() from test_bpf.ko have to add
three export_symbol_gpl.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

ARG1 = BPF_R1 as it stands, evaluates to regs[BPF_REG_1] = regs[BPF_REG_1]
and thus has no effect. Add a comment instead, explaining what happens and
why it's okay to just remove it. Since from user space side, a tail call is
invoked as a pseudo helper function via bpf_tail_call_proto, the verifier
checks the arguments just like with any other helper function and makes
sure that the first argument (regs[BPF_REG_1])'s type is ARG_PTR_TO_CTX.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

bpf_trace_printk() is a helper function used to debug eBPF programs.
Let socket and TC programs use it as well.
Note, it's DEBUG ONLY helper. If it's used in the program,
the kernel will print warning banner to make sure users don't use
it in production.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

eBPF programs attached to kprobes need to filter based on
current->pid, uid and other fields, so introduce helper functions:

u64 bpf_get_current_pid_tgid(void)
Return: current->tgid << 32 | current->pid

u64 bpf_get_current_uid_gid(void)
Return: current_gid << 32 | current_uid

bpf_get_current_comm(char *buf, int size_of_buf)
stores current->comm into buf

They can be used from the programs attached to TC as well to classify packets
based on current task fields.

Update tracex2 example to print histogram of write syscalls for each process
instead of aggregated for all.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Besides others, move bpf_tail_call_proto to the remaining definitions
of other protos, improve comments a bit (i.e. remove some obvious ones,
where the code is already self-documenting, add objectives for others),
simplify bpf_prog_array_compatible() a bit.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As this is already exported from tracing side via commit d9847d31
("tracing: Allow BPF programs to call bpf_ktime_get_ns()"), we might
as well want to move it to the core, so also networking users can make
use of it, e.g. to measure diffs for certain flows from ingress/egress.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function
which can be used from BPF programs like:
int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
  ...
  bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index);
  ...
}
that is roughly equivalent to:
int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
  ...
  if (jmp_table[index])
    return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx);
  ...
}
The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call.
The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current
stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding
extra call frame.
It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs.
In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue
is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping.
Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or
do stack unwind before jumping into the next program.

bpf_tail_call() arguments:
ctx - context pointer
jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table
index - index in the jump table

Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space
need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs.
If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere
and program execution continues as normal.

New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can
populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs.
Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables.

The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore
tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32.

Use cases:
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

==========
- simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs

- dispatch routine
  For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system
  calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more
  efficient to implement them as:
  int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx)
  {
     bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */);
     ... default: process unknown syscall ...
  }
  int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...}
  int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...}
  syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event;
  syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event;

  For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on
  packet format, like:
  int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb)
  {
     ... parse L2, L3 here ...
     __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol));
     bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto);
     ... default: process unknown protocol ...
  }
  int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...}
  int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...}
  ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp;
  ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp;

- for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic

- bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table
  are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly

Implementation details:
=======================
- high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal.
  It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of
  BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides:
  . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and
    tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return,
    stack allocate would be done for every tailcall.
  . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since
    generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would
    need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper
    or global variable protected by locks.

  In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the
  callee program after prologue.

- bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller
  are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed
  program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different.
  Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid.

- jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map'
  abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic.
  It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are
  shared with regular array map.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

ALU64_DIV instruction should be dividing 64-bit by 64-bit,
whereas do_div() does 64-bit by 32-bit divide.
x64 and arm64 JITs correctly implement 64 by 64 unsigned divide.
llvm BPF backend emits code assuming that ALU64_DIV does 64 by 64.

Fixes: 89aa0758 ("net: sock: allow eBPF programs to be attached to sockets")
Reported-by: NMichael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch adds the possibility to obtain raw_smp_processor_id() in
eBPF. Currently, this is only possible in classic BPF where commit
da2033c2 ("filter: add SKF_AD_RXHASH and SKF_AD_CPU") has added
facilities for this.

Perhaps most importantly, this would also allow us to track per CPU
statistics with eBPF maps, or to implement a poor-man's per CPU data
structure through eBPF maps.

