Allowing a guest to execute MWAIT without interception enables a guest
to put a (physical) CPU into a power saving state, where it takes
longer to return from than what may be desired by the host.

Don't give a guest that power over a host by default. (Especially,
since nothing prevents a guest from using MWAIT even when it is not
advertised via CPUID.)

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

VMware exposes the following Pseudo PMCs:
0x10000: Physical host TSC
0x10001: Elapsed real time in ns
0x10002: Elapsed apparent time in ns

For more info refer to:
https://www.vmware.com/files/pdf/techpaper/Timekeeping-In-VirtualMachines.pdf

VMware allows access to these Pseduo-PMCs even when read via RDPMC
in Ring3 and CR4.PCE=0. Therefore, commit modifies x86 emulator
to allow access to these PMCs in this situation. In addition,
emulation of these PMCs were added to kvm_pmu_rdpmc().
Signed-off-by: NArbel Moshe <arbel.moshe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

If KVM enable_vmware_backdoor module parameter is set,
the commit change VMX to now intercept #GP instead of being directly
deliviered from CPU to guest.

It is done to support access to VMware Backdoor I/O ports
even if TSS I/O permission denies it.
In that case:
1. A #GP will be raised and intercepted.
2. #GP intercept handler will simulate I/O port access instruction.
3. I/O port access instruction simulation will allow access to VMware
backdoor ports specifically even if TSS I/O permission bitmap denies it.

Note that the above change introduce slight performance hit as now #GPs
are now not deliviered directly from CPU to guest but instead
cause #VMExit and instruction emulation.
However, this behavior is introduced only when enable_vmware_backdoor
KVM module parameter is set.
Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NNikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

If KVM enable_vmware_backdoor module parameter is set,
the commit change VMX to now intercept #GP instead of being directly
deliviered from CPU to guest.

It is done to support access to VMware backdoor I/O ports
even if TSS I/O permission denies it.
In that case:
1. A #GP will be raised and intercepted.
2. #GP intercept handler will simulate I/O port access instruction.
3. I/O port access instruction simulation will allow access to VMware
backdoor ports specifically even if TSS I/O permission bitmap denies it.

Note that the above change introduce slight performance hit as now #GPs
are not deliviered directly from CPU to guest but instead
cause #VMExit and instruction emulation.
However, this behavior is introduced only when enable_vmware_backdoor
KVM module parameter is set.
Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NNikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Access to VMware backdoor ports is done by one of the IN/OUT/INS/OUTS
instructions. These ports must be allowed access even if TSS I/O
permission bitmap don't allow it.

To handle this, VMX/SVM will be changed in future commits
to intercept #GP which was raised by such access and
handle it by calling x86 emulator to emulate instruction.
If it was one of these instructions, the x86 emulator already handles
it correctly (Since commit "KVM: x86: Always allow access to VMware
backdoor I/O ports") by not checking these ports against TSS I/O
permission bitmap.

One may wonder why checking for specific instructions is necessary
as we can just forward all #GPs to the x86 emulator.
There are multiple reasons for doing so:

1. We don't want the x86 emulator to be reached easily
by guest by just executing an instruction that raises #GP as that
exposes the x86 emulator as a bigger attack surface.

2. The x86 emulator is incomplete and therefore certain instructions
that can cause #GP cannot be emulated. Such an example is "INT x"
(opcode 0xcd) which reaches emulate_int() which can only emulate
the instruction if vCPU is in real-mode.
Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NNikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Next commits are going introduce support for accessing VMware backdoor
ports even though guest's TSS I/O permissions bitmap doesn't allow
access. This mimic VMware hypervisor behavior.

In order to support this, next commits will change VMX/SVM to
intercept #GP which was raised by such access and handle it by calling
the x86 emulator to emulate instruction. Since commit "KVM: x86:
Always allow access to VMware backdoor I/O ports", the x86 emulator
handles access to these I/O ports by not checking these ports against
the TSS I/O permission bitmap.

However, there could be cases that CPU rasies a #GP on instruction
that fails to be disassembled by the x86 emulator (Because of
incomplete implementation for example).

In those cases, we would like the #GP intercept to just forward #GP
as-is to guest as if there was no intercept to begin with.
However, current emulator code always queues #UD exception in case
emulator fails (including disassembly failures) which is not what is
wanted in this flow.

This commit addresses this issue by adding a new emulation_type flag
that will allow the #GP intercept handler to specify that it wishes
to be aware when instruction emulation fails and doesn't want #UD
exception to be queued.
Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NNikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

VMware allows access to these ports even if denied
by TSS I/O permission bitmap. Mimic behavior.
Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NNikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Support access to VMware backdoor requires KVM to intercept #GP
exceptions from guest which introduce slight performance hit.
Therefore, control this support by module parameter.

Note that module parameter is exported as it should be consumed by
kvm_intel & kvm_amd to determine if they should intercept #GP or not.

This commit doesn't change semantics.
It is done as a preparation for future commits.
Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NNikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add kvm_fast_pio() to consolidate duplicate code in VMX and SVM.
Unexport kvm_fast_pio_in() and kvm_fast_pio_out().
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fast emulation of processor I/O for IN was disabled on x86 (both VMX
and SVM) some years ago due to a buggy implementation.  The addition
of kvm_fast_pio_in(), used by SVM, re-introduced (functional!) fast
emulation of IN.  Piggyback SVM's work and use kvm_fast_pio_in() on
VMX instead of performing full emulation of IN.
Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fail a nested VMEntry with EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE if L2 guest state
is invalid, i.e. vmcs12 contained invalid guest state, and unrestricted
guest is disabled in L0 (and by extension disabled in L1).

WARN_ON_ONCE in handle_invalid_guest_state() if we're attempting to
emulate L2, i.e. nested_run_pending is true, to aid debug in the
(hopefully unlikely) scenario that we somehow skip the nested VMEntry
consistency check, e.g. due to a L0 bug.

Note: KVM relies on hardware to detect the scenario where unrestricted
guest is enabled in L0 but disabled in L1 and vmcs12 contains invalid
guest state, i.e. checking emulation_required in prepare_vmcs02 is
required only to handle the case were unrestricted guest is disabled
in L0 since L0 never actually attempts VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME with vmcs02.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

CR3 load/store exiting are always off when unrestricted guest
is enabled.  WARN on the associated CR3 VMEXIT to detect code
that would re-introduce CR3 load/store exiting for unrestricted
guest.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Now CR3 is not forced to a host-controlled value when paging is
disabled in an unrestricted guest, CR3 load/store exiting can be
left disabled (for an unrestricted guest).  And because CR0.WP
and CR4.PAE/PSE are also not force to host-controlled values,
all of ept_update_paging_mode_cr0() is no longer needed, i.e.
skip ept_update_paging_mode_cr0() for an unrestricted guest.

Because MOV CR3 no longer exits when paging is disabled for an
unrestricted guest, vmx_decache_cr3() must always read GUEST_CR3
from the VMCS for an unrestricted guest.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

CR4.PAE - Unrestricted guest can only be enabled when EPT is
enabled, and vmx_set_cr4() clears hardware CR0.PAE based on
the guest's CR4.PAE, i.e. CR4.PAE always follows the guest's
value when unrestricted guest is enabled.

CR4.PSE - Unrestricted guest no longer uses the identity mapped
IA32 page tables since CR0.PG can be cleared in hardware, thus
there is no need to set CR4.PSE when paging is disabled in the
guest (and EPT is enabled).

Define KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST (to X86_CR4_VMXE)
and use it in lieu of KVM_*MODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON when unrestricted
guest is enabled, which removes the forcing of CR4.PAE.

Skip the manipulation of CR4.PAE/PSE for EPT when unrestricted
guest is enabled, as CR4.PAE isn't forced and so doesn't need to
be manually cleared, and CR4.PSE does not need to be set when
paging is disabled since the identity mapped IA32 page tables
are not used.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Unrestricted guest can only be enabled when EPT is enabled, and
when EPT is enabled, ept_update_paging_mode_cr0() will clear
hardware CR0.WP based on the guest's CR0.WP, i.e. CR0.WP always
follows the guest's value when unrestricted guest is enabled.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

An unrestricted guest can run with hardware CR0.PG==0, i.e.
IA32 paging disabled, in which case there is no need to load
the guest's CR3 with identity mapped IA32 page tables since
hardware will effectively ignore CR3.  If unrestricted guest
is enabled, don't configure the identity mapped IA32 page
table and always load the guest's desired CR3.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