Example function proto-type looks like:

  u32 (*smp_processor_id)(void) = (void *)BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id;
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This work is similar to commit 4cd3675e ("filter: added BPF
random opcode") and adds a possibility for packet sampling in eBPF.

Currently, this is only possible in classic BPF and useful to
combine sampling with f.e. packet sockets, possible also with tc.

Example function proto-type looks like:

  u32 (*prandom_u32)(void) = (void *)BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32;
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fengguang reported, that on openrisc and avr32 architectures, we
get the following linker errors on *_defconfig builds that have
no bpf syscall support:

  net/built-in.o:(.rodata+0x1cd0): undefined reference to `bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto'
  net/built-in.o:(.rodata+0x1cd4): undefined reference to `bpf_map_update_elem_proto'
  net/built-in.o:(.rodata+0x1cd8): undefined reference to `bpf_map_delete_elem_proto'

Fix it up by providing built-in weak definitions of the symbols,
so they can be overridden when the syscall is enabled. I think
the issue might be that gcc is not able to optimize all that away.
This patch fixes the linker errors for me, tested with Fengguang's
make.cross [1] script.

  [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/wfg/lkp-tests.git/plain/sbin/make.crossReported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Fixes: d4052c4a ("ebpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL ifdefs in socket filter code")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Nothing needs the module pointer any more, and the next patch will
call it from RCU, where the module itself might no longer exist.
Removing the arg is the safest approach.

This just codifies the use of the module_alloc/module_free pattern
which ftrace and bpf use.
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: linux-cris-kernel@axis.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: nios2-dev@lists.rocketboards.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

introduce two configs:
- hidden CONFIG_BPF to select eBPF interpreter that classic socket filters
  depend on
- visible CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL (default off) that tracing and sockets can use

that solves several problems:
- tracing and others that wish to use eBPF don't need to depend on NET.
  They can use BPF_SYSCALL to allow loading from userspace or select BPF
  to use it directly from kernel in NET-less configs.
- in 3.18 programs cannot be attached to events yet, so don't force it on
- when the rest of eBPF infra is there in 3.19+, it's still useful to
  switch it off to minimize kernel size

bloat-o-meter on x64 shows:
add/remove: 0/60 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 0/-15601 (-15601)

tested with many different config combinations. Hopefully didn't miss anything.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

eBPF programs are similar to kernel modules. They are loaded by the user
process and automatically unloaded when process exits. Each eBPF program is
a safe run-to-completion set of instructions. eBPF verifier statically
determines that the program terminates and is safe to execute.

The following syscall wrapper can be used to load the program:
int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
                  const struct bpf_insn *insns, int insn_cnt,
                  const char *license)
{
    union bpf_attr attr = {
        .prog_type = prog_type,
        .insns = ptr_to_u64(insns),
        .insn_cnt = insn_cnt,
        .license = ptr_to_u64(license),
    };

    return bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
where 'insns' is an array of eBPF instructions and 'license' is a string
that must be GPL compatible to call helper functions marked gpl_only

Upon succesful load the syscall returns prog_fd.
Use close(prog_fd) to unload the program.

User space tests and examples follow in the later patches
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Since BPF JIT depends on the availability of module_alloc() and
module_free() helpers (HAVE_BPF_JIT and MODULES), we better build
that code only in case we have BPF_JIT in our config enabled, just
like with other JIT code. Fixes builds for arm/marzen_defconfig
and sh/rsk7269_defconfig.

====================
kernel/built-in.o: In function `bpf_jit_binary_alloc':
/home/cwang/linux/kernel/bpf/core.c:144: undefined reference to `module_alloc'
kernel/built-in.o: In function `bpf_jit_binary_free':
/home/cwang/linux/kernel/bpf/core.c:164: undefined reference to `module_free'
make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1
====================
Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Fixes: 738cbe72 ("net: bpf: consolidate JIT binary allocator")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Introduced in commit 314beb9b ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit
against spraying attacks") and later on replicated in aa2d2c73
("s390/bpf,jit: address randomize and write protect jit code") for
s390 architecture, write protection for BPF JIT images got added and
a random start address of the JIT code, so that it's not on a page
boundary anymore.