An unrestricted guest can run with CR0.PG==0 and/or CR0.PE==0,
e.g. it can run in Real Mode without requiring host emulation.
The RM TSS is only used for emulating RM, i.e. it will never
be used when unrestricted guest is enabled and so doesn't need
to be configured.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Hyper-V 2016 on KVM with SynIC enabled doesn't boot with the following
trace:

    kvm_entry:            vcpu 0
    kvm_exit:             reason MSR_WRITE rip 0xfffff8000131c1e5 info 0 0
    kvm_hv_synic_set_msr: vcpu_id 0 msr 0x40000090 data 0x10000 host 0
    kvm_msr:              msr_write 40000090 = 0x10000 (#GP)
    kvm_inj_exception:    #GP (0x0)

KVM acts according to the following statement from TLFS:

"
11.8.4 SINTx Registers
...
Valid values for vector are 16-255 inclusive. Specifying an invalid
vector number results in #GP.
"

However, I checked and genuine Hyper-V doesn't #GP when we write 0x10000
to SINTx. I checked with Microsoft and they confirmed that if either the
Masked bit (bit 16) or the Polling bit (bit 18) is set to 1, then they
ignore the value of Vector. Make KVM act accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NRoman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

When a new vector is written to SINx we update vec_bitmap/auto_eoi_bitmap
but we forget to remove old vector from these masks (in case it is not
present in some other SINTx).
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NRoman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Nested Hyper-V/Windows guest running on top of KVM will use TSC page
clocksource in two cases:
- L0 exposes invariant TSC (CPUID.80000007H:EDX[8]).
- L0 provides Hyper-V Reenlightenment support (CPUID.40000003H:EAX[13]).

Exposing invariant TSC effectively blocks migration to hosts with different
TSC frequencies, providing reenlightenment support will be needed when we
start migrating nested workloads.

Implement rudimentary support for reenlightenment MSRs. For now, these are
just read/write MSRs with no effect.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NRoman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

... to avoid having a stale value when handling an EPT misconfig for MMIO
regions.

MMIO regions that are not passed-through to the guest are handled through
EPT misconfigs. The first time a certain MMIO page is touched it causes an
EPT violation, then KVM marks the EPT entry to cause an EPT misconfig
instead. Any subsequent accesses to the entry will generate an EPT
misconfig.

Things gets slightly complicated with nested guest handling for MMIO
regions that are not passed through from L0 (i.e. emulated by L0
user-space).

An EPT violation for one of these MMIO regions from L2, exits to L0
hypervisor. L0 would then look at the EPT12 mapping for L1 hypervisor and
realize it is not present (or not sufficient to serve the request). Then L0
injects an EPT violation to L1. L1 would then update its EPT mappings. The
EXIT_QUALIFICATION value for L1 would come from exit_qualification variable
in "struct vcpu". The problem is that this variable is only updated on EPT
violation and not on EPT misconfig. So if an EPT violation because of a
read happened first, then an EPT misconfig because of a write happened
afterwards. The L0 hypervisor will still contain exit_qualification value
from the previous read instead of the write and end up injecting an EPT
violation to the L1 hypervisor with an out of date EXIT_QUALIFICATION.

The EPT violation that is injected from L0 to L1 needs to have the correct
EXIT_QUALIFICATION specially for the access bits because the individual
access bits for MMIO EPTs are updated only on actual access of this
specific type. So for the example above, the L1 hypervisor will keep
updating only the read bit in the EPT then resume the L2 guest. The L2
guest would end up causing another exit where the L0 *again* will inject
another EPT violation to L1 hypervisor with *again* an out of date
exit_qualification which indicates a read and not a write. Then this
ping-pong just keeps happening without making any forward progress.

The behavior of mapping MMIO regions changed in:

   commit a340b3e2 ("kvm: Map PFN-type memory regions as writable (if possible)")

... where an EPT violation for a read would also fixup the write bits to
avoid another EPT violation which by acciddent would fix the bug mentioned
above.

This commit fixes this situation and ensures that the access bits for the
exit_qualifcation is up to date. That ensures that even L1 hypervisor
running with a KVM version before the commit mentioned above would still
work.

( The description above assumes EPT to be available and used by L1
  hypervisor + the L1 hypervisor is passing through the MMIO region to the L2
  guest while this MMIO region is emulated by the L0 user-space ).

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

The type 'enum kvm_reg_ex' is an extension of 'enum kvm_reg', however
the extension is only semantical and the compiler doesn't know about the
relationship between the two types. In kvm_pdptr_read() a value of the
extended type is passed to kvm_x86_ops->cache_reg(), which expects a
value of the base type. Clang raises the following warning about the
type mismatch:

arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h:44:32: warning: implicit conversion from
  enumeration type 'enum kvm_reg_ex' to different enumeration type
  'enum kvm_reg' [-Wenum-conversion]
    kvm_x86_ops->cache_reg(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);

Cast VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR to 'enum kvm_reg' to make the compiler happy.
Signed-off-by: NMatthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NGuenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Devices which use level-triggered interrupts under Windows 2016 with
Hyper-V role enabled don't work: Windows disables EOI broadcast in SPIV
unconditionally. Our in-kernel IOAPIC implementation emulates an old IOAPIC
version which has no EOI register so EOI never happens.

The issue was discovered and discussed a while ago:
https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg148098.html

While this is a guest OS bug (it should check that IOAPIC has the required
capabilities before disabling EOI broadcast) we can workaround it in KVM:
advertising DIRECTED_EOI with in-kernel IOAPIC makes little sense anyway.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Add support for AMD Core Performance counters in the guest. The base
event select and counter MSRs are changed. In addition, with the core
extension, there are 2 extra counters available for performance
measurements for a total of 6.

With the new MSRs, the logic to map them to the gp_counters[] is changed.
New functions are added to check the validity of the get/set MSRs.

If the guest has the X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE cpuid flag set, the number
of counters available to the vcpu is set to 6. It the flag is not set
then it is 4.
Signed-off-by: NJanakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
[Squashed "Expose AMD Core Perf Extension flag to guests" - Radim.]
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

According to Intel SDM 26.2.1.1, the following rules should be enforced
on vmentry:

 *  If the "NMI exiting" VM-execution control is 0, "Virtual NMIs"
    VM-execution control must be 0.
 *  If the “virtual NMIs” VM-execution control is 0, the “NMI-window
    exiting” VM-execution control must be 0.

This patch enforces these rules when entering an L2 guest.
Signed-off-by: NKrish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Use the new MSR feature framework to tell userspace which VMX capabilities
are available for nested hypervisors.  Before, these were only accessible
with the KVM_GET_MSR VCPU ioctl, after VCPUs had been created.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Move the MSRs to a separate struct, so that we can introduce a global
instance and return it from the /dev/kvm KVM_GET_MSRS ioctl.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

This commit implements an enhanced x86 version of S390
KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS functionality. KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS "allow[s]
userspace to access certain guest registers without having
to call SET/GET_*REGS”. This reduces ioctl overhead which
is particularly important when userspace is making synchronous
guest state modifications (e.g. when emulating and/or intercepting
instructions).

Originally implemented upstream for the S390, the x86 differences
follow:
- userspace can select the register sets to be synchronized with kvm_run
using bit-flags in the kvm_valid_registers and kvm_dirty_registers
fields.
- vcpu_events is available in addition to the regs and sregs register
sets.
Signed-off-by: NKen Hofsass <hofsass@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[Removed wrapper around check for reserved kvm_valid_regs. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

In Hyper-V, the fast guest->host notification mechanism is the
SIGNAL_EVENT hypercall, with a single parameter of the connection ID to
signal.

Currently this hypercall incurs a user exit and requires the userspace
to decode the parameters and trigger the notification of the potentially
different I/O context.

To avoid the costly user exit, process this hypercall and signal the
corresponding eventfd in KVM, similar to ioeventfd.  The association
between the connection id and the eventfd is established via the newly
introduced KVM_HYPERV_EVENTFD ioctl, and maintained in an
(srcu-protected) IDR.
Signed-off-by: NRoman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[asm/hyperv.h changes approved by KY Srinivasan. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Move kvm.arch.hyperv initialization and cleanup to separate functions.