Since both use a very similar allocator for the BPF binary header,
we can consolidate this code into the BPF core as it's mostly JIT
independant anyway.

This will also allow for future archs that support DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
to just reuse instead of reimplementing it.

JIT tested on x86_64 and s390x with BPF test suite.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

add BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction to load 64-bit immediate value into a register.
All previous instructions were 8-byte. This is first 16-byte instruction.
Two consecutive 'struct bpf_insn' blocks are interpreted as single instruction:
insn[0].code = BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM
insn[0].dst_reg = destination register
insn[0].imm = lower 32-bit
insn[1].code = 0
insn[1].imm = upper 32-bit
All unused fields must be zero.

Classic BPF has similar instruction: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_IMM
which loads 32-bit immediate value into a register.

x64 JITs it as single 'movabsq %rax, imm64'
arm64 may JIT as sequence of four 'movk x0, #imm16, lsl #shift' insn

Note that old eBPF programs are binary compatible with new interpreter.

It helps eBPF programs load 64-bit constant into a register with one
instruction instead of using two registers and 4 instructions:
BPF_MOV32_IMM(R1, imm32)
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, R1, 32)
BPF_MOV32_IMM(R2, imm32)
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, R1, R2)

User space generated programs will use this instruction to load constants only.

To tell kernel that user space needs a pointer the _pseudo_ variant of
this instruction may be added later, which will use extra bits of encoding
to indicate what type of pointer user space is asking kernel to provide.
For example 'off' or 'src_reg' fields can be used for such purpose.
src_reg = 1 could mean that user space is asking kernel to validate and
load in-kernel map pointer.
src_reg = 2 could mean that user space needs readonly data section pointer
src_reg = 3 could mean that user space needs a pointer to per-cpu local data
All such future pseudo instructions will not be carrying the actual pointer
as part of the instruction, but rather will be treated as a request to kernel
to provide one. The kernel will verify the request_for_a_pointer, then
will drop _pseudo_ marking and will store actual internal pointer inside
the instruction, so the end result is the interpreter and JITs never
see pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insns and only operate on generic BPF_LD_IMM64 that
loads 64-bit immediate into a register. User space never operates on direct
pointers and verifier can easily recognize request_for_pointer vs other
instructions.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way,
hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow
seems appropriate.  This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to
read-only pages.

In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g.
caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only
provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls
as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not
change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable
made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea
is derived from commit 314beb9b ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit
against spraying attacks").

This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore.
After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents
any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT
image pointer).

Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call
bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image
as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(),
including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the
eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no
performance penalty.

Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual
inspection of kernel_page_tables.  Brad Spengler proposed the same idea
via Twitter during development of this patch.

Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Suggested-by: NBrad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way:
- everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix
- everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix

split 'struct sk_filter' into
struct sk_filter {
	atomic_t        refcnt;
	struct rcu_head rcu;
	struct bpf_prog *prog;
};
and
struct bpf_prog {
        u32                     jited:1,
                                len:31;
        struct sock_fprog_kern  *orig_prog;
        unsigned int            (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb,
                                            const struct bpf_insn *filter);
        union {
                struct sock_filter      insns[0];
                struct bpf_insn         insnsi[0];
                struct work_struct      work;
        };
};
so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up
'unattached' bpf use cases

split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into:
    SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and
    BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *'

__sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains
__bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function

also perform related renames for the functions that work
with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines:

sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size
sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime
sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free
sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create
sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy
sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter
sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter
__sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter
__sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter

API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same:
sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *)
and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program
which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet

API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes:
bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *)
and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program
which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

to indicate that this function is converting classic BPF into eBPF
and not related to sockets
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

trivial rename to indicate that this functions performs classic BPF checking
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

eBPF is used by socket filtering, seccomp and soon by tracing and
exposed to userspace, therefore 'sock_filter_int' name is not accurate.
Rename it to 'bpf_insn'
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

BPF is used in several kernel components. This split creates logical boundary
between generic eBPF core and the rest

kernel/bpf/core.c: eBPF interpreter

net/core/filter.c: classic->eBPF converter, classic verifiers, socket filters

This patch only moves functions.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>