For now only a mutex is inited in the former, and the latter is empty;
more stuff will go in there in a followup patch.
Signed-off-by: NRoman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Moving the code around broke this rare configuration.
Use this opportunity to finally call lapic reset from vcpu reset.

Reported-by: syzbot+fb7a33a4b6c35007a72b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fixes: 0b2e9904 ("KVM: x86: move LAPIC initialization after VMCS creation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Linux (among the others) has checks to make sure that certain features
aren't enabled on a certain family/model/stepping if the microcode version
isn't greater than or equal to a known good version.

By exposing the real microcode version, we're preventing buggy guests that
don't check that they are running virtualized (i.e., they should trust the
hypervisor) from disabling features that are effectively not buggy.
Suggested-by: NFilippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Introduce kvm_get_msr_feature() to handle the msrs which are supported
by different vendors and sharing the same emulation logic.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

In order to determine if LFENCE is a serializing instruction on AMD
processors, MSR 0xc0011029 (MSR_F10H_DECFG) must be read and the state
of bit 1 checked.  This patch will add support to allow a guest to
properly make this determination.

Add the MSR feature callback operation to svm.c and add MSR 0xc0011029
to the list of MSR-based features.  If LFENCE is serializing, then the
feature is supported, allowing the hypervisor to set the value of the
MSR that guest will see.  Support is also added to write (hypervisor only)
and read the MSR value for the guest.  A write by the guest will result in
a #GP.  A read by the guest will return the value as set by the host.  In
this way, the support to expose the feature to the guest is controlled by
the hypervisor.
Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Provide a new KVM capability that allows bits within MSRs to be recognized
as features.  Two new ioctls are added to the /dev/kvm ioctl routine to
retrieve the list of these MSRs and then retrieve their values. A kvm_x86_ops
callback is used to determine support for the listed MSR-based features.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[Tweaked documentation. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

The SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command fails with error code 'invalid param'
because we missed filling the guest and header system physical address
while issuing the command.

Fixes: 9f5b5b95 (KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command)
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

RSM instruction is used by the SMM handler to return from SMM mode.
Currently, rsm causes a #UD - which results in instruction fetch, decode,
and emulate. By installing the RSM intercept we can avoid the instruction
fetch since we know that #VMEXIT was due to rsm.

The patch is required for the SEV guest, because in case of SEV guest
memory is encrypted with guest-specific key and hypervisor will not
able to fetch the instruction bytes from the guest memory.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Using the access_ok() to validate the input before issuing the SEV
command does not buy us anything in this case. If userland is
giving us a garbage pointer then copy_to_user() will catch it when we try
to return the measurement.
Suggested-by: NAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: 0d0736f7 (KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE ...)
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Guests on new hypersiors might set KVM_ASYNC_PF_DELIVERY_AS_PF_VMEXIT
bit when enabling async_PF, but this bit is reserved on old hypervisors,
which results in a failure upon migration.

To avoid breaking different cases, we are checking for CPUID feature bit
before enabling the feature and nothing else.

Fixes: 52a5c155 ("KVM: async_pf: Let guest support delivery of async_pf from guest mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Reported by syzkaller:

   WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 2434 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:6660 handle_ept_misconfig+0x54/0x1e0 [kvm_intel]
   CPU: 6 PID: 2434 Comm: repro_test Not tainted 4.15.0+ #4
   RIP: 0010:handle_ept_misconfig+0x54/0x1e0 [kvm_intel]
   Call Trace:
    vmx_handle_exit+0xbd/0xe20 [kvm_intel]
    kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xdaf/0x1d50 [kvm]
    kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3e9/0x720 [kvm]
    do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x6a0
    SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x25/0x9c

The testcase creates a first thread to issue KVM_SMI ioctl, and then creates
a second thread to mmap and operate on the same vCPU.  This triggers a race
condition when running the testcase with multiple threads. Sometimes one thread
exits with a triple fault while another thread mmaps and operates on the same
vCPU.  Because CS=0x3000/IP=0x8000 is not mapped, accessing the SMI handler
results in an EPT misconfig. This patch fixes it by returning RET_PF_EMULATE
in kvm_handle_bad_page(), which will go on to cause an emulation failure and an
exit with KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR.

Reported-by: syzbot+c1d9517cab094dae65e446c0c5b4de6c40f4dc58@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